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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyses radio broadcasting as an area that conveys 
the complex dynamics of boundary management in the constitution of 
Turkish national identity. The research dwells on the conceptions, 
sites of transmission, strategies and programmes of Turkish Radio 
from its inauguration in 1927 until the end of the 1940s, and the field 
of force lines it was positioned in, particularly in relation to the BBC 
Turkish Section during the same period. 
The main hypothesis in the thesis is that the historical divide 
between "the West" and "the East" over-determined the way tensions 
in Turkish radio broadcasting -between "the elite" and "the people", 
and between men and women- were conceived and handled. Every 
attempt to define, build and demarcate Turkish national identity was 
shaped with reference to an imagined Western-ness and for the 
Western gaze, which is called Occidentalism in the thesis. Turkish 
Radio was regarded as the "voice of the nation" and was imagined to 
be heard simultaneously by Others, the West and the people. 
However, the thesis also attends to the reality of the Occidentalist 
fantasy. Through a comparative analysis of the BBC Turkish Section 
Radio and Turkish Radio, the thesis shows how fantasies of the Other 
in both cases were shaped in relation to each other, in a dialogic 
relationship. 
Radio technology with its processes of embodiment and 
disembodiment, and "mass address" provided the means to produce 
and sustain an Occidentalist fantasy that both denied and re-defined 
divisions in the national realm in a dialogic link with the West. Thus, 
the thesis raises a range of theoretical and practical questions 
concerning the discursive, technical and psychoanalytical aspects of 
national identity and "communication" through radio broadcasting. 
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PREFACE 
... one who goes too far East, because of geography, arrives in the West. 
The reverse is also true. 
Ece Ayhanl 
I did the other way around, I went West to arrive in the East. 
The process of doing my research and writing this thesis involved 
frequent traveling between Britain and Turkey. I discovered the 
many and fragmented selves within me through these voyages. 
One "self" was speaking in English and enjoying it, while another 
was feeling alien there, missing the sounds and smells of home. 
One was scrutinising "the British way of life", the other was judging 
the Turkish "mentality". So, I traveled back and forth between 
orientalisms and occidentalisms. Yet, the critical distance from 
both "the West" and "the East" helped me to "pass through" the 
Occidentalist fantasy. By translating Turkish texts into English, and 
Western theories into the Turkish context, I could follow the 
footsteps of the early Turkish national elite, whom I take as an 
object of analysis in the thesis. 
The traveling also introduced me to the realities of the 
borders. Every time I passed through the customs at the Heathrow 
Airport I learned once more that I was "Other" -queuing in the line 
for "Other" and having to account for my journey each time- despite 
my position of being both a student and a tutor in British 
universities. So I could, in a mediated way, identify with the 
"blacks" of Britain. As in the poem of Merle Collins' "The sheep and 
the goats", which reflects the experience of blacks exposed to 
racism at immigration control, I was puzzled too: 
Standing in the queue 
at the airport terminal 
I From a poem by a Turkish poet, Ece Ayhan, Yort Savul: ý3iirler 1956-76, Istanbul: 
Agaoglu Yayinevi, p. 41. 
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london heath- 
row 
i tried to decide 
which were the sheep 
and which the goatS2 
These experiences informed my research and ways of 
theorising. On the other hand, the research question held a mirror 
to the researcher. I realised that in posing questions to a past, I 
was, in fact, tackling the question of "What is my present? " So, my 
research, that takes an excursion into Turkish history, is inevitably 
linked to my present which is semi self-consciously split between 
my own "native" history and my Western academic formation. 
I owe many thanks to all those who supported me through these 
difficult, sometimes painful, voyages. I feel a deep gratitude to my 
supervisor, Andrew Barry, who has guided me very gently out of 
blocks and moments of crisis. Yet I have the full responsibility for 
possible errors. I feel I was lucky to be in Goldsmiths College where 
the academic staff and colleagues provided a highly motivating 
intellectual environment. I would particularly want to thank Les Back, 
Vikki Bell and Celia Lury, from Goldsmiths College, for their valuable 
comments. I would like to thank Paddy Scannell (CCIS) and John 
Keane (CSD) from Westminster University, who with their letters of 
recommendation made my acceptance to the Goldsmiths College 
possible; and Ayýe OncO from Bogazi9i University who recommended 
me to the MERC Award. Thanks to John Thompson from Jesus 
College and to Georgina Born from Emmanuel College, helping me to 
get supervision work in Cambridge University; and to Patricia Cole, 
John James and Michael Bull from Anglia Polytechnic University who 
offered me a part-time lectureship in their university. I also appreciate 
the vital contributions of Overseas Research Students Award 
Scheme, the British Council, The British Federation of Women 
Graduates Charitable Foundation, the Ford Foundation (MERC 
Award) funding my studies and research. Finally I owe more than 
thanks to my friends, Gabriela, Neils, Claudia, Tevfik, Ash, Anna, 
in Rotten Pomerack (1992) 
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Ahmet, Algin, Selma, Berrak, BOlent, Teresa, Linda, Michael, Hale, 
MOge, Semih, Ferhan, "here" and "there", who have generously 
opened their houses, hearts and minds to support my practical and 
theoretical traveling. And it was love which, at the end, gathered me 
safely in. I don't know a better word, thank you Timugin. 
7 
INTRODUCTION 
Turkish Radio, National Identity, and the "Real Thing" 
"Of all the nations in the world, Turkey is unique in having 
failed to forge a consistent image of herself. Is she of 
Europe or of the East? Is she a modern nation-state or a 
feudalist association wallowing in the Middle Ages? Is she 
a popular democracy or a camouflaged group dictatorship? 
Aware of their lack of articulateness in international 
discourse, the Turks blame themselves for this confusion. " 
Eren (1963: 249) 
This thesis is about Turkish radio broadcasting starting from 
1927 until the end of the 1940s. Yet its aim is not solely to give an 
account of the history of Turkish radio broadcasting. It addresses the 
question of Turkish national identity, as it manifests itself in and 
through radio broadcasting. It also attends to sentiments due to the 
lack of a "consistent image" torn between the East and the West, and 
the desire for recognition from an imagined West. The thesis, 
therefore entails a range of theoretical and practical questions 
concerning the discursive, technical and psychoanalytical aspects of 
national identity and communication. 
From its beginning until the 1990s radio broadcasting was 
controlled by the state in Turkey within a legal framework that did not 
allow private and independent local broadcasting. ' It maintained a 
centralised structure based around Istanbul and Ankara. 2 In the 30's 
I The ban on private broadcasting was waived following a popular demand of both 
potential private broadcasters and the audience in 1991. Today there are 1056 radio 
stations all over the country. Still most of them are concentrated in big cities such as 
Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. HOrriyet, 15 June1999. 
2 The legal decree that envisioned the constitution of radio stations in different provinces 
was made in 1959. It took some years to put it into practice: Erzurum, Iskenderun, 
Diyarbakir, Van, Adana, Antalya, and Kars radio stations started their regular 
broadcasting between 1961-1963 (Kocaba§oglu, 1980: 380). Both Kocaba§oglu (1980) 
and Mahmut Tali Ong6ren, whom I interviewed (24 January1996) and who worked as a 
programme director in Ankara Radio after 1957, point to the "dependent" programming of 
radio stations in provinces: most of the programmes were sent from Ankara. 
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and 40's the radio was considered as the "voice of the nation". This 
was not unique to Turkish broadcasting though. It is well documented 
that radio figured significantly in "building" and sustaining a "national 
life" mainly until the end of the 50's in Europe and the United States, 
although the assumptions of the existing research regarding nation 
and communication are highly debatable. (Barfield, 1996; Briggs, 
1961; 1965; Cain, 1992; Crisell, 1997; Hilliard&Keith, 1997; Hilmes, 
1997; Scannell&Cardiff, 1991) "Nation" and "communication" cannot 
be treated as objective facts that simply correlate; they have been 
configured within the same historical dynamic. What the Turkish case 
reveals most explicitly is the gap between the imagination attached to 
the "voice" produced by radio technology and the "reality" into which it 
traveled. Radio technology of the West allowed experimentations in 
the domain of the audible to manufacture a "modern nation" in Turkey, 
but at the same, these oral representations could not be easily 
matched with the visible; in other words, Turkey could not build itself a 
"consistent image": the sound of the West contradicted the vision of 
the East. There are ample accounts of the contradiction in the history 
of early Turkish broadcasting which have informed my research. The 
thesis attends to this gap and aims to account for it by problematising 
the ways of conceptualising the oppositions of East and West; 
discourse and technology; and reality and fantasy. 
I agree with Michele Hilmes, who has written on American 
broadcasting between 1922-1952, that we regard "radio not as a 
collection of wires, transmitters, and electrons but as a social practice 
grounded in culture, rather than in electricity... " (1997: xiii) But we 
should not regard radio as solely belonging to a field of culture which 
excludes technicalities and material arrangements. Radio is, at the 
same time, "wires, transmitters, and electrons. " It is the technology of 
radio through which the broadcaster builds a certain political 
imagination regarding his/her subject position and the audience. As 
Raymond Williams argues in the case of writing, the technology of a 
certain medium of expression influences "the conditions of 
composition: the kinds of "audience" or "reader" in mind or addressed; 
the available forms and conventions; the state of the language itself. " 
9 
(1991: 3) Thus the technical aspects such as the setting of 
transmitters, their location and strength, the quality of radio voices, 
and the problem of distortions, as well as more linguistic questions 
such as the composition of radio talks, the correct accent of the 
presenters, the radio drama form, all were charged with national 
meanings in Turkish radio broadcasting, similar to others in Europe 
and the US. These meanings involved the management of 
boundaries that were to differentiate a national elite from a "mass" 
audience, a "national" culture from that of "minorities" (in terms of 
race, religion or ethnicity), and the positioning of the national in face 
of other cultures. They were played out in defining the national time, 
the national space, and gender differences. Radio technology, as a 
technology of transmitting sounds to a wide geographical area, was 
utilised in defining the masseS3, a distinctive trait of national cultures 
in the beginning of the twentieth century. Different from writing, radio 
played a role in "the twentieth-century transition from a culture based 
on conservation to one of consumption. " (Hilmes, 1997: xiv) It led to 
"shifts in relations of power and social distinctions, particularly around 
race, gender, and ethnicity... " (Ibid) 
But how to analyse Turkish radio broadcasting, if it had to deal 
with the gap between a Western technology and a so-called Turkish 
culture, designated as Oriental by the West in its past? How to make 
sense of the anxiety of a prominent Turkish nationalist, Afetinan4 , 
who addressed the Turkish on BBC Turkish broadcasts and tried to 
convince them of Turkish Westernisation after 40 years of Turkish 
"Western isation": 
"We Turks have really achieved the radical application of 
the Westernization movement through AtatOrk's leadership. 
AtatOrk had a wide cultural background and he read not 
only books connected with his profession but on other 
subjects as well and he loved to discuss and argue with 
scientists and scholars of various branches... He did not 
want the Turkish Nation to adopt a way of life different from 
3 Liah Greenfeld makes an important point that apart from other institutional and political 
traits, the specificity of nationalism, "that which distinguishes nationality from other types 
of identity, derives from the fact that nationalism locates the source of individual identity 
within a "people, " which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, 
and the basis of collective solidarity. " (1992: 3) 
4 An adopted daughter of Mustafa Kemal, who had been presented as a model for new 
Turkish women. 
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that of the contemporary civilized nations. "5 
It is also interesting that Afetinan used pieces of Orientalist 
writing, such as Lady Montague's letters, in her BBC Turkish Service 
talks to inform the Turkish audience of Turkish geniUS. 6 She adopted 
an internalised Orientalist approach to prove that Turkish nation is in 
fact Western. The question, then, of comprehending the dynamics of 
Turkish national identity manifested through radio technology gets 
even more complicated. If one aspect of the question is the way 
nations are imagined as sovereign units, the other is how different 
national imaginations are shaped with respect to each other on the 
basis of power relations and technologies of power. It is a question 
that addresses issues related with national identity, Orientalism, 
postcolonial theory, technology, subjectivity and politics. It cuts across 
a range of disciplines and focuses on a boundary that implies a 
necessary critical distance to each of them. 
Are all "Imagined Communities" Imagined in the Same 
Way? 
The idea that nations are fabricated or invented, instead of being 
defined by a natural heritage, such as language, race or religion, 
though not a novel idea7, gained significance in the last decade 
especially with Benedict Anderson's seminal book Imagined 
5 A. Afetinan, Taymis'ten UskjdaralFrom the Thames to Scutari, (BBC Turkish Section 
talks) trans: Engin Uzmen, Ankara: Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, p. 53. 
6 She claimed that Lady Montague was first to note in her letters that Turks used small- 
pox vaccination long before Western cultures. Ibid., 47-51. 
7Gellner, back in the 1960s argued that "(N)ationalism is not the awakening of nations to 
self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist. " (1964: 169) However 
Gellner's primary emphasis was not on the process of invention itself, but on "necessary 
and thoroughly functional response to the Great Transformation from static agrarian 
society to the world of industry and mechanical communication. " (Anderson, 1996: 10) 
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Communities (1991)8. Anderson's contribution was to introduce the 
term "imagination" instead of "invention" or "fabrication" which 
emphasised the role of communication in the making of a national 
community. While Gellner's term "invention" (1964) implied a 
possibility of a true and authentic community, Anderson argued that 
all communities, apart from primordial villages of face-to-face contact, 
are imagined : 
"It is imagined because the members of even the smallest 
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives 
the image of their communion. " (Anderson, 1991: 6) 
Anderson attends to institutional and technical aspects of the 
national imagining, and dwells on the interaction between the 
capitalistic system of production, the technology of communications9, 
and the fatality of human linguistic diversity (1991: 43). He analyses 
several cases of national imagination ranging from Europe to India to 
demonstrate the specifics of this process. Yet, despite the emphasis 
on historical analysis he remains within a structuralist framework, 
connecting nation with a certain function, that of meaning of life. 10 In 
this framework, all communities had to assume a nation form, once 
their "sacred genealogies" were annihilated by European imperialism 
(Anderson, 1991: 70). Late nationalist imaginings outside of Europe 
8 Benedict Anderson, in his introduction to Mapping the Nation, "maps the terrain" of 
nationalism stating that there is no political phenomenon as nationalism which remains "so 
puzzling and about which there is less analytic consensus". (1996: 1) There has been a 
variety of theoretical stances which explicated the connections between nation and state, 
nation and economic transformation, and nation and ethnicity represented primarily by 
Bauer (1996), Gellner (1983), Hobsbawm (1990) and Smith (1983). There is also some 
writing on the problematic relation of Marxism to nationalism ( Munck, 1986; Nairn, 1977). 
Yet the scope of nationalism as a political phenomenon was extended by Anderson's 
book by attending to the relation between a transformation in consciousness and 
"sociological" and "historical" factors, thus extending the limits of the political. For a 
sociological critique of this property of Anderson's work see Breuilly (1985). 
9 Anderson refers primarily to print. However, he also makes reference to radio technology 
in this context: "Invented only in 1895, radio made it possible to bypass print and summon 
into being an aural representation of the imagined community where the printed page 
scarcely penetrated. Its role in the Vietnamese and Indonesian revolutions, and generally 
in mid-twentieth century nationalisms, has been much underestimated and understudied. " 
(1991: 54) 
10 Anderson pointed to the affinity of national imagining to religious imaginings; and 
argued that the idea of nation had to replace religious belief, as a "secular transformation 
of fatality into continuity. " (1991: 10-11) 
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had no choice but to adopt "the model". ' 1 This was facilitated by a 
it new consciousness", embedded in "homogeneous, empty time" 
which "created amnesias and estrangements exactly parallel to the 
forgetting of childhood brought on by puberty. " (Anderson, 1998: 57) 
Anderson, despite his psychological descriptions, does not 
venture into the field of subjectivity in national imaginings, especially 
of those who had to follow the model. He does not ask the question 
why, for example, "the young officers ('Turks') produced by new 
military academies" and who "played significant roles in the 
development of nationalism" (Anderson, 1991: 120) accepted the 
name "Young Turks" given to them by Europeans (Mardin, 1962). 
Instead, he emphasises the institutional basis of nationalist ideas. In a 
similar vein, he detects "the seeds of Turkish nationalism" in "the 
appearance of a lively vernacular press in Istanbul in the 1870s. " 
(Anderson, 1991: 75) but does not inquire about the way an imported 
technology and medium12 triggered a national imagining. The 
technology of communication is treated as an objective factor by 
Anderson, that travels not only in homogeneous and empty time but 
also in space. 13. 
While Anderson's work deals with the model and its import into 
the non-West in terms of the objective conditions of national 
imaginings, other scholars of nationalism, such as Bhabha (1990) 
and Chatterjee (1993a; 1993b) treat the question of the nation within 
the terms of subjectivity/intersubjectivity shaped by colonial and 
postcolonial dynamics. With differing styles of analysis both Bhabha 
and Chatterjee offer critiques of Anderson's work. Bhabha points to 
"subaltern voice of the people" that speaks "betwixt and between 
11 Anderson argues, with Hobsbawm that the French Revolution was turned into a 'thing' 
due to its entrance to the memory of print; "the experience was shaped by millions of 
printed words into a 'concept' on the printed page, and in due course, into a model. " 
(1991: 80) 
12 Printing technology was introduced to the Ottoman Empire by Ibrahim Mateferrika and 
Said Mehmet who brought the machinery and equipment from Europe in 1728. One of 
the first books they published was a Turkish grammar book designed to teach Turkish to 
French merchants (Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyete Tijrkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol. 1, p. 94). Also 
the first newspapers were started by the Westerners. They were designed to "guide the 
Ottoman government"; and had names such as Le Progr6s d'Orient, Levant Times, Le 
Stamboul (Alemdar, 1996: 17). 
13 As Chatterjee puts it, "the theoretical tendency represented by Anderson attempts to 
treat the phenomenon as part of the universal history of the modern world. " (1993b: 5) 
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times and places"14 (1990: 309) yet without necessarily pointing to a 
medium for it other than language and its performativity. He dismisses 
the question of technology in the process of signification. Chatterjee 
raises a more critical question: "If nationalisms in the rest of the world 
have to choose their imagined community from certain 'modular' 
forms already made available to them by Europe and the Americas, 
what do they have left to imagine? " (1993b: 5) He argues that 
anticolonial nationalism constitutes a "derivative discourse" which 
locates the national imagining in the domain of the spiritual -dividing 
the world of social institutions and practices into two domains: the 
material and the spiritual. The material is the domain of the "outside", 
of the economy and of statecraft, of science and technology. It is a 
domain where "the West had proved its superiority and the East had 
succumbed. " (Chatterjee, 1993b: 6) In this way Chatterjee also renders 
the problem of technology insignificant; he brackets it off. 
Is it possible to repose the question of national imagination 
without either treating technology as a universal and structural 
determinant or dismissing it all together in order to stress anticolonial 
and imperialistic subjectivity? This very question has been a leading 
one in my research. I argue that the question is especially significant 
in Turkish nationalism which was imagined to be a blending of an 
authentic national culture with Western civilisation, mainly seen as a 
source of modern technologies and techniques15 . 
14 Bhabha says that "(T)he space of the arbitrary sign, its separation of language and 
reality, enables Anderson to stress the imaginary or mythical nature of the society of the 
nation. However, the differential time of the arbitrary sign is neither synchronous nor 
serial. In the separation of language and reality -in the process of signification- there is no 
epistemological equivalence of subject and object, no possibility of the mimesis of the 
meaning. " (1990: 308-9) 
15 The idea is most evident in Ziya G6kalp's writings, who is considered to be one of the 
sources of Turkish nationalism. He wrote in the beginning of the twentieth century that 
national culture and civilisation are two different orders, the former consisting of non- 
voluntary and essential ties, and the latter of voluntary adaptations of knowledge and 
technique. He said: "Because the Turkists want to leave the Eastern civilisation, which is 
Byzantian, and take the Western civilisation, they will succeed. The Turkists are those 
who want to remain Turkish and Muslim yet are willing to enter into the Western civilisation 
with no reservations. " (G6kalp, 1994: 39) The idea was taken by Kemalists after the 
foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, who sought a balance of Western civilisation 
and Turkish culture in their modernising reforms. 
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The "Model" and the "Copy" 
Recently, Turkish scholars are more critically engaged with a 
range of questions regarding the so-called "national history" offering 
critiques of official discourses on Turkish nationalism and 
modernisation (Ak9am, 1994; Aktar, 1993; Aydin; 1993; Bora, 1996; 
Ersanli-Behar, 1992; G61e, 1991; 1997; Kadioglu, 1996; Kandiyoti, 
1989; 1991; 1993; 1996; 1997a; 1997b; 1998; Kasaba, 1997; Keyder, 
1987; 1997; bztOrkmen, 1998; Parla, 1985; 1989; 1991a; 1991b ; 
1992; Yeýen, 1995; 1999; Yeýilkaya, 1999). The recent literature on 
nationalism and national identity contest significant issues in official 
history concerning Westernisation, gender, Islam and ethnicity. Yet it 
is possible to argue that the problem of the Western "model of 
civilisation" has not been dealt critically enough , that is, by attending 
to the history of the concept of the "model". There is a tendency to 
interpret the making of Turkish nation in terms of "fabrication" from a 
model. 16 The perspective which privileges fabrication to historical 
dynamics can be designated as an inversion of the framework of 
Kernalism. In order to refute the Kemalist theses on nationality, which 
had emphasised that the Turkish nation as a whole had awakened to 
their national life under the guidance of a father Turk, Atatclrk; the 
oppositional reading of history underlines the fact that the "national 
project" was alien to the people. If the former representation sticks to a 
universal model by way of naturalising the birth and the existence of 
the Turkish nation, the latter projects an Orientalist outlook back to 
itself. 17 While the West remains the stage for modernity to play its 
concepts and institutions, Turkish identity is treated within a 
problematic of imitation. According to this view, the Turkish 
"modernising elite" voluntarily adopted Western civilisation and 
16 For example, Kadio§lu who makes use of Chatterjee's perspective to analyse Turkish 
nationalism, argues that "the emerging new Turkish identity... was distinguished by its 
manufactured character. " (1996: 188) Despite the fact that Chatterjee insists on the 
dynamics of imagining the nation in India (1993a; 1993b), Kadioglu's statement reflects 
the exceptionalism that has been so widely internalised by the Turkish people. 
17 1 make this point because, as Edward Said argues in Orientalism (1995) an Orientalist 
look would deny any historicity for the so-called Orient; it treats it as a constructed 
category "with no corresponding equivalent in the Orient itself. " 
15 
imposed it on the masses. 18 This approach renders Turkish 
nationalism as a non-historical and non-sociological phenomenon. 
Recent critical readings of modernity and nationalism in Turkey 
are self-consciously opposed to modernisation theories. As 
Bozdo6an and Kasaba argue, "(I)n Turkey and around the world 
today, we are witnessing the eclipse of the progressive and 
emancipatory discourse of modernity. " (1997: 3) Where classical 
modernisation theories19 celebrated the adaptation of Western 
modernity in Turkey, critiques of this approach "publicly debate and 
criticize the Kemalist doctrine as a patriarchal and antidemocratic 
imposition from above that has negated the historical and cultural 
experience of the people in Turkey. " (Bozdogan&Kasaba, 1997: 4) 
Where the former saw a more or less successful example of universal 
modernity, the latter treats the Turkish case as a failure to achieve a 
democratic and modern society. While communication technology 
was considered as essential by modernisation theoriStS20, critiques of 
modernisation mostly dwell on narratives and projects, and ignore the 
question of technology and material arrangements. 
However both views share the reference point of the implicit 
model. Whether the history of Westernisation is designated as a 
success or as a failure, both versions imply that Turkey which 
"imitated" the West is an exceptional case: an inept vehicle for 
Western modernisation. It is bound to be a "copy". Modernisation 
theorists regarded the process of Westernisation as a spatial 
movement of Western values and techniques, yet due to be distorted 
in the end because of the essential particulars of the specific space 
under consideration. It is not surprising that Bernard Lewis, who 
18 Keyder argues that "Turkish nationalism is an extreme example of a situation in which 
the masses remained silent partners and the modernizing elite did not attempt to 
accommodate popular resentment. " (1997: 43) 
19 Classical texts of modernisation theory are considered to be Daniel Lerner's The 
Passing of Traditional Society (11958); and Bernard Lewis's The Emergence of Modem 
Turkey (11968). 
20 Anthony Smith refers to Lerner's book (1958) to illustrate the link between 
modernisation and communication: "Modernisation theorists who stress the crucial role of 
'communications' and a 'communications revolution' have found in this approach a useful 
tool for analysing the political changes in societies newly exposed to the impact of the 
West. Modern Turkey provides a typical case-study of this 'communications revolution'. " 
(1983: 89) 
16 
celebrated "the emergence of modern Turkey" (1968) more than thirty 
years ago, today evaluates the Turkish case as still facing "important 
choices" between the Middle East and the WeSt2l (B. Lewis, 1997: 
48). Turkey is not "there" yet because "(C)atching up with the modern 
world means more than borrowing or buying modern technology. " 
(Ibid., 46) The Turkish case can only be found "impressive" when 
compared to "other Muslim and Middle Eastern countries facing such 
problems. " (Winter, 1984: 192) Those who are more critical of the 
dominance of Western values, such as Robins (1996) pursue the 
same logic to emphasise the evils of the imitation. According to 
Robins, Turkish culture "has been imitative and derivative in its 
emulation of the European model. " (1996: 67) He believes that 
Kernalists sought a simulation of the original paradigm. "But, of 
course, however good the simulation, it does not amount to the real 
thing. " (Robins, 1996: 67, emphasis added) 
So, one is confronted with several questions deriving from the 
above statements concerning Westernisation in Turkey: the problem 
of how one might conceive of "impact" and "influences"; the problem 
of what "imitation" may mean; and of course, the problem of what the 
"real thing" is. Hence a theoretical challenge for my research: Should I 
treat my work as an "example" that would be complementary to 
Western studies that dealt with modernity, and nationhood in specific? 
Such an approach would follow the work of Anderson or Schlesinger - 
who has complemented Anderson's argument by stressing the need 
to "take account of later, post-Gutenberg media technologies and try 
to examine their implications for the consciousness of nationhood. " 
(1991: 164) Or, should I perhaps, attend to the nature of the difference 
of Turkey, treating my research subject as a separate history which 
has its own peculiarities and patterns? 
These questions are especially critical in the historical context of 
the relations between the West and its others. Modernity is a Western 
21 In his recent work he argues that: "Turkey today stands before important choices. It 
may choose, as some of its leaders would clearly prefer, to turn its back on the West and 
return to the Middle East, this time not leading but following, in a direction determined by 
others. It may choose, as other Turkish leaders would clearly prefer, to tighten its ties with 
the West and turn its back on the Middle East, except for those countries that share 
Turkey's westward orientation and democratic aspirations. " (Lewis, 1997: 48) 
17 
concept, "inextricably linked to the history of European colonialism. " 
(Osborne, 1995: 13) The fact that Europe is already an example, 
bound with the history of domination over others, inscribes a 
hierarchy between the examples in Europe and those elsewhere: As 
Derrida puts it: 
iý ... Europe has the privilege of being the good example, for it 
incarnates in its purity the Telos of all historicity: 
universality, omnitemporality, infinite traditionality, and so 
forth; 
... The empirical types of non-European societies, then, 
are only more or less historical; at the lower limit, they tend 
toward nonhistoricity. " (1992: 115) 
If one looks at the Turkish case within the terms of Western 
modernity, one can only see the lack ascribed to it. If one begins "by 
defining the phenomenon that does not fit into existing conceptual 
frameworks in negative terms as a society which does not have 
something we understand" (Gledhill, 1994: 12), Turkey would be 
regarded as "exotic". In the first approach the Turkish example 
acquires a resistance to Western critical theory as it falls out of 
historicity. In the second, one is confronted with excesses of meaning 
that remain inexplicable within the terms of contemporary social 
theory. By treating the Turkish case as essentially different from 
Western modernity, one falls into the trap of a relativistic approach 
that repeats "a Romantic respect for particulars for their own sake, 
recoding a discredited Arnoldian 'culture' as Third World 'difference"' 
(Robbins, 1992: 55). The structuring mechanisms or the constitutive 
principles that delimit and represent the "differences" remain 
unacknowledged. Furthermore, a relativistic approach does not have 
any explanatory value in a case where it is obvious that the 
technologies, such as broadcasting, and even the concepts, such as 
nation, are Western imports. Therefore a new theoretical 
conceptual isation is required to comprehend the historical 
interdependence between Turkey and the West, without either 
collapsing particular differences into a dubious universalism, or 
18 
celebrating particularisms for their own sake. 22 
This new theoretical conceptual isation is especially significant 
when one attends to questions of identity and technology in a nation- 
state that aspires to be an "example" of modernity for its neighbours in 
the Middle EaSt23 but never manages to be a good one: a national 
identity that has been signified, both in Europe and in Turkey, to be a 
bridge between East and West. Turkey has been regarded, since at 
least the nineteenth century, as an ideal space where East and West 
meet. 24 But it was, at the same time, where the boundary between 
East and West was demarcated and consequently reproduced. 
Turkish national identity was constituted and continuously modified at 
the margin between being a "bad" and a "good" example of 
modernity. 25 Islam has been a very important factor that contributed 
to the ambiguity. For, Islam was seen to contradict Westernisation and 
modernity -both by Westerners and Turkish nationalists who aspired 
to be Westernised. Yet, as Bobby Sayyid argues, Turkish nationalists, 
Kemalists, "found themselves in a paradoxical situation: to be 
western, one had to reject the Orient", but "their rejection of the Orient 
relied on them being able to articulate and perpetuate an oriental 
identity ... The only way to manage this paradox of westernizing and 
orientalizing was for the Kemalists to fix upon Islam the representation 
22 Deniz Kandiyoti has made an important point of how "revolving around two opposed 
narratives -two sides of the same discursive coin" brings us "full circle to positing notions of 
lost authentic 'indigeneity' and inviting forms of neo-Orientalism that are inimical to an 
understanding of complex historical processes. " (1997a: 114) 
23 "A great deal of intellectual energy in the Muslim world was devoted to discussions of 
Mustafa Kemal's reforms and their general applicability in other Muslim territories. " (Sayyid, 
1997: 69-70) 
24 In the 1830's, August Comte wrote to the Grand Vizier, Reýit Paýa, saying: "the world 
has been divided into two oppositional worlds, Asia and Europe, for centuries; that it is 
time that this opposition should be overcome; that there must be a common civilisation in 
the world; and he regarded Turkey as the only country with the capacity, in historical and 
geographical terms, to realise the synthesis between the two worlds; that Turkey should 
continue its efforts towards this end. " (in Kaplan, 1967: 73) 
25 The ambivalence as to where Turkey fits in the world, can be clearly observed in the 
writings of Western visitors to the Ottoman Empire: In 1854 in a book called Turkey, its 
History and Progress, etc., Sir George Larpent wrote that Turks "have shown themselves 
worthy of our support and assistance; they have striven hard during the last few years to 
improve the internal condition of their Empire ... 
They are allies whom we have not the 
slightest cause to feel ashamed. " But during the same period, Cardinal Newman could 
come up with opposite ideas in a book, Lectures on the History of the Turks, that 
"Christianity is synonymous with civilisation; the Turks are not Christian; therefore the 
Turks are barbarous. " Both cited in (Bowen, 1945: 43) 
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of orientainess. " (1997: 69) Turkish nationalists split between the 
marker of modernity, the West, and the marker of orientalness, Islam, 
regenerated the role of a "bridge between East and West". 
Occidentalism and Fantasy 
The entrapment in a "bridge" identity involves a set of 
discrepancies between official discourses and institutional practices, 
between aspirations and desire, and frustrating self -assessments in 
Turkish national history, which I will be addressing in the following 
chapters. It is true that the national elite sought ways of making the 
Turkish society "contemporary and civilised" which practically meant 
adopting Western technology and techniques, ideas, and ways of life 
which had already penetrated the culture in the late Ottoman period. 
However this was not a smooth and, as modernisation theorists would 
claim, a "devoted" process of Western isation, 26 The Turkish national 
discourse, as regulated and disseminated by the elite, was an eclectic 
mix of diverse elements: ideas taken over from past generations of 
nationalists; concepts, tools and techniques borrowed from the West; 
unique solutions to deal with the pressing current political, ethnic, 
social and economic problems; and much post factum theorising. The 
consequent national discourse, which is named as Kemalism, was 
pragmatically positioned in terms of its Others: against the Western 
gaze which labeled it nothing more than a "copy", and against the 
heterogeneous people, which was to comprise the unified national 
population but represented in practice the Orient -in terms of 
"backward" Islamic and of Arabic influences. The ethnic and religious 
minorities in the population, such as the Kurds, Armenians, Greeks, 
Jews and Gypsies yet established another kind of Other, which posed 
26 According to Dumont, Westernisation meant for Kemalists "to devote oneself to the 
cause of modernization ... 
the adoption of western ways of life, a fight against ignorance 
and superstition, the import of new techniques, economic development, and in particular, 
a constant resort to science. " (1984: 34-5) 
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a threat to homogeneous national unity. 27 
In the thesis I leave aside how the actual policies and boundary 
management with reference to relations with various Western nation- 
states, Islamic groups and sects, and ethnic and religious minorities 
were shaped in the history of Turkish nationalism. Instead I attend to 
the dynamics of national fantasy which figured in official and literary 
texts; informed practices of national reforms, and was articulated 
through the use of technology, including radio broadcasting. At the 
level of fantasy, the diverse realm of relations with the Western 
countries was translated into a marker called "the West"; in a similar 
manner the heterogeneous realm of the population was signified as 
"the people". Kernalists' attitude to both constructs was very 
ambivalent. On the one hand, the Turkish national elite had to admit 
the superiority of the West which was most clearly proven in the 
military and the technological field, yet they had to keep their distance 
from this "profane" culture. They thought that too much Westernisation 
brought a danger of loss of identity. So, a pragmatic approach28 was 
required which would make it possible to adopt a position of being 
Western ised/anti-Western simultaneously. Civilisation had to come 
from the West for pragmatic reasonS29, whereas the real Turkish 
values had to be found in the culture of the people. On the other hand, 
the glorification of the people went hand in hand with a diagnosis of 
the impurity of the people. Though posited as the source of real 
culture30, the people had diverse ethnic origins, languages and 
disparate local traditions; and they were regarded as contaminated 
21 "The question of Turkish national identity is a dialectical one. In the case of existing 
minorities, although they comprise only a small fraction of Turkey's ethno-religious 
subcultural population, they have historically and continue today ideologically to play an 
apparently important role in defining Turkey's own self-identity and her selfconscious 
stance in light of world opinion. " (Salamone, 1989: 51) 
28 Onder claims that Kernalists' philosophy can best be described as pragmatism against 
the predominant view that it was positivistic. He argues that pragmatism has been 
functional in three aspects: it maintains a distance against things that are 
i nstru mental ised; avoids internalisation, thus the deterioration of the real spirit; it makes it 
possible to treat the Western world with contempt. (1996: 40-1) 
29 Gbkalp made the point that: "We have to accept the civilisation of the West because, if 
we do not, we shall be enslaved by the powers of the West. " (1981: 266) 
30 According to G6kalp, "culture is something which is alive among the people 
themselves. The elite are those who lack it... The elite are the carriers of civilisation and 
the people the holders of the culture. " (1981: 259) 
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with "traditions and precepts that are not grounded in any logical 
framework. "31 
Therefore the national fantasy was not a monolithic discourse. It 
was produced and reproduced by continuous negotiations between 
the West and the Orient. Also, it was not a voluntarily created set of 
ideas -as the "imitation" problematic would say. Westernisation and 
modernisation had been brought on the agenda of the Turkish 
national elite by means of a threat, "by convincing Turks of past and 
present inadequacy. " (Davison, 1990: 92) The constitutive lack was 
there, right at the centre of the national identity. Turkish national 
fantasy was structured within an encounter with the West which had 
imposed a "model" for modernity in its colonialist and imperialistic 
history, and which reproduced itself always against an insufficient 
i9copy". 
Said's (1995) work on Orientalism illustrates how the Western 
scholars' attempt to travel to, to penetrate into, and to represent the 
Orient produced an objectified and essentialised Orient. The Orient in 
its "eccentricity", its "backwardness", its "silent indifference" and 
"feminine penetrability" is the essentialised construct of the Orientalist 
discourse. I read Said's Orientalism within a different problematic (my 
critical reflections on Said will be explicated in Chapter 1), and argue 
that although othered, objectified and dominated by Western forces, 
the "Orientals" are not just victims of this process. They react to the 
imposed model by various techniques that enable the construction of 
their specific and different subjectivity. They do not only become 
objectified in the process, but they also become subjects. I choose to 
name the discourse, or fantasy, which is a product of the interrelated 
process of objectification/subjectification and of being a subject, as 
Occidental ism. 32 The concept of Occidentalism, as I define it in 
31 Mustafa Kemal's words, cited in Metin And (1983: 34) 
32 1 have come across the term in two different sources. One is a book edited by James 
Carrier, called Occidentalism: Images of the West (1995). The other is a work by Couze 
Venn, Occidentalism and its Discontents (1993). Also a Turkish scholar, Orhan Tekelio0lu, 
in his analysis of Turkish popular music makes use of the term though without elaboration: 
"It is significant that this curious episodic socio-political history reflecting a national 
experience with cultural policies designed to reshape music is in fact an exemplary history 
of Occidentalism -the twin notion of Orientalism. " (1996: 213) 1 will be addressing the 
concept more in detail in Chapter 1. 
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Chapter 1, is very different from an idea of internalised Orientalism or 
a defensive reaction against the West. 33 Instead, it points to both the 
specific mechanisms that "Orientals" employ to create their subject 
status, which is not at all a homogeneous entity, but also to the 
common sky that structures different horizons. Hence the 
conceptualisation also aims to deconstruct the Western 
representation of being Western, stressing how "centre" and 
"periphery" are already inscribed in the representation. This entails, 
as Parry argues, "breaking into the West's sealed representation of its 
history as self -generating. " (1992: 24) 1 find the perspective of 
Occidentalism useful to address the dynamics of national imagining 
in a setting already imagined to be a bridge between East and West. 
The concept of Occidentalism is also significant in dealing with 
issues of technology in connection to national imagining. The "West" 
was, on the one hand, a reified concept for Turkish nationalists. It was 
signified in tools, artifacts and goods representing "civil isation". These 
were, at the same, objects of desire -means for being Westernised. 
On the other hand, the signifer -the West- was recodified, in the local 
context, based on class, gender and ethnic differences. Thus, the 
utilisation of the "West" informed power relations. The way the 
concept of the West was both reified and mobilised -Occidentalism- 
denotes a complex relationship between technologies, power and 
national imagining. Therefore, in opposition to Anderson's objective 
treatment of communication technology as a basis for national 
imagination, by using the term Occidentalism, I could address 
communication technology both as an objective factor that enhanced 
national imagination, and as an object of desire that involved a 
commentary on the West. Broadcasting technology constituted a 
33 Said, in his "Afterword" to Orientalism in1995, talks about the reception of his work by 
some, as signifying anti-Westernism -a position which he disowns. For Said, to criticise 
Orientalism should not be seized as a pretext for arguing the exact opposite, defending 
"the Orient". "Occidentalism" may mean in this context seeing the West as an enemy. 
Kandiyoti refers to Nader who makes use of the term in this sense: Occidentalism' and 
its related demonology... is used as a mechanism of social control over Middle Eastern 
women stripping Arab women of their rights. " (Kandiyoti, 1993: 385) 1 argue that this is 
only one aspect of what the term may denote. In this thesis, "Occidentalism" is used to 
address both the desire for and the denigration of what is essentialised as "the West", 
and also the re-codification and operational isation of a notion of "the West" within power 
relations. 
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medium for the Occidentalist fantasy to play itself out. 
Occidentalism was a fantasy but had its own reality. Through 
organising and regulating operations of fantasy it naturalised "the 
otherwise formless displacements of desire". (Donald, 1992: 69) It 
involved the mobilisation of sentiments. If it were not for the 
dissemination and regulation of sentiments one would not be able to 
account for the "transition from the love of country" which is very 
localised to the "love of this imagined community that is the nation. " 
(Liobera, 1994: 120) Though triggered by material and clashing 
interests, by the forceful, and usually violent, dynamics of capitalism; 
and feeding on medieval realities, the fantasy of nation as a new 
origin had its own impact. However, in some instances it clashed with 
"reality" that was not signified (or was repressed ) within the fantasy. 
Yet the clash did not take the form of a binary opposition; instead, the 
fantasy was projected onto reality, and reality, in turn, provided 
sources for the problematisation and redefinition of the fantasy. In this 
way, both were transformed during the course of historical events. 
The shifting gap between them can be observed in radio 
broadcasting. 
Ankara, Radio Broadcasting and Dialogic Leakage 
The national elite could deal with its Others, both the West and 
the people, through projected images in order to contain the ideal 
purity of the nationalist project, or the Occidentalist fantasy. The 
project took the form of an experiment choosing Ankara as its site. 
The choice had further significance than just being a strategic 
positioning during the course of the National Struggle. 34 In 1919 
some members of the National Struggle had originally decided that 
their centre of government would be Istanbul to show that Turks cared 
34 Istanbul was the capital of the Ottoman Empire at that time. The Ottoman government 
came out of the First World War as a loser ; it had to accept the unfavourable conditions 
of the armistice in 1918 -endorsed in Sevres Treaty in 1919. Istanbul was formally 
occupied by Anglo-French forces in 1920. The National Struggle initiated by some 
Ottoman officers, including Mustafa Kemal, and led in cooperation with local forces in 
Anatolia was represented in the first national assembly in 1920 in Ankara to form a 
government against both the defeatist Ottoman policies and against the invading 
Western forces: Britain, France, Italy and Greece. Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e T6rkiye 
Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 4, p. 1110-1119. 
24 
for Istanbul. However others, including Mustafa Kemal, opposed this 
view; they preferred a place within Anatolia with the argument that 
that would enable them to "bring civilisation" to those parts of the 
country (Adivar, 1994: 47). The life in Istanbul was regarded as 
degenerate and cosmopolitan, highly infused with excessive Western 
ways of life. A necessary distance from the West and the past regime 
was inscribed in the final decision that Ankara be the centre of the 
national government a year later. The members of what would be the 
national elite mostly came from Istanbul to assume national tasks in 
the Ankara government. They were very unhappy to be there due to 
Ankara being no more than a barren village at the time. Against the 
complaints that Ankara was like a desert, Mustafa Kemal uttered the 
secret of the national formula: 
"A life has to be created from these ruins. What seems so 
vacant is actually full. There is a strong life in this area 
which is taken as a desert, and that is the nation, the 
Turkish nation. " (Abalioýlu, 1955: 97, emphasis added) 
Turkishness which was only articulated within the national 
discourse in a paradoxical relationship to the WeSt35, aimed to bind 
the national space and set up an origin for those who lived on it. 
Ethnic and cultural diversity had to be annihilated in the new unitary 
vision of national and cultural life. The most effective tools for this lay 
in the realm of cultural signification. The motto of the nationalists 
reveals the self-conscious effort: "Happy are those who say they are 
Turkish. " 
The national elite had to be creative in imagining the cultural 
distinctness of the new nation. The "language reform", the new dress 
code, the "Turkish history thesis", the People's Houses, the 
archeology of Anatolian folk culture, which I will be addressing in the 
following chapters, were among those ventures of cultural 
signification. However, many of these attempts remained limited in the 
35 Tann6ver, who was the head of the Turkish Hearths, the nationalist associations 
between 1912-1931, said that "Turks have realised their Turkishness only after they have 
become a European society. " (cited in Ye0en, 1995: 39) F. Ahmad says that even "as 
late as 1897 there was a sense of shock when the nationalist poet Mehmed Emin 
(Yurdakul) wrote with newly-found pride the line: 'I am a Turk, my faith and my race are 
mighty'. Even 'TOrkiye', the name adopted for the newly created country by the 
nationalists, was taken from the Italian 'Turchia"'. (1993: 78) 
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extent of their dissemination. This was later regarded as "political 
elitism" and was associated with authoritarian rule of the nationalist 
single party, Republican People's Party (RPP), "which made no 
notable effort to broaden the party's popular base and to enlist the 
support of the peasant masses; instead it concentrated its attention on 
the small westernised elite. " (Eisenstadt, 1981: 140) 
1 argue that the nationalist project in Turkey had to attend first to 
disciplining its own chosen members which represented the nation in 
Ankara, the newly constructed capital. The articulation of the 
Occidentalist fantasy -imagining the "modern" national space and 
time, of the people and their culture, and of the necessary difference 
from the West- was functional to the self -disciplining of the elite. The 
nationalists as mediators between the West and the Orient, had to 
form themselves as a group, or as the ruling class which involved the 
education of sentiments as well as political, legal and economic 
arrangements. A "love of nation" had to be manufactured. Romantic 
visions of folk culture mainly contributed to this end. Domestic life and 
gender roles were recoded in nationalist terms. The education of 
children and youth became national concerns. 36 
In this situation, radio broadcasting had a double function: one 
was to experiment with sound projections of the Occidentalist fantasy; 
the other was the self -discipli n ing of the nationalist elite by making 
them active in the making of the fantasy. It was one of the arenas in 
which the elite assumed the task of creating a new culture, a 
synthesis between the West and the East. Radio broadcasting which 
started in 1927, in the form of a private enterprise, was nationalised in 
1936. In its initial years, radio was seen as something that is alien to 
Turkish culture. It was, as we shall see, "western" and "cosmopolitan", 
associated with the culture in Istanbul, the centre of Westernisation 
during the Ottoman period. In the early 1930's, when the politicisation 
of the cultural realm gained prominence, the national elite advanced 
more positive ideas about radio broadcasting. It was regarded as a 
significant means for educating and modernising the population. It 
36 As Foucault argues, bio-power, technologies that addressed the re-regulation of 
private life, "was one of the central strategies of the self -constitution of the bourgeoisie" 
before it was targeted to working classes in Europe (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: 186). 
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was claimed by intellectuals of the period that the state or the party, 
which were almost identical in meaning, had to have a central hold on 
all broadcasting facilities so that it could defend the principles of 
"inkilap"37 both towards "outside" and "inside" with a vengeance and 
determined boldness. 38 The idea was that through radio broadcasting 
the nation state could inform both the Western world and the people 
of its presence and progress. Radio was an efficient vehicle to 
demarcate the boundaries between the "foreign" and the "national", 
the past and the present, the elite and the people, the private and the 
public. It was a means to assert the presence of that national identity, 
which was regarded deficient by the West; to prove to themselves and 
to the Others that, as Mustafa Kemal had said; "what seems so vacant 
is actually full. " Radio tempted the desire to be Western and civilised 
by its Western technology, and tried to arouse national feelings by its 
projection of the Occidentalist fantasy. 
I claim that the operations of the Occidentalist fantasy are best 
observed in radio broadcasting, such as the relation of fantasy and 
reality. Certain discourses are hard to penetrate into since they exhibit 
monologic characteristics determined by their claim to be directly 
referring to their objects. Then it becomes difficult to recognise the 
constitutive outside of discourses. I choose to look at the specific 
space defined by radio broadcasting to deconstruct the seemingly 
monolithic expressions of the official discourse. Radio broadcasting 
provides important clues for this because its use as a medium of 
totalisation -to reach all through crossing the rigid social boundaries- 
can contradict its concern to be heard by an actual audience, due to 
the difference beteen an idealised totality and a real actuality. One 
can see in radio both the working of a grand design of power but also 
the way it is adjusted to speak to an audience, that is its dialogic 
nature. Radio cannot operate within fixed definitions. It is a medium 
that cannot easily exalt itself to the level of art; it is contaminated by 
politics and propaganda but it also has to be creative and entertaining 
if it is going to have an impact. This leads to a constant 
problematisation of its output in terms of the desired intentions of the 
37 Which meant ambiguously both restoration and revolution 
38 Burhan Asaf (Belge) , "Inkilkimizin Sesi, " Kadro, No. 1 1, November 1932, p. 35. 
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producers and the responses of the audience (both "inside" and 
ii outside" in the Turkish case). Radio has to incorporate sources of 
ordinary culture, albeit specially processed for radio broadcasting, if it 
is talking to masses and not to selected individuals. However, the 
communication thereby produced cannot easily claim to represent a 
unified national culture since it has to address unknown and absent 
audiences and has to introduce a plurality of forms if it is going to 
have an effect on them. 39 In this sense, it is both a form of "mass 
communication" and a simulated individual communication 
(Bachelard, 1993: 220). 
Radio exists in a temporally redefined space40, with a format of 
always priviliging the moment of "now" and "here", and being located 
in-between the private and public spheres; art and technology; 
spiritual and material life; information and entertainment. Radio's 
"immateriality" allows it to cross these boundaries (Hilmes, 1997: 15). 
It is, at the same time, giving life and body to what is in fact a void, that 
is the studio, and disembodying the sound messages "that are 
disparate in terms of their location of origin, their cultural Purpose, and 
their form, in order to create a continuous enveloping rhythm of sound 
and information. " (Berland, 1993: 211) 
These properties of radio broadcasting arising both from its 
sound technology and its common format to address the "mass" 
audience in their private space, lead to various conflicts and tensions. 
These include moving the historically masculine public sphere into a 
private sphere defined in feminine terms; disseminating the norms of 
"high culture" but, at the same time, using the narrative forms of local 
cultures; creating a "virtual visibility" that is presented as reality but 
manufactured using "make-believe" sound engineering techniques in 
the studio. Finally, the intended control over the masses is difficult, 
almost impossible, to achieve via radio. The efforts of listeners are 
always unknown and uncertain. The quality and reliability of radio 
recievers may have been less or different than was imagined. 
39 Michele Hilmes points to the clash of "dignified", "formal" style -even mandating that the 
unseen announcers wear formal dress- and populism in the history of American 
broadcasting (1997: 1) 
40 "Radio redefines space and structures time not only in its acoustic movement over 
distances but also in its format. " (Berland, 1993: 209) 
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These properties of radio turn it into a significant field which 
provides rich sources to analyse the diverse and dynamic aspects of 
the constitution of identities in fantasy and the network of power 
relations that they are structured in, both in space and time, and 
across boundaries. Radio has its "dialogic leakage", in Pechey's 
terms (1989) which conveys the efforts of totalisation and their failure. 
Therefore, the study of radio broadcasting makes it possible to extend 
the seemingly fixed boundaries of the official discourse. 
Research Question 
My aim in this research is to analyse the conflicts and tensions 
within radio broadcasting in Turkey to address the dynamics of the 
Occidentalist fantasy. I refer to its sites of transmission, its strategies, 
and specific programmes, such as radio talks and dramas. 
Conceptually I analyse the boundary management, that occurs in and 
through radio broadcasting, between what is "foreign" and what is 
"national", between the "elite" and the "people", and between men 
and women. 
I argue that the primary conflict that is shaped by the historical 
divide between the West and the Orient overdetermine the way other 
tensions were conceived and handled. My first hypothesis is that 
every attempt in early Turkish history, in defining, building and 
demarcating national identity, was shaped with reference to an 
imagined Western-ness and for the Western gaze. Being Western 
was associated with certain spaces and groups of people which led to 
internal divisions within the country: "the people", women, and 
individuals associated with liberal Western ideas became, in different 
ways, the borderlines against which the Turkish-Western identity was 
defined. 
The main paradox of national identity, in this case, was to 
eliminate the "disturbing difference" from the West whilst maintaining 
a "necessary difference" in order to define "identity". "Western" radio 
technology provided the means to imagine both difference and 
identity. The disembodiment of sounds through radio broadcasting 
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made it possible to sample the pure "voice of the nation" with the 
assumption that it would be simultaneously heard by Others. However 
the attempt to produce and contain national identity within the 
boundaries of a pure auditory representation was ridden with failures. 
All kinds of interferences and transgressions of boundaries 
contaminated the pure "voice of the nation" which led to frustrations 
and anxieties for the Turkish elite. 
My second hypothesis in the research is that the Occidentalist 
fantasy was not a mere fantasy of the Turkish elite. It was in dialogue 
with what was signified as the "model" or the West, and shaped itself 
accordingly. On the other hand, the "model" could only assert its truth 
by constant redefinitions of what belongs to the West and what is 
Oriental. To demonstrate this, I include a chapter on the BBC 
broadcasts to Turkey at the same period. The analysis of the 
strategies of the BBC for knowing and influencing the Turkish 
audience provide sources to assess how the "copy" figures in the 
"model". Thus, it gives the means to understand the external limits of 
the Occidentalist fantasy. The analysis of the BBC Turkish Section 
strategies shows a similar kind of effort of mediation that occurs in 
and through Turkish Radio, between the "universal" and the "different" 
in modernity. The fantasies involved in both cases point to the 
unequal but "intertwined" histories, in Said's terms, of the Occident 
and the Orient. Yet the different techniques employed in the 
production of the two fantasies provide an entry into the discussion of 
the production of truth in different contexts. 
The period of the research extends from 1927 when Turkish 
Radio was inaugurated until the end of the 1940's. I chose to study 
this period for two reasons: First, in these years radio's role of being 
the "voice of the nation" was most significant in Turkey. Many 
intellectuals worked for radio until the end of the 40's, with the idea of 
fulfilling "national" tasks. Efforts of cultural signification to define the 
national identity were at their peak, as we shall see in Chapter 3. 
When the Democratic Party (DP) came to power in 1950, Turkey 
entered a new phase adopting, on the one hand, more populistic 
internal policies leading ultimately to an Islamic reassertion 
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(F-Ahmad, 1993: 93), and, -on the other 
hand a new foreign policy, as 
an ally of the US in the early Cold War. Radio became the focus of 
internal party feuds and a supporter of US foreign policies 
(Kocabaýoýlu, 1980). Radio was no longer considered to speak to 
the whole nation, when internal conflicts within the nation became 
more visible. In the context of the Cold War, the "national 
independence" of Turkey also became a dubious statement. 
The second reason that justifies the choice of this period has to 
do with the Second World War. The war years were decisive in 
defining national identity, and radio was most extensively used for this 
end in many countries. 41 Furthermore, the BBC broadcasts to Turkey 
were designed, as part of the World Service, specifically for the 
wartime. I argue that the conditions of the Second World War made 
the dynamics of the construction of the truth of the "model", which 
afterwards was taken for granted in Turkey, more apparent. This will 
be further discussed in Chapter 4. 
The history of communication, and specifically radio 
broadcasting, has been one of the most neglected subjects in Turkey. 
Questions regarding communication and national identity remain to 
be addressed42 while most studies on nationality dwell on what is 
called the political history of the nation. This may be due to taking the 
"claims of nationalism to be a political movement much too literally 
and much too seriously. " (Chatterjee, 1993b: 5) Deniz Kandiyoti also 
makes a similar argument saying that "studies of modernisation in 
Turkey have generally privileged juridico-political and institutional 
realms" (1 997a: 113). This research takes the challenge to extend the 
limits of what has been included in the political by connecting radio 
technology to national imagination in Turkey. 
Another challenge comes from Uygur Kocabaýoglu (1980) at a 
different level. Kocabaýoglu's work, which is the only precious record 
on Turkish radio broadcasting concludes with the argument that the 
41 Crisell (1997); Johnson (1988); Lacey (1993); Nicholas (1996); Hilliard (1997); Hilmes 
(1997); Potts (1989) give accounts of wartime broadcasting and its connections to the 
national framework in Britain, the US, Australia and Germany. 
42 ýerif Mardin (1991) pointed, years ago, to the importance of studying cultural 
signification and communication in the formation of Turkish nationality, but the task has 
remained unfulfilled until today. 
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Turkish radio has failed to. achieve its aims. 43 Radio was not able to 
disseminate national culture, and has not been used efficiently as an 
instrument to discipline and educate the people. He too, posits a gap 
from an ideal model, in this case, an ideal model of efficient 
broadcasting that serves the nation. He imagines the BBC, for 
example, to be such an ideal model. As I have argued before, this 
thesis is critical of such a framework, and aims to illustrate that radio 
broadcasting in Turkey was not a "failure" but has been an efficient 
medium for experimenting with the elements of the Occidentalist 
fantasy, as well as disciplining its actors. Therefore, as a working 
hypothesis, which the research can only partially address, I argue 
that radio broadcasting maintained a role in the production and 
reproduction of power relations, justified by Occidentalist strategies, 
on the borderline of the East and the West. 
Organisation of the Thesis 
I explore the questions of "Occidentalism and Turkish National 
Identity" more in depth in the first chapter. Theoretically, I dwell on 
Said's Orientalism (1995) to interrogate the problems of identity and 
subjectivity in a setting which has been labeled, othered and 
objectified by the West. I ask a series of related questions: Are, what 
is called as the Orient and the Occident merely representations? Or 
should they be thought as ideological discourses which legitimise 
existing power relations? How do they connect to reality? The critical 
reflection on Orientalism and Occidentalism guide the discussion on 
Turkish national identity. I draw on the historical data pertaining to the 
relations of Turkey to the West starting from the nineteenth century, to 
convey how Kemalism, the founding national discourse, was 
articulated. This points to shifting borders and the complex 
mechanisms of the formation of Turkish national identity. It also sets 
43 He gives several reasons: Radio broadcasting was able to reach a very limited 
audience due both to technical reasons, and to the nature of its programmes. The 
number of radio receivers remained limited and was concentrated mainly in three big 
cities, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. Programmes designed for villages were few in number 
and far from reality in their romantic projections of an ideal village. Most of the talk 
programmes were targeted at the urban population and addressed their domestic 
problems. 
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the historical conditions of. the Occidentalist fantasy manifested in and 
through early Turkish radio broadcasting. 
The second chapter, "The Burden of History", is on methodology. 
The chapter first dwells on the theoretical and practical problems 
confronted through the research: the problems involved in a 
comparison between the BBC and the Turkish radio, and the problem 
of the destructions of archives in the Turkish case. Contrary to the 
meticulous register of events and debates in the BBC case, Turkish 
broadcasters have not preserved any substantial archive. Both written 
and sound archives were either abandoned in storage rooms to 
decay or willfully destroyed. One cannot remain indifferent to the lack, 
or rather the destruction of archives if the archivisation "produces as 
much as it records the event" (Derrida, 1996: 17). The practical 
challenges in the research inform my theoretical methodology. I draw 
on theories of discourse analysis (Foucault), dialogic analysis 
(Bakhtin) and the psychoanalysis of culture (Zizek) to specify my 
conceptual tools, namely "projection", "translation", "social fantasy" 
and "surplus", to attend to the subjectivity of the Other as manifested 
in Occidentalism. 
In the third chapter, I analyse the history and the cultural site of 
"The Studio" giving life and body to what is in fact a void, in Berland's 
terms (1993: 211). The growing "national" importance of Ankara 
Radio, defended against the ascribed "cosmopolitanism" of Istanbul 
provide significant data for reflecting on the Occidentalist fantasy. I 
demonstrate how the "voice of the nation" as a pure representation of 
nationality was envisaged against Others, the West and the people. 
Referring to the history of Turkish Radio, and the statements and 
practices of broadcasters, I discuss the missions attached to radio by 
the elite and the ideals that were imagined within the process of 
shaping the broadcasts. Turkish radio was regarded as a mediator to 
translate the projected essence of people's culture into "modern" 
terms and for the Western gaze. Music broadcasting sets an important 
example. I also refer to the way the output was criticised by the elite to 
point to the complex boundary management involved in the 
production of the "voice of the nation". I show how the boundaries 
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between Istanbul and Ankara, between entertainment and national 
culture, between body and disembodied love of nation were set on an 
Occidentalist axis, in terms of a projected Western gaze. 
Chapter 4, "London Calling Turkey", provides an entry to the 
reverse side of the projected image of the West, that is, the Western 
look itself. Referring to the BBC archival material concerning the BBC 
Turkish Section broadcasts mainly during the Second World War, I 
discuss the strategies of the BBC, much in collaboration with 
government, to know and influence the Turkish audience. These 
changing strategies during the course of the war show, not only how 
propaganda was coined within a certain regime of truth, but also the 
frustrating process in which the British conception of Turkish identity 
was constructed. In this chapter I try to penetrate into the sealed self- 
representation of the "model". The fact that Turkish Radio and the 
BBC Turkish Section were competing for the same audience at that 
period, reveals the subtle negotiations involved in the dialogic 
definitions of identities. How the audience remains mostly unknown 
for both institutions shows the gaps, splits and discrepancies covered 
up in the representations of the truth. By utilising a comparative 
analysis of both the strategies and the tactics of the BBC and Turkish 
Radio with regard to representations of truth, I discuss the dynamics 
of the construction of different orders of truth 
In the fifth chapter on "Radio Talks" I reflect on the actors of the 
nationalist project, that is the elite, to analyse how the projectors were 
shaped within their own projections. I dwell on the pedagogical 
strategies adopted by radio broadcasts, especially radio talks that 
were targeted at the elite. Here the mediating concepts, such as 
children, youth and women, that serve to link civilisation and nature 
are of utmost significance. I discuss how gender-based definitions of 
nature present in radio talks were contrasted with Western civilisation 
in the signification of national identity; and how "national reforms" 
were conceived as a negotiation of a natural essence of the nation 
and Western oriented technological imagination. 
Chapter 6 is on "Radio Drama: Gender and the Fantasy of the 
Nation". Here I expand on the issue of gender distinctions in radio 
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broadcasts to discuss how women were regarded as the liminal case 
of the national identity. Women were charged with several duties in 
the national project, as mothers, as housewives, but also as the 
frontier soldiers to show the Western world the extent of modernity in 
Turkey. Thus they signified the "difference" of the national identity; as 
Norton argues, women "serve both to maintain the body politic and to 
mark its boundaries by the differences inscribed upon them. " (Norton, 
1988: 79) 1 discuss, based on analyses of radio dramas, that the 
representation of women's roles was central to the Occidentalist 
fantasy. The feminisation of culture, the "maternal authority" of radio 
broadcasting and the gendered concepts of change/stability are some 
key issues that I attend to in this chapter. 
In the "Conclusion", I take up my working hypothesis on 
communication and power in Turkey. The Turkish case which has 
remained mostly invisible in its specific configurations of 
0 riental/Occ i dental identity, even in Said's Orientalism (1995), 
provides rich sources to reflect both on the role of communication as a 
form of government and on its connections to the historical divide 
between East and West. I hope my research contributes to a new way 
of thinking on various aspects of the divide. For example the 
difference, illustrated in the thesis, between the way the Turkish and 
British truths were structured can be further interogated in terms of 
communication and government. The "liberal form of government" that 
Foucault (1991c) critically studied within Western history, operated on 
the assumed identity of the "sayable" and the "visible"; while in the 
Turkish case the "sayable" could clash with what was excluded and 
repressed in discourse- "reality". The analysis of what is explicit and 
what is excluded in communication can be fruitful in exploring the 
dialogic relationship of identities, both Occidentalist and Orientalist 
fantasies. I hope in future research, new theoretical and 
methodological perspectives will be developed to account for the 
"difference". This of course, entails bringing into light diverse 
narratives of modernity other than official representations of the ruling 
elite. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Occidentalism and Turkish National Identity 
Late nineteenth century witnessed the rise of Turkish 
nationalism in the Ottoman Empire. ' When the Empire was invaded 
and partitioned by European- British, Italian, French, and Greek- 
forces after being defeated in the First World War, most of the Turkish 
nationalists who opposed the policies of the Ottoman government in 
Istanbul and were "denounced as godless atheists waging war 
against the caliph" (F. Ahmad, 1993: 48) took refuge in Anatolia where 
they participated in the National Struggle. 2 Halide Edip, a rare female 
figure in the National Struggle, had been assigned the duty to visit 
different villages and report the violence done by the Greek to Turkish 
populations. She mentions, in her memoirs, a conversation with an 
old peasant woman at that time: The peasant woman complained to 
Halide Edip that her writing reports was in vain. She said, "Why do 
you write? What could writing mean for a people who have been 
slaughtered? " (Adivar, 1994: 201). Then she continued: "I have asked 
for pity from the Greek-They told us that they have been sent by 
Avrope (Europe, in Turkish Avrupa). So my girl, please tell that man 
called Avrope to leave us alone, we didn't do anything bad to him, tell 
him not to disturb us. " (lbid) 
The old peasant woman's painful words on Europe gives a 
sense to what the West or Europe could mean for the people of 
Anatolia during the imperialist invasion. It represented a threatening 
force that strove to destroy the traditional order of things, that was 
1 The rise of Turkish nationalism, the debates within its different advocates, and its 
connections to the rise of other nationalisms in and out of the Empire, such as Greek, 
Bulgarian, Serbian, Russian, Albanian and Arab nationalisms are extensively documented, 
some references are: F. Ahmad 1969; 1993; Aydin, 1993; Heyd, 1950; Kent, 1984; 
E. Kuran, 1968; Kushner, 1977; Mardin, 1962; Oba, 1995; Okyar& inalclk, 1980; 
Shaw&Shaw, 1977, ZOrcher, 1984. 
2 The history the Turkish National Struggle, its organisation, progress, economic and 
military sources, as well as the memoirs relating to the period, is a vast subject for 
historians. Some aspects of this period are accounted by Abahoýlu, 1955, Adivar 1994; 
Atay, 1969; Wclerrisoýlu, 1974; Selek, 1970; Timur 1968; Tunaya, 1956. 
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involved in conspiracies and aimed to take the local people's lives, 
and which was embodied in a figure of a man. 3 But for Halide Edip 
herself, the writer, Europe always was an abstract concept, 
ambivalent in many aspects. While actually fighting the Western 
forces, Halide Edip and other Turkish intellectuals discussed and 
wrote on the possibilities of Westernisation. There was a wide gap 
between how the intellectuals and the local populations interpreted 
the "West". Yakup Kadri, who also wrote on the war years in Anatolia 
says: "The difference between a person educated in Istanbul and an 
Anatolian peasant is greater than an English Londoner and an Indian 
from Punjab. " (1983: 53) According to Yakup Kadri, the "strange" 
existence of the intellectuals, who considered themselves as part of 
the Western world, was demonstrated when they went to Anatolia 
during the National Struggle. The intellectuals felt, that "as they went 
deeper into the country which they call their own, their alienation from 
their origins grew bigger. " (Karaosmanoglu, 1983: 53) In return, the 
peasants labeled them as "strangers". Should the national struggle 
end with victory, said Yakup Kadri, then the intellectuals had "to make 
the nation" by bridging this gap. 4 
The Turkish national identity that was propagated as the official 
identity of the new Turkish State after 1923, had to assume many 
dimensions that were thought to belong to the nation but were absent: 
the homogeneity of the "national" population, the existence of 
common origins, and a common will to the future development of a 
national state. In these circumstances, the nation had to be imagined 
3 However it could also mean a force that put an end to all misery. In Yakup Kadri's novel, 
Yaban, based on the war years, there is also a reference to some peasants' beliefs 
regarding "Europe". The peasants believed that Europe was a Queen who has sent her 
armies to save the peasants. And they thought that she will convert to Islam after the 
victory (Karaosmano6lu, 1983: 141). 
4 Anatolia was a land of heterogeneity. Many people did not even consider themselves 
as "Turks". In the novel Yaban (which means "stranger") the intellectual "hero" talks to 
peasants about Turkishness. He says that all Turks should support Mustafa Kemal, to 
which one peasant's reply is that they are not Turks but Moslems, he says "Turks only live 
in Haymana" -a region in central Anatolia (Karaosmanoolu, 1983: 173). 
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first by the national elite. 5 National identity was constructed by 
displacements, denials and projections: what was considered as the 
unifying factor of the nation, Islam, only a few years ago6 was 
denounced as a political tOO17 ; the Ottoman legacy, which was taken 
as a given condition by early nationalist movements was denied; and 
the desire to be Westernised was projected unto the national territory 
which was not only suffering the poverty and the damage of the war, 
but also contained radically differing ideas as to the role of Islam, 
economy and democracy in the future of the nation8. Finally, the West 
that had been a threatening force against the nationalist movements 
and reforms9 in the Ottoman Empire was heralded as a natural ally. 
The national dream was to bridge the gap between the West and 
Turkey, between the national elite and the local Muslim population, 
between the economic power concentrated in the hands of non- 
Muslim communities and the politics centrally controlled by the 
5 The term, "national elite" figures almost in all writings on Turkish nationalism. It denotes 
a group of people, both intellectuals and officials, who assumed positions of power in the 
new Turkish nation: "Under the Kemalists, the national elite figures with intellectual and 
official backgrounds dominated the political life of the nation and for some time ran the 
country in near-model tutelary fashion. " (Frey, 1965: 388) Only after thell 950s an 
alternative elite emerged that was more local in character, "led to a large extent by 
lawyers and men of trade and commerce. " (Ibid) The historical background of the national 
elite will be discussed later in the chapter. 
6 The nationalists had legitimised their struggle in the eyes of the Muslim population by 
referring to their devotion to liberate the Sultan-Caliph, described as the captive of 
Christian powers (F. Ahmad, 1993: 48). Even the word nation ( millet in Turkish and Arabic) 
had religious connotations- it meant the religious communities in the Empire. 
7 Mustafa Kemal justified the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, in his speech in the 
National Assembly, pointing to the need "to cleanse and elevate the Islamic faith, by 
rescuing it from the position of a political instrument, to which it has been accustomed for 
centuries". (cited in F. Ahmad, 1993: 54) 
8 Demirel (1994) in his important research on the First National Assembly in 1920, 
documents the ideas coined by various local representatives in opposition to Kernalists' 
vision of Turkey. 
9 According to Feroz Ahmad, the quest for modernity of the Young Turks after 1908 
clashed with the interests of the Western powers: "Not only the capitulations violated 
Turkish sovereignty and the principle of the unity of law, their very existence made the 
task of carrying out reform impossible. The Porte could not pass most laws without having 
them vetoed by the European embassies. Every piece of legislation was carefully 
scrutinised by the legal staff at the embassies to see that it did not infringe upon the 
'treaty of foreigners"'. (1993: 41) 
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national elite10, and between the authoritarian regime in practice and 
an image of a civilised democratic republic. 
The dream manifested itself in novels, dramas and other writings 
written by the intellectuals of the period, as well as in radio 
broadcasting, as we shall see in Chapter 3.1 address the question of 
the "West" in Turkish national history in this chapter in the context of a 
discussion of "making" the Turkish nation. In particular, I discuss how 
an Occidentalist fantasy was produced within the historical encounter 
with the West. The subjects of the fantasy referred to a pool of images 
and attributes attached to the West in the consolidation of their 
"national" power which either subsumed or silenced the disturbing 
differences within the national domain. 
In dealing with the question of the West and Turkish national 
identity, I begin with a theoretical discussion of the historicity of the 
division of the West and the East. My aim is not to assess the "real 
thing" that is the Orient" as opposed to the Western "real thing". If 
Orientalism is a representation, though never a pure, unconditional or 
nonmaterial representation as Edward Said argues (1995: 23), how 
the "Orientals" answered back to their representation by the West 
brings to view a complex field of subjectivity: What is the subjectivity of 
the Other? Furthermore, if , "the creation of the 
Orient ... signifies the 
West's own dislocation from itself, something inside that is presented, 
narrativised, as being outside" (Young, 1990: 139) then what does the 
concept of "the West" produced by non-Westerners present and 
dislocate? Questions of history and national identity, as well the more 
recent concepts that refer to nation as construction or as an "imagined 
community" (Anderson, 1983) require further reflection in the context 
of these questions. 
I argue that the term Occidentalism can be best understood as 
describing the set of practices and arrangements in and against the 
idea of "the West" in the non-West. On the one hand, it signifies a 
10 In 1915 the capital shares of different communities in industrial life were as follows: 
Greeks 50%, Armenians 20%, Jews 5%, Foreigners 10% compared to %15 of Turkish 
capital (Aktar, 1993: 141). See Keyder (1987) for a very good account of the political and 
economic aspects of the state intervention in Turkey that transferred capital from the 
"ethnic communities" to newly developing "Turkish" bourgeoisie. 
11 Said argues that the Orientalist representation or re-presentation "excluded, displaced, 
made superogatory any such real thing as 'the Orient"'. (1995: 21) 
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projective identification with the threatening power of the West. On the 
other hand, it implies a demarcation of internal and external 
boundaries: As Carrier puts it "(O)ccidental isms and orientalisms 
serve not just to draw a line between societies, but also to draw a line 
within them ... this process is likely to be particularly pronounced in 
societies that self-consciously stand on the border between occident 
and orient. " (1995: 22-3) 1 have already discussed Turkey's "bridge" 
identity shaped on the border between occident and orient. 
Occidentalism, in my view, does not particularly point to a "literary 
field" that provided the data for Said's Orientalism, but signifies ways 
of living and a conception of self that are produced in exchange with 
Western cultural and technological domination. 
In the second part of the chapter I give a brief account of the 
history of Turkish nationalism and the Kernalist regime. I particularly 
dwell on a debate in that history that concerns the relation between 
technology and culture in the process of "Western isation". The debate 
centred on whether Westernisation should be associated only with 
borrowing Western techniques or should also mean the import of 
Western ideas and ways of life. The opposition between "Western 
techniques" and "Western culture" figured as an important constituent 
of Occidentalism in Turkey. Here I argue that the central theses of 
nationalism in Turkey, even the concept of "Turkishness" was 
constructed in relation to "the West". However, at the same time, 
"Western technology" was utilised to construct a "national" identity" 
and was functional in defining and justifying the role of "the elite" in 
relation to the "Others". 
1.1. Occidentalism as Opposed to Orientalism? 
Edward Said's book Orientalism (1995) played a critical part in 
opening up the question of the constitution of the relation between 
"the West" and "the East" in the Western intellectual and political 
tradition. Said, in his introduction to the book mentions his hope that 
there will be new research in this field, tackling those questions and 
data left beyond the scope of his own work. In his view, "(P)erhaps 
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the most important task of all would be to undertake studies in 
contemporary alternatives to Orientalism, to ask how one can study 
other cultures and peoples from a libertarian, or a nonrepressive and 
nonmanipulative, perspective" (24). Following Said's work Robert 
Young (1990) poses the question whether there could be another 
kind of knowledge that escapes the imprints of European domination? 
However, while Said holds the belief that it is possible to dissolve "the 
unitary field ruled hitherto by Orientalism, historicism, and what could 
be called essentialist universalism" (cited in Young, 1990: 11), for 
Young the problem remains unsolved by Said's "distanced" 
intellectual criticism; Young's question persists: how can the other be 
articulated as such? (11) 
Although what we know as modern "history" exists primarily as a 
Western inscription articulated through Western conceptions of 
centre and periphery, history never manifests itself as a monolithic 
narrative. It entails contestations and encroachments of Western 
discourses by the subordinated and the colonised, as well as its own 
splits regarding the representations of the non-West. 12 The Other, as 
the site of either the projection of desire or disavowal plays a crucial 
role in the constitution of the Western narratives. Then the question as 
to whether what is posited as the Other can have its own separate 
history becomes more difficult to answer. 13 I find Porter's criticism of 
Said helpful in reposing the question; Porter (1993) points to Said's 
failure to take account of how Orientalist discourse reproduced itself 
as a hegemonic form of knowledge. According to Porter, Orientalism 
succeeds by replacing an earlier hegemonic principle through a set of 
novel dynamics "in which power relations are continually reasserted, 
challenged, modified" (1993: 152). It can be argued, then, Orientalism 
12 Moore-Gilbert points to a "persistent inner dissonance" within Western Orientalism 
(1997: 44). He argues that "it is ambivalence rather than a simply clichotornizing and 
essentializing attitude which more accurately characterizes the Western vision of the 
East. " (1997: 61). 
13 For Spivak, the Other is reproduced within a theory of the Subject. This does not 
encompass the heterogeneous Other: "... there are people whose consciousness we 
cannot grasp if we close off our benevolence by constructing a homogeneous Other 
referring only to our own place in the seat of the Same or the Self. " (1993: 84) Spivak's 
question: "Can the subaltern speak? " points to specific and heterogeneous positioning of 
what is called as the Other, which can only express its separate (yet connected) presence 
by disrupting the representational structure of the Subject and the Other. 
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is produced within a constantly modified economy of "sameness" and 
"difference" in its constructions of the Occident and the Orient. It is 
tempted, again and again "to go through the eye of the needle of the 
Other' in Stuart Hall's terms (1991: 21), to maintain its hegemony. 
This implies a categorical space for the narratives of the Other against 
which the Western subject is redefined. However, the Other is not only 
represented by the Western subject. The Other's inhabiting the space 
of the Other and speaking for itself, Occidentalism for example, 
contribute to the hegemony of Orientalism. Occidentalism, in my view, 
corresponds to an answering practice to Orientalism and Western 
domination, within the same economy of signification, the same 
discursive field that we refer as "modern history". 
Therefore, I would like to make it clear that by Occidentalism I do 
not mean to suggest that 1) it represents the Other, as such, as a 
unitary and separate entity, 2) it designates a (libertarian, or 
nonrepressive and nonmanipulative) alternative to Orientalism, or 3) it 
is merely a fictive representation of the Other othered by Western 
domination. I have already dwelt on the first two points but the third 
point needs further explication. Said's account of Orientalism presents 
a contradictory argument as to the existence of the Orient. His most 
quoted idea that the "Orient" is constructed by Orientalism implies a 
fantasy that has no counterpart in reality; but on the other hand, when 
Said speaks of the misrepresentation of the Orient he seems to be 
referring to an entity that exists exterior to the signification of 
Orientalism. Said is right to incorporate the two contradictory aspects 
to his argument, since the Orient is a displaced category that partly 
corresponds to what exists beyond the boundary that separates the 
West and the East, and partly represents the imagined Other within 
the Western identity. It is both a fantasy and a historical reality. 
However, I do not agree with Said when he says that with "a new kind 
of dealing with the Orient, indeed if it eliminates the 'Orient' and 
'Occident... we will advance in the process of "what Raymond Williams 
has called the 'unlearning' of 'the inherent dominative mode"' 
(1995: 28). What seems more important to me is not to undo or to 
unlearn the dichotomy of Orient/Occident, as if they are mere 
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representations, but to. analyse the interconnected historical 
experiences to understand how subjectivities are constituted and 
represented, in relation to each other but within the unequal power 
relations between the two. The Orient and the Occident, although 
constructed in narratives, are not simply ideas that can be undone. 
They correspond to a network of significations that creates, 
reproduces and sustains political regimes. Identities, especially 
national identities are informed by these regimes. 
Said's Orientalism has been criticised on different aspects. 14 
Yet Said's work continues to be an influential text that opens up new 
questions regarding the conception of the West and the East. 
Orientalism cannot be reduced to a simplistic subject/object 
framework, as some critics would claim15, the West being the subject 
and defining and controlling its object, the East. Said's most radical 
contribution was to think of what seems as the subject and the object 
in modern history in relation to each other. 16 However, one can 
criticise Said for not going beyond narratives and not attending to 
complex networks of technologies of power. Furthermore, his work 
can be criticised for not accounting for the mechanisms of subjectivity 
that are produced in the East, within the very power structure of 
colonialism and/or imperialism. I will concentrate on these two 
problems that I see as important in developing the framework of 
Occidentalism: one is Said's primary focus on texts, and the other is 
his conception of subjectivity within the tradition of humanism. 
Said's account of Orientalism attempts to make the connection 
14 1 can only cite few of the criticisms here as they constitute a vast literature. Orientalism 
was criticised for not allowing any space for indigenous resistance (Fox, 1992); for 
essentialising the West ( A. Ahmad, 1992); for producing an "Orientalism in reverse" (al- 
'Azm, 1981); and for not attending to the specific relation of capitalism and Orientalism 
(A. Ahmad, 1992 ; Amin, 1989). Said replies some of the criticisms directed to Orientalism 
in his afterword to the book in 1995. 
15 For example Aijaz Ahmad argues that Said "speaks of the West, or Europe, as the one 
which produces the knowledge, the East as the object of that knowledge. In other words, 
he seems to posit, stable subject-object identities, as well as ontological and 
epistemological distinctions between the two. " (1992: 183) 
16 1 agree with Benita Parry that Said introduced a perspective "of thinking non- 
synchronous and antithetical experiences together, of reconceiving the encounter 
between unequal partners as an area of 'overlapping territories and intertwined histories' 
as seen from the perspective of the Western meta-subject, and is an address against 
western hegemony which refuses its center/margin polarity. " (1992: 24) 
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between "politics" and "texts". Orientalism is not just a collection of 
texts, for him, but "a distribution of geopolitical awareness into 
aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and 
philological texts". (1995: 12) Texts exist in exchange with political, 
intellectual, cultural, moral power. Said points to the matrix of 
Foucauldian knowledge and power to make the connection. 
However, despite his attempt to include institutions and practices, in 
addition to texts in the matrix of knowledge and power, Said's 
formulation of Orientalism remains limited to a certain "field" of 
intellectual knowledge, which primarily operates in writing. 17 First, I 
argue that Orientalism, or Occidentalism, cannot be confined to works 
of literature. Instead they define a horizon of meanings and 
significations that are employed either to trigger, justify, or make 
"sense" of certain practices that may not necessarily belong to the 
intellectual sphere. These are often evoked in connection to practices 
of government, and discriminatory practices of elitism, racism and 
sexism in a range of institutions from education to public 
management. 18 Said allots to texts "a centralizing, affirmative and 
sovereign power" (Parry, 1992: 26). 19 Second, I argue against Said's 
17 "Therefore I study Orientalism as a dynamic exchange between individual authors and 
the large political concerns shaped by the three great empires -British, French, American- 
in whose intellectual and imaginative territory the writing was produced. " (Said, 1995: 15) 
18 Although Said makes a point that his scope of text is wide: I set out to examine not 
only scholarly works but also works of literature, political tracts, journalistic texts, travel 
books, religious and philological studies. " (1995: 23), he fails to fully acknowledge the 
importance of institutional practices and techniques in the production of discourses as 
Foucault does. 
19 Said's textualism is criticised by others too. Aijaz Ahmad points to the paradox in 
Orientalism: "... Said is vehement in his criticism of 'Orientalism' for its highly 'textual' 
attitude, yet in his own account imperialist ideology itself appears to be an effect mainly of 
certain kinds of writing. " (1992: 181) For Bryan Turner, Said's "textualism" has resulted in 
"vicious solipsisms in which there can be no distinction between fictional writing and social 
reality. " (1994: 7) 
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humanistic emphasiS20 that dwells on "willed human work"21 (1995: 
15). Although Orientalism conveys the dynamics of subjectivity - as 
Said acknowledges that Orientalism "has less to do with the Orient 
than it does with 'our' world" (1995: 12)- it denotes a much more 
complex field that is coloured by mechanisms of dislocation and 
projection as well as ambivalence and SplitS22, than what the term 
"willed human work" evokes. Furthermore, from a Foucauldian 
perspective, discourses cannot be equated with the "subject"s 
intentions. Said's emphasis on texts and authorship, as willed human 
work, sides him more with traditional humanist scholarship than it 
does with Foucauldian discourse analysis. He remains within the 
"European cultural heritage", in Young's terms , with his "tendency to 
focus exclusively on European high culture. " (Young, 1990: 140) 
What I attempt to do instead, is to attend to certain instances in 
history in which various forms of Western domination are incurred as 
objects of desire and derision for the non-Westerners -specifically the 
Turkish- , which in turn, inform practices that arrange and sustain 
power relationships. My study dwells on both texts and practices. I 
choose to focus on the constitution of political subjectivity in Turkey, in 
its relation to certain material processes, such as the employment of 
Western technologies, as in the case of radio broadcasting. I bring 
together three conceptual frames, namely a theory of governmentality 
that borrows from Foucault's notions of technology and the self; a 
psychoanalytic theory of subjectivity; and a Bakhtinian theory of 
20 Said's humanism influenced by Auerbach's ideas are variously criticised. One strand of 
criticism points to the contradictions in the way he brings together the anti-humanism of 
Foucault with traditional humanist scholarship (Clifford, 1988; Porter, 1993; Young, 1990). 
He was also criticised for treating Orientalism as a "department" of Western humanism 
while, at the same time, proposing "a reconstituted version of humanism, adumbrated in 
the work of certain Orientalists themselves in the first instance, as the way forward beyond 
the disablingly dichotomizing and essentializing vision which is characteristic of 
Orientalism. " (Moore-Gilbert, 1997: 42) 
21 "In fine, how can we treat the cultural, historical phenomenon of Orientalism as a kind 
of willed human work - not of mere unconditioned ratiocination- in all its historical 
complexity, detail and worth without at the same time losing sight of the alliance between 
cultural work, political tendencies, the state, and the specific realities of 
domination? Governed by such concerns a humanistic study can responsibly address itself 
to politics and culture. " (Said, 1995: 15). 
22 On which most postcolonial theories focus, most significantly Bhabha (1994); Spivak 
(1987); Young (1990). For an account that maps the terrain of postcolonial theory see 
Moore-Gilbert (1997). 
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dialogue which I will explicate further in the second chapter. These 
are used to address the specifics of Turkish Occidentalism. These 
concepts enable me to look at the practice of radio broadcasting 
associated with the constitution of the subjectivity of the Other, in its 
position of both "inferiority" in relation to the West, and of "superiority" 
in managing and controlling differences within its so called own 
national body. In this way I look at differential yet interconnected 
histories of "the Orient" and "the Occident". Thus, I do not see 
Occidentalism as an alternative to Orientalism but as an echo, as it 
happens in the myth of Narcissus, that chooses to repeat some "lines" 
of the "model" to construct its own subjectivity. Consequently these 
lines designate other meanings than those ascribed by Western 
subjects. 
In order to deal with Occidentalism and national identity one 
must first attend to a contemporary dilemma regarding "identity", 
which is: how, if the essentialist notion of identities are to be 
dissolved, is it still possible to talk of identities? While the 
"identitarian" approaches to identity - identification with an essential 
characteristic already existent in the subject- are rightly criticised - 
theories of "construction" and "ambivalence" regarding identities 
remain problematic. Even Said, while he criticises the essentialist 
mechanisms of identity construction, builds his argument using the 
very "essentialised" concepts of the Orient and the Occident. These 
refer to hierarchical power relations which do have some kind of 
"reality". Carrier's formulation is significant; he talks of "the visibility of 
political forces in the generation and use of these essentializations. " 
(1995: 15) Similarly Donald's emphasis on the need for the 
"acceptance of the terms of identity; an identification with the polarity 
rather than with either pole" (1992: 181) is meaningful. If we are not 
going to be indifferent to these "political forces" and the reality of the 
boundaries, then how are we going to tackle identities, especially 
nationalist identities, in non-essentialist terms? 
Bhabha's concern is to overcome the given dichotomous 
(self/other) poles of identity by pointing to hybridity and ambivalence 
in colonial discourse. Based on his reading of Fanon, he presents 
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three dynamics for the process of identification: 1) to exist is to be 
called into being in relation to an Otherness, its look or locus; 2) the 
very place of identification, caught in the tension of demand and 
desire, is a space of splitting; 3) the question of identification is never 
the affirmation of a pregiven identity, never a self-fulling prophecy -it is 
always an "image" of identity and the transformation of the subject in 
assuming that image (1993: 117). From such a perspective identities 
are never self-identical. The operations of desire transgress the 
defined boundaries between the self and the other (Donald, 1992: 
64). In a similar manner Taussig talks of the self as "no longer as 
clearly separable from its Alter... the self is inscribed in the Alter that 
the self needs to define itself against" (1993: 252). According to 
Taussig, mimetic reflections are the source of identities; and mimetic 
excess, that is the mimetic self-awareness allows new possibilities. 
Both Bhabha and Taussig dwell on the possibilities opened up by the 
acknowledgement of hybridity and mimetic excess in identity, 
especially of the Other. The ambivalence posited in the colonial 
discourse implicates slippages and dislocations that undermine 
authority and provide ground for subversive readings of Western 
domination for the colonial subject. 
But does ambivalence, as such, contribute to the disruption of 
identities or does it, instead, enhance their articulation? The question 
ties in with my concern to link the reality of political boundaries with 
the dynamics of identity. Following Zizek's suggestion that the 
"traumatic, non-integrated character of the Law is a positive condition 
of it" (1989), 1 argue that ambivalence and hybridity, that is, the 
transgression of boundaries is a necessary condition of any identity 
formation. Ambivalence and hybridity do not make national identities 
in a colonial setting less solid or less real. The paradox of identity, that 
it is both fluid and solid, or both totalised and infinite is not 
resolvable. 23 Identities are always "constructed", always "hybrid" and 
"ambivalent", but they are, at the same, totalised within boundaries 
and bear the violence and the burden of history as well as the 
23 Young makes it clear that "both historicism or entirely differentiated histories are in 
themselves impossibilities: history will always involve a form of historicism, but a historicism 
that cannot be sustained. " (1990: 84) 
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possibilities for resistance within themselves. These, in a way, 
constitute their "historical essence". 
Therefore, rather than dissolving the poles of identity, one 
should address the tension involved, both in its particular 
manifestations and "universal" relevance. "Only an understanding that 
recognizes that an irresolvable tension works within the historical 
schema itself will be in a position to make its contradictory claims 
productive. " (Young, 1990: 83) Occidentalism provides examples of 
this tension. It describes a setting -a set of practices, ideas and 
feelings- by which traditions are built against an essentialised and 
objectified entity called "the West". But at the same time the 
projections of the West hover over the universal principles of Western 
modernity as a deferred echo that challenge and alter its initial 
"universal" meanings. According to Carrier, Occidentalism is "a 
projection of one element of the West, linked to the perpetual, 
unsatisfied desire that is so pronounced under capitalism. " 
(1995: 13)24 Thus Occidentalism is both particular and universal; it is 
both a finite representation and an ongoing political intervention in 
the dialogic relation between the East and the West. But as I have 
argued before, the intervention of Occidentalism also contributes to 
the hegemony of Orientalism. It produces a resistance to the Western 
power, but operates within its discursive terms to maintain a system of 
government that endorses its hegemony. The desire of the nationalist 
elite in Turkey to become both Western and Turkish resonates with 
the Western desire to see Turkey as a "bridge" that never crosses the 
distance between the West and the East; that becomes Western but 
never quite like it. The Western desire is marked by the ambivalence 
to want Turkey to be irreducibly Other yet Western. Occidentalism 
does not challenge the West but it is nonetheless disturbing. The 
West constructed within the history of Turkish nationalism gives an 
24 Carrier's collection on Occidentalism includes very interesting research on cultures such 
as in Melanesia, Japan, and Greece. Lindstrom's article on Melanesian cargo cults argues 
that these narratives (the belief that the spirits of the dead bring quantities of the 
Europeans' goods for the loyal believers) are both a commentary about the Orient and 
the Occident, and represent allegories of desire. Lindstrom, especially underlines the 
"universalisation of desire" here, that is "perhaps peculiar to capitalist society" (1995: 55) 
which seeks material goods and is never satisfied. It is a representation of an 
essentialised aspect of the West which is circulated to effect both the Orient and the 
Occident. 
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account of the subjectivity of the Other. 
1.2. "The Western Question" in Turkey 
a. Early Turkish Nationalism and Westernisation 
It is noteworthy that the concept of the West, replacing that of 
Christianity, crystallised "in opposition to the Muslim attacks against 
Europe, and in contrast to the overseas discoverieS25 ." (G69ek, 1996: 
5) The Europeans used the term "Europe" to refer to themselves in 
their overseas encounter with other cultures, while the "West" was the 
term attributed by others (1996: 5). Although "the West" was an 
imagined and an ambiguous concept, it was fostered by a new 
physical image. I find G69ek's emphasis on the physical image of the 
West an important point that is usually missed in Western oriented 
conceptions of Westernisation. She argues: 
"Westernization marked the first stage of Europe's 
permanent impact on the rest of the world; it evolved to refer 
to the transformations societies underwent to become like 
the West. All too often, "Westernization" alluded to an 
imagined transformation and had at best, as empirical 
evidence, the adoption of the physical attributes of the West, 
namely, its mode of dress, aesthetics, or material culture. 
What was Westernized was simply what appeared Western; 
what appeared Western in turn was a measure of social 
change. This was partially the consequence of the 
expanding role of science and technology in defining the 
West... " (1996: 6). 
G69ek's notion of Westernisation, as the adoption of the physical 
attributes of the West which already defines what being Western 
means, is helpful in showing a way out of the usually posited 
opposition between "what appears as Western" and "what is really 
Western". The opposition especially figured in the debates on 
Westernisation and nationalism in the Ottoman Empire. 
The Ottoman Empire first encountered the "West" through wars. 
25 G6qek refers to Hay (1968) to point to the "image" that was associated with Europe in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In cartography and geographical works Europe 
was portrayed as "crowned, cuirassed, holding a spectre and orb, with weapons, scientific 
instruments, a palette, books, and Christian symbols (Hay, 1968: 104-5). 
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Napoleon Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt in 1788, which according to 
Edward Said was a turning point in OrientaliSM26 , was 
interpreted by 
Ottomans as "wildness" that turned human beings into animals 
(B. Lewis, 1953: 121). The changing interpretations of the West as a 
superior civilisation in the following years was due to accelerating 
decline of the Ottoman power, usually described in terms of the 
relation between the Ottoman Empire and Europe (F. Ahmad, 1993: 
23). The first projects of Westernisation was considered to be 
"Shallow" by later reformers because they were confined to the import 
of European furniture and fashions for the ruling classes (Ibid). Yet 
these imports demonstrate how the West came to be an object of 
desire for the Ottomans starting from the eighteenth century. 27 
However, the institutional and military reforms in the nineteenth 
century led to more substantial changes. This was initiated by more 
systematic contacts with Europe28, and resulting comparisons with the 
West. The Tanzimat reforms during the reign of Mahmud 11 (1808- 
1839) aimed to restructure the state and the army taking the West as 
the "model". Indeed, as Mardin argues even the name Tanzimat 
(reorganisation or correction) implied a reference to a model (Mardin, 
1991: 13). In this process, the autonomy of the official class was 
increased; Janissaries, the standing army, was put under government 
control and the ulema (religious elite) lost their financial 
independence. Constitutional arrangementS29 both put restraints on 
the absolute power of the Sultan and decreed the sanctity of private 
26 "... an invasion which was in many ways the very model of a truly scientific appropriation 
of one culture by another. For with Napeleon's occupation of Egypt processes were set in 
motion between East and West that still dominate our contemporary cultural and political 
perspectives. " (Said, 1995: 42) 
27 G69ek cites Enver Pasha's letter to a "lady friend" in Europe in 1911, in which he says: 
"Your civilization, it is a poison, but it is a poison that wakes one up and one cannot, one 
does not want to sleep anymore. One feels that if one were to close one's eyes, it would 
be in order to die. " (Enver Paýa, 1989: 186) One can see here that the image of 
civilisation has connotations of desire, associated not only with goods and fashion but 
also with women. 
28 Ottoman embassies were founded in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century. 
Also many members of the ruling class traveled into European countries and came back 
with analyses of possible reasons of Ottoman decline in face of Europe (Mardin, 1991: 
13). 
29 A charter, known as the Noble Rescript of G01hane, was issued in 1839. It brought a 
flood of statues, regulations, ordinances and laws, which according to Mardin caused the 
conflict between statute law and religious law to deepen (1981: 196). 
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property. "The significant outcome of these changes was the creation 
of a new bureaucratic class", which, according to Ahmad (1993: 25), 
assumed the task of social engineering. 
G69ek points to the rise of another social group -partly 
overlapping with the bureaucratic class- in these years, which she 
terms as Ottoman intellectuals. 30 This group taught at Western style 
schooIS31 , worked for newspapers and journals, wrote novels and 
plays. They became conversant in Western languages, especially 
French. They defined a new Ottoman social vision, which the sultan 
did not support (G69ek, 1996). However the new vision was not 
entirely based on imitation. The interpretation of Western ideas was 
accompanied by the translation of both literary and other, scientific, 
social and political, texts. The translation chamber of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs employed intellectuals who did not only translate texts 
but made adaptations for the Ottoman public. Adaptations and 
translations usually altered the original texts and accommodated the 
meanings in a different epistemology. 32 While altered meanings were 
attached to Western concepts some Western words were left 
untouched; they were transliterated to refer to Western ideas, such as 
"liberte" (liberty) and "nasyon" (nation). The use of foreign words 
"provided political opponents of the sultan with a means of symbolic 
resistance" (G69ek, 1996: 128). One can see here the first examples 
of a boundary management between the West and national. 33 A 
similar experimentation in defining identity using Western forms can 
be observed in the fields of journalism and theatre. Ottoman identity 
and problems of "motherland" were debated through these media 
W She connects the rise of intellectuals to a process in which bourgeoisie was formed as 
part of civil society (1996). 
31 New western-style schools, based not on religious but on positive sciences were 
opened in the field of engineering, medicine, law and military at the end of the eighteenth 
century and in the nineteenth century (Aydin, 1993: 53). 
32 J. Parla points to the distortions in the translations of Shakespeare's plays in the 
Tanzimat era. She argues that it was due to two distinct epistemological orders, Western 
and Islamic, which were incommensurable (1990: 92). 
33 Though it was defined in different terms at that time. Motherland and Islam were two 
keywords in defining the Ottoman identity. 
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which were first introduced by Western initiatives. 34 The name of one 
the first newspapers published by an Ottoman in 1860, TercOmcln-i 
Ahvcil (the translation of the situation) gives a clue to what this meant. 
The Western oriented reformist intellectuals and officials, called 
the Young Ottomans in the late nineteenth century, blamed the 
previous reformers of the Tanzimat era for adopting only a superficial 
form of Westernisation confining it only to a style of life. The term 
"Tanzimat mentality", still used in Turkey, denoted an alienation from 
the authentic Islamic culture. The Young Ottomans were in search of a 
synthesis between Western concepts, such as liberty, citizenship, 
and Islamic-Ottoman identity. They forced the regime to adopt a 
constitution in 1876 which coined the idea of Ottoman citizenship. The 
Constitution was shelved for 30 years under the despotic regime of 
AbdOlhamid 11, and most of the reformist intellectuals had to go to 
Europe for political exile where they had further contact with Western 
ideas and sciences. The Young Turk movement was shaped in the 
exile. In 1908 the Young Turks came to power to stay until the end of 
the war -with some interruptions in between due to instability caused 
by a continuous clash between the Court, the Sublime Porte (the 
assembly and the government), the wars, and the inner conflicts 
between reformist activists. The Young Turks had "Turkist" nationalist 
ideas, that were still in close relation to Islamic identity, but 
foregrounded "Turkishness". 35 
It is not possible to give a full account of the history of the late 
Ottoman Empire here. What I want to to focus on, instead, is the 
conception of nationalism, starting with Young Ottomans but at its 
peak with Young Turks, put within a frame that brought together 
Western civilisation and Turkish culture. The most interesting example 
34 For example the discussion of what comprised "true and correct Ottoman" in new 
theatres (G69ek, 1996: 130) foreshadows the debate in Turkish Radio about "correct 
Turkish" in the 30's which I will be discussing in Chapter 3. 
3S It is agreed by many scholars that Ottomanism failed due to the absence of unifying 
patterns among the multiplicity of groups that existed in the Empire. Islamism, on the 
other hand, lost its appeal because of the emerging separatist movements of the 
Albanian and Arab Moslems. The Russian expansion in Central Asia brought Turkish 
immigrants to the Empire with Pan-turkist ideas, such as Yusuf Akqura. These ideas 
fostered Turkish nationalism organised within the Young Turks and the Committee of 
Union and Progress. (F. Ahmad, 1993; Georgeon, 1986; Kuran, 1968; Mardin, 
1981; 1991) 
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to look at would be Ziya G. 6kalp's trinity of "culture", "civilisation", and 
"Islam". G6kalp was a sociologist, whose ideas are said to inform both 
Young Ottoman and Young Turk policies, and influenced the later 
Kernalist nationalists to a certain extent36. With his work, "idiosyncratic 
Westernisms" are thought to be "supplanted by a critical appreciation 
of the West" (Parla 1985: 22). G6kalp wrote in a period when the 
attempts of Westernisation were already in practice. 37 Yet the 
critiques that accused the higher classes for "excessive 
Western isation"38 persisted. The search for true nationalist identity 
was especially focused on defining the limits of the identity of women 
(Kandiyoti, 1997b: 134). G6kalp came up with a conceptual frame that 
comprised an idea of a "unique" true culture and a civilisation that is 
"international" and "common" to various cultures. Culture, for G6kalp, 
consisted of "complex rules of language, politics, religion, morality, 
aesthetics, law and economy which exist on an unconscious level in 
the life of the nation" (1917a: 166). Civilisation, or specifically 
"modern" civilisation was "the product of the positive sciences, their 
methods and techniques" (G6kalp, 1917b: 134). In this formulation the 
concept of civilisation denoted the "sciences and techniques" of the 
West but in no way was it reducible to Western culture. Culture was to 
be found in what comprised Turkishness. Islam had a function in the 
organisation of the Turkish society as well the development of the 
national SOU1.39 
G6kalp's ideas, although highly influenced by Durkheim, were 
original in drawing subtle boundaries between being Western, 
36 For continuities and discontinues between G6kalp's ideas and Kemalism see Parla 
(1985). 
37 There were schools and faculties based on Western positive sciences. Western books 
and newspapers were accessible, in addition to Ottoman translations. Journals for women 
appeared. Western style activities, such as competitive games were introduced. Postal 
service was organised by giving numbers to houses and naming streets. Telephones 
were installed. The building of roads and railways were started. Telegraph connected 
some peripheral areas with the centre (F. Ahmad, 1993; Aydin, 1993 ; G6qek, 1996; R. 
Davison, 1990). 
38 Mardin uses the term to point to the criticisms of those writers in the late nineteenth 
century , such as Ahmet Mithat and HOseyin Rahmi, who were sarcastic about the lifestyles of Westernised figures in the Ottoman society. Their writing mainly focused on 
the tragic effects of Westernisation on women and ferninised "weak" men (Mardin, 1991: 
23-81). 
39 see A. Davison (1995) for debates on G6kalp's relation to Islam and secularism. 
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Turkish and Muslim identites. He built his theory on absences, 
deficiencies and projections: First, he started from a state of denial of 
Turkishness in the Ottoman Empire. Turks were excluded from real 
loci of power; they could not establish themselves as an economic 
class. They were mostly peasants and were ridiculed both by the 
religious and secular elites. 40 But as "sociology has shown, genius is 
hidden in the people", and Turkishness can be awakened by 
nationalism. Nationalism was an ideal that would raise the 
conscience of Turkish people from a subconscious to the conscious 
level. The origins were based on an utopia: Turkish life long before in 
Central Asia. The Turkish cultural traits were not those of Oriental 
origin, such as polygamy, the seclusion of women and their low 
status, fatalism, and ascetism, or "sickly Oriental music" -imposed 
upon the Islamised Turks through the infiltrations of the Near East 
(G6kalp, 1981: 29). Thus, G6kalp denied the present situation of 
Islamic culture; projected unto "the people" Turkish nationalism that 
was seemingly absent but was present as an "ideal"41 ; and 
operationalised the West in terms of "sciences and techniques". He 
was against "copying" or "imitating" Western culture. By relegating 
the West to the realm of sciences and techniques he could also 
oppose it in cultural terms: The new synthesis in Turkey would show 
that "the foundations of European civilization are worn, sick, and 
rotten, that they are destined to fall and disintegrate" (G6kalp, 1981: 
60). He believed that "the Turkish intelligence is not worn out, its 
sentiments are not effeminate, its will is not weakened" (Ibid). 
G6kalp's theory of nationalism opens up a new space for 
thinking the dynamics of Occidentalism as part of historical conditions 
-in relation to the self-definitions of the Ottoman elite in their attempts 
of both Westernisation and coining national identity. It also provides 
an important insight to thinking respectively about Kemalism, which 
has been mostly framed within a paradigm of "imitation" as I have 
4U "The old Ottoman elite scorned the peasant as 'stupid Turk'; the people of Anatolia 
were ridiculed as 'outsiders'; the title given to people was 'vulgar'. " (G6kalp, 1981: 260) 
41 Gbkalp defined the concept of the "ideal" as a force: "Psychological facts, which we call 
opinion, ideal, belief, are not mere passive ideas and ineffective representations. In them, 
creative and destructive forces, positive or negative values, are inherent. " (Gbkalp, 1981: 
52) 
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already discussed. 
b. Kernalism and Occidentalism 
For more than 75 years Kemalism has been declared as the 
ruling ideology of the Turkish nation state, which itself underwent 
significant mutations and employed a variety of policies at different 
periods, which were not always consistent with each other. Therefore 
looking back at Kemalism from today, and trying to define it is a 
difficult task. It involves a set of methodological and ideological 
problems. 42 For example, Turkish "modern isation" triggered by 
nationalist Kernalist reforms is often studied at the level of state 
structures, political institutions, and the industrial economy. Thus, 
"more penetrating effects on the cultural level, in lifestyles, gender 
identities and self-definition of identity" (G61e, 1997: 83) are 
neglected. Also, as I have discussed before, Turkish national reforms 
were often viewed within a frame of "imitation" with implications of 
opposing Islam to Western civilisation, that still continues to be a 
matter of debate in Turkey. 43 Here I will specifically discuss the 
42 Contemporary Turkish and Western intellectuals seem to suffer from a difficulty in 
dealing with their own positions with regard to Kernalism. Most of the Turkish intellectuals 
are themselves the product of Kemalist heritage; it is not easy to challenge the 
constitutive presuppositions of a framework when oneself is formed by it. Turkish 
intellectuals usually lack the critical distance from their history. For Western intellectuals 
the difficulty arises from being on the other side, either being influenced by various 
orientalisms or being too distant from the complexity of occidentalism. Yet there is a huge 
literature on Kernalism. For Western accounts from the perspective of modernisation see: 
Bisbee, 1951; Frey, 1965; Kinross, 1964; Kruger, 1932; Lerner, 1958; Lewis, 1968.; 
Landau, 1984; Rustow, 1956; 1973; E. D. Smith, 1959; Szyliowicz, 1973; Ward&Rustow, 
1964; Weiker, 1973; 1981. For Turkish accounts within the Kemal ist-modern isation 
tradition see: Adivar, 1935; Alp, 1936; Atay, 1969; Ateý, 1981; Aykut, 1936; Berkes, 
1964,1973; Eren, 1963; Erikan, 1974, inan, 1977; Kazancigil &(5zbudun, 1981; Karpat, 
1959; 1973; Ozbudun, 1975; Peker, 1935; Sunar, 1974; Timur, 1968; 1971; Tunaya, 
1952; 1983; 1996. For more critical accounts see: Ahmad, 1993; Akqam, 1994; Aktar, 
1993; Aydin; 1993; Bora, 1996; Ersanli-Behar, 1992; G61e, 1991; 1997; Kadloolu, 1996; 
Kandiyoti, 1989; 1991; 1993; 1997a; 1997b; Kasaba, 1997; Keyder, 1987,1990; 1997; 
Kbker, 1990; Mardin, 1973,1981,1991,1997; (5ztOrkmen, 1998; Parla, 1989; 1991a; 
1991b; 1992; Schick&Tonak, 1987; Tuncay, 1981; Yegen, 1999; Yeýilkaya, 1999, 
Zurcher, 1984. 
43 Against the political arguments that oppose Islamic traditions to Westernisation, 
Bozdogan and Kasaba emphasise that "it is sometimes ignored that regardless of how 
shallow Turkey's 'civilizational shift' from Islam to the West has actually been, institutional, 
ritual, symbolic, and aesthetic manifestations of modernity have become constituent 
elements of the Turkish collective consciousness since the 1920's. " (1997: 5) 
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conditions of Occidentalist fantasy in early Turkish history, in 
opposition to both perspectives that primarily dwell on the "objective" 
institutional and economic changes, and conceive politics and 
economy too narrowly; and those that render the "subjective" 
elements as manifestations of imitation. The "question of the West" in 
Turkish national history can be studied in its wide range of aspects 
from institutions to psychology. However, it is not my aim here to 
reconstruct another version of the history of Westernisation in Turkey. 
Not only because it lies beyond the scope of my thesis, but also due 
to some methodological problems. I argue that what is called 
Westernisation in Turkey cannot be understood as an objective 
process - that can be accounted as a totalised history- in which 
certain things, including manners, were imported from the West. 
However, it was neither just a subjective orientation that shaped 
events in line with the will power of the elite. What exactly lies within 
my interest, in terms of Occidentalism and national identity, is the 
stock of images and techniques associated with "the West" that were 
i nstru mental ised to define the horizon of Turkish national identity. 
That is, how the national elite consumed and reproduced the 
projection of "the West" (and civilisation) to negotiate and consolidate 
their power in line with their pragmatic interests. 
First it has to be observed that Kemalists in early Turkish history 
were ambivalent about the possible impact of Westernisation. This 
challenges the idea that the "nation" together with modern 
industrialism, is "probably the major European contribution to the 
world at large. Certainly it is the major political contribution of Europe 
to Turkey's modern isation. " (R. Davison, 1990: 87) In a similar manner 
it contests a Turkish Kemalist's assessment: "there is no reason why 
one should not regard the Westernization movement as the scientific 
basis of Turkish revolution" (Karal, 1981: 12). However, while Western 
civilisation was acknowledged as "superior" to the Ottoman heritage 
of the new Turkish Republic, it was, at the same time, despised for 
several reasons associated with its morality, the presence of 
"dangerous" class struggles and the existence of imperialist 
tendencies, etc. It was seen both as a source of progress and a threat. 
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The imagery of Western. civilisation that appears, for example, in 
Mustafa Kemal's speeches in the early 20's is striking: 
"it is futile to try to resist the thunderous advance of 
civilization, for it has no pity on those who are ignorant or 
rebellious. The sublime force of civilization pierces 
mountains, crosses the skies, enlightens and explores 
everything from the smallest particle of dust to stars ... When faced with this, those nations who try to follow the 
superstitions of the Middle Ages are condemned to be- 
destroyed or at least to become enslaved and debased. " 
(1959: 212, emphasis added) 
"We lived through pain because we did not understand the 
conditions of the world. Our thinking and our mentality will 
have to become civilized. And we will be proud of this 
civilization. Take a look at the entire Turkish and Islamic 
world. Because they failed to adapt to the conditions and 
rise, they found themselves in such a catastrophe and 
suffering. We cannot afford to hesitate any more. We have 
to move forward... Civilization is such a fire that it burns and 
destroys those who ignore iC' (1959: 207, emphasis added) 
Civilisation in Mustafa Kemal's words stands out as a fierce force 
that destroys those who resist or stay indifferent to it; it is aggressive, 
threatening and all-powerful. The feelings of panic raised by its 
progress and the fear of "being late" are accompanied by a feeling 
of inferiority inflicted on those who are not part of the Western 
civilisation. "The lethargic mentality of the past centuries" should be 
abandoned, said Mustafa Kemal; the new standards should be based 
on "speed and movement that define our century. " (1959: 277) In a 
similar manner G6kalp had said, "(W)e shall skip five hundred years 
and not stand still. " (cited in Lerner, 1958 : 136) 
The impact of the West, therefore, was more than a mere import 
of concepts and techniques for Turkish nationalists. It was not just a 
movement of "modernity" in time and space. It was a totally new 
conception of time which proceeded violently, like a war machine. It 
was a threat that the Turkish nationalists had to acknowledge and 
adapt to with "high speed" for the sake of survival. This probably set 
the ground and defined a complex structure of sentiments for the fast 
"process of modernisation" after the foundation of the Turkish 
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Republic. Whether Kemalist reforms were in continuity with the earlier 
"modern isation" attempts is a much debated one. 44 I agree with 
Mardin who emphasised that "the sensitivity to dimension of time " 
places Kemalist reforms "in a different category from the reformism of 
early Tanzimat" (1981: 200). Mardin points to a feeling of urgenCy45 
on the part of Kemalists "to work for something which did not exist as if 
it existed and make it exist" (209). "Nation" and "Western civilisation" 
were two fundamental keywords for this (lbid). 
Similarly, whether the Kemalist restructuring of the political and 
social realms was reformist or revolutionary has attracted various 
interpretations. 46 The ambiguous word inkllap, which had both 
connotations of reform and revolution, was functional in fostering a 
radical image for attempted changes, but at the same time, allowing a 
space for ongoing negotiations with different interest groups. For 
example, the abolition of the authority of the Sultan-Caliph in 1922 
was an outcome of complex considerations. The majority of the 
people in the national struggle did not have particularly nationalist 
visions; they saw the national struggle as a means to restore the 
sultan-caliph and Islamic constitutionalism (F. Ahmad, 1993: 52). 
Mustafa Kemal, who had referred to Islam as a unifying force in the 
44 Dumont argues that "there is an unbroken continuity in Turkish modernist doctrine from 
the ideology of the Tanzimat to the six Kemalist arrows. " (1984: 41) Eisenstadt proposes 
a comparative framework of revolutions along the axis of continuity/discontinuity. He 
locates the "Turkish revolution" in between the English case where there was a relatively 
small degree of discontinuity, and the Russian case where the largest of discontinuity was 
experienced (1981: 140). 
45 The adoption of a new script within what was called the "language revolution" is an 
excellent example for the feeling of urgency. The commission working on the new 
alphabet came up with two alternative schedules: 15 or a5 year transition programme. 
Mustafa Kemal replied that "(T)his will either happen in three months or it won't happen at 
all. " (cited in G. L. Lewis, 1984: 199) 
46 It is generally agreed that Kemalists did not attempt a revolutionary change that would 
cover the whole national territory. bzbudun argues that the attempted changes remained 
basically within the field of "superstructure" (1981: 93). F. Ahmad (1993) gives an 
illuminating account of the economic, political and social reasons for Kemalists' divide 
between reforming and totally changing the society. He also points to how the term was 
disputed in the Kemalist party, the moderates interpreting it as reformism, the radicals as 
revolutionism (63). 1 argue that Partha Chatterjee's use of the Gramscian concept 
11 passive revolution" in the Indian context can be applied to Turkey: "Passive revolution" 
had the strategy of "molecular transformation" of the state, "neutralising opponents, 
converting sections of the former ruling classes into allies in a partially reorganised system 
of government, undertaking economic reforms on a limited scale so as to appropriate the 
support of the popular masses but keeping them out of any form of direct participation in 
the processes of governance. " (Chatterjee, 1993a: 45) 
58 
First Assembly made a point against the sultan-caliph few years later 
by naming the defenders of the Islamic regime as "conservatives" who 
wanted to perpetuate the "backwardness of Turkey" in relation to the 
West. Images of Western civilisation was employed by Kernalists to 
silence the opponents. 47 However, it can also be argued that the 
British demand that the sultan also sent a delegation along with the 
nationalist delegation to the Lausanne conference in 1922 (for peace 
negotiations which ended with the recognition of the new Turkish 
state) played a role in the decision: the abolition of the sultanate 
represented a distance from both the imperialist British demands and 
the pressing oppositions of "conservatives". 48 Thus the conservatives 
vs. revolutionaries frame, duplicated in most simplistic terms in 
Turkish textbooks on history, require a further analysis in light of 
specific reasons for each reform/revolution. Mustafa Kemal had to 
fight various oppositions to his power, coming from rural authorities 
and landlords who felt threatened by the idea of land reform, mostly 
non-Muslim tradesmen and businessmen who feared that their links 
with the international economy would be severed, Islamists who used 
the figure of the caliph as a symbol for their opposition, and even 
officers in the army who were against the personal rule of Mustafa 
Kemal. 
Kernalists, who organised themselves as the Republican 
People's Party, had to develop policies both to silence and to 
47 A debate in 1925 between an Istanbul MP, Hamdullah Suphi, and an Erzurum MP, 
Ziya Hoca, illustrate how different images of the West were employed in the discussion of 
11 past vs. present". According to Tunaya, Ziya Hoca who represented the past was against 
excessive Westernisation, which imported corruptions together with good aspects of 
civilisation. Against this Hamdullah Suphi gave an ironic reply. He argued that the 
conservatives thought "civilisation would stop at customs when traveling from one 
continent to the other. We would have a committee and inspect each entering item one 
by one. What is this? A locomotive. Let it pass. What is this? Dancing. No we don't want 
it... " (Tunaya, 1996: 108) The debate shows that the culture/civilisation opposition was 
not easy to resolve for Turkish nationalists. 
48 Curiously the term designates not only the Islamic opponents but also Westernised 
liberals, usually members of what was called the Istanbul bourgeoisie, who had vested 
interests in restoring the system of economic dependency on the West (F. Ahmad, 1993: 
53). 
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accommodate the opposition. 49 Turkey had to follow a similarly 
"balancing" international policy which oscillated between abolishing 
the privileges of Western forces and their collaborators inside, and 
making new political and economic alliances with Western 
countries. 50 The complex foreign policies of the Turkish governments 
until the end of the Second World War5l point to the influence of the 
fascist regimes of Germany and Italy on the nationalist political 
vision52, but also the importance given by the government in 
establishing friendly relations with Britain53 . There were also tensions 
in the relations with the Soviet Union54; on the one hand, good 
49 Kernalists used anti-democratic means to suppress the opposition. The law for the 
Maintenance of Order in 1925, following a Kurdish rebellion in eastern Anatolia, brought 
heavy censorship on the press and freedom of opinion. This was an important blow for 
leftist journals (Tuncay, 1981: 142-6). The opponents of the regime were effectively 
silenced by special courts founded at that time, known as Independence Tribunals 
(Tuncay, 1981: 140-1). The opposition party, the Progressive Republican Party founded 
only a year ago in 1924, was dissolved. However, in addition to harsh measures 
Kernalists also sought ways to accommodate the opposition. The experiment of founding 
a token opposition party, the Free Party, with the aim of giving the image of a democratic 
regime is one interesting example. I will mention about the party's fate later in the chapter. 
50 There was a strong sentiment at the Economic Congress of Turkey in 1923, to 
establish "national economic sovereignty". The idea was to build a national industrial 
economy by abolishing the privileges that Europeans enjoyed by the existence of 
"capitulations" in the Ottoman Empire, which was seen by Kernalists as a "colony of 
foreigners". However, the forced immigration of non-Muslim populations who used to hold 
most of the trade and industrial enterprises, in addition to the poor condition of the 
economy after the war, made an isolated economic development impossible. Therefore, 
Kernalists welcomed, even invited, foreign capital. Between 1920 and 1930 about a third 
of the companies set up were joint ventures with foreign capital (F. Ahmad, 1993: 72- 
101). 
51 For an account of the foreign policies during the Second World War, and a 
comprehensive bibliography on Turkish foreign policy before and during the period, see 
Deringil, 1994. 
52 "Fascism ... seemed to suit the ideological needs of Ankara. With Kemalism it shared a love of nationalism and a hatred for class conflict which was denounced for dividing and 
bringing only harm to the nation... But the appeal of fascism was more in the realm of 
practice and organisation than ideas; and that was the direction in which the Kernalists 
were moving ... the regime began to move in the direction of a mono-party system in which 
party members assumed state responsibilities, for example a provincial party chairman 
would be appointed governor of his province. " (F. Ahmad, 1993: 62) 
53 There was a liberal turn in policies in 1936 as a measure against "the regime's fascist 
colouring" before the Montreux Convention on the status of Straits. Recep Peker, the 
representative of anti-liberal sentiments was forced to resign leaving his post as general 
secretary to RPP. The turn was warmly accepted by Britain and led to Anglo-Turkish 
rapprochement sealed by the visit of King Edward Vill's to Turkey (F. Ahmad, 1993: 68). 
54 Turkey established friendly relations with the Bolsheviks starting from the national 
struggle. For an account of the history of Soviet-Turkish relations during the Turkish 
National Struggle see Gbkay, 1996. 
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intrastate relations had to be maintained, on the other hand, all 
indigenous versions of socialist and communist movements were 
crushed. 
The principles of Kemalism, usually known as the six arrows that 
symbolised the RPP, were coined in the beginning of the 1930s as 
Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Secularism and 
Revolution ism/Ref orm ism. In 1937 these principles were incorporated 
into the constitution defining the nature of the Turkish state. 
Nevertheless all were controversial issues. 55 Yet despite all the 
complexities and controversies regarding policies, informed by both 
internal and external historical factors, the ideology of Kemalism 
appeared as a more or less unified discourse towards the end of the 
1930s. This was partly due to the anti-democratic laws and measures 
that crushed or silenced for a period, the opposition. Also by that time, 
many of the reforms associated with the Turkish national identity had 
been accomplished: In 1922 the Sultanate, and in 1924 the Caliphate 
were abolished. In the same year a new Constitution was accepted; 
the laws of March 1924 put education under the monopoly of the 
state and banned medrese, the religious schools. In 1926 Civil Code 
based on Swiss law was adopted in place of Islamic code of law, and 
in the same year the Gregorian calender was put into effect and 
Islamic way of keeping time was replaced with the international clock. 
In 1927 radio broadcasting was inaugurated. After replacing Arabic 
numerals with Western ones, a new Turkish-Latin script was 
introduced in 1928. Women were granted voting rights in 1930, and 
the right to stand for election in national elections in 1934. In 1935 
Sunday was declared to be the weekly holiday in line with the West. 
55 All these principles had also pragmatic functions. Republicanism, which defined the 
regime, was coined against the old regime symbolised in the sultanate. Nationalism was 
the product of the past nationalist movements but it also delineated the Turkish regime 
from Islamic internationalism. Populism was the legitimation of the power of the national 
elite who claimed themselves to be the representatives of "the people". Statism signified 
the anti-liberal economic and political policies, which treated the nation not as composed 
of different classes but as a "unified whole". Instead, the state adopted a paternalistic role 
in regulating the society and economy. Secularism, or Laicism, that justified the abolition 
of the caliphate, aimed to dismiss the use of Islam as a political tool. Finally, Reformism/ 
Revolutionism secured the rule of Kemalists by making it certain that the 
reforms/revolutions are unchangeable (Karal, 1981). All of these principles were 
contested by different groups, such as the Islamists, the liberals and the landlords -who 
feared state intervention (F. Ahmad, 1993). 
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The short time span. of the reforms together with their radical 
nature succeeded to create an effect of revolution which attracted the 
attention of the Western visitors and/or observers. For example, 
Arnold Toynbee, one of the architects of the Western partition plan of 
the Ottoman Empire and who had recorded the "hopeless situation" of 
Turkey after the First World War (F. Ahmad, 1993: 46-7), praised the 
"Turkish state of mind" for its revolutionary character: "L'Empire 
Ottoman est mort; vive la Turquief' joynbee, 1925: 558) Harold 
Bowen, in his "British Contribution to Turkish Studies" identified the 
recovery of Turkey as a "political miracle" , especially noting the 
'miraculous restoration" of Anglo-Turkish friendship (1945: 56). 
Eleanor Bisbee, who admired "the New Turks", called "everybody 
interested in trends of civilization, the fate of nations, and the capacity 
of humans to change their own lives" to turn to the story of the Turks 
(1951: ix). She made use of the "bridge" identity to emphasise the 
importance of Turkey. 56 Turkish nationalists surely managed to draw 
"the attention of the entire world" (Dumont, 1984 : 41). 
However, it is highly debatable that the reforms/revolutions 
succeeded in transforming the whole society according to the desired 
image. Kernalists themselves were aware of the limited reach of the 
changes. The experimentation with a token opposition party, the Free 
Party, had some grave results. The party was established by Mustafa 
Kemal's will in 1930 to "improve Turkey's image in Western Europe" 
(F. Ahmad, 1993: 59), and was thought to be representative of "mild 
opposition" . However, the party attracted an unexpectedly high 
interest from the people. There were strikes and demonstrations 
mobilised around the name of the party, followed by a bloody event; 
the uprising of the members of an Islamic mystical order in middle 
Anatolia led by Dervish Mehmed caused a beheading of an officer in 
the local gendarmerie. The demand articulated in the uprising was to 
restore the Islamic regime. The Free Party was banned in the same 
year. Yakup Kadri, the persistent critical voice of Kernalists, wrote that 
Dervish Mehmed was only a "symptom" of the failure of Kernalist 
56 "They are uniquely important people to know in this era of one-world hopes, because 
they live in a country which is both Asia and Europe, and share the culture and problems 
of both Occident and Orient. " (Bisbee, 1951: ix) 
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reforms: "it is as though nothing has happened all these years, as 
though ... the idea of any of our radical reforms has not altered 
anything in this country" (in OstOn, 1981: 40-1). Yet many Kernalist 
intellectuals and officials did not raise their doubts. What surfaced 
instead, was the devotion to create a "new Turk". 57 This figured as 
part of the principle of populism, especially in the setting up of the 
People's Houses in 1932.58 
Furthermore, some reforms were interpreted in a rather flexible 
way. For example, the new dress code that banned the wearing of fez 
for men, allowed women to continue to wear the veil. On the one 
hand, the modernity of the Turkish nation was signified through the 
"icon" of new Kemalist women (Kandiyoti, 1997a), but on the other, 
there were negotiations with the patriarchal Islamic tradition to keep 
women in newly defined traditional roles, such as wife and mother. 
The double edge of the nationalist discourse in giving some rights to 
women, yet strictly controlling their conduct will be discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6. As a whole, the extent and nature of reforms, and 
the reaction of the Western audience, set the conditions of the fantasy 
articulated in the official discourse. The fantasy of "civilised" Turkish 
identity was projected onto "the people". Kemalists were aware that 
57 The qualities of the new Turk was contrasted to a type of person that existed in the 
past, whose traits were "undervaluing human life, vagabonclage, laziness, poverty, not 
being concerned about nature, being unable to assess the actual value of any concept, 
turning one's back on free thought" (Karal, 1981: 15). One can observe the feeling of 
inferiority in these descriptions which were derived from a comparison with the West. I will 
take up this issue when discussing Radio Talks in Chapter 5. 
58 These semi-educational and politically charged institutions followed on from the Turkish 
Hearths that had been active in the reform period in the Ottoman Empire. The People's 
Houses were established to maintain closer contact with the people in order to educate 
and discipline them. The set goal was to "perpetually constitute the bases of national and 
social life through discipline, education, speech" (words of Prime Minister, ismet jn6no, 
cited in Halkevleri 1932-1935: 103 Halkevi Gegen Yillarda Nasll (ýallýtl, p. 2) They were 
initially designed as sites of cultural exchange and solidarity, where ideally people would 
bring in their own experiences and learn from each other. However, in practice, the 
People's Houses gained a highly centralised structure and were eventually associated 
with the government (Kirby, 1963; bztOrkmen, 1998; TOrko§lu, 1996). Bora draws 
attention to the non-correspondence of the design and practice in the People's Houses 
(1997). 1 will point to how radio broadcasting fitted into the practice of the People's 
Houses in Chapter 3. 
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the full "modern isation" had to deal with the periphery59 but the 
resistant peripheral forces had to be pragmatically manipulated, 
involving compromises. Therefore, the notion of "full modernisation" 
could only be incorporated at the level of fantasy. It was produced and 
consumed primarily in Ankara, the newly constructed site of the 
nation. "Going to the people" as the essential strategy of popUliSM60 , 
was replaced by talking about "the people". The body of the people 
was denied through symbolism, as their "spirit" was incorporated into 
fantasy. Children would hear a song broadcast on Ankara Radio that 
said "there is a village there far away/even if we don't go there, even if 
we don't see it/ it is our village". I will point to the role of Ankara for the 
generation of the Occidentalist fantasy, especially through radio 
broadcasting in Chapter 3. 
Finally, it is possible to argue that Kemalism was not a 
simulation of the Western model but was an act of creation within a 
certain structural and historical network, and was definitely a part - 
quite an old part- of the "real thing", the West. The Occidentalist 
fantasy was powerful to the extent that it could fill a void by means of 
a narration endorsed by Western techniques. 61 The forms of narration 
produced in the process was neither monolithic nor without 
59 Mardin points to the different cultures, including Islamic traditions, of the centre and the 
periphery in the Ottoman Empire. He argues that Ottomans did not adopt modernisation, 
in the Western sense, to join the peripheral ways of life in the national culture (1973, 
1991) Kemalists, too, could not easily bridge the gulf between the centre and the 
periphery. The attempts of "going to the people" were countered by the fear of peripheral 
revolts which would undermine their power. 
60 The People's Houses, with their motto of "going to the people", constitute a highly 
significant subject to analyse the dynamics of populism in Turkey. Their operations 
manifest how the representation of the people had to be denied in practical terms both to 
secure an ideal image and to sustain a central authority. Yeýen analyses the People's 
Houses, from a Foucauldian perspective, as instruments of discipline (1995). However, 
they can also be studied as sites where a different rationale of government manifests 
itself. I will take up this problem in Conclusion. 
61 The Turkish History Institute and The Turkish Language Institute were founded in the 
beginning of the 1930s to to create a basis for Turkishness. They came up with national 
narratives concerning the origins of Turkish race and language. Turkish History Thesis 
developed by a large group of historians, and which claimed that Turkish race had a 
determining role in the foundation of all civilisations made references to some Western 
research (Ersanli-Behar, 1992). Yegen evaluates the endeavor in relation to the desire to 
be part of "Western civilisation" (1995). The role of the "scientific techniques" in developing 
the racist- nationalist theory should not be ignored. The production of text-books based on 
the theory, according to Yegen, was inspired by the discipline of pedagogy. The aim was 
to foster citizenship consciousness. 
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contradictions. Yet it made use of the images of the West, both in a 
negative and positive way, to address the complexity of being, at the 
same time, both Western and Turkish. "Western civilisation" was 
operationalised to justify the new regime against the old, but only to 
emphasise that the Turkish nation would surpass the evils of Western 
way life. The Turkish national anthem should be interpreted in the 
light of Occidentalism that opposed the West and yet yearned to be 
Western: "Fear not, how can that monster called Civilisation/Choke, 
with the last tooth in its jaw, the faith of an entire nation? "62 The desire 
and the contempt produced in and around the "Western isation" 
process were the key elements that fostered the dynamics of 
Occidentalism. 
In this chapter I explored both the theoretical framework and 
some historical conditions of the Occidentalist fantasy and its 
subjects/objects, the national elite, in Turkish national history. In the 
following chapter I will address the methodological issues in 
analysing its manifestations in and through radio broadcasting. 
62 The lyrics were written by Mehmet Akif, a pious poet, and was accepted as the national 
anthem after being suggested by Hamdullah Suphi, a determined supporter of 
Westernisation. Samet Agao6lu comments that this is something that is difficult to 
interpret even today (Tark Yurdu, February 1967, p. 128). 
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The "map" drawn by a former sound engineer, Ertuýrul imer, of 
Ankara Radio as a guide to find the old records in the store room. 
The archives were officially declared to be non-existent but technically 
were lying behind the cupboard. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Burden of History: The Methodological Framework 
All too often social theory is used to provide a frame in which 
empirical analysis is situated. Theory contextualises; history and 
empirical work exemplifies. This work is informed by theory. But my 
ambition is less to produce a theoretical framework than indicate the 
possibility of a dialogue between history and theory. My theoretical 
framework is in constant tension with the historical data, as it confines 
itself to a set of critical questions. 
My aim in this work, is an intervention to the readings of the 
political ideology of Kemalism, in early Turkish national history, by 
shifting the locus of political analysis from official discourses that are 
based on party politics and the state to social fantasies that figure in 
and express themselves in radio broadcasting. The concepts that are 
employed to interpret the highly complex movements in this field 
come from Western human sciences, such as sociology, 
psychoanalysis, and linguistics. They are put into work to treat a 
particular set of practices and texts that come from a non-Western part 
of the world. This involves a re-narrativisation of modernity extending 
and transposing its limits, outside of Western parameters (Hall, 1996: 
250). Thus the concepts travel out of the tradition of Western sciences 
in the process. In this way the conceptual metaphors of the human 
sciences, themselves, are translated gaining other meanings and 
shades, that may, in turn, shed some light on those temporal zones of 
modernity unaccounted within the confines of Western scientific 
inquiry. My research, therefore, is trans-disciplinary in its character 
that moves in between different "scientific" fields of representation, 
and focuses on both the principles and limits of the Western human 
sciences in their attempt to make sense of an "exceptional" non- 
Western case. 
I begin with an account of my research, in the form of a research 
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diary which reveals certain tensions between "unapplicable theories" 
and "untheorisable practices". Then, I move on to develop a 
methodological framework, that has been primarily data-driven, 
emerging through historical research. Here I discuss existing 
theoretical perspectives, namely Foucauldian discourse analysis, the 
psych oanalytical framework of Zizek, and Bakhtin's dialogic model. 
These approaches I find capable, although only partly, to support my 
methodological framework. In this chapter I do not attempt to 
synthesise these quite distinct theoretical perspectives. Rather I try to 
assess the relevance of these theoretical tools for the interpretation of 
my data. 
In the third part of the chapter, I deconstruct the concept of the 
Other as it appears in the theoretical perspectives that I discuss, in 
order to reconstruct the different planes that the concept figures in 
within the specific context of my research. I employ the term 
Occidentalism, as I have discussed in the previous chapter, to analyse 
the active, imaginative and power-producing political subjectivity of 
the Other. This entails a reversal of the treatment of the Other from the 
Western standpoint. The concept of the Other has been "a 
symbolically marked 'constitutive outside"' (Hall, 1996: 252) for the 
West. The modern Western identity is constructed in and through this 
Other which indicates a series of closely linked categories: race, 
gender, and class in the history of Western modernity. I attempt to 
engage in a historical treatment of the Other as it plays a role, and is 
played on by the political subjectivity of the "othered", in the 
"Western isation" process of early Turkish national history. I will attend 
to the concept, within the framework of Occidentalism, in its positivity, 
as a set of experiences, utterances, and practices, instead of 
adopting the often negative definition of the Other: as non-West, as 
non-discursive, or as non-visible. In this section I explicate the 
theoretical tools, namely projection, translation and social fantasy, that 
I instrumentalise in my analysis of Occidentalism. 
Finally, I specify the key analytical objects of this thesis. I pursue 
different levels of analysis drawing on a variety of sources from 
archives to memoirs. The specific methods that I employ to analyse 
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the heterogeneous data are driven from the theoretical- 
methodological framework that I explicate in this chapter; they will be 
outlined with reference to specific sources in the final section. The 
object of the thesis, that is, Occidentalism as conveyed in the history of 
Turkish radio broadcasting, will emerge in the theoretical space that is 
demarcated by these analyses. In this sense, my thesis is to 
construct and define my object of analysis as a product of historical 
research. 
2.1. Research Diary 
My initial research question was derived from a concern to 
relocate Anderson's (1983) argument of "imagined communities" in 
Turkish national history. My question was: In what ways, did radio 
broadcasting during a specific period serve to imagine the Turkish 
nation? The question involved the idea of "modernity as form" in 
Osborne's terms (1995). 1 1 aimed to look for the organisation of 
certain techniques by Turkish Radio, through which the notion of 
nationhood was created or invented, and addressed to a "mass" of 
people, while at the same time, annihilating the temporal differences 
with other nations in the West. The stanclardisation of language, the 
signification of a national present and a national space, the invention 
of a past, the fixation of national memory all appeared as my objects 
of analysis in this context. And it seemed to me that the phase of 
consolidation of the national discourse, which corresponded to the 
years between 1930-1950 was particularly significant in 
understanding the role of radio-broadcasting in providing the formats 
and forms of modernity through a modern medium. However, my 
initial theoretical framework seemed not perfectly applicable in the 
actual process of doing the research. 
I started my research going first to the library of TRT2 (Turkish 
1 "... modernity is not, as such, a project, but merely its form. It is a form of historical 
consciousness, an abstract temporal structure which, in totalizing history from the 
standpoint of an ever-vanishing, ever-present present, embraces a conflicting plurality of 
projects, of possible futures, provided they conform to its basic logical structure. " 
(Osborne, 1995: 23) 
2 TRT was founded as a semi autonomous national broadcasting institution that 
incorporated the separate organisations of Ankara and Istanbul Radio, in 1964. 
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Radio Television) to look. at the publications on the history of radio 
broadcasting. I was pretty sure that the librarian could guide me in 
searching the vast amount of material that I hoped to find. What I 
found, instead, was a librarian completely uninterested and quite 
ignorant of the history of radio broadcasting, and possessing very 
few publications on the subject. The institution seemed to function, 
without any need for historical documentation. It existed in the ever- 
present. My venture to get hold of historical archives, further 
complemented and complicated the picture. Although there existed 
some "selected" sound recordings of radio programmes, they were 
not cataloged according to date3 , and none of them belonged to the 
period I wished to study. I was given the first hint by a higher official in 
a government bureau: "This institution does not keep organised, 
neither sound or written, archives; most of the old material has been 
destroyed either due to neglect or to the obsessive wish of "cleaning" 
the place by new managers". 4 The confessional stories of various 
present or ex-broadcasters, that I talked to, regarding the destruction 
of archives grew in number in a very short time. What struck me in 
those, was the taken-f o r-g ranted ness of the discontinuity. Everybody 
seemed to think it was "normal" that the archives were destroyed. 
Another significant point I noticed was the enjoyment that 
accompanied the stories of destruction. I heard several stories, told 
with pleasure, of how the old records of broadcast programmes in 
Ankara Radio was broken to halves to ease storage; how they were 
distributed to staff who turned them into objects of decoration, such as 
wall clocks. It was told that the written archives were abandoned to lie 
in a "store room" for years, and eventually most of them were 
destroyed by rats; the remaining ones were destroyed by the military 
after the coups of 1971 and 1980. 
Almost all the broadcasters that I interviewed, most of whom were 
active in radio broadcasting in the 50's and 60's, told me that the past 
was not that important anyway. They did not hide their "astonishment" 
about my wish to study the radio broadcasting back in the 40's. One 
3 The most "outstanding" outputs of national importance were preserved basically for 
possibilities of re-broadcasting, not for keeping historical records. 
4 The account of the General Director of Press and Publications Bureau, as a reply to my 
request to have access to the radio archives. January 1996. 
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person thought that radio, in those years, was no more than an 
ii arnateur" venture that reflected only the viewpoints of certain people 
and was produced in "primitive" formats. According to my informant, 
there were no good dramatised programmes, even nothing that can 
be called radio drama5, as we understand it today. Only in the 1960s, 
she said, they could find their way in programming, and that, only by 
groping. 6 Another person declared that, there didn't exist any 
"programming" before the 60's, as well as no clear norms to define 
what a broadcaster was supposed to do. 7 When I asked if there was 
any contact with the BBC in the 40's to a former radio director, he 
seemed surprised at the question and said the contacts with the BBC 
started after the 60's. 8 
These interviews conveyed a certain indifference to the past of 
radio broadcasting. They also reflected an indifferent attitude towards 
organisational history, mostly focusing on personal achievements, or 
the feuds among people within radio. What I encountered in those 
interviews was an extremely personalised account. The non- 
existence of both written and sound archives reinforced the sense of 
discontinuity, and made the past irrelevant. However, while the 
present directors of Ankara Radio ensured me that there were no 
existing archives, guided by an informal "map" of a former sound 
engineer of Ankara Radio, I found my way in the radio building, 
almost as a detective, and finally discovered some precious old 
records of programmes from the 40's lying behind a cupboard. The 
director of Ankara Radio was surprised too. But when he kindly 
agreed to tape them for me, I could see no sign that he was keen to 
keep them for the institutions' sake. 
5 This contradicts the information that Kocabaýoglu gives about radio drama in the 40's, 
which he considers as the "golden years of radio drama" in his account of the history of 
radio broadcasting in Turkey (1980). 
6 Serpil Erdemgil, the director of Cultural Programmes, 1964-70. Now the Chief Director of 
the Turkish Service, BBC. Interview, June 1996. 
7 Abdullah Yilmaz, a programmer who prepared "village programmes" between 1967- 
1972. Interview, June 1996. 
8 Turgut bzakman, Interview, January 1996. His statement contradicts the information in 
the BBC Written Archives which show the contacts started as early as 1937 : 
"M. Hayreddin Bey is the Director General of the newly formed Turkish Government 
broadcasting service, and he is over here on a longish visit to study the working of the 
BBC" ,1 October 1937, "Circulating Memo", E-1/1258. 
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How to explain the destruction or the neglect of archives? One 
clue comes from Marvin's discussion of the double-edged idea of 
"preservation". She argues that the new technologies and media in 
the nineteenth century were considered as the finally achieved means 
that enabled preservation of messages. Guarding culture was 
tantamount to guarding truth. However, while preservation could 
reduce heterodoxies of interpretation and enforce right-thinking 
homogeneity, it could also imperil by introducing uncontrolled variety 
(Marvin, 1988: 204). One can, then, explain the destruction of archives 
in the history of Turkish radio broadcasting as an attempt to control the 
variety of interpretation of the past. By destroying the past, the heirs of 
the past could fix it in their imagination as an absent constant. 
However, this was an all too easy solution to the problem, as I 
have discovered, stepping into the BBC Written Archives. My initial 
reason of visiting the BBC Archives was to find some documents that 
could provide me with information on the history of Turkish Radio. 
The vast amount of material I found there regarding the activities of 
the BBC Turkish Service, radically changed my view. 9 The archival 
documents, neatly kept in files, contained highly "subjective" material: 
such as views on Turkish people and life that can easily be described 
as "Orientalist"; explicit political concerns of propaganda; detailed 
accounts of strategy building to capture the Turkish audience; and 
endless worries regarding the efficiency of strategies. The BBC 
archives, far from providing me with "information" on Turkish radio, 
opened up a domain of politics. My initial reaction, after having 
contemplated on the destruction of archives in the Turkish case, was: 
Why should the BBC keep such documents that express overt 
political concerns? The documents could, one imagines, make the 
institution accountable for critical investigation. But by whom and for 
what end? The archives, for the time being, rest there peacefully 
while the BBC ponders on new ways of addressing and containing 
9 Scannell and Cardiff also point to the vast amount of records in the BBC Written 
Archives: "At present the Written Archives, in the grounds of the BBC Monitoring Service 
at Caversham Park, Reading, contain at least 200,000 files on all aspects of broadcasting 
from the early twenties through to the early sixties. " (1991: xiii) 
72 
multiculturalism. 10 The. truth, manufactured within a dominant 
paradigm of power, Britain still being a model-setting representative of 
Western modernity, has its value as long as it is not challenged from 
within its own procedures of construction. The truth guarded by the 
BBC archives is the still valid truth of the "humanistic" discourse of 
British modernity. In the Turkish case, however, truth has been a 
product of ongoing negotiations that were structured by the Western 
gaze. In the former, archives are merely "history" with no connection to 
the present", while history is denied in the latter. A conclusion that 
follows from this : The BBC employed quite different strategies of 
manufacturing and guarding the truth than Turkish Radio. The 
inscription of historical records (the "empirical") demonstrates a 
technology of government peculiar to the West, in particular to Britain; 
while it is reckoned to be useless in Turkey where government must 
be operating within a different logic. Nonetheless, one may ask: are 
these two logics independent from each other? The intertwined 
history between the West and Turkish nationalism that I have 
illustrated in Chapter 1 makes one think that they are not. 
The experience of doing the research and the data itself, forced 
me to rethink my initial research question. "Modernity as a form" was 
not universal, but was a representation which both produced and 
displaced historical experience. While the representations 
manufactured and disseminated by the BBC, for example claimed a 
full historicity and contained within its identity all the possible 
differences; Turkish Radio had to present its logic of progress in 
nonhistorical terms -modernity, akin to the logic of commodity, being 
an ever-present present to Turkish political subjectivity. In the case of 
the BBC, the recording of historical time affirmed political subjectivity, 
10 Georgina Born's unpublished research points to the recent concerns of the BBC on 
multiculturalism. Seminar, SPS, University of Cambridge, March 1998. Multiculturalism is a 
problematic concept that aids policies, which usually fail to address the continuing 
hierarchies of power. Therefore, multiculturalism remains "within the political logic of 
assimilationism. And historically it plays a role to "endorse the claims to tolerance and 
inclusiveness of English national culture and the British state. " (Donald& Rattansi, 1992: 
2) 
11 Heidegger's comment is relevant here: "every report of the past ... is concerned with 
something that is static. This kind of historical reporting is an explicit shutting down of 
history, whereas it is, after all, a happening. We question historically if we ask what is still 
happening even if it seems to be past. " (1967: 43) 
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while in the Turkish case,. through the annihilation of "historical time" 
the gap with the West was bridged, and identity was constructed by 
the denial of any difference. So, instead of covering up the problem, 
and building up a research on the material available, I felt that, 
however ironic it may sound, the lack of knowledge and absence of 
memory had to be incorporated into my research question. Hence, I 
reformulated my research question: What historical dynamics do 
radio broadcasting, in Turkish national history, convey in terms of the 
articulation and representation of political subjectivity, on the 
boundary of identity/difference with reference to the West? 
Pursuing such a question, means that one cannot deal with self- 
identical units, such as national identity. One has to attend to the 
boundaries that differentiate certain representations, and the history of 
the experiences that shape the boundary management, which are not 
usually represented in sealed representations. The status of archives, 
as an historical symptom, provides an entry to the question. If an 
archive document "draws its value from its place in a chronology and 
a relationship of proximity and legality with the past event" (Agamben, 
1993: 70) then the destruction of the archives indicates an attempt to 
be free from the burden of history. The burden of history, in the Turkish 
case, implies an "inferior" position with reference to an assumed 
universal model. 12 If an archive document registers a discourse of 
power, the absence of the register points to an articulation of power 
behind and beyond discourses. Finally, if an archive document 
registers the self in relation to its others in a fixed form, then the 
absence of the register draws one's attention to pragmatical 
definitions of the self and the other on shifting planes. 
The absence of the archives in Turkish radio broadcasting, is, I 
argue, indicative of a surplus -invested with an abundance of 
symptoms and effects- a surplus which manifests itself as an 
absence, and which resists analysis in a Western framework of doing 
historical research. The surplus is the realm of the Other that has 
12 It is interesting that in Turkey, while the Ottoman archives are open to scholarly view, 
the national archives, in general, are non-existent, either kept from view or destroyed. 
Recently it is discovered that the archives of the Senate between 1961 and 1980 have 
been destroyed. The directors of the archives of the National Assembly claim that this was 
due to a "mistake". Radikal, 29.7.1999. 
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been denied subjectivity. and historicity in the representations of 
Western modernity. Hence, in the second part, I critically discuss 
some theoretical perspectives that, I believe, can address the various 
aspects of the analytical problems that figure in my research. 
2.2. Theory and Methodology 
a. Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
Foucault's critical analysis, provides a theoretical perspective 
that unsettles the universalised categories of Western humanism. 
Therefore it provides a method to analyse the particular configurations 
of political subjectivity in a case, such as Turkey, which raised on the 
translation of Western models of government but produced a critical 
difference. 13 Informed by a Foucauldian discourse analysis one can 
start by analysing the historical conditions of existence of certain 
statements and practices in Turkish nationalist discourse; and how 
they figure as constituents and by-products of political technologies. In 
the same manner, the truth that emerges on Turkish nationality would 
not be treated as given, but would be analysed within the history of its 
production (Foucault, 1988). 
It is also significant that a Foucauldian perspective extends the 
limits of the analysis of politics. Instead of addressing what are called 
as political institutions or political ideology, Foucault chose to attend 
to other, less central fields, such as pedagogy and sexuality, to study 
the production of political technologies as discursive practices. These 
are, according to Foucault, "embodied in technical processes, in 
institutions, in patterns for general behavior, in forms for transmission 
and diffusion, and in pedagogical forms, which, at once, impose and 
maintain them. " (Foucault, 1977: 200) Political technologies as 
discursive practices are not just what produce discourses, but they 
1j Bhabha, based on Foucault's theory of "repeatable materiality" in the The Archeology 
of Knowledge (1972), points to "the process by which statements from one institution (or 
enunciative context) can be transcribed in the discourse of another ... any change in the statement's conditions of use and reinvestment, any alteration in its field of experience or 
verification, or indeed any difference in the problems to be solved, can lead to the 
emergence of a new statement: the difference of the same. " (Bhabha, 1994: 22) 
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link to bodies in space and time, and to sensations, such as pleasure. 
In this way, Foucault analyses the production of "truth" through 
techniques that lie across and beyond the conventional boundaries of 
disciplines. 
Foucault's method of doing theory, informed by a historical 
practice of analysis, is relevant to my work. First of all, my research 
question that focuses on the boundaries of the nationalist discourse 
that is reproduced in radio broadcasting and that tie with a political 
subjectivity, is justified by a Foucauldian perspective. I treat radio 
broadcasting as a site of discursive practices which are linked to a 
whole range of complex modifications outside of its domain, such as 
social relationships and political institutions; but also to inside factors, 
such as its techniques for determining its object, the adjustment and 
refinement of its concepts, and its accumulation of facts (Foucault, 
1977: 200). Secondly, the "problem of reason" as it appears in the 
absence of archives in Turkish history, can be treated historically and 
not metaphysically in a Foucauldian perspective. It draws attention to 
the specific manifestations of truth, as "the connection between ways 
of distinguishing true and false and ways of governing oneself and 
others" (Foucault, 1991b: 82). This justifies my treatment of the 
specificity of the discourse that informed radio broadcasting in Turkey, 
not as a less perfect form14 of the Western model but as a distinct 
practice which has its boundaries, its rules of formation, and its 
conditions of existence (Foucault, 1991a: 62). Such a perspective 
guided my comparative analysis of the BBC Turkish Section and 
Turkish radio broadcasting. Thirdly, in connection to the displacement 
of absolute models, it is also significant that Foucault's theoretical 
perspective has provided the tools for analyses of Western power in 
the non-West, such as Said's work on Orientalism. Said uses 
Foucault's concepts to show how the "Orient" is the essentialised 
construct of the Orientalist discourse (1995). 
However, looking closely at Foucault's categories at work in 
14 Foucault warns us against not assessing things "in terms of an absolute against which 
they could be evaluated as constituting more or less perfect forms of rationality, but rather 
examining how forms of rationality inscribe themselves in practices or systems of practices, 
and what role they play within them, because it's true that 'practices' don't exist without a 
certain regime of rationality. " (1991b: 79) 
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theory, I see certain interconnected problems in relation to my 
research. Foucault's analysis of discourse dwells on the "exteriority" of 
discourses, that is, their manifest appearance. Foucault has dealt with 
the limits and the forms of the sayable; and argued against the 
excavation of "implicit meanings". This links to Foucault's interest in 
analysing discourses from the viewpoint of the forms of inscription 
and circulation of knowledge. One of his most important questions is: 
"how can scientific discourses be objects of a political practice? " 
(1991a: 69) His method of inquiry employs tools that are mostly 
borrowed from the tradition of Western sciences, such as diagrams, 
schemes, and grids used to demonstrate the operations of discursive 
practices. His emphasis lies on the scientifically demonstrable 
techniques of power or government. In this context, the problem of 
reason is treated in a universe which is assumed to be intelligible 
within a certain rationality. It is a universe where the meticulous 
attempt to register the social, and a will to truth exists as the dominant 
mode of power. The "antagonisms of strategies"15 that he studies 
within this universe exist only to make the already inscribed forms16 
of rationality visible. Therefore a Foucauldian perspective does not 
help one to reflect on the historical conditions of the articulation of 
reason as part of the Western history17, in which the Western power 
over non-West has been the structuring principle. 18 Although Foucault 
makes it clear that: "Even if the Aufkljrung has been a very important 
phase in our history and in the development of political technology, I 
think we have to refer to much more remote processes if we want to 
10 ý-oucault argues in his seminal article, "The Subject and Power', that what describes 
his methodology is: "(R)ather than analyzing power from the point of view of its internal 
rationality, it consists of analyzing power relations through the antagonism of strategies. " 
(1982: 211) 
16 Foucault often uses texts and documents as his sources; his "battlefield was at the 
same time the world of archives and manuscripts. " (Kritzman, 1988: xviii) 
17 Derrida's critique of Foucault centres on the assumptions of a "history": "A history, that 
is, an archaeology against reason doubtless cannot be written, for, despite all 
appearances to the contrary, the concept of history has always been a rational one. It is 
the meaning of 'history' or archia that should have been questioned first, perhaps. A 
writing that exceeds, by questioning them, the values 'origin', 'reason', and 'history' could 
not be contained within the metaphysical closure of archaeology. " (Derrida, 1978: 36) 
18 The Western representation of modernity is "inextricably linked to the history of 
European colonialism, and as such bound up with the politics of a shifting set of spatial 
relations... " (Osborne, 1995: 13) 
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understand how we have been trapped in our history" (in 
Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 210); his historical imagination does not go 
as remote as the non-West. 19 
Keeping on mind C. L. R. James's warning that the postcolonial 
critics must remain alert to "domains of social practice that are not 
governed by textual/communicative rules" (Henry&Buhle, 1992: 140), 1 
argue that the nationalist discourse in Turkey is not merely legible in 
terms of the forms and the limits of the sayable. What was considered 
as "not sayable" and remained unrepresented, but which continued 
to shape the discursive practices should be addressed too. The 
translation of Western discourses of government in Turkey 
overdetermined the split between the sayable and the non-sayable, 
and consecutively the tension between the inscription of knowledge 
and the destruction of archives. Foucault's theoretical perspective 
does not attend to those experiences and practices that are not 
articulated in a discourse, that remain fragmented and unrepresented. 
Discourses or discursive practices, in Foucault's genealogical 
analysis, appear as sites, or "logical spaces" in which objects, 
subjects, concepts and strategies are articulated in a specific 
configuration enacting power, and producing truth. Foucault argues 
that in order to arrive at "a grid of intelligibility of the social order ... one 
needs to be nominalistic. " (in Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 187) Actors 
pursue a logic regarding their practices, although they are not the 
subjects of their actions. The problem, however in my case, is how to 
make sense of those practices that do not seem to fit into a logic (what 
is manifest as the logic) but informed by other factors that remain 
implicit. Or to put in more general terms, how do we understand the 
temporal and spatial zone of modernity that has not been illuminated 
by the Enlightenment framework, that escapes its own reasonal- 
critical reflection, yet that has historically contributed to its structuration 
19 Foucault's interpretation, for example, of the revolutionary struggle of the people in 
Iran appears as an exception to his method of analysis. Young criticises Foucault for his 
fantasy of "a collective will, as pure being, screens the historical relation of the revolution 
to its colonial adversaries" (1995b: 57). Because it happens elsewhere, in a non- 
Christian, non-Western environment, the revolution in Iran does not fit into the historical 
diagrams of the modern regime of power according to Foucault. It seems to transcend 
"what might appear as the 'prison house of discourse'. " (Kritzman, 1988: xxii) Foucault's 
depiction of the political upheaval in Iran comes close to a form of Orientalism.. 
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by its repression or displacement in the Western representationS? 20 
That "dark" zone where reason meets its counterpart, where 
discourses are in a dynamic link with non-discursive practices. The 
question ties to my concern, in the research, to interpret various non- 
discursive practices in the Turkish national history as part of the 
history of modernity. Thus, going through Foucault, I try to reach to 
"much more remote processes" that may lie beyond, or alongside, 
modern discourses and modern technologies, in order to analyse the 
historicity of those practices produced in relation to modern 
discourses and technologies, but as something in the realm of the 
Other. 
b. Zizek and "non-knowledge" 
I have argued that the destruction of archives in Turkish Radio 
can be treated as an historical symptom. I have discussed how a 
Foucauldian perspective can open a path to attend to the procedures 
of production of truth in the specific circumstances. But I also pointed 
to the blind-spots in Foucault, that a Foucauldian perspective cannot 
say much about the non-existence of a register of knowledge, in its 
connection to power. At this point, I want to introduce a 
psych oan alyti cal perspective, specifically one that is formulated by 
Zizek. 
Zizek, a post-Lacanian thinker, pursues a method of 
psych oan alytical critique of culture and ideology. Arguing against 
structural readings of Lacan, he shifts the focus of analysis from 
language to social fantasy. The emphasis made by Zizek, in this 
context, regards the position of the subject, not as a predetermined 
position in a discourse but as an empty space, a void, that has to be 
filled by identification . Thus, 
he ascribes fantasy an important role as 
a link between individual psychic life and the social context. He says, 
"(F)antasy is basically a scenario filling out the empty space of a 
fundamental impossibility, a screen masking a void. " (Zizek, 1989: 
20 It is a central theme in Bhabha's argument that "the role the non-Western world played 
in the constitution of modernity has never been properly acknowledged. " (Moore-Gilbert, 
1997: 123) 
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125) 1 find Zizek's treatment of social fantasy useful in my analysis of 
the political subjectivity of Kernalist elites, as it manifests itself in radio 
broadcasting. 
I resort to psychoanalysis to make sense of the splits and gaps 
in the nationalist discourse that often appear in my data. The way "us" 
and "them" figure in early Turkish nationalism, especially in radio 
dramas and talks are stricken with an ambivalent attitude to the West: 
"The West that has denied and ruined our history" versus "the West 
idealised as the civilisation". The ambivalence has been treated by 
the elite in the realm of social fantasy and was thought to be 
superseded in the conception of "Turkish national identity" which 
combined the elements of both Western "civil isation" and "authentic 
Turkish culture". However, despite the attempts to define and fix the 
"Turkish national self" embedded in a unique national culture, the self 
still appears as split in most of its articulations. The self-conscious 
effort to overcome the split can be observed in an interest, among the 
elite, in psychology, especially Freud's psychoanalysis in the 1940s. 
However, the emphasis in this interest lay more on interpreting away 
the splits rather than on Freud's analysis of the self, "split and 
fractured by unconscious desire, to be forever thrown off-center from 
itself. " (Elliott, 1992: 24) It dwelled on psychological explanations of 
"social vice" that could be eradicated by further commitment to 
Kernalist principles, as I will discuss more in detail in Chapter 5. 
Therefore, psychoanalysis, figured and employed in this context, 
helped to endorse the political regime, instead of leading to a radical 
analysis. Hence the process of adaptation of Freud's theory, which 
can be designated as "psychologism" in early Turkish national history 
is itself worthy of analysis, as well as the objects of analysis that are 
indicated within it. In a very interesting series of articles, "Social 
Neurosis in Turkey"21 
, dated 1937, ýadan compared Turkish society 
to a "sick" individual referring to Freud. He said: 
"It is not unusual that a social community that has been 
drifted into war and poverty for long years; that has only 
been treated by hostility by all nations, both Islamic and 
Christian, gets sick just as an individual who has been 
21 Dr. lizeddin ýadan, 70rkiye'de Ma§eri Nevroz", Yeni Adam, N. 198,199,200.14,21,28 
October 1937, pp. 8,8,8. 
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subject to traumas. " 
Although the article itself is not exempt from an internalised 
Western judgment that had labeled the Ottoman State as "sick man", it 
dwells on the problem of Westernisation and its effects on Turkish 
society. $adan's concern was to both diagnose the problem and to 
develop forms of treatment. The article classified the members of the 
elite according to the different categories of neurosis that ýadan 
defined. The categories ranged from "defeatism" to "infantilism", from 
"narcissism" to "revoltism". Thus, they gained highly political 
overtones in the context of the nationalist discourse, which was 
treated as the "norm". However the thread that underlined the analysis 
of the political symptoms of social neurosis, was the "inferiority 
complex". 
"A feeling of inferiority has been corroding us for hundred 
and fifty years. To see ourselves inferior, and to always 
lament that the West, or rather the Christian world, is 
superior to us is one of our most pathetic habitS. "22 
ýaclan explicated the primary "pathetic" trait of the Turkish society 
by referring to Freud's concept of hostility: namely, the historical 
hostility against the Turks. But he believed that this was "nonsense" at 
the present moment , as there was no reason to denigrate the present 
"psychological formation" of the Turkish nation. In contradictory ways, 
the analysis both diagnosed and denied the problem at the same 
time. In other words, it wished it away. What this rather non-reflexive 
and "ideological" interpretation of Freudian analysis crucially brings to 
view, is the split between the narrative of the "civilised" self and social 
"reality" in the Kemalist political subjectivity. 
The split recurs in almost every account of the nationalist project, 
and becomes more apparent within the domain of discursive practices 
pertaining to radio broadcasting due to its fragmentary nature as a 
less totalised and less theorised domain. Furthermore, "the voice of 
the nation" that disseminates from radio, is already a product of a split, 
in the sense that it is loosely attached to the political subject. Radio 
technology produces a voice "without bearer, which cannot be 
22 Dr. lizeddin . 9, adan, "TOrkiye'de Ma§eri Nevroz", Yeni Adam, NA 99,21 Octoberl 937, 
p. 8. 
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attributed to any subject and thus hovers in some indefinite 
interspace. " (Zizek, 1991: 126) A psychoanalytic framework that 
addresses this indefinite space is useful in theorising the splits of the 
"national" self in its various aspects in the Turkish nationalist 
discourse which constitute the objects of analysis in my thesis. These 
include: the denial of history, the denial of the heterogeneous 
experience of the people, the ambivalent attitude toward the West, the 
ferninisation and infantilisation of popular culture. Furthermore it can 
illuminate some historical aspects of Occidentalism, that is, the 
relationship between the self and the Other in modernity, seen from 
the Other's position. 
Psychoanalysis unsettles the Western notions of self-identical 
selfhood. The unconscious desire, according to Freud, splits the 
human subject, and makes it non-identical with itself. Freud's theory is 
a "challenge to Western thought on power of reason and rationality, of 
reflective and conscious control over the self. " (Elliott, 1992: 17) Given 
that the Western notion of the self is contested by psychoanalysis, it is 
not mere coincidence that postcolonial criticism, dating back to Fanon, 
has made some use of psychoanalytical concepts to address the 
splits in the colonised subject as structured by the conditions of 
colonialism. 23 For Fanon, for example, the "inferiority complex" that 
the "Negro" experienced in colonised Algeria had nothing to do with 
family dynamics or the Oedipus complex but to do with 
"epidermalization" of social inferiority (Kruks, 1996). It is also 
23 Postcolonial theory makes use of psychoanalysis by not focusing on "individual 
psyche" but addressing the dynamics of subject-constitution and identification in the realm 
of experiences in a colonial situation extending to the postcolonial period. Fanon's 
original writing on "black identity" in Algeria, emphasised that self-consciousness requires 
recognition by the Other (1993: 216). Bhabha's rereading of Fanon, explicates the 
concept by employing Lacan's notion of the Other as a necessary element of subject- 
constitution. He says that he is engaged with the "foreign" element that becomes the 
"unstable element of linkage" between cultures (1994: 227). For both Fanon and 
Bhabha, the seemingly monolithic identities constructed by colonialism, such as Negro or 
native, are produced through a complex relationship with the "foreign" and can become 
sites of both mimicry and resistance. Ashis Nandy, in a similar manner, attends to splits in 
Indian identity which has been produced through colonialism. He, too, uses concepts of 
psychoanalysis but claims to shift "the locus of criticism from the purely psychological to 
the psycho-political" (1994: xix) Another postcolonial critic, Spivak adapts classical 
psychoanalysis for the study of colonial relations (1987; 1993) but she warns against the 
use of universal categories of psychoanalysis. She introduces the concepts of gender 
and race into the study of classical psychoanalytical discourse, as can be seen in her 
essay "Feminism and Critical Theory" (1985). 
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significant that Fanon contrasted the appeal to reason in the Western 
context to the temptation of the colonised to escape reason. 24 The 
psychic economy that produced "pathologies" in this context was 
generated by the conflict between the "lived experience of the black", 
and the linguistic imposition of an "education to whiteness". (Stevens, 
1996: 206) While Freudian analysis is confined to the operations of 
the individual psyche, despite its dynamics that relates it to an "other"; 
postcolonial critics offer mediating concepts, such as ambivalence, 
resentment, mimicry, to account for the interconnections between 
individual experiences and historical processes. 
Nevertheless the analyses of these interconnections remain 
problematic and have been subject to criticisms. 25 The employment of 
both Freud's and Lacan's theories in the analysis of the colonial 
situation have been problematised in terms of their shortcomings 
regarding the acknowledgement of the colonial history but also 
gender, race and class. Spivak has extensively dealt with these 
problems and suggests that both Freud and Lacan's work need to be 
situated within the history of "the institutionalization of 
psychoanalysis ... and its imposition upon the colonies" 
(1987: 261-2). 
The problem is further complicated in my case where I attend to the 
psychoanalytic mediations, between lived experience and the 
historical processes, that are specifically produced through the 
medium of electronic mass communication which could alter their 
"original" conceptions in other mediums, such as in face to face 
interaction. There is always the danger of collapsing specific 
individual dynamics into the operations of the social and the 
technological or vice versa. Therefore, keeping all these problems 
24 Fanon says: I had rationalized the world and the world had rejected me on the basis 
of color prejudice. Since no accord was possible on the level of reason, I threw myself 
back toward irrationality ... 
I wade in the irrational. Up to the neck in the irrational. And how 
my voice vibrates! " (1993: 123) 
25 The criticisms directed to the use of psychoanalysis in the study of colonial relations 
cover a wide range from the use of inappropriate tools to the problem of applicability of 
these tools in a colonial context. Kruks criticise Fanon for not providing tools with which to 
theorise "the interconnections between the realm of existential experience, in which the 
dynamics of non-recognition and self -affirmation are played out, and the broader world of 
political and historical processes in which the dynamics of oppression they (Fanon and 
Sartre) describe are enmeshed. " (1996: 132-3). Young's criticism of Bhabha dwells on a 
more general problem concerning the "applicability" of "the transcendental categories of 
psychoanalysis for the analysis of the historical phenomenon of colonialism. " (1990: 144) 
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and limitations on mind, 1. choose not to focus on the study of the 
unconscious when I resort to psychoanalysis. Instead, I follow 
Donald's question: "How do you analyse the dynamics of culture 
differently once you recognise the centrality of the unconscious? " 
(1991: 3) 
Zizek offers a psychoanalytic approach to deal with the 
symptoms of the unconscious in a cultural framework. He dwells on 
the objects of social fantasy that the subject of the signifier in 
language attempts to incorporate into its virtual identity. Zizek points 
both to the process of subjectivisation, and to the object-cause of 
desire in this context. The significance of this conceptual isation bears 
upon two points that I want to make in my analysis: 1) the process of 
identification of the Kemalists with the West, and the objects of desire 
that are incorporated in a social fantasy; yet 2) the elements that 
escape the discursive network, that "falls out" from it, that are 
produced as its "excrement" or "remainder" (Zizek, 1991: 131). 1 use 
the two concepts of Zizek's to interpret the symptoms (the coded 
messages in Zizek's terms) of these dynamics in early Turkish 
national history in its relation to the West; they are: "the virtual 
viewpoint of the Ego-ideal" and "non-knowledge". 
Zizek posits, with Lacan, that 
"the status of the subject itself (the subject of the signifier) is 
that of just such a 'virtual image': it exists only as a virtual 
point in the self-relating of the signifier's dyads; as 
something that 'will have been, that is never present in 
reality or its 'real' (actual) image. It is always-already 'past', 
although it never appeared 'in the past itself'; it is 
constituted by means of a double reflection, as the result of 
the way the past's mirroring in the future is mirrored back to 
the present. " (Zizek, 1996: 15) 
The double-reflection complicates the identification process. In 
Lacanian analysis identification is normally conceived of in terms of 
an imaginary mirror relationship. But in Zizek's account it is linked with 
Ego-Ideal, being located in the symbolic realm. The Ego-ideal that 
emerges out of this process can be paraphrased as: I am what I think 
how the others (that are symbolically significant determined by the 
hegemonic discourse of signifiers or the "master-signifier") see me. 
84 
Then, both the subjective Jdentity and the viewpoint of the other are 
virtual. Symbolic truth emerges via "imitation of imitation" (Zizek, 
1996: 13). Because the subject can never bridge the gap between the 
1i actual" and the "virtual" points, it is forever trapped in the impossibility 
of achieving self-identical identity. The self is both displaced and 
constituted by the non-knowledge that arises out of the virtual circuit of 
the self's relation to the other. The self imitates an object it can never 
know. 
Non-knowledge is a functional non-discursive entity in Zizek's 
model. It does not necessarily indicate the implicit or unconscious 
meaning that can be revealed by excavation. According to Zizek, "the 
unconscious must instead be conceived as a positive entity that 
retains its consistency on the basis of a certain non-knowledge. " 
(1992: 44) In the same manner, for "reality to exist, something must be 
left unspoken. " (45) Zizek, in this way, links "non-knowledge" to the 
process of identification whereby subjects assume a certain identity in 
a social reality structured by the social fantasy of suture which 
narrates itself as having origins and laws of development. He talks of 
a kind of reality, "whose very ontological consistency implies a certain 
non-knowledge of its participants- if we come to 'know too much', to 
pierce the function of social reality, this reality would dissolve itself. " 
(Zizek, 1989: 21) 
1 argue that Occidentalism, as the primary object of analysis in my 
thesis, can be posited through the processes of identification of the 
Turkish elite with the West. This would mean that the West is 
constituted as a virtual viewpoint of the Ego-ideal for them, and 
consequently the social fantasy constructed by the appropriation of 
the Western objects of desire constitutes the subjectivity of the elite. 
The non-knowledge, as the remainder of the circuit, corresponds to 
the gap that is necessarily produced by but which also secures the 
process. The gap, therefore, is not necessarily disrupture as Bhabha 
implies. 
Zizek's model allows me to connect social fantasies, the 
elements of which can be traced in radio dramas, for example, with 
the conditions of subjectivity. It enables me to locate not only, 
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following Foucault, discursive practices, but also the remainders, in 
Turkish national history, which exist as effects and manifest 
themselves as symptoms such as the destruction of the archives. 
However, the psychoanalytic model does not provide the tools to 
interpret the historical differences, such as the difference between the 
strategies of the BBC and the Turkish Radio. It only points to the 
general dynamics that paradoxically sustain the symbolic order while 
also condemning it to failure (Elliott, 1992: 191). It dismantles the 
supposed fit between culture and subjeCt26, which paves the way for 
a critical analysis, but the model turns out to be too static in its 
emphasis on the necessity of the "lack of fit". For Zizek, the failure is 
functional for the maintenance of a social order both in its discursive 
and non-discursive aspects. In this framework, non-identity is the 
condition of identity, and non-knowledge is what makes the discourse 
of truth possible. Zizek does not attend to the historical configurations 
in which the discourse of truth as well as its remainder emerge. He 
does not study the interaction between different possible models of 
subjectivity and truth as observed in actual cases, such as the 
difference between the subjectivity of the coloniser and the colonised 
in the colonial history. 
To the extent that Zizek does not address the problems of 
historical subordination and power, some of my questions cannot be 
approached within this model. For example, what makes the Turkish 
elite more aware than the British of the "split" that is, the "lack of fit" 
between culture and subject, as can be seen in the psychologism of 
the elite in the 40's? Why is "imitation" a problem for the Turkish 
modernisers and constitute an important theme in writings on Turkish 
nationality, while Western modernity can be treated as the "real 
thing"? (introduction, Chapter 1) Why was the "voice of the nation" 
that was disseminated from Turkish Radio associated with a display 
for the West ? (Chapter 3) Why did the BBC Turkish Service and 
Ankara Radio adopt different strategies for constructing "truth"? 
(Chapters 4) Why did the works of social fantasy on radio, specifically 
radio dramas, fail to construct a convincing popular address? 
26 According to Donald (1991) the most disconcerting question that psychoanalysis poses 
to cultural studies is the "lack of fit" between culture and subject. 
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(Chapter 6) These questions lead me to deal with non-knowledge 
more closely, not only as a functional remainder, but as a form of 
boundary management. What I mean by boundary management is 
the continuous historical struggle -which is informed by power 
relations- to distinguish the discursive field of truth from what 
contests it. Non-knowledge refers, in this context, to a functional and 
invisible remainder but which is historically produced, transgressed 
and contested. The discursive practices orientated towards defining 
"the people" as an object in radio broadcasting, and the non- 
discursive effects that circumscribe these practices provide a ground 
for this conceptualisation. The analysis of the boundaries, and of 
consequent boundary management that has been part of the 
articulation of political subjectivity of the Turkish elites seems to me 
crucial in order to grasp the historical aspects of Occidentalism. 
Zizek's functional treatment of non-knowledge implies a boundary 
which he fails to address. Therefore, I introduce a third dynamic 
constituent of my analytical framework, a dialogic analysis. 
c. Bakhtin and Dialogic Analysis 
In my analytical framework Foucault provides a theoretical 
perspective to understand the constitution of subjectivity through 
discursive practices. Zizek offers a model for the analysis of structural 
dynamics of the relationship between the self and the Other. I argue, 
Bakhtin's dialogic approach gives me the tools to interpret the specific 
historicity of practices and utterances that occur within my data. 
Bakhtin's contributions are not limited to the field of linguistics. 
He offers an innovative methodological outlook to comprehend the 
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social and historical attributes of utterances. 27 He is against both a 
relativist and a structuralist approach, treating history neither as 
random nor as completely ordered, and regarding social entities as 
aggregates rather than systems. According to him, 
"(T)he world clusters and unclusters. Particular elements 
interact with existing aggregates; particular elements are 
also continually detached from aggregates, cluster anew, 
and form the basis for yet more unforeseen interactions. 
Unfinalizability characterizes the whole as well as 
particular parts. " (Morson& Emerson, 1990: 45). 
Bakhtin attends specifically to boundaries to analyse the 
historical articulation of identities. According to him, neither 
individuals nor social entities are locked in their boundaries, they are 
partially "located outside" themselves. So cultural entities are all 
determined at the boundary, through an interaction with another. 
There is no sovereign internal territory: when one looks inside, one 
looks "into the eyes of another or with the eyes of another" 
(Morson&Emerson, 1990: 51). Then one must not imagine the realm of 
culture as some sort of spatial whole having an internal territory; "it is 
entirely distributed along the boundaries, boundaries pass 
everywhere, through its every aspect... Every cultural act lives 
27 Bakhtin's Russian texts which had remained fragmented and untranslated for a long 
time, had a big impact on Western social theory after thel 980s with the English 
translation of The Dialogic Imagination (1981) (French translation in 1978) On the one 
hand, it appealed to Marxist literary critics, such as Tony Bennett (1979); Terry Eagleton 
(1981); David Forgacs (1982); Fredric Jameson (1981); Graham Pechey (1983); Allon 
White (1984), as a historical and materialist approach to the study of literary texts. For 
Marxists Bakhtin provided a "sociological critique of structuralism, as well as the materialist 
theory of language" (Young, 1986). On the other hand, Robert Young (1986) also 
discusses how Bakhtin has been celebrated by post-structuralist thought, following 
Kristeva's much earlier essays, in the 60's, on Bakhtin (1981). Bakhtin's work provokes 
"intertextuality, the denial of univocal meaning, infinite interpretation, the negation of 
originary presence in speech, the positioning of the subject in and by discourse, the 
breaking down of the identity of the subject, of all inside/outside oppositions, of the 
semantic identity of the sign, and 'the crumbling away of the representational system' as 
such" (Young, 1986: 87). Young argues that Marxists too easily adapted Bakhtin's ideas 
to their framework to offer an alternative to post-structuralism and confuse "dialogism" with 
"dialectics" 
. 
He also offers his own criticisms to Bakhtin. Young's criticism was replied by 
Allon White from a Marxist point of view: According to White (1988) Bakhtin unsettles the 
simple opposition between post-structuralism and radical humanism; "he becomes their 
active break as well as their conjuncture" (241) In discarding Bakhtin, "Young simply aligns 
him with existing conservative appropriations and misses an important opportunity to 
enrich the debate between radical humanists and post-structuralists on the left" ([bid). I 
agree with White that the "struggle over Bakhtin" shows that Bakhtin's work provides a 
rich and provocative source for social theory. 
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essentially on the boundaries: in this is its seriousness and 
significance; abstracted from boundaries it loses its soil, it becomes 
empty, arrogant, it degenerates and dies. " (Morson& Emerson, 1990: 
51) Bakhtin speaks of cultural entities that resemble oscillating 
"fields", that is, a play of force lines rather than an assembly of objects. 
Bakhtin defines the term "dialogue" to grasp the play of force 
lines which exist in a "tension-filled environment". The significance of 
this approach lies in its capacity to bring in the situatedness of the 
word as it relates to its object, which happens not in singular way nor 
in a vacuum: 
61 ", between the word and its object, between the word and the speaking subject, there exists an elastic environment of 
other, alien words about the same object ... It is precisely in the process of living interaction with this specific 
environment that the word may be individualized and given 
stylistic shape. Indeed, any concrete discourse (utterance) 
finds the object at which it was directed already as it were 
overlain with qualifications, open to dispute, charged with 
value, already enveloped in an obscuring mist -or, on the 
the contrary, by the 'light' of alien words that have already 
been spoken about it. " (Bakhtin, 1981: 276) 
A dialogic conception of truth reveals the historical, social and 
political interaction that plays a part in its production; the moment of 
utterance is ordered by the interaction of past words yet in its 
'presentness' it bears the potential of unfinalisability. It could have 
been otherwise, but once it has become it is irreversible and enters 
the field of interaction of future utterances as a constraining element. 
However most discourses on history tend to codify the words by way 
of masking their dialogic character, that is killing their once live and 
unfinalisable context. Codification is based on the separation of the 
elements of the historical interaction fixing them in a closed context, 
hiding their relationality and the tension of force fields involved. 
On the other hand, Bakhtin's emphasis is on how utterances are 
shaped by a real or imagined listener from the outset. This approach 
radically differs from the ethnographic approaches in media studies 
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that privilege the meanings produced actively by readers/listeners. 28 
While it may be so that meanings vary in different contexts Bakhtin's 
approach points to readers/listeners as shaping "the utterance as it is 
being made. " (Morson&Emerson, 1990: 129). Voloshinov, who belongs 
to the same circle of linguists as Bakhtin in Russia, says that a word is 
a two-sided act. "it is determined equally by whose word it is and for 
whom it is meant ... it is precisely the product of the reciprocal 
relationship between speaker and listener, speaker and addressee... " 
(1973: 86). There is also a third party in the dialogue that Bakhtin 
names as the superaddressee who is a posited imaginary listener, 
"whose absolutely just responsive understanding is presumed, either 
in some metaphysical distance or in distant historical time. " (Bakhtin, 
1986: 126) Superaddressee has been personified in various 
ideological expressions (God, absolute truth, the court of 
dispassionate human conscience, the people, the court of history, 
science, and so forth) (lbid). The "superaddressee" is a constitutive 
aspect of the whole utterance and one that can be revealed under 
deeper analysis. 
The theoretical approach of Bakhtin and Voloshinov provides 
significant points of departure that I make use of in my analysis. There 
are two interconnected axes in my research that dialogic analysis 
specifically bears upon: The play of force lines 1) on the boundary 
between "the people" and the elite in the practice of radio 
broadcasting, 2) on the boundary between the West and the East, 
especially in the context of the BBC Turkish Service transmissions 
and Turkish Radio. Thus, I follow the guidelines provided by dialogic 
analysis, to interpret the utterances and texts that constitute my data: 
1) Extralinguistic forces are constitutive of utterances and their 
history: so a metalinguistic or a sociological perspective is required for 
; ýb A Bakhtinian approach can also be utilised to criticise the rather static 
encoding/decoding model of Hall (1980). Hall's idea of messages being first encoded by 
producers, then decoded by receptors, albeit within a different scheme of reading, 
implies two separate horizons, that of production and reception. Bakhtin's approach, on 
the other hand, emphasises the unity of these processes: how production is always 
already shaped according to an imagined receptor, and how reception is realised 
according to an imagined sender of messages. Hall's approach is reworked in the 
ethnography of media audiences by Ang (1985), Fiske (1987), Morley (1980; 1989), 
Radway (1987). 
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the analysis of them. 29 
2) Language, cultural norms, personal history are given but an 
utterance or an action is never just the product of what is given. "It 
always creates something that never existed before, something 
absolutely new and unrepeatable" (Bakhtin, 1986: 119-20). So 
"presentness" of each moment of and creativity in each utterance and 
its novel effects must be acknowledged. 
3) Utterances are shaped in a dialogue between the speaker and 
the addressee, though not in a direct or singular way. They are 
shaped by the anticipation of a response- by the "not-yet-spoken"; 
they are also shaped by previous utterances about the topic- the 
"already-spoken" (Morson&Emerson, 1990: 137). So one must seek 
the imprints of a continuous struggle- a historical and a social one- , of 
the play of force lines that shape each utterance while being 
internalized/interpreted within it. Each utterance is a value judgment, 
a stance with reference to past, present and future words, thus each 
utterance should be treated as a political act. 
4) The ideological expression of the superaddressee structures 
the utterances. So, utterances should also be linked to the level of 
more systematic "discourses"; the way specific utterances talk to more 
general discourses should be analysed. 
5) "The ideological sign must immerse itself in the element of 
inner, subjective signs; it must ring with subjective tones in order to 
remain a living sign and not be relegated to the honorary status of an 
incomprehensible museum price. " (Voloshinov, 1973: 39) So I shall 
not only look for the ideological signs emerging out of the tension 
filled environment of dialogues, but also attend to the dialogic 
character of ideological signs, that is how they are dressed in 
personal and subjective tones. 
The dialogic analysis of utterances, texts, and discursive 
practices also sheds light on the remainder, on what falls out of 
discourses, and what belongs to the unknown realm of the Other. 
Because it draws attention to the play of force lines on boundaries as 
constitutive of identities, the Other, in a dialogic analysis, can be 
2Y As against a Sausserean account of serniotics which would divorce discourse from 
sociology (Hodge& Kress, 1988: 15-21). 
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conceived as a structuring. principle of identity. This resembles Zizek's 
statement that non-identity is the condition of identity. However, rather 
than leaving non-identity out of the scope of any theoretical inquiry, as 
a necessary and functional entity, a dialogic analysis attends to 
possible transgressions on the boundaries between self and Other. 
Language, in this sense, comprises the imprints of a continuing 
struggle; it is "heteroglot" from top to bottom. Bakhtin wrote that he 
heard "voices in everything and the dialogic relationships between 
them" (cited in Shukman, 1983). Therefore, a dialogic analysis makes 
use of the "excrements" that reside in language to grasp the Other 
theoretically. In return, it acknowledges that the boundaries which 
demarcate the Other bear upon Identity. In other words, in this 
framework, the content of differences are reinserted into the analysis. 
According to Pechey, a "dialogue cannot be misrecognised as 
ýcommunication"'. (1989: 62) Dialogic analysis is designed to 
"theorise otherness" and not only to theorise "the metropolitan 
practice of 'othering'... but also the answering practice of Europe's 
'others' in which the 'otherers' are themselves othered. " (Pechey, 
1989: 62) This means that Bakhtin not only provides me with tools for 
the interpretation of specific historical material, but it also becomes 
significant for theorising Occidentalism as an "answering practice". 
2.3. The Conceptual Tools in the Analysis of Data 
By going through these three theoretical approaches I formulate 
the conceptual tools of my analysis. However, at this point, I must 
make it clear that this is not an attempt to synthesise these theories, 
which may contradict each other at several points. 30 What I attempt to 
do in my thesis is, by holding in suspension the "contradictions" 
between these approaches, to open up a theoretical space for 
30 It can be noted that although, in general, Foucault was critical of psychoanalysis , that Bakhtin was critical of Freud, and Bakhtin's dialogic analysis, as well as, Foucault's theory 
of subjectivity fall out of scope of Zizek's approach; there do exist theoretical accounts 
which bring together, though not without problems, some aspects of these theories in the 
context of a specific analysis, such as, theories of Foucault and Zizek (Donald, 1992); 
Foucault, Freud and Lacan (Forrester, 1990; Rajchman, 1991); and of Bakhtin and 
psychoanalysis (Kristeva, 1981). See also Young (1986) for a discussion of Bakhtin in 
relation to Foucault and Freud. 
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formulating new questions. and attend to them with new conceptual 
tools -which the encounter of these approaches give life to. These 
concepts will be put to work in the historical interspace between West 
and non-West, namely, in the analysis of Occidentalism. 
As I have discussed in Chapter 1, the term Occidentalism, in my 
thesis, indicates a set of practices and discourses that are shaped, 
structured and reproduced within the historical context of dealing with 
the power of the West. It involves the psychological dynamics of 
constructing a national identity that is, at the same time, "Western" and 
"authentic". Therefore, it points to the operations of desire, projection, 
and disavowal. Secondly, Occidentalism designates the way the 
social reality was imagined by the Turkish elites in dialogue with the 
projected gaze of the West. It brings into view the contradictions of the 
two orders of reality, that is of social fantasy and social experience, 
which is most apparent in handling of the category of "the people" by 
the elite. Thirdly, the term is operational in material processes in 
which the elite adopt "Western" techniques and know-how to develop 
a solution to the problem of Turkish government. The analysis of 
various moments of radio broadcasting convey these different but 
interlinked processes that draw the contours of Occidentalism. 
Within this framework I study the spatial, temporal, technical and 
discursive variables of political subjectivity that bear upon radio 
broadcasting. To analyse the forms and the shifting boundaries of a 
political subjectivity that has been ascribed the role of the Other by the 
representations of Western modernity, I employ three conceptual 
tools: Projection, Translation, and Social Fantasy. In addition to these 
concepts, I refer to the concept of "surplus" as a field of unknown that 
rests in the interspace between West and East, and points, both, to 
the limits of my analysis and to a set of variables for further possible 
inquiry that may engage in re-narrating the history of modernity. 
The concept of "projection" takes on different meanings in 
different fields, such as psychology, geography, management, and 
technology. It involves diverse processes such as 
relocation/dislocation, planning, imagination, prediction, and 
movement in space and time. I employ the term in its rich 
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connotationS31 to analyse certain dynamics of nationalism in Turkey. 
Projection operates both as the displacement of what is intolerable 
inside into the outside world, thus as refusal to know; and as 
introjection of what is threatening in the external world so as to 
contain and manage it. Therefore it designates, at the same time, what 
the subject "refuses to be" and "desires to be". Projection, in its double 
process, figures in the conceptions of "popular culture" and "the 
people" on one hand, and in the conception of the West, on the other, 
in Turkey. The elite constitute their identity through a projection of 
certain attributes to the "national" population. By doing this they 
introject the imagined nation into their subjectivity. But they displace 
what is disturbing in them by attributing it to the "less civilised" and 
heterogeneous population. They seek purity and distinction in the 
process. The elite, also, engage in projection by internalising what is 
thought to be the Western values and techniques. However, in the 
same process, they attribute impurities to the West from which they 
distinguish themselves. The virtual viewpoint of the West, which is the 
product of a double projection disturbingly oscillates between 
recognition and rejection, and leads to a series of gaps and splits. 
Projection also plays a role in spatial and temporal descriptions 
of the nation, such as, in defining a national landscape and national 
time which becomes evident in building Ankara as a laboratory for the 
national project. Furthermore, the projection of the national ideal to 
JI Projection designates, for example in neurology and geography, "a point-by-point 
correspondence between, say, a figure in space and a figure in a plane. " 
(Laplanche&Pontalis, 1973: 350). Another use of the word drives from this but specifically 
implies a movement from centre to periphery- as defined in "eccentric" projection: 
"localisation of a sense datum at the position in space of the stimulating object, rather 
than at the point of stimulation on the body. " (Laplanche&Pontalis, 1988: 350) Freud 
linked "projection" with paranoia: the paranoiac projects his intolerable ideas outwards, 
whence they return in the shape of reproaches. It also designates in Freud other 
meanings such as "refusal to recognise" (the subject recognises in others precisely what 
he refuses to acknowledge in himself), or "not wishing to be" (the subject ejects something 
he does not want and later rediscovers it in outside reality). The former indicates a state 
of illusion, while the latter points to a division between subject and outside world. It is 
possible to argue that, whatever the connotations are, the processes of projection and 
identification are similar in operation. Klein speaks of "projective identification" in children, 
either as phantasised projection of the self into the interior of mother's body, so as to 
injure and control the mother from within, or as introjection being experienced "as a 
forceful entry from the outside into the inside, in retribution for violent projection. " (cited in 
Laplanche&Pontalis, 1988: 356) This closely links, in Klein, with the way an agency such 
as the ego-ideal may become external to the subject. 
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the children, and the projection of "authenticity" to women are 
analysed as moments of Occidentalism in the thesis. The fact that all 
these moments were articulated within radio broadcasting blends the 
technical meaning of the term with its other meanings. The projection 
of "the voice of the nation" through the technology of radio 
circumscribes and makes apparent the other processes of projection. 
The analysis of projection at various levels reveals, both, the 
dynamics of identification and frustration that shape the political 
subjectivity of the Turkish national elite. 
The concept of "translation" lies at the core of the Westernisation 
process in Turkey. I have discussed in Chapter 1 that starting as early 
as the nineteenth century, the works of Western, specifically French 
authors such as Hugo, Rousseau, Voltaire, Bergson, Comte were 
translated into Turkish. I have also noted that the Translation 
Chamber founded in Istanbul in the late nineteenth century produced 
both translations of Western texts and their adaptations. It is important 
to reemphasise the two significant historical processes that 
accompanied the translation of the Western texts. One is the 
adaptation and recontextualisation of certain ideas in translations 
which involved an adjustment to the specific historical problems and 
to an epistemology of a different order (J. Parla, 1990: 92). The second 
is the translators' acquisition of power in the fast pace of 
reform/revolution in the beginning of the twentieth century: those 
people with the cultural capital of foreign languages, converted their 
intellectual capacity to gain power positions (G69ek, 1996) in a 
society where Westernisation was not just an ideal but had become 
the practical axis of the national project. Therefore, the concept of 
translation designates, both, the shifts in the meaning systems and the 
material processes of Occidentalism. 
Translation, in a broader sense, is also significant for an 
understanding of the dynamics of identity and difference. Translation 
or mediation can be regarded as the medium of identity, by enabling 
the representation of the self in relation to otherness. 32 The self or 
the identity is the embodiment of "difference", produced in translation 
j2 "(t)ranslation is the materialization of our relationship to otherness, to the experience - through language- of what is different. " (Simon, 1992: 161) 
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and temporarily enclosed in boundaries. Thus, identity is an unstable 
product of translation. 33 However, an act of translation also crucially 
brings to view the existence of a field of ambiguity and the ever 
changing borderlines. The uncertain space indicated by translation 
corresponds either to a surplus of meaning which cannot always be 
contextualised and individualised, or to a non-knowledge which 
allows subjectivity as a separate domain -though non-coincident with 
itself- to appear. I locate my analysis of Occidentalism, in the uncertain 
space that is produced by a range of acts of translation. In this sense it 
is neither an emic analysis, that tries to "see things from the actor's 
point of view" (Geertz, 1993: 14) nor an etic analysis that looks at 
things from an imposed frame of reference34, such as theoretical 
frameworks based on Western representations. I pursue, rather, the 
analysis of contradictions and mismatches that are produced on the 
boundaries of the interconnected acts of translation which, primarily, 
are: 1) the translation of Western discourses on nationality and 
civilisation by the Turkish national elite, 2) the translation of 
supposedly "essential" popular-national culture by the Turkish elite, 3) 
the translation of national discourses into the technology of sound in 
radio broadcasting. The translation indicates, in this context, both 
spatial and temporal adjustments and movements that are not only 
verbal but also embedded in the use of techniques and technologies. 
It is a discursive practice that produces "truth" and links to bodies in a 
specific time and place; and enables a boundary management 
between what is to be excluded and included in the national project. It 
is framed by a dialogic relationship between the virtual viewpoint of 
the West and the virtual point of political subjectivity of the Turkish 
national elite. And as it centres on the borderlines of these acts, it 
indicates both identity and otherness in historical terms. 
My third conceptual tool is "social fantasy" which played an 
JJ According to Blanchot translation is the sheer play of difference: "it alludes to it 
constantly, it dissimulates this difference, but occasionally in revealing it and often in 
accentuating it; translation becomes the very life of this difference... " (1997: 58-9) 
34 This is akin to an immanent critique which strives to grasp discursive phenomena 
"through the analysis of their form and meaning, the contradiction between their objective 
idea and that pretension. It names what the consistency or inconsistency of the work itself 
expresses of the structure of the existent .... it seeks to derive them (inadequacies) from the irreconcilability of the object's moments. " (Adorno, 1981: 32) 
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important role in the constitution and reproduction of power relations 
in early Turkish history. However, I do not mean to suggest by this that 
the concept indicates mere illusion or simply is an ideological 
apparatus of the state. 35 It, rather, indicates the field of utterances 
and practices assembled by the material and discursive processes of 
projection and translation. Social fantasy, in this case, evokes the 
political subjectivity of the Other in its relation to the West. The 
analysis of Occidentalism as it manifests itself in radio broadcasting in 
early Turkish history reveals how the actual reality of "the people" had 
to be denied and displaced in social fantasy, because it was not 
concordant with the discourses on modernity. The Occidentalist 
fantasy evokes a "lack" in "the people" upon which it organises the 
"desire" to fill it. This is in close connection to the lack projected unto 
the Turkish by the Orientalist fantasy. They function in the same 
economy of identity and desire. The interconnection becomes 
apparent in my analysis of radio drama and talks disseminated 
through a non-visible "mass" medium - radio broadcasting. It is also 
apparent in the assumptions that both the BBC Turkish Service and 
Turkish Radio made with regard to their audiences. 
In line with my concern to re-embody and historicise the concept 
of the Other, I argue that the concept of "the people" stands out as a 
significant leverage for the production of social fantasies in Turkey. 
The diverse experiences of what is called "the people", as such, was 
denied by modernisers; nevertheless, it was in and through the 
concept of "the people" the representations of modernity were 
constructed and generalised. The concept remained invisible, as the 
Other, in the representations of modernity, compared to those 
categories of race and gender which were stigmatised as differences 
in a hierarchy of power. Therefore it is possible to say that "the 
people" is the generalised and absent structuring principle of 
3b Mladen Dolar points to "the Real of the fantasy: the fantasy stands in the place of an 
impossible Real, a void which it disguises and discloses in one and the same gesture. 
This is why fantasy is never simply a 'hallucinatory satisfaction of desire', as it has 
frequently been described. " (1998: xxii) 
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otherness in modern national societies. 36 Its ultimate symbolisation 
lies in the term "mass" culture and communication. 37 It functions as a 
quilting point , in Zizek's terms (1991: 16), to make all other 
differences, such as race, ethnicity and gender, marginal and less 
significant in their link to power. 38 This is possible by pointing to 
"nation as a unified cultural community" (Gilroy, 1993: 53) in which 
"the people" are thought to be the silent, "natural" and complacent 
partners. These generalised attributes, consequently, endorse the 
reinscription of other differences, such as gender and ethnicity, in a 
naturalised way. My analysis of the inscription of women in radio 
drama, in Chapter 6, derives from and supports this perspective. In 
my treatment of the social fantasies of the Other, therefore, I take "the 
people" imagined by the Turkish national elite, in its relation to the 
West, as the shared discursive realm of modernity. This points to an 
36 The disembodiment of "the people" makes the representation of "the people" possible. 
Specifically inherent to modernity, is the leveling off of the diverse experiences to 
incorporate them in rationally constructed universal representations. What is significant 
about "the people", as it is converted into the general category of "everyman" or "anyone" 
in the discourses on modernity, is that it provides a generalising principle of a particular 
knowledge, it furnishes the reality that is true for all. It becomes, in de Certeau's words, a 
common place, a philosophical topos within which representations are constructed 
(1988). The displacement or disembodiment of the people "that lead toward the common 
place where 'anyone' is finally silent" (cle Certeau, 1984: 5), can be traced on the borders 
of the modern discourses on the people. 
37 The concept of "mass" indicates a certain way of looking at the "people" which, 
historically was regarded as a natural category and thought to be validated by the 
technology of "broadcasting" in the West. The use of the concept "mass" both refers to a 
possibility of a unity of culture in the social realm (by educating the masses), and to a 
recontextualised differentiation between the "high" and the "low" culture. So it represents 
a point in the history of modernity when the broad assumption of "common culture" was 
taking the place of segregated lifeworlds and cultures of classes and groups. When 
Raymond Williams referred to culture, as 'a particular way of life, whether of a people, a 
period or a group' (1983: 90), he took a stand against the association of culture with 'high' 
values of the elite. He attacked the idea of a divided culture, which opposed the 
cultivated tastes to those of the 'vulgar and ignorant masses'. For him, to define people 
as "masses" was just a way of othering them. "There are in fact no masses; there are only 
ways of seeing people as masses" (Williams, 1958: 289). So, his conception of culture 
entails the representation of 'common' in both senses, that culture is ordinary, and is not 
divided as 'high' and 'low'. Yet his stance can be read within the "structure of sentiment" 
that emphasised a common national culture: "The making of a society is the finding of 
common meanings and directions, and its growth is an active debate and amendment 
under the pressures of experience, contact and discovery, writing themselves into the 
land". (Williams, 1993: 6) 
38Gilroy argues that we should focus on "race" and racism "not as fringe questions but as 
a volatile presence at the very centre of British politics, actively shaping and determining 
the history not simply of blacks, but of this country as a whole at a crucial stage in its 
development. " (Gilroy, 1993: 51) 
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aspect of Occidentalism which bears the imprints of intertwined 
histories in modernity. 
These three conceptual tools, namely projection, translation and 
social fantasy enable me to address Occidentalism 1) as processes 
of identification with the West and "the people", 2) as an "answering 
practice" to the West, 3) as a complex set of techniques for boundary 
management, and, 4) as a social fantasy that constitutes a base for 
the enactment of power and political subjectivity in the shared 
discursive realm of modernity. 
The analysis of Occidentalism reveals the dynamics of the 
political subjectivity of the Other, as well as, some significant elements 
in the shared discursive realm of modernity. This is possible, first, by 
pointing to the historical boundaries of a modern identity, represented 
by the humanistic discourse of truth of the BBC as it is reflected upon 
in the context of an "answering practice". Secondly, it points to the 
boundaries of the modern discourse on nationality, by bringing into 
light a range of adjustments in the same discursive realm. This can be 
traced in the strategies employed by Turkish Radio to address the 
"new man". Thirdly, it indicates a non-discursive realm of the Other 
that fall out of representations. This can be observed in the limits of 
the representations of the audience of the BBC Turkish Service and 
the Turkish Radio. A comparative analysis of the practices of the BBC 
Turkish Service and of Turkish Radio provide data to analyse the 
absent topos of the representations of "the people" and its shifting 
borderlines. 
Finally, I would like to introduce the concept of "surplus" to attend 
to the constitutive outside of my analysis which is partially captured in 
the immanent critique of the various aspects of Occidentalism. A form 
of radio broadcasting that assumes it is possible to talk to the 
"masses" is one significant area in which the fluctuating dynamics of 
clustering and unclustering of the reality, of suture and dissolution, of 
conscious strategies and non-knowledge can be observed. For 
example, the analysis of historical data shows that the social fantasy 
in Turkey could not be congealed and fixed since it was constantly 
disrupted by external events. The surplus that cannot be fixed in 
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discourses or rationally framed in representations reveals itself in 
symptoms. I have treated the destruction of the archives as one 
symptom of the surplus. The surplus also corresponds to unaccounted 
tactics that act against official discourse; to forms of violence or 
enjoyment that secretly sustain visible arrangements. I will refer to a 
tactic of distortion practiced by Turkish broadcasters in contradiction to 
the officially declared openness to receiving foreign radio 
transmissions, in Chapter 4. 
Symptoms have a significant place in my thesis, in the sense that 
they have triggered the formulation of key questions that are new to 
the field. However, these symptoms are not accommodated fully in the 
analysis of Occidentalism. They remain resistant to analysis as 
scattered and discrete signs sporadically appearing in anecdotes and 
memoirs. The full analysis of these symptoms, as in psychoanalysis, 
waits for new narratives, new versions of history narrated by those 
subjects silenced and disembodied by official discourse. Therefore 
they link to new possibilities of future research. 
I believe, the historical analysis of Occidentalism, shows not only 
how the specific arrangement of various elements, in a certain 
context, is sustained and becomes functional, but also, the 
unfinalisability of the arrangement. The deconstruction of the Other 
corresponds, in my view, to the task of evoking other voices that were 
silenced (but never absolutely) in the process of codification of official 
representations. Finally I argue, with Bakhtin, that this is possible from 
a distance in time, in space and from the grip of the centripetal forces 
in culture. In DuBois's words, "those who are obliged to negotiate both 
'margins' and 'center' are somewhat better placed to deconstruct 
dominant or narrowly national discourses. " (cited in Shohat&Stam, 
1994: 48-9) So, the deconstruction of the Other is also a political act. 
2.4. The Research Question and the Methods of 
Analysis 
Informed by the methodological framework that is outlined in the 
previous parts, my research question can be formulated specifically 
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as: how the discourses, strategies and techniques of Turkish radio 
broadcasting can be linked to Occidentalism, through which Turkish 
national identity was articulated both as part of and in opposition to 
the "West"? My research dwells both on early Turkish radio 
broadcasting and the analysis of the field of force lines it was 
positioned in, in particular, in relation to the contemporary BBC 
Turkish Section broadcasts. I have given my reasons to include the 
case of the BBC Turkish Section in the Introduction. To summarise: 
First, given that the BBC was regarded as a model by Turkish 
broadcasters the case provides data which constitutes an "outside" to 
the utterances on Turkish radio, and historically contextualises the 
Turkish radio broadcasting, specifying the ongoing struggles and 
conditions in which it attempted to address both the nation and the 
West; second, the BBC Turkish Section broadcasts can be treated as 
almost a "control " case which brings a comparative perspective to the 
critical analysis of the conditions of production and manifestation of 
"truth" on radio. I argue that the dialogic analysis of contemporary 
Turkish Radio and the BBC Turkish Section broadcasting is significant 
in deconstructing the Occidentalist fantasy in Turkey, which operated 
by reference to an imagined West, but nevertheless was shaped by 
extralinguistic forces that figured in the history of the Western 
domination over non-West. The analysis of the BBC Turkish Section 
broadcasting provides clues to understand both, the imagined 
character, the "fantasy", of Occidentalism, and the "real" conditions of 
its production as a discourse. 
My thesis employs data coming from various sources and is 
based on the analysis of a wide range of material from archives to 
memoirs; from legislations to journal articles (see the list of sources). I 
put to work a combination of methods, that are informed by my 
methodological framework, to analyse the diverse material. First, I 
draw on various sources to map out the institutional history of Turkish 
Radio, using Foucauldian discourse analysis to attend to the 
conditions of discursive techniques. I study the strategies and the 
sites, bodies and the forms of significations on radio that were 
articulated in the discourse on nationalist identity. I study how radio 
101 
was connected to the conception of the West, as well as to centre of 
government, to the ruling elite, to other institutions, to cultural reforms, 
and to governmental policies, such as legislations and regulations in 
Turkey. Hence I draw the discursive contours of the Occidentalist 
fantasy to the extent that it relates to radio broadcasting. 
Then I pursue a Bakthinian dialogic analysis to treat the BBC 
Turkish Section archives in link to the concept of "communication" as 
government. The dialogue with an imagined audience, Turkey, that 
has shaped the utterances on the BBC Turkish Section enables me to 
rethink the connections that the Occidentalist fantasy, manifested on 
Turkish Radio, had with the 'West'. The BBC material points to the 
intertwined constellations of Orientalism and Occidentalism. The 
conception of the "audience" that figured in both the BBC and Turkish 
Radio broadcasts is significant here. I draw on both dialogic and 
psychoanalytical methods to show the limits of the sayable within the 
discourse of nationalism, by making references to both the non- 
knowledge regarding the audience, and the invisible tactics that act 
against the official nationalist discourse. Thus, I try to depict the 
reason within what seems as "irrational" in Turkish Radio's resorting 
to "fantasy", and its denial of "reality", in the representation of the 
people. 
Finally I dwell on certain radio programmes, namely talks and 
drama, to show how the fantasy of the nation was articulated in 
narratives with the aid of radio technology. The perspective that 
guides me in analysing the radio talks and drama is again informed 
by a combination of methods. I use discourse analysis to point to the 
conditions in which these programmes were produced and how they 
link to other discursive practices. Psychoanalytic treatment of the 
material shows me the blind spots within these texts that remain 
unaccounted by their apparent narrative logic; and gives clues 
regarding what has been excluded from the explicit national 
discourse. Bakthinian textual analysis enables me to attend to the 
different levels of meaning that are shaped in dialogue with various 
imagined audiences. Therefore, I do not confine myself to mere 
textual analysis but introduce other variables, such as the dichotomies 
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of the West/ Turkey, people/elite, nature/civilisation, women/men, to 
grasp how desired changes in the national life expressed in these 
narratives were conceived in Occidentalist terms. Here Occidentalism 
refers to the setting and management of the boundaries within the 
nation between what is foreign and what is authentic. Furthermore, I 
use these texts to show how nature, culture, and civilisation were 
operationalised in gendered terms in the nationalist discourse; and 
how this was informed by the Occidentalist fantasy, especially 
endorsed by the technology of radio broadcasting. 
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Announcers in the studio of Ankara Radio just before the 
broadcasting started. (Radyo, 8/87: cover page, March 1949) 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Studio 
In this chapter, I draw on the history of Turkish radio, its 
institutional organisation, the nature of its programmes and the 
debates around them, to discuss the shifting boundaries of Turkish 
national identity, imagined through radio. I will dwell on three 
aspects: First: I will show how specifically Ankara Radio gained 
prominence in the 1930s and became associated with the national 
culture as opposed to Istanbul Radio; and how this is linked to the 
boundary management between the past and the present; between 
what was foreign and what was national. How the spaces of Istanbul 
and Ankara are opposed to each other in this context is especially 
significant. Second: I will dwell on the space of radio itself to depict the 
way the radio technology was perceived and used to create a "pure 
national voice". I will discuss the significance of the attempts of 
mediation between the people's culture and the Western civilisation. 
Third: I will attend to the frustrations and anxieties involved in the 
experiment; the failures, both in technical matters and in terms of 
achieving a "pure" voice of the nation on radio, due to interferences 
coming from other spaces, such as the West. I will show how the 
projected Western gaze has been a source that triggered 
problematisations on the issue of national culture. 
As a form of technology radio both provides a specific kind of 
space for an experiment on the national, and also stands as a key 
symbol of modernity and universal progress, as it did in other 
peripheral nations. ' One can see in the Turkish venture of 
1 Lesley Johnson's account of the early Australian radio bears some resemblance to the 
Turkish case, in terms of the perception of radio as a marker of universal modernity 
(1988). The examples of radio in opposition to power -for national struggle, for guerrilla 
warfare, or for workers' struggle- although vested with oppositional meanings, also make 
allusions to universality and progress (Fanon, 1970; Godfried, 1997; Ignacio&Vigil, 1995) 
Fanon's account of Algerian Radio, "The Voice of Algeria", points to how radio became a 
symbol during the national struggle: it "created out of nothing, brought the nation to life 
and endowed every citizen with a new status, telling him so explicitly' (1970: 80). 
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experimentation -in being national and modern- via radio 
broadcasting, both an incredible effort of creativity and a lack of 
knowledge; very strict rules of control and transgressions of 
boundaries at the same time. However, the process of 
experimentation, although it fails to sustain its sterile laboratory 
conditions, gives a portrait of modernity, shaped under certain 
conditions of Western domination, and which bears, in itself, the 
elements of an ongoing dialogue with the Occident. 
3.1. Radio and Turkish National Identity 
National identity is at once very real and ambiguous; it is difficult 
to set the boundaries of a national identity as it can only be articulated 
through its differentiation. The existence of the nation depends on the 
existence of the international order. The "origin" of the nation is 
dependent on "a differentiation of nations which has already begun. " 
(Bennington, 1994: 241) However, national identity is not signified 
through a single opposition between "us" to "them". The nation is 
also a temporal construction, a form of temporality, that is split in itself. 
The signification of national identity refers to past and future, to pre- 
modern as well as modern elements, to an "authentic essence" and to 
a radical break with tradition at the same time. "'(N)ation' designates 
at one and the same time the instance by means of reference to which 
traditional 'organic' links are dissolved and the 'remainder of the pre- 
modern in modernity ..... The crucial point is again to conceive both 
aspects in their interconnection". (Zizek, 1991: 20) And the problem of 
legitimacy, that is a result of the incongruity between the claim of a 
radical break with tradition and the reality of history (Osborne, 1995), 
can only be settled in the "present" time. The "p resent- ness" is the 
principle that articulates, orders and justifies, although not without 
problems, the contradictory references in a national discourse. 
The temporal character of the signification of national identity can 
best be observed in an institution that continually emphasises and 
displays its "present-ness", such as radio broadcasting. Radio 
broadcasting not only alters the perception of space but also time. It 
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annihilates the gap between past and future -by juxtaposing them in 
the moment of now. Radio stages a play of sounds, that is always now 
and here; that bridges the gap between its source and its projection; 
"has impact both outwardly and inwardly at once -destroying the 
illusion of difference between exterior and interior, perceiver and 
perceived. " (Dyson, 1994: 170) Radio becomes a mediated location, 
"a social/temporal location joining source and listener in the instant of 
a sound" (Berland, 1994: 35). 
1 argue that radio in Turkey served as a mediator between the 
conflicting concerns of the national elite, as they worked to create a 
national identity. Its significance can be listed in five points. Radio 
enabled mediation between the seemingly unbridgeable fields, being 
at the intersection point of: a) Culture and Civilisation. Radio 
represented Western modernity and progress in its very technological 
form, but was also the means to disseminate the cultural "messages" 
that uniquely belonged to the nation; b) Education and Entertainment. 
It was seen as a vehicle for "mass" education but had to be 
entertaining if it was going to have any impact; c) Elite and the People. 
In the definition of broadcasting it was implied that radio talked to 
"masses", yet the elite were keen on disseminating their own values 
and ways of living, as markers of modernity; d) Absence and 
Presence. The national unity envisaged through the technique of 
radio broadcasting meant talking to citizens, that were absent in the 
national project yet represented in the very address of radio; e) 
Private and Public. Radio was perceived as an apparatus to 
reorganise the public domain of national life by implanting modern 
values to the society, yet it had to address people in their private 
realm, in their intimate domestic setting. 
These five points provide a framework to interpret the debates 
around Turkish radio, and in its strategies to bridge the gaps between 
past and future, between the West and Turkey; between the serious 
and masculine image of politics and the more feminine and more 
sentimental field of "popular" culture; between the pre-modern 
essences ascribed to the nation and modern ways of living. 
Although a late comer, the history of early Turkish radio until 
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1950s bears some resemblance to the practices of radio broadcasting 
in their early years, in "liberal" regimes of power, such as the UK, USA 
and Australia which basically employed "the appropriate techniques 
for managing a population in democraCy"2 (Donald, 1992: 78) and 
"setting up of and legitimating of distinctions between the culture of 
the elite and the culture of popular tastes. " (Johnson, 1988: 4) On the 
other hand, it shares some elements with Italian and German radio 
broadcasting systems that functioned within totalitarian regimes 
starting from the early 30's. 3 Yet Turkish Radio has its unique 
characteristics which are embedded in the Occidentalist experiment of 
imagining a nation in relation to the West. Turkish Radio followed a 
different path, being invested with national and public meanings only 
in the mid 30's, which challenged the existing conceptions of radio 
broadcasting that the cultural elite had when radio started in 1927. 
The entertainment oriented broadcasting of, specifically, Istanbul 
Radio was criticised in its link to the city of Istanbul, which was 
regarded as "foreign" in many aspects. Istanbul was thought to be a 
corrupted space due to its multi-cultural make up, ethnic diversity, 
"foreign" and too much Westernised ways of living. 4 The critique was 
also a self-challenge. It implied the need for the elites to curb their 
cosmopolitanism and excessive modernism and to engage in a 
process of self -disciplining. Then, radio created both the means and 
the space to build up a self-image; to make the necessary distinctions 
not only between the elite and the people, but also between the 
cosmopolitan and the national elite, between Istanbul and Ankara, 
between a Western and a Turkish national modern. 
Turkish Radio, after 1936, was interested in its audience only as 
a projected image. Contrary to some other cases in other countries, it 
resisted popular demand, avoided audience participation and 
2 Burhan Beige wrote in the radio journal that "Radio is a very democratic machine. It is as 
if it was invented for the people... " Radyo, Vol. 3. No. 28.15 March1944, p. l. 
3 For example, in Italy radio was invested with peciagogic and moral missions in order to 
raise an "awareness of ethical and national values" (Richeri, 1980: 4) which resembles the 
Turkish concerns in nationalising the radio. I will make some references to similarities with 
German radio broadcasting when discussing radio talks in Chapter 5. 
4 F. Ahmad makes the point that Istanbul was also associated with "conservatives". "Such 
was the bitterness between Ankara and Istanbul ... that Kemal refused to visit Istanbul 
after its liberation and went there only in 1928... " (1993: 54). 
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populist strategies that would give in to differentiated needs and 
tastes. 5 It took its serious self-image seriously, experimenting with the 
mix of elements of national identity. The only nationwide survey 
concerning radio programmes was operationalised in 1948, the 
results of which were published in Radyo. It is said in the introduction 
to the results, that the survey "illuminated" Turkish Radio to a great 
extent, and that it will be "useful" in shaping the future programmeS. 6 
The results which reflect the opinions of 6639 people were published. 
Some of the responses were highly specific, such as "demanding a 
story from Suat Taýer", "that Hikmet MOnir talks more", "that Nurettin 
Artam avoids coughing in his talks. " On the other hand, some of the 
responses reflected attitudes on more critical issues, such asking for 
chanting of Koran to be included in radio broadcasting, or demanding 
more domestic news. 7 (Neither of these influenced future 
programming. ) Yet there was no systematic evaluation of the results. It 
was as if the "survey" itself, not its content, signified a "scientific" 
confirmation of radio's close contact with the people. 
A few months later, an article published in Radyo gives a better 
clue for understanding the attitude of Turkish Radio to audience 
research. The question that is asked in the article is: "How can one 
measure the performance of a social institution, such as radio ?" The 
article tackles the question from various aspects. The dominant theme 
5 Whereas in Australia, for example, the broadcasting which started in the beginning of 
the 1920s, had already adopted "a special style of radio performance" in the beginning 
of the1930s, which was friendly and intimate in its style and avoided talking and lecturing 
to an unseen audience. Appropriate ways of addressing the segmented audience were 
developed (Johnson, 1988). In Germany, a similar shift occurred when Nazis came to 
power. There was more interest in the audience in the Nazi period compared to self- 
acclaimed strategies of radio in the Weimar period, more audience research in order to 
better target the listeners (Lacey, 1993). The process in which "the BBC softened its 
paternalism of its early days" started in the late 1930s, "in the increased awareness, 
demanded by producers and supplied by the first research, of the differentiated needs 
and tastes in the audience. " (Lewis&Booth, 1989) Ethnic speech patterns were essential 
in the entertainment programmes of the American NBC, despite their emphasis on 
"general American speech" in the 40's (Barfield, 1996). According to Browne who did a 
comparative study of broadcasting systems of "six industrialized nations" , in the Soviet Union there was little need to assess audiences until the"1950s since "those in charge of 
broadcasting naturally would have the best interests of the public in mind" (1989: 286). It 
could be interesting to compare the Turkish broadcasting system to the one in the Soviet 
Union. 
6 Radyo, Vol. 7, No. 78-79-80, June/July/Augustl948, p. 3 
7 [bid., 42-43. 
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of the article is: 
"At first glance, it may seem that public opinion is a perfect 
and adequate criteria in a democracy. But a deeper 
inspection will reveal that public opinion research, although 
a fundamental criteria, cannot by itself be considered as the 
true criterion... Whether the product is of high quality or not 
is very important. " 8 
So, the "true criterion" was monopolised by broadcasters. 9 
Radio projected images of the people to the people without 
attempting to adopt their way of talking, that was, in reality, highly 
diversified in terms of class, gender, ethnic origins, and locality. 
Radio's address was determined by the voice of the "centre". But 
what was excluded and included in this central discourse on 
nationality derives from a complex field of negotiations. For example, 
radio avoided talking to women in feminine forms and, instead 
broadcast talks addressed at the whole family. On the other hand, it 
employed women to present the news, as part of its modern window 
to the outside world. Radio broadcast serious talks on the national 
history and on the national war against the Western forces; but it also 
broadcast talks on daily matters, such as "how to spend a weekend", 
or "the problems with domestic servants" in order to educate the 
wealthy urban people in the Western ways of living. Radio, also, took 
local forms of culture, such folk music and traditional dramas, and 
altered their content and form to make them modern and Westernised. 
The space of radio became a field of boundary management against 
the burden of history, the Western desire/threat, and the diversity of 
local cultures. At the crossroads of all these differently set boundaries 
and their management occurs the discourse on nationality. 
Yet Turkish radio's basic concern, after 1936 when it was 
8 Radyo, Vol. 7, No. 83, November/December 1948, p. 1 
9 This resembles other cases in which "high culture" and "quality" were privileged over the 
"low tastes" of the "masses". For example, Reith, the first director of the BBC had said 
,... we are apparently setting out to give the public what we think they need -not what they 
want... " (McDonnell, 1991: 12) But as I have discussed before the BBC had to come to 
terms with the differentiated needs and tastes of the audience in the late 30's, at least by 
implementing audience research, which implies that the BBC used more "rational" 
methods to justify its production whereas Turkish radio could not devise the means to 
evade the accusation of "arbitrariness". This has been a matter of debate between 
broadcasters themselves best illustrated in Muzaffer ýerif's criticisms to Turkish Radio, in 
1939, which I will be picking up in Chapter 5. 
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nationalised due to growing concerns of building a "national culture" 
in the 30's, was to imagine and retain a pure image of modernity, the 
purity that was thought to be at the core of the national identity and 
was to be represented to others. However, despite all attempts of 
purification and synthesis, which I will be addressing later in the 
chapter, Turkish radio was afflicted with all kinds of failures in its 
experiment ranging from technical problems to the problems of 
organisation. The technical failures accompanied by the "non-serious" 
attitudes of the broadcasters, and the ambiguous "ideological" content 
of broadcasting that was somehow to find a balance between national 
and Western values posed all kinds of problems and frustrations for 
the elite. The purity of the "voice of the nation" produced through 
radio remained a problematic issue until the 1950s when radio was 
no longer the voice of the nation, but the voice of the political party in 
government. 
In its experimental character the early Turkish radio manifests a 
significant trait that dominated the realm of politics. A question from 
the Koran best expresses it: "Why do you say that which you do not 
do? "10 The significance of this trait can be better understood with 
reference to the machinery of the political in Turkey, that brought 
certain people together in a certain space, and composed them as the 
national elite. 
3.2. The National Elite and Ankara 
I have discussed before, in Chapter 1 how Westernisation 
proceeded "under the continuous 'assault' of Western nations": the 
Ottoman Empire had no choice, if it wished to survive, but to adopt 
Westernisation (Karal, 1981: 31). The process of reforms based on the 
Western forms introduced a divide between the religious elite (Ulema) 
and the new elite who were familiar with the Western texts, forms and 
techniques. Translation of Western texts became one of the most 
important activities that distinguished the new elite, who were located 
10 "Lime Tekulune Ma la tef'alun", Koran, "ýuaff'. Used by Hilmi Ziya Olken, an early 
Turkish philosopher, as a sub-heading for the section on Politics in his book that was 
reviewed in the Turkish Press published in Vienna in 1931 as a book that reconciles 
"Idealism with Realism, the individual with society, man with humanity". (Olken, 1971) 
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and thus disciplined in some government bureaus in Istanbul, one of 
them being the Translation Chamber. But the course of the national 
struggle (1918-1923) against the Western plans of partitioning the 
Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, and later the 
foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 dramatically altered the 
conditions of the Westernised elite, as I have previously pointed out . 
The task of building a nation on the ruins of an empire brought forth 
two new concerns: defining a national homeland as opposed to the 
Ottoman Empire (which covered different lands and populations); 
second, time-sensitivity: Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the national 
project began thinking in decades, whereas Ottoman intellectuals had 
been thinking in millennia (Mardin, 1981: 200). In this new context 
there was also a need to form a new avant-garde cadre to combine 
the political and the cultural" , to create and communicate the content 
of the attempted reforms. 
The new elite was formed, in this context, of those people who 
took charge of government activities under the authoritarian and 
charismatic leadership of Mustafa Kemal and those intellectuals who 
sided with Mustafa Kemal and were devoted to tackling the questions 
of nationality and Westernisation with the concerns of "homeland" and 
"time-sensitivity", in different fields, such as history, law, architecture, 
and language. This group of people, more or less coincided with the 
members of the single party, the RPP. I have discussed before how 
the political regime was shaped under the single party rule and the 
strict control of politics and economy by the state, and how the liberal 
versions of modern society were rejected. In practice this meant 
banning all forms of political opposition. Here I will be concentrating 
more on the spaces and the social network within which the elite, who 
had shares in the centralised power, were initially connected to each 
other as a group. This will entail looking at Ankara, and at the 
Qankaya Villa of Mustafa Kemal in Ankara, where all the important 
decisions were made and the appointments to different governmental 
and bureaucratic posts were determined -a practice that continued 
11 Some parallels can be drawn to the experience in the USSR, where "the conjunction 
of political and cultural revolution with the new view of technology " and associated with 
the vanguard party became evident in avant-garde institutions of art and culture. 
(Huyssen, l 986: 12) 
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until the death of Mustafa Kemal in 1938. 
1 will give a brief picture of the meetings in the Qankaya Villa 
that both nurtured the vision of national life as seen from Ankara, and 
that practically served as an institution through which the people were 
recruited to become part of the national elite. 12 The meetings in the 
Qankaya Villa, which were usually held in the evenings and which 
sometimes lasted until dawn, were both social -eating, drinking and 
entertainment- and political in character. It was during the course of 
these meetings that national issues were debated, ideas regarding 
the social and cultural reforms were examined, speculations over 
possible forms of the cultural synthesis between the East and the 
West were considered. 13 Mustafa Kemal's tastes of entertainment 
and drinking, and his paternal supervision over issues determined the 
atmosphere of the meetings. Atay says, in his memoirs, that these 
meetings were so important that the people in Ankara, when invited to 
them, often reclined from other invitations, those, for example, from the 
foreign embassies. "They did not want to lose the opportunity" (Atay, 
1969 : 414) of being involved in the central network of power. I will 
come back to the significance that the discourse on modernity and its 
interpretations within that network of relations, had for decision 
making, specifically those decisions regarding radio broadcasting, 
later in the chapter. The network of people established in Ankara 
created a group, comprised of politicians, military officers, literary 
men, journalists and academics who declared their allegiance to the 
charismatic leader and to the cause of the national project. Most of 
these people were from Istanbul , who have moved to Ankara after the 
foundation of the Republic. They had good command of foreign 
languages, especially French. So, in a way, they were the heirs of the 
12 G69ek argues that in the Ottoman period, the Sultan's household was the basic 
organisational unit of the society. It cut across formal organisations and class boundaries 
and contained within it diverse activities including economic and political administration. 
She, then, makes the point that this system was countered by the process of 
Westernisation and the emergence of new voluntary organisations, in which the new 
"civilised" elites organised themselves (1996). Qankaya Villa bears a strange resemblance 
to Sultan's court. In order to assess the similarity, of course, further research and 
reflection are required. 
13 Mustafa Kemal was a keen amateur in many subjects, language being one of them. 
The Turkish language reform and the adoption of the Latin alphabet were shaped in 
these meetings in his villa, where he and others played with different options in a "game" 
of speculations ( Heyd, 1954). 
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new elite in the Ottoman Empire. Yet the "new Turks" (Bisbee, 1951) 
of the Republican era had to be disciplined in their cosmopolitan 
tastes and ways of living to prepare themselves for the tasks of the 
national project. This was only possible through certain institutions 
among which was radio. 
The conditions of life in Ankara, at that time, were very 
discouraging, as narrated by Karaosmanoýlu in his novel Ankara. The 
first "revolutionaries" coming from Istanbul during the war were 
labeled as "alien" by the local population, which were partly 
Christians and Greeks and partly Muslim peasants (ýenyapili, 1985). 
Ankara was a barren village. There was no running water, no 
electricity. The avant-garde (both in military and cultural terms) elite 
who were the first habitants of Ankara, and who were very few in 
number, chose Qankaya and its surroundings to settle. They had 
difficulties in adapting to local ways of living in Ankara; they even 
found difficult to understand the language spoken by the local people. 
Therefore they mostly socialised with each other, but they kept the 
dream alive that one day, "they will mingle with an anonymous crowd" 
(Atay, 1969: 352). However, they were also nostalgic of their days in 
Istanbul. When viewed from Ankara, Istanbul seemed like Paris (Atay, 
1969: 352). The burden of the poor conditions combined with the fact 
that Ankara was not an attractive place for the Westerners. For 
example, the foreign embassies were against the idea of Ankara 
being the capital, and did not want to move their offices from Istanbul 
to Ankara ($enyapili, 1985: 18). Istanbul was one of the big harbours 
of the world trade and, with its ancient history of religions and 
civilisations had been a city of "desire" for many "foreigners", such as 
travelers, pilgrims, and diplomats. There were foreign -Italian, French, 
Russian- communities in addition to non-Muslim Ottoman 
communities -Greeks, Armenians, Jews- settled in Istanbul. 
The national elite who chose Ankara as the space for the 
national government, despite their longing for Istanbul, rejected 
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Istanbul in their national - discourse. 14 Istanbul was regarded as 
impure in many aspects: It was full of "foreigners, Armenians, 
Greeks". 15 It was a place where the undesirable remnants of the 
empire had combined with cosmopolitan ways of living and 
international commerce. It was a symbol of the past traditions from 
which the new elite wanted to break. It was also a chaotic place 
inhabited by the "unemployed and trouble causing mobs" (Atay, 
1969: 417). 
In the first years of the national government, to build a modern 
city in Ankara, as opposed to Istanbul became an exciting project for 
the elite. To silence the dissident voices that claimed Ankara can only 
be a transitory capital, "scientific" reports were prepared. The reports, 
referring to foreign experts' views, "proved" that Ankara was not a 
"barren land" but a "plateau" suitable to be a modern city. The reports 
made use of world statistics about temperature, humidity, and other 
natural factors to compare to Ankara's values. Ankara's climate, 
though unfavourable in many respects -dry and cold- was regarded 
as helpful for the struggle for civilisation. Professor Piery from Lyon 
University had said for Ankara, "(T)he climate here is good for 
disciplining people to struggle against hardship and pain, thus it 
makes a unique school in that sense" (cited in Atay, 1969: 419). In the 
beginning of the 1930s, a new urban plan was designed -a German 
planner, Jansen was commissioned for this- to make Ankara a 
modern city. The desire was to create a "clean, beautiful, green, 
magnificent, organised and civilised" City16 (ýenyapilj, 1985 : 49) . But 
in reality, Ankara was only a "draft". "Life in Ankara was a draft. " (Atay, 
1969: 415) 
The elite lived in segregated neighbourhoods. Peasants were 
forbidden to transgress the boundaries (Sertel, 1968). The 
Westernised forms of entertainment, concerts, balls, and theatres that 
14 Ideas against Istanbul was overtly stated in the proclamation of Ankara as the capital: 
"Istanbul (noted the deputy Celal Nuri) was the capital of the Ottoman Empire, a 
multinational state formed of peoples of various religions and ethnic identities. Ankara, on 
the other hand, will have a different meaning as the capital of a national state, a young 
state still growing up. " (cited in F. Ahmad, 1993: 91) 
15 Yeni Adam, Vol. 2, No. 59,14 November 1935. 
16 ý; enyapili's study of planning in Ankara gives a comprehensive account of how this 
plan eventually failed (1985). 
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the elite enjoyed in Ankara were strictly isolated from the rest of the 
population. The novel Ankara points to the dilemma of the elite in this 
atmosphere. On the one hand, "to dress like a European, to live and 
enjoy life like a European, to dance like a European, and to succeed 
in these in the eyes of the Europeans seemed as important as 
winning a big victory" (Karaosmanoýlu, 1994: 112). But on the other 
hand, the anxiety of the artificial life troubled the elite: "As I was 
climbing the stairs to the ball room I felt dizzy. I felt, as if with every 
step I was moving away from them, as if the gap with the people 
widens ever more. I had a sudden impulse to jump into this abyss and 
mix with them, so that I can watch our world, this artificial world from 
their eyes. " (119) 
Turkish Radio's broadcasting was shaped by the members of 
the elite in such a space, and in such a structure of sentiments. The 
life envisioned in Ankara nourished the strategies of Turkish Radio. 
And the complexity and heterogeneity of a built environment was 
reflected in the discrepancy between the performances of the 
broadcasters and the projected images via radio. Nevertheless it is 
significant that Ankara was chosen as the site of the national 
discourse. Contrary to what happened in nineteenth century Europe, 
that put society -instead of city and territory- at the centre of the 
concerns of political rationality, Turkish political ideology took the city 
as "a model for governmental rationality that could be applied to the 
whole territory". 17 For the Turkish state the newly founded capital 
Ankara was an utopian project that encompassed the core of the 
nation -its architectural, social, scientific and technical design. 
3.3. The Early Years of Turkish Radio: Istanbul vs. 
Ankara 
An exhaustive history of Turkish Radio still waits to be written. 
17 What Foucault says for eighteenth century France bears some resemblance to the 
Turkish case. "The model of the city became the matrix for the regulations that apply to a 
whole state. " (Foucault, 1986: 241) This was quite different from governmental rationality 
that has "to deal with a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and 
mechanisms of reaction, its regulations and as well as its possibilities of disturbance. " 
(Foucault, 1986: 242) 
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The limited research that has already been done on this subject 
provides a general outline of the legal framework of radio, the dates 
of important events, some figures concerning the number of listeners 
with radio sets, and the schedules and contents of broadcast 
programmes. Yet this research does not give any sense of the 
internal culture of the institution, its efforts to make links with other 
institutions. Nor does the existing research give any sense of the 
broadcasters themselves. Archives of the broadcasters' 
correspondence with each other and with other institutions do not 
exist. Yet some understanding of the performances of the 
broadcasters, their experience of this remarkable national experiment, 
is possible from the personal memoirs -either written or expressed in 
interviews- and, also from the debates that were held about radio in 
certain cultural journals of that period. While giving a brief account of 
the history of Turkish radio here, I will try to link statements with 
performances, hence, to situate the discourses on nationality as they 
were produced and articulated in practice and in relation to the 
spaces I have described before, Ankara and Istanbul. 
The introduction of radio to the new Turkish society was a source 
of awe and fascination. In 1923, when there was still no radio 
broadcasting in Turkey, ilkin18 tells, in his memoirs, how he witnessed 
a demonstration in the lecture room of Istanbul University. The 
demonstration was to show to a large number of guests, how a 
concert in a nearby building could be relayed live to the lecture room 
in the university. 11kin's description of the experience is focused on 
the technological artifact, the radio set, which was a huge black box 
placed on a wide table in the middle of the room. There were huge 
black speakers that "looked like trombones" on each side. He says, 
"we listened to the explanations with excitement. We 
awaited the experiment with excitement ... I can still 
remember the sound that came out of the speakers, though 
what we heard was mostly atmospherics. " 19 
The radio set described in this passage resembles a monument. 
18 Who became the General Director of Press and Publications Bureau in 1945. 
19 Nedim Veysel 11kin, "Radyonun Bize Kazandirdi6i Kiymetler", Radyo, Vol. 4, No. 39,1 
March 1945, p. l. 
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The usage of the metaphor, "monument", in people's general account 
of their early experience of radio sets in their domestic environment is 
quite common in Turkey. Similar to Fanon's (1970: 53-79) account of 
Algerian Radio in the 1950s, the perception of radio as an object and 
as sound, though mostly unintelligible, acquires special meanings in 
specific contexts. In the Turkish setting of the 1920s, in which 
modernisation attempts were being introduced and carried at a high 
speed, radio signified an alien object representing other worlds, yet 
something magical and empowering. 
The first radio station was established in 1927, which was built 
by a French firm. The legal decree of 1926 delegated the rights of 
radio broadcasting, normally belonging to the state, to a private 
company. By starting radio broadcasting Turkey was to be cited 
among "other civilised countries": 
"... operation of the transmitter stations in Ankara and 
Istanbul in the name of the Post, Telegraphy and Telephony 
Institute (PTT) is adjudged to the above mentioned 
company for 10 years; which would serve the general 
interests within the boundaries of the Turkish Republic with 
the aim of transmission and propagation of political, 
economic, social and scientific news, talks, conferences and 
concerts, and information about weather conditions and 
other issues that wireless telephone stations take up and 
transmit in other civilised countries to people, with the 
advent of science. "20 
The radio company which enjoyed the broadcasting rights for a 
set period, was financed by license fees. But it was mostly funded by 
state organisations, with 70% of its capital coming from the state. It 
also had the right to keep the revenues of tax on the radio sets 
imported to the country. The same company was also active in the 
trade of radio sets. 21 The journal published by the company, Telsiz , 
included some advertising to sell radio sets, which were called 
"wireless telephone receivers" at the time. It was Telsiz which started 
the first advertising campaign in Turkey, promising a free receiver for 
20 DDn'den BugOne Radyo-Televizyon, 1927-1990, TRT Yayinlari, 1990: 10. 
21 The founding of this company was part of the policy of the state to create some private 
entrepreneurship. Some of these private companies, sponsored by the state, were 
notorious for fraud. Private entrepreneurs, close to government, especially enjoyed the 
financial facilities of 1ý Bank to make easy money (Atay, 1969:. 456). 
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5 coupons to be collected from the journals. The journal's mission 
was set as to promote radio listening as well as educate the listeners 
and to spread the "magic" around. 
The first director of the Istanbul Radio, Hayreden describes the 
first days as follows: 
"I was already interested in wireless as an amateur when 
they asked me to join the company .... 
Then we organised a 
group of people for broadcasting ... 
Everything was ready 
except that there was no audience. Then, I gave training 
classes on radio in a room above the post office, for three 
weeks. Our aim was to make people understand what the 
wireless is so that they could tell friends and neighbours 
about it. "22 
Hayreden and others in the company, hoped that some "avant- 
garde" people would spread the desire of the new technology through 
their network of social relations. Some of the political elite were 
against radio broadcasting at that time, thinking that people, because 
of their "backward state", were not ready for it. However Mustafa 
Kemal's attitude towards radio determined the course of events. 
Hayreden tells about taking a radio set, that he himself made, to 
Mustafa Kemal: 
"They told me that he had said, 'let him bring the machine, 
so we shall listen to it'. I took a receiver that I have made 
myself to him in Ankara. While searching for stations, just by 
chance we had the Russian Radio. AtatOrk, who stayed in 
Sofia as a diplomat could understand some Russian. He 
listened and listened, then all of a sudden he hushed 
everyone: 'Efendil&23 he said, 'look they are doing 
propaganda'. And then he ordered that the radio station be 
built. " 
This example illustrates the process of decision making that took 
place in the Qankaya Villa, which I have described before. It was 
common that entrepreneurs would go to Mustafa Kemal to sell some 
of their bright ideas. And they knew how to refer to the discourse of 
"civil isation" to convince him. So the legitimation of the inauguration of 
22 Ankara Radio Sound Archives, "GOnOn l9inden", Sezi Ergun& Zehra Kurttekin, TRT 
Radio Programme, 1987. 
23 A public address to men, that AtatOrk much used in his speeches in the National 
Assembly. 
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radio broadcasting, whatever the personal hopes of the entrepreneurs 
were, stands out as: "If other civilised countries are using radio, we, 
too, must do it. " The discourse on modernity provided the necessary 
justification. It was important that Turkey started broadcasting, the rest 
-including the programmes, the audience- would follow. 
The programmes of Istanbul and Ankara Radio, in their first 
years, mainly consisted of music broadcasting, news bulletins 
prepared by Anatolian Agency, and stock exchange and cereal 
market news. 24 There were some talks on new Turkish reforms, on 
the new Turkish family, or on the national campaign for the use of 
domestic goods. But these remained marginal in comparison to 
music broadcasting. 25 
It is interesting that the opening and closing announcements 
were made in two languages: Turkish and French. Radio employed 
announcers only if they were fluent in both languages. 26 The 
programme schedules were also published in two languages in 
Telsiz. This led to some rumours that the company disguised its 
original French ownership under a Turkish name. While Kocabaýoýlu 
rejects this view (Kocabaýoglu, 1980: 14), a report prepared by the 
American Embassy in 1927 claims that , even though the transmitter 
company has a Turkish name (Tark Telsiz Telefon Anonim ýirketi) "it 
is known that it is supported by a prominent French company, 
"Compagnie Frangaise de Radio", and it is understood that most of 
the devices and equipment are provided by this French company. "27 
Although it is not possible, given the available sources, to verify 
either view about the origins of Turkish radio, the image of an 
"outsider" attached to radio is significant in itself. One reason for this 
could be the fact that prior to the foundation of the Republic all means 
of communication, like telegraph and telephone were in the hands of 
24 Radio's service to "the conditions and exigencies of the financial world" is a trait that is 
common to many countries in the beginning of the century (Marvin, 1988: 225). James 
Carey links this to the formation of the national markets (1992). 
525 Between 1927-1936, music broadcasting amounted to approximately 84% of the 
transmissions of Ankara and Istanbul radios (Kocabaýoýlu, 1980: 72). 
26 An advertisement for announcers to be hired by Istanbul Radio, Vakit, 3 February 
1927. 
27 American Embassy Document, Istanbul, "The Opening of the First Radio Station in 
Turkey", 27 June 1927. 
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"foreigners". The policy of the new government was to "remove 
foreigners from various positions". 28 Yet there were suspicions that 
some Turkish businessmen collaborated with foreign investors 
(Atay, 1969: 456). 29 However what is more significant in terms of this 
research, is the perceptions of the radio technology in the national 
context. The boundary management of what is foreign and what is not 
gains interesting meanings within the space of the radio broadcasting. 
This is best illustrated by the differences between Ankara and Istanbul 
Radio, which were set in completely different environments. Here we 
see a twist in the definition of the foreign. The multi-ethnic and 
cosmopolitan heritage of Istanbul which was reflected in the 
transmissions of the Istanbul radio in the 30's, was opposed to a purer 
version of national culture to be constructed in the "void" of Ankara, 
and specifically Ankara Radio. 
Both Istanbul and Ankara Radio, between 1927-1936 broadcast 
"Western" music. This was mostly "classical" music but also included 
some dance music. However an almost equal space was given to 
"Turkish" mUSiC30, inviting musicians working in clubs and cafes, 
especially in Istanbul, to perform live concerts in radio. In this sense 
Istanbul radio was more lively because it could rely on the sources of 
music and entertainment in the city. All famous musicians of the time, 
Safiye Ayla, Hamiyet YOceses , Zehra Bilir, could be heard on Istanbul 
Radio. Also most of the saZ 31 players in the town were employed by 
Istanbul Radio. 32 Whereas, for its music programmes, Ankara Radio 
had to be mostly dependent on "Riyaseticumhur Mijzik Takimi", a 
28 Which created some concern, for example, for the British. Correspondence from R. H. 
Howe to A. Chamberlain, 8.7.1925, PRO (F0371/10865) 
29 Mete Tuncay discusses the frauds during the single party regime. According to him, 
these were possible because those in power positions could use their unaccountable 
power for their economic interests, usually by helping foreign companies to have business 
contracts with the Turkish government and being illegally paid by the companies (1981: 
206-208). 
30 The approximate proportions were: "Turkish music" (a total of 30.3%) and "Western 
music" (a total of 40.28%) (Kocabaýoýlu, 1980: 72). 
31 A special musical instrument used both in folk and "classical" Turkish music. 
32 Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar in a text on Istanbul, refers to the diminishing life in the Turkish 
cafes in the late 1920's, which were once prominent as spaces for public interaction (and 
which according Hetherington (1997: 14) inspired the coffee houses in England and 
France, in the middle of the seventeenth century) because the musicians were 
increasingly employed by radio. (Tanpinar, 1979) 
121 
military band officially organised by the state and which performed 
both Western and Turkish music. The director of the band, Veli Kanlk 
was also the director of Ankara Radio. Both Istanbul and Ankara 
Radio were directly connected to their urban environment. It was 
Istanbul that was more privileged in terms of entertainment. 
Istanbul Radio, which enjoyed generally longer hours of 
transmission33 and was regarded as more important than Ankara 
Radio (Kocaba§oýlu, 1980: 58), was a candidate to replace the rich 
entertainment life of the city. It was considered as a medium for 
entertainment, that is "civilised and, by all means, contemporary", that 
is also "pleasurable, inexpensive and aesthetic". 34 In a technical 
booklet about radio it was written: 
"There is a beat35 to the big studio of Istanbul wireless 
telephone studio every evening. Why go to far places, and 
spend lots of money to listen to saz ? ... 
Why sit in polluted 
theatre halls and suffer trying to get some pleasure and 
amusement? It is intolerable isn't it? "36 
The meaning invested to radio, as a modern apparatus in this 
context, is not very different from that emerged in the pre-national 
forms of modernisation in the Tanzimat period. In effect, the importing 
of pleasurable ways of living and consumer goods for the elite in 
Istanbul. 37 Radio broadcasting in Istanbul, in a similar manner, fitted 
into the existent "pleasurable life" as another object of pleasure. 
Istanbul's urban space populated with "foreigners" was already 
associated with Western ways of living that had been, at the same 
time, enmeshed with the "high culture" of the Ottoman. Through radio 
the cosmopolitan space of Istanbul could be connected to the Western 
world non-problematicly. For example, in 1928, the national 
newspapers gave the daily programmes of Istanbul Radio, together 
33 Hours of daily transmission were unstable and varied in time. Ankara sometimes had to 
stop its transmissions. The average time of daily transmission for Istanbul was 4,5 hours, 
whereas for Ankara it was 3 hours (Kocabaýoýlu, 1980: 57-8). 
34 Telsiz, No. 1,30 June1927, p. 2. 
35 The word used in Turkish is ahenk which also has connotations of entertainment life. 
36 ýemsi, Genglere Telsiz Hocasl, Istanbul, 1927, p. 4. 
37 What is called as "excessive modernisation" by $erif Mardin (1 991). He is critical of the 
process arguing that it was mostly the consumer goods and certain styles not the Western 
values that was adopted by the rich people, which, in turn, was caricatured by some 
populist writers. 
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with those of Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Milan, and Bratislava while not 
mentioning Ankara Radio at all! Istanbul was, in this way, a 
cosmopolitan European city. 
The fact that, in 1927, there were only 2000 people with radio 
sets in Turkey -only half of them registered- and that most of them 
were either foreigners or "minorities" concentrated in Istanbul could 
justify the nature of broadcasting by Istanbul Radio. The supply was 
justified by the demand, though far from fully satisfying it. There were 
criticisms that radio was not satisfactory in its entertainment since it 
broadcast the same songs over and over again (Kocabaýoglu, 1980: 
60). 
The radio directors replied to these criticisms by making it clear 
that they "were only tradesmen" and gave "what the clients want"- But 
"a song only lasts three minutes. How many new songs, do 
you think , are produced 
in Turkey in a year? Let's say 100, 
then it would amount to 300 minutes. How can we fill the 
long four hours with this? " 38 
The scarcity of sources, the poor technical quality of the 
broadcasts were admitted by the directors. In that sense, the 
broadcasters were not in an effort to present their performances in a 
form that made it different from what it was. The radio was not yet 
invested with meanings that would serve the signification of 
nationality. The civilising mission that was loosely attached to it in the 
beginning, could not gain a transcendental meaning, surpassing the 
performances of the broadcasters linked directly to the conditions and 
sources available in their own spaces. The memoirs of broadcasters 
from this period are full of "silly" events that convey the poor 
conditions of broadcasting then. How the noise from the street or the 
hotel -in which Ankara Radio's studio was set for a while- interfered 
with broadcasting; how they stopped the main flow to broadcast the 
news of the fire in the next door building; how they leaned out of the 
window to give the weather report; how they had to put a stocking 
over a microphone to improve the quality of sound; and how they 
erred in their words while they were presenting programmeS39 ... It is 
38 Cevat Fehmi, "Radyo StOdyosunda Bir Saaf, Cumhuriyet, 22 Octoberl 932. 
39 Ankara Radio Sound Archives, "Radyo Anilan", Elgin Temel, TRT Radio Programme. 
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striking that the memoirs from later periods of radio, though full of 
similar irrational and comical elements, are coloured by a different 
structure of sentiment. If a tone of enjoyment and pleasure dominates 
the former, a sense of mission and above all a "love of mission" are 
emphasised in the latter. 40 Also one can see in the latter accounts, a 
modern concern to detach the product from the conditions of 
production, which implies a denial of experience and body, and the 
growing impact of mediation in the representation of subjectivity. 
3.4. Radio as the "Voice of the Nation" 
In the period after 1930 the elite was "more systematically 
geared" towards creating a new ideology (Kadioolu, 1996: 187). The 
six principles of Kemalism -Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, 
Statism, Secularism and Revolution ism/Ref ormism- that I have talked 
about before, were launched in 1931. This pointed to the attempts of 
treating the national matters, which had been embedded in personal 
networks before, within a discipline. Culture and the daily life of 
people were among these matters. 
"By 1930, it was generally agreed by the Republican elites 
that the reforms that were undertaken in the course of the 
1920s had not taken root. This problem was to be remedied 
with further reforms from above that were geared towards 
creating a new Turk. " (Kadioolu, 1996: 188) 
Culture was regarded as a field through which a "new man" 
could be created. Baltacio6lu, who was publishing a journal called 
Yeni Adam (New Man) describes the "new man" in opposition to the 
"old": "The old man thinks first of himself, and then his family. The new 
40 Most people working in Ankara Radio in the late 30's emphasise that it was like a 
school. However, a school meant not only discipline and control but also play. 
Broadcasters talk of the childish games they played with each other in their memoirs: how 
one musician scared another in a dark corridor, how they played songs with special 
meanings for themselves, how a sound engineer pretended to be a dog walking on the 
floor during a live performance of a radio drama, how someone slept while reading the 
long news bulletin for the press at night... But it is also often emphasised that they "loved" 
their job. Ankara Radio Sound Archives, "TOrkiye Radyolarinda Yarim YOzyil", Yocel 
Ertugay, 1975; "GOnOn i9inden" , Sezi Ergun& Zehra Kurttekin, 1987, TRT Radio Programmes. 
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man thinks first of his nation, then his family, and then himself. "41 The 
new hierarchy prescribed here, according to writers on national 
culture, could only be achieved by new moral standards, by new 
language, and by new history. These areas were being turned to 
fields of experimentation by the elite. The growing concerns with 
"cultural nationalism" were practiced in institutes, such as the Turkish 
Language Institute, the Turkish History Institute, and the People's 
Houses which were busy creating theses on language, history and 
folklore. But there were others who claimed that "the new man" will 
also be a product of disciplining the sentiments via cultural means, 
such as theatre, film, radio, books, journals and newspapers. 42 After 
all, Mustafa Kemal had said "You should be able to transform the 
great ideal that we are working for, in the heart of the people, from an 
idea into an emotion. "43 It is in this emphasis on culture and on the 
emotions that radio was invested with new meanings, and a new 
significance. 
Yeni Adam emphasised the need for further development of 
radio as a medium: 
"The brief history of radio introduced it as a medium of 
entertainment to us. We are used to hear dance tunes at 
certain hours in the evening. But it is not that difficult to 
understand that radio cannot be confined to the 
dissemination of musical sounds. It can also broadcast 
lectures, monologues, interviews, dramas, lessons, radio 
journals. "44 
The middle of the 1930s witnessed harsh criticisms coming from 
intellectuals -journalists, writers- of the broadcasts of the "company 
radio", especially, Istanbul Radio. Kocabaýoýlu argues that the use 
made by radio in the USSR had also been influential in the 
41 Yeni Adam, No. 1 0,5 Marchl 934, p. 1 0. 
42 A declaration on culture in Yeni Adam, demanded that all cultural means be under the 
control of state authority. The demands listed were: 1. We want the city theatre to be a 
stage for culture; 2. We want cinema to become an organ of revolution; 3. We want radio 
to be public university and a music academy; 4. We want newspapers purified from their 
pornographic content and become a social and a political school; 5. We want journals to 
be freed from the dictates of the market; 6. We want the book publishing to be designed 
according to the ideals of knowledge and culture. No. 81.18 July 1935, cover page. 
43 cited in And (1983: 3). 
44 Yeni Adam, No. 92.3 October'1935, p. 8. 
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formulation of new ideas on radio in Turkey. 
"The experiences in Russia, Germany and Italy have shown 
us that radio can raise the standards of culture, it can teach 
anything; in short, radio can be the fastest and the most 
industrious worker of the new revolution. "45 
"it is a big deceit to regard radio as a medium of 
entertainment, but a private company does not have either 
the financial or the cultural means to turn it into an 
appropriate instrument of culture ... 
While we have been able 
to Westernise in every other matter, why are we so bland in 
the case of radio? " 46 
"At present radio fails to achieve the ideal to work for the 
national culture. Its musical broadcasts corrupt the 
discipline of culture and MUSiC. "47 
The criticisms against music broadcasting focused on the 
unwanted effects of alaturka48 music. Alaturka, which supposedly was 
the Turkish music, as categorised and named by the Western sources, 
constituted a vast field of debate on national identity. Alaturka music, 
even in the last days of the Ottoman Empire, had a degrading 
connotation for the pro-Westerners. 49 The Westerners had named this 
music "Turkish", but the Turkish nationalists were disturbed by the 
inferiority imposed upon it, in comparison to the Western music. So 
they denied that it was "Turkish". It was Eastern but not Turkish music. 
G6kalp had argued that it was essentially Byzantine and "Eastern". 50 
45 !. H. Baltacioýlu, "Radyoyu 011<01eýtirmek Lazimclir", Yeni Adam, No. 8.19 February 1934, 
p. 7. 
46 Nbvit Osmay, "Radyolarimiz! ", Yeni Adam, No. 88.1 September 1934, p. 9. 
47 "Tbrk Radyosu Ne Yapiyor? ", MOzik ve Sanat Hareketleri, No. l. September 1934, p. 9. 
48 The term alaturka is derived from alla turca (in the Turkish way) opposed to alafranga 
(in the Western way). Tekelioolu demonstrates that alaturka had degrading connations for 
pro-Westerners both in Ottoman and Turkish societies (1996). 
49 Even Sultan AbdOlhamit 11, in the beginning of the century, had said: "To tell the truth, 
I am not especially fond of alaturka music. It makes you sleepy, and I prefer alafranga 
music, in particular the operas and operettas. And shall I tell you something? The modes 
we call alaturka aren't really Turkish. " BOlent Aksoy, "Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Musiki ve 
Batflilaýma", Tanzimat Ddnemi T&rkiye Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 5, p. 1215. 
50 He interestingly argues that alaturka music borrowed from the ancient Greek music in 
the Middle Ages, as the Western music did. But the Westerners overcame the "mistakes" 
of this music and gave rise to "civilised" music. However the Eastern music -which was 
"depressingly monotonous - played in the Ottoman lands, continued its "ill" state (1994: 
126-8). It is possible to see, in this account, the internalised Western look. In the West 
the Ottoman Empire had been called the "sick man" in the nineteenth century. 
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In the 30's the national elite were unhappy with both the technical 
and moral standards of alaturka, in the form that could be heard on 
radio. It was said to be stricken with "alcohol ism"51. It provoked "lustful 
feelingS"52 and it was unbearable to listen to its "wailing". 
There are two sets of specific concerns that mingle with each 
other in the criticisms towards radio broadcasting, especially its music 
broadcasts. One concern pertains to the role that radio must play in 
disciplining the people in order to create a "new man" equipped with 
national sentiments; and the other concern relates to the image 
projected to the Western world as can be seen in the words of an 
early Turkish poet: 
"Every evening on radio, I suspect 
A yob belches towards the face of the WeSt"53 
The demand that radio should be controlled by the state and 
thereby, produce the vital elements of a national culture have to be 
situated in larger framework that concerns the problem of forming of 
new national identity. Here we witness a dilemma: Culture was the 
only field where national identity could be imagined, since the 
distinction between "culture" and "civil isation" in the constitutive 
discourse on nationality, that G6kalp and other nationalists 
vehemently argued, implied that only technology and certain forms 
could be borrowed from the Western civilisation. Culture had to be 
distinctly Turkish. But on the other hand the existing culture that the 
institutions, such as radio, could feed on was regarded as "sickly 
Oriental", in G6kalp's words. The problem was further complicated by 
the fact that the principles contradicted the sentiments. Most of the 
members of the elite, including Mustafa Kemal, in fact, liked alaturka 
music. Mustafa Kemal "liked alaturka music but believed in Western 
music. He listened to alaturka music at home all the time, but 
defended the place of Western music in national education ... He was 
51 Peyami Safa, "Alkolik Musiki", Yeni Adam, No. 8.19 Februaryl 934, p. 9. 
52 Used by $DkrO Kaya, the Minister of Internal Affairs then, in his criticism of radio 
broadcasting. His basic criticism was that state should play a more efficient role in 
processing those sounds that directly come from the coffee houses. Ayln Tarihi, No. 6.1- 
31 May 1934, p. 32. 
53 A poem written by Neyzen Tevfik, a poet and a musician (cited in Kocabaýoglu, 
1980: 90). 
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able to crush the rebellions. of his heart by his brain. " (Atay, 1969: 410) 
The dilemma and splits led to a period of confusion and 
contradictory practices. Mustafa Kemal's interview with a foreign 
journalist, in 1930, conveys the pain associated with the 
contemporary conditions of national music. Mustafa Kemal says: 
"You see with how much care we treat our musical affairs... 
How long did it take Western music to reach its present 
standards? 400 years.. We cannot wait that long. You see 
that we are trying to adopt Western MUSiC. "54 
The tension filled attitude of Mustafa Kemal to make the 
Westerners "see" that Turkey is on a rapid move toward 
modernisation also implies the internalised Western gaze that has 
pushed the elites to problematise their own culture, made them ready 
to judge themselves in the most severe terms. The attitude is not a 
simply defensive one that clings to its own culture; but it is defensive 
in the sense that it internalises the lack projected to its "self" from the 
Other, and tries to make it up to the Other's "reflected" standards. It 
points to the unstable boundaries of a national identity that is shaped 
in a continuous dialogue with the West. The West, here constitutes a 
"virtual viewpoint of the ego ideal", in which reflection itself is reflected 
back into "reality". (Zizek, 1991: 15) The ideals of modernisation are 
assessed in terms of a reflection of the West (its music being 
developed as opposed to alaturka) which is reflected back to render 
the "Turkish music" poor. The Turkish elite saw their culture not with 
the eyes of the West, but through an Occidentalist projection of the 
West. They were split, in the sense that they could never identify with 
the Western gaze. They had to build or create their own identity 
against a projected Western gaze which remained uncertain and 
open to changing interpretations; and always a source of frustration 
because of its uncertainty and arbitrariness. 
The complexity of the mediation between West and national 
identity can be traced in the anxiety stricken and arbitrary attempts to 
define the boundaries of the national culture in the mid 30's. A speech 
delivered by Mustafa Kemal in the National Assembly was taken as a 
warning against broadcasting alaturka music on radio. His statement 
54 Ayin Tarihi, Vol. 22, No. 23, April 1930, p. 6054-6055. 
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that Turkish music was not. in a state "that would make us proud" was 
taken as an "inspiration" to ban alaturka on radio. Mustafa Kemal's 
words were: 
"Today the music that we are made to listen is not in a state 
that would make us proud. We should openly admit this. 
It's necessary that national, refined feelings and ideas are 
expressed; elevated forms of speech and phrases be 
compiled and these are processed according to the 
general rules of contemporary music now. Only then, 
Turkish music can be exalted and find its place as a 
universal MUSiC. "55 
These rather general words on Turkish music were interpreted 
by the Ministry of Internal Affairs as follows: 
II '** taking an inspiration from the enlightening speech of 
the noble Gazi56 on alaturka in the National Assembly 
today, it is declared to those in charge that alaturka music 
should be totally removed from radio broadcasting as of this 
evening, and only those pieces of music that have been 
composed by Western techniques and played only by 
musicians that have a knowledge of Western techniques, 
are to be broadcasted. "57 
So, a mastery of Western techniques were made as a 
precondition of production of national music, while the Western 
labeled "Turkish music" was rejected. The reversal of the meanings of 
foreign and national58 , in this context, is striking. We see, at the same 
time, both a revolt against the Orientalist Western categorisations, and 
a desire to assert subjectivity, reducing the Western civilisation to a 
technique that can be mastered or to an object that can be 
appropriated. 
However, the ban on alaturka was not there to stay. It lasted only 
two years. There are several versions of the "story" regarding the 
55 Zabit Ceridesi, Vol. 25, Period 4, Meeting 4, pA 
56 Mustafa Kemal was generally addressed by his inferiors as Gazi, which means a warrior 
who has been hurt in a holy war. It is curious that such an address was used in a society 
whose secularism has been accentuated so distinctly. 
57 A supplement to Mizik ve Sanat Hareketleri, January 1935. 
58 Which resembles the case of Greek Occidentalism where everything local was 
despised as foreign, and ironically the West became the Greek tradition 
(Herzfeld, 1995: 248). 
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reversal of the decision. Kozanoglu, who has played Turkish music on 
radio, tells his version of the story: Mustafa Kemal who liked listening 
to Osman Pehlivan's saz and chanting has invited him to his villa in 
qankaya one evening. Osman Pehlivan went there without his saz. 
And he complained that "the noble Gazi" loved this music yet was 
being harsh on others who loved it too. Then it is said that Mustafa 
Kemal became sentimental and sent Osman Pehlivan to Ankara 
Radio to play saz to the nation. 59 The split, illustrated in this story, 
that afflicts national identity seems incurable. The split was between 
body and mind, between pleasure and mission -the love of the nation. 
The radio stations' strategies after 1936 were oriented towards 
imagining a space that would be freed from splits. The antidote for the 
split between pleasure and the love of the nation, between the 
Western and the national modern was to recreate a nationalised 
popular culture, process it through radio and try to make, first, the elite, 
and then the people love it. These strategies were grounded both in 
the artificial space of Ankara and in the purified sound of radio. 
Radio, was already regarded as the voice of the nation, the voice of 
the revolution that should be heard by others, both in the national and 
Western space. 
"Ankara Radio should not be broadcasting "hicazkdri- 
kOrdi"60 gurgling that has risen from its grave still carrying its 
sarcophagus, or canned jazz music that is sickening. 
Instead, it should make the voice of Ankara's revolution 
heard. So that an Emil LudWig6l who hears this voice, 
would be dazzled with astonishment and come running to 
Ankara, and crave for a few more interviews. We are a 
nation that has made the most manly revolution. It is time 
that we raise our voice and made it heard. "62 
3.5. Ankara and the Problems of the "Pure Voice" 
In a similar manner to the earlier decision regarding the 
59 Cevdet Kozanoýlu, Radyo Habralarlm, p. 1 1. 
60 A special makam, a set rhythm in alaturka. 
61 The name of the foreign journalist whom Mustafa Kemal had given the interview on 
Turkish music. 
62 Burhan Asaf (Belge), "Inkilabimizin Sesi", Kadro, No. 1 1, November 1932, p. 37. 
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development of radio, the. nationalisation was put into practice as a 
result of an "inspiration" from a speech by Mustafa Kemal at the 4th 
General Assembly of the RPP in 1935. For Mustafa Kemal, "it would 
be very appropriate" that the issue of radio, "which is vital for national 
culture, but also of highest importance in terms of international 
concerns, be given care. "63 In the RPP's programme it was written 
that , "(T)he party considers radio as one of the most valuable tools for 
the cultural and political discipline of the nation. We will establish 
powerful transmitters. We will provide easy and inexpensive access to 
radio receivers. "64 
A year later, it was decided that the contract with the private 
company for its transmission rights was not going to be renewed and 
radio will be nationalised. The operation of transmitters was put under 
the responsibility of the PTT. In 1937 a new law was passed regarding 
radio transmitters and broadcasting rights. The government also 
commissioned Marconi to build new transmitters and a new station 
for Ankara Radio, which was completed and started operations in 
1938. 
The transition period between the date of nationalisation and the 
date the state radio started its official broadcasting did not introduce 
major changes in the make-up of professional teams or in the internal 
organisation. However new ways of producing a "national culture" 
were developed. One of the most significant among these, was the 
organised effort of radio, in cooperation with the Ministry of Education 
and the State Conservatory, to research and compile examples of folk 
music. 
In the previous period, what is called "the people's music" or folk 
music was only represented on radio by few local songs that were 
known by musicians who happened to work for radio. Ankara Radio, 
after 1936 started broadcasting programmes of folk music in a more 
"scientific" way. The first programme of this kind was called "Folk 
music with explanations" which included explanations about the 
music broadcast, specifying the region and the sources of various 
bj Zablt Ceridesi, Vol. 6, Period 5, Meeting 1, Session 1, p. 3. 
64 CHP Ddrdiinctj Bijy0k Kurultayl GdrOýmeleri Tutulgasl, Ankara: Ulus Basimevi, 1935, 
p. 73. 
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pieces of music. Then Sarisbzen, who was a music teacher in Sivas 
and who was appointed to take part in the folklore research of the 
Ministry and the Conservatory, prepared a programme for Ankara 
Radio, called "Tunes from Homeland". The aim of the programme 
was to introduce "the people's music" to the nation and to the world. 
Sans6zen says: 
"Old and young, peasant and urban, ignorant and wise, 
musician or not, those who are familiar with alaturka or with 
alafranga, everyone is deeply attached with love to the 
folk songs that are the most beautiful examples of our 
traditions. Therefore, folk music today is not just the affair of 
certain institutions or individuals but of 'the whole nation'. "65 
The attempt entailed a representation of the national space, 
processing diverse sources of folk music and stripping them of their 
ethnic and local characters to include them in the unitary voice of the 
nation. However these programmes also had another function. They 
were educating the pro-Western elite in the national culture, teaching 
them the "values" of their homeland 66 that were different but still 
belonged to the Western civilisation. The new task was not just to be 
Westernised but national. Too much Westernism was as dangerous, 
for a sense of national identity, as sticking to oriental forms. So the 
hidden target audience inscribed in these programmes was the elite 
situated in Ankara who did not know about folk music and who had to 
learn it in order to keep away from the immoral effects of alaturka. 
Ankara had to be saved from the immoral attraction of 1stanbul67 
through the mediation of the imagined national space. 
There is a disembodiment involved in the process of compiling 
folk songs. All local colours were removed, local accents were 
evened out, different languages were transformed into Turkish (for 
65 Cited in Muhip Arciman, Radyoda Kimlerle Baýbaýayiz?, Ankara, 1948, p. 42. 
66 The elite in Ankara had very little knowledge of the conditions of living and of culture in 
the Eastern and Southern areas of Turkey. Handan Uran, who played in radio dramas in 
the 40's, says it was common in Ankara at that time, that people only thought of Anatolia 
as an image. She tells how she was really shocked when they first went on a tour to 
Mersin by train. Interview, 16 November 1996. 
67 "The only kind of human being, who does not understand serious issues, and then 
unceremoniously sets aside the seriousness to make a caricature of these issues that 
he has been unable to understand, can only be found in a single city of Turkey: Istanbul. 
ýevket Sbreyya, "Yari MOnevverler KulObO", Kadro, No. 8. August 1932, p. 42. 
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example Kurdish songs were sung in Turkish), and the songs were 
performed by musicians who were under the strict education of 
directors both in the Conservatory and in Ankara Radio. 68 The songs 
were stripped of the actual bodies that produced them in certain local 
ways of living and traditions. 69 In this sense, the body and its 
expressions, once again, were opposed to a transcendental idea of 
love of the country and the nation. Love was to be a product of 
discipline. 
The folk music broadcasting of Ankara Radio continued in its 
later years, eventually institutionalising it as a genre of music that has 
continued. There was also an attempt to give alaturka a classical 
status under the name of "Classical Turkish Music". Music, that was 
compiled from different sources was transcribed into notes. A 
classical Turkish music choir was established and many musicians 
were brought to Ankara from Istanbul to participate in it. 70 The 
activities of disciplining the field of music were also extended to 
Western music. Several orchestras of symphonic music, dance music, 
"salon" music were formed which performed in the studios of Ankara 
Radio. The military band "Riyaseticumhur MOzik Takimi" continued its 
performances. All these bands had the function of education besides 
performance. "Students" were expected to master the Western music 
techniques and the classical repertoire. The director of 
"Riyaseticumhur MOzik TakimP Zeki Ong6r's speech to his students 
conveys the structure of sentiments within which disciplining activities 
took place. "You are my bacteria" he said to his students, "you will 
spread the Western music in Turkey. " (Sun, 1969) 1 will further reflect 
on the metaphor, that evokes both a sense of illness associated with 
68 Radife Erten, who is a folk singer, tells in her memoirs about the long hours of practice 
and education they had in Ankara Radio: "It was like a school. We were put in a studio for 
three or four hours to practice. Then our teacher Nuri Halil Bey would come to check us, 
also other teachers would come and check who is working and who is not. They would 
pull the ear of those who is not working. " Ankara Radio Sound Archives, "Torkiye 
Raclyolarincla Yarim YOzyil", YOcel Ertugay, TRT Radio Programme, 1975. 
69 For example, the traditional music of tarikats (religious orders) was dealt a major blow 
and it essentially vanished except for the mystical music of Mevlevi origin, as all tekkes 
and zaviyes (religious lodges and cloisters) were abolished after the proclamation of the 
Turkish Republic (Tekelioolu, 1996: 198). 
70 In this process too the traditions were altered. A certain form ýarki (song) was picked 
from the more sophisticated old tradition in which a number of musical forms followed one 
another in a consecutive order, and was popularised (Tekelioglu, 1996: 209). 
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the word "bacteria" and the desire to fill the lack projected to "the 
people", later in the chapter. 
By the end of the 1930s Ankara Radio was getting far ahead of 
Istanbul both in terms of the variety of its programmes and its 
significance for the nation. From 1936 onwards Ankara Radio 
organised separate units for Turkish and Western Music, and for 
Drama. Talks addressing mostly domestic issues, such as new forms 
of entertainment, health, family affairs, child education were integrated 
into the broadcasting of Ankara Radio, and a children's programme 
was designed. 
After two years of a transition period, Ankara Radio officially 
began its transmissions in its new building on 28 October 1938, the 
fifteenth anniversary of the Republic. The opening of the new Ankara 
Radio was announced by a claim to represent the whole nation: "This 
is the Turkish Radio". Istanbul Radio was soon closed down and 
could broadcast on and off during the 40's until it was reopened in 
1949 in its new building. The first speech on the inauguration of 
Ankara Radio was made by the prime minister, ln6nO, in English. 
Then, the Minister of Public Works spoke: 
"it was a necessity and a mission that Turkish Republic 
benefited from radio, which is one of the highest products of 
science of the nineteenth century and of global importance 
in the twentieth century. "71 
He continued his long speech thanking the English Marconi 
Company which "was a company established by Marconi who had 
invented radio, a company which is exemplary of the high developed 
English science and art". The Minister believed that the radio will 
adjoin "our existence to the people, and inform other civilised nations 
of the degree of our progress and developments. "72 
Radio was regarded both as a defender of national values 
against the world, but also as a technology that provided the 
necessary means to unite the nation. The two transmitters built by 
Marconi -one medium wave transmitter of 120 kW power and one 
71 Cemal Yorulmaz, "Bizde ve bteki Memleketlerde Radyo", unpublished manuscript, 
1945, p. 32. 
72 Ibid. 
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short wave transmitter of . 20 kW power- were allocated for internal 
(Central Anatolia) and external (Central Europe, Balkans and Near 
East) transmissions respectively. 73 When radio was nationalised there 
were 6175 subscribers; the number reached 25,510 in 1937 and 
showed a steady increase in the following years. However, the 
percentage of radio sets to population was still very JOW. 74 Yet, it was 
thought that the physical boundaries, "the mountains, the sea, the 
deserts, the distance, these material and geographical reasons that 
are barriers to the integration of the units of the nation"75 can be 
surpassed now, not only by actually "going to the people" via the 
People's Houses, but more easily through radio waves. 
Radio was conceived as a new medium to implement the 
national principle of populism. Radio broadcasting altered the 
previous metaphors of "the people". Early nationalists had talked of 
"the people" as the "body" and of the elite as the "head" in the 
society. 76 The difference between the elite and the people had been 
translated into spatial terms: consecutively Istanbul and Anatolia. 
However, the old metaphor of the head and the body was refigured 
through radio broadcasting. In 1942, the Prime Minister's speech on 
Ankara Radio stressed that: 
"The Turkish nation-is a body that has a head made of 
light. The body functions, the head inspects and protects. All 
the world believes, trusts in, and is proud of this living 
example. "77 
The metaphor of "light" employed to signify power also points to 
the ascending importance of more scientific and less tangible 
/J Although the medium wave transmitter was quite powerful (one of 36 transmitters of 
the same power in Europe), Eastern and Southern Eastern regions of Anatolia and 
Thrace, including Istanbul, had reception difficulties (Kocabaýoýlu, 1980: 150). 
74 The number of sets for 1000 people in 1940, for example, was only 4.1, while it was 
234.7 in Denmark, 223.7 in the USA, 196.2 in Britain, 169.4 in Germany, 14.1 in Algeria, 
12.1 in Bulgaria (Cemal Yorulmaz, "Bizde ve Oteki Memleketlerde Radyo", unpublished 
manuscript, p. 110). 
75 i. H. Baltacioolu, Yeni Adam, 5 March1934, p. 10. 
76 It was written, in 1916, in the journal TOrk Yurdu, that "Istanbul has been neglecting 
Anatolia. Our struggle was that Istanbul, the head of the country, got interested in the 
body... Our aim was to force those gentlemen in Istanbul to take some interest in 'the 
people', in 'Anatolia'. " ( cited in Toprak, 1995: 45) 
77 The speech of Prime Minister on Ankara Radio in 1942. Radyo, Vol. 1, No. 4,15 March 
1942, p. 9. 
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metaphorS78 in interpreting away observable differences in the 
national territory. The messages disseminated by radio, were 
assumed to reach all those listening, without altering their conditions, 
without "busying the eye, without disturbing the body". 79 Radio 
programmes were as immaterial as the actual waves. "Radio presents 
to people, not the real scientific or artistic events, but a replica -which 
is very similar to the real; almost a sap, a preserve of the real. "80 
Radio was seen as an echo and a replica of the real while letting the 
power of imagination free. "it leaves you free to imagine the people as 
beautiful as their voices. "81 
This is why the so-called institutions of the people sought help 
from radio when they could not deal with the reality in their local 
settings. The People's Houses, in some districts, such as Silifke, 
Malatya, Mardin, and Muýla, "that realised that the local potential was 
not suitable to get people interested in music, called help from radio, 
from the mature and enlightened musical arts of the big centres... "82 
They were connected to Ankara through radio; "so leaving the 
responsibility to Ankara, which with its refined choices does its best to 
attract large numbers of people, and make them listen to broadcasting 
diffusing from the big speakers in the yards ... In this way the people 
will have the possibility to connect not only their hearts but also their 
minds and ears to the Centre. Radio plays the role of the most smooth 
and untiring educator in musical discipline. "83 (emphasis added) 
The radio made the Occidentalist fantasy, that the "imagined" 
people can be incorporated into the "modern" national culture, 
possible. It also provided a sense of reality to the fantasy. The elite 
were hearing their voice as an echo, as a replica of a certain reality 
which they could take as reality. Therefore the "voice of the nation" on 
radio had to be carefully crafted. This is best illustrated by the 
importance attached to presenters and announcers' perfection in 
78 "It is the technical realization of new scientific imaginings, a realization that itself 
materializes their improbable possible worlds. " (Beer, 1996: 153) 
79 Nurettin Artam, Radyo, Vol. 3. No. 29.15 April 1944, p. l. 
80 Burhan Belge, Radyo, Vol. 3. No. 27.15 February 1944, p. l. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Halkevleri 1932-1935: 103 Halkevi Gegen Yfflarda Nasil iýahýtl, p. 41. 
83 Ibid. 
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speech and to the quality of their voice. 
"Radio is basically a box of voice, a box of beautiful voice. 
Beautiful voice is the essence of the policy in radio. 
Everything on radio, music, talks, drama, news, are 
disseminated via this beautiful voice. A voice that is not 
beautiful kills both what it is and the things that it is not. "84 
The way Baltacioglu describes the beautiful voice on radio 
manifests how technology was conceived in this context : 
"Radiophonic voice means a voice that is beautiful, that becomes 
beautiful when filtrated through electrons. "85 However the "filter of 
electrons" combined with strict control over broadcasting did not result 
in producing the desired "beautiful" voices of the nation. Although 
Ankara Radio's announcers and presenters were tutored in 
pronunciation, Turkish language, literature and grammar by expertS86, 
the elite were never happy with the performance of the radio, in this 
and other respects. Even towards the end of the 40's, the Turkish 
language used by Ankara Radio were still being criticised. One 
criticism went far to say, "that we are in no position to criticise the 
language of the London Radio (the BBC Turkish Service)" since we, 
on our own radio, are no better". 87 
Ankara Radio became a modern laboratory in which different 
experiments took place and were problematised. For example, after 
Mustafa Kemal's death, the sound engineers in Ankara Radio tried to 
produce a sound record of Mustafa Kemal's speech on the tenth 
anniversary of the Republic which had been filmed by the Russians. 
They sampled the soundtrack from the available copies of the film by 
using "electrical filters". After working two months, the speech was 
broadcast on Ankara Radio. However, the quality was far from being 
satisfactory. There were complaints that the voice of AtatOrk cannot be 
b4 I. H. Baltacio6lu, Yeni Adam, No. 600,27 June1946, p. 7. 
85 Ibid. 
86 The announcers were employed, after 1940, if they passed an exam. They were 
further trained by special tutors in "Turkish language, grammar, literature, and 
pronunciation" (Kocabaýoglu, 1980: 199). The broadcasters that I interviewed also 
emphasised that there was a big concern that announcers spoke "correct Turkish" , they were trained by tutors from the Conservatory. Mahmut Tali Ong6ren, Interview, 24 
January-1996; Turgut bzakman, Interview, 25 January-1996. 
87 Yeni Adam, No. 611,4 December 1947. 
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that "bad". 88 That pointed to the paradoxes of recorded voice. 89 
"Mechanisms for recording and reproduction on the one hand provide 
a technical body, a framework for representations, and on the other 
hand, by presenting themselves as a double, constitute a simulacrum 
of power, destroy the legitimacy of representation. " (Attali, 1985: 86) 
It is also interesting that some of the experiments were known to 
bear elements that were alien, even dangerous, to the culture of the 
people as the metaphor "bacteria", used for Western music, reveals. 
This manifests the second-order nature of constructing a national 
identity in Turkey. Many attempts to create a national culture were 
experienced in a self-conscious way, concentrating on the 
constructed and projected images. The lack reflected from the West 
caused anxieties that had to be compensated by the image. Yet the 
image did not sound authentic and real enough. 
Ankara Radio adopted a stricter control and censorship over its 
products during the Second World War. The content of broadcasting 
became highly centralised. In 1940 Ankara Radio was directly 
adjoined to a department of government, and operated under its direct 
control. The texts of the "radio journal" were written by the members of 
the government bureau, the General Directorate of Press and 
Publications. It is only in these years that Ankara Radio established its 
own news unit. 90 Ankara Radio was proud of its "neutral and truthful 
radio journalism" during the course of the war. Its duty was, according 
to the broadcasters, "to tell the nation the truths, whether they are 
sweet or bitter, and by doing this, to be the ear of the nation and the 
mouth of the government. "91 Yet the criticisms of the elite continued 
88 Ankara Radio Sound Archives, "Radyo Andari", Elgin Temel, TRT Radio Programme. 
89Attali's (1985) point shows the need for studies on "voice" in media studies, within which 
mostly textual and visual analyses are privileged. 
90 Before then, news would reach radio in an iternised form from the Anatolian Agency 
just before the news programme started. The presenters had to list them in order and 
compose them as a news report few minutes before the time of broadcasting. Ankara 
Radio Sound Archives, "Radyo Andan", Elgin Temel, TRT Programme; Mahmut Tali 
Ongbren, Interview, 24 January`1996. 
91 Selim Sarper, "Ankara Radyosu Milletin Emrinde", Radyo, Vol. 1, No. 3,15 February 
1942, p. l. 
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both in relation to language, and to the content of news and drama. 92 
There was a gap between the actual representation of the voice of the 
nation and the ideal one. The voice of the nation, in Bhabba's terms, 
kept "stumbling over itself, its obligations and its limitations" (1991: 
95). Between what the elite said by "the mouth of the government" and 
heard by "the ear of the nation" falls a shade of atmospherics, of "non- 
beautiful" voices, the "non-serious" performances of the broadcasters. 
But also the interference coming from the space of the West, such as 
the broadcasting of the BBC Turkish Section. While the Turkish 
broadcasters boasted with their "truthful" news, the BBC claimed that 
Turkish radio duplicated the material that was already put by the 
British. 93 But as I will be showing in the next chapter, the BBC, in fact, 
shaped its news programmes according to the concerns of the 
Turkish. The disturbing voice that infiltrated the space of the national 
identity and which had to be denied in order to construct a 
representation of truth requires further analysis. I argue that the 
representations of truth constructed, on both sides, were based on a 
hidden dialogic link. The analysis of the BBC Turkish Service in the 
next chapter, gives an account of the common sky that structured the 
interconnections between the Turkish case and the "West" , which 
includes not only representations but also temporality, space and 
bodies. 
92 News programmes were criticised by some intellectuals for.. being dependent on 
Western sources and giving no domestic news. Mahmut Tali Ongbren, Interview, 24 
January 1996. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu, in his correspondence to Hasan Ali Yocel in 
1939, complained of getting no news from Ankara (being out of Ankara) : "You may say 
that there is radio now. But this radio does not give any domestic news. Just talks about 
China or other faraway countries, because Anatolian Agency does not have any network 
for domestic news, it only disseminates what Reuter and Havass News Agencies give as 
news. " (Eronat, 1996: 50) 1 will point to criticisms about radio drama in Chapter 6. 
93 BBC Written Archives, 31 October, 1 941, "Turkish Broadcasts" 
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CHAPTER 4 
London Calling Turkey 
In this chapter I analyse the dialogic character of the BBC Turkish 
Service policies in its relation to its constructed object - the Turkish 
people- primarily from 1939 to the end of the 40's, referring to the 
BBC written archives. I address the historical context and the 
changing strategies of the BBC Turkish Service in defining, knowing 
and influencing its object. However, the reactions of the constructed 
object , through which a subject position is evoked, can also be traced 
within the same material. Therefore, the analysis does not only point 
to the specific role of radio broadcasting in the government of distant 
masses , but also reveals the processes in which claims to truth and 
its justifications were made. One can see the work of subtle 
calculations based on information, as well as sweeping 
generalisations based on assumptions and anecdotal evidence in 
this process. The truth, in contradiction to the "rational" framework 
within which it is usually presented, is not always based on "objective 
knowledge". It is a product of on-going negotiations and power 
relations. Thus, my analysis aims both to deconstruct the "discourse of 
truth" of the BBC and to show its connection to the truth produced in 
and out of the Occidentalist fantasy. The answering practice of Turkish 
Radio to London and other foreign stations during the war 
demonstrates two distinct orders of truth in operation: one is the truth 
produced in a dialogic link with the West and articulated in discourse, 
the other is the repressed order of truth that revealed itself in 
symptoms, such as the tactic of distortion used by Turkish 
broadcasters. 
The period I will be studying corresponds broadly to the years of 
the Second World War. These years represent the crystallisation of 
tendencies for both the BBC and the Turkish Radio. The efforts of 
sophisticated propaganda during the war, "swept away the last 
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remnants of that peculiar brand of comfortable English parochialism. " 
(Mansell, 1982: 188) Therefore issues of direct or indirect propaganda, 
such as influencing Turkey's alliances in the war, predominate in the 
transmissions of the BBC Turkish Service in those years when 
compared to seemingly more indirect cultural issues that came to the 
fore in the post-war years. While it was openly declared in the 40's 
that propaganda and the possible ways of manipulation were of 
paramount import, and even found extreme expressions such as in 
Miss Benzie's inquiry in the name of the Ministry of Information 
(M. O. I. ) directed to the BBC in 1940: "Could you give me some idea of 
the range of the Ankara long-wave situation? I am thinking of what 
games we could most usefully play with Turkey if the political situation 
so changed that she was willing to play! "' The aims of the Turkish 
Service envisaged for the post-war years were not that innocent 
either. The policy that was projected in 1944 for the post-war years 
was thought to produce "goodwill towards the British export trade". 2 
Of course, in a few years anti-communist propaganda was to become 
another declared concern. Overt political targets were never absent in 
the aims of the Service. However, it may still be argued that the period 
covered here is an extraordinary one determined by the war 
conditions and especially coloured by being against the fierce Axis 
propaganda, and as such, is not representative. While I believe that 
there are some differences in the emphases and organizational 
structure of the BBC Turkish Service between its war and post-war 
years, the war years are especially significant to study for two 
reasons: to convey how culture is problematised for propaganda 
objectives , and how a certain universal "humanistic" discourse of 
"truth" is constructed to fulfill particular national interests which were 
more visibly articulated through a network of correspondence among 
several government institutions -the BBC, the Ministry of Information, 
the War Office, the Foreign Office (FO), the British Council -during the 
war years. The strategies of the BBC also generated a significant 
response from the Turkish national elite and the Turkish Radio in 
The BBC Written Archives, 25 October 1940, From Miss Benzie (Broadcasting Division, 
Ministry of Information) to L. W. Hayes (BBC), E1/1256. 
2 The BBC Written Archives, 20 October 1944, "Post-war Broadcasting in Turkish", 
E1/1 259/2. 
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those years, as we shall see later in the chapter. 
Furthermore the logic I pursue to defend that this period is as 
"representative" as the more "normal" years is similar to the one used 
by Bauman in his argument regarding the Holocaust and modernity. 3 
Similarly, I treat the war years of the BBC in general, and the BBC 
Turkish Service in particular as a kind of "laboratory" in which the 
concepts such as "impartiality" and "truthfulness" are tested, and 
hidden tendencies, strategies as well as weaknesses and failures are 
revealed. Thus, the choice of the period for this case analysis 
coincides with the choice of my main topic - the study of Turkish Radio 
in its efforts to construct a national identity in the 30's and 40's when 
everything had to be defined and redefined in what may be called 
"laboratory conditions" -not only for chronological but also for 
methodological reasons. 
4.1. The Historical Context of the BBC Turkish Service 
There is not much account of the BBC World Service in the 
written history of the BBC. 4 Moreover, the few accounts of the World 
Service do not go much further than praising the "credible, effective 
and influential"s broadcasts of the Service. The history of the BBC 
World Service remains both invisible and out of the scope of critical 
theory. My archival research of the BBC Turkish Service, of course 
only partially, contributes to filling this gap; and contests the usually 
J "I propose that the experience of the Holocaust , now thoroughly researched by the historians, should be looked upon as, so to speak, a sociological 'laboratory'. The 
Holocaust has exposed and examined such attributes of our society as are not revealed, 
hence are not empirically accessible, in 'non-laboratory' conditions. In other words, / 
propose to treat the Holocaust as a rare, yet significant and reliable, test of the hidden 
possibilities of modem society. " (Bauman, 1989: 12) 
4 Both Asa Briggs (1961; 1965; 1970; 1979) and Scannell&Cardiff (1991) who have 
produced detailed histories of the BBC do not dwell on the specific history of the World 
Service. The existing records of the BBC World Service are usually based on memoirs of 
those who have themselves worked in the service. Among those, Mansell's account stand 
as the most detailed one, albeit its lack of critical perspective (1982). John MacKenzie 
emphasises the need to analyse the ideological content of BBC's domestic output within 
its relation to the Empire (1986). See also Taylor (1981) on propaganda and the Empire. 
5 John Tusa refers to the World Service as "strong, independent, credible, effective and 
influential". It is due to the reason that it is part of the BBC, "an institution which takes its 
stand on editorial independence and impartiality... " (1992: 15). Andrew Walker in his A 
Skyful of Freedom: 60 Years of the BBC World Service regards the World Service as a 
champion of "freedom" (1992). 
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taken for granted general statements on the World Service. First, I will 
give a brief history. 
The BBC's first venture into international broadcasting started 
with the Empire Service beamed at Australia and New Zealand in 
1932. The BBC had been very cautious in stepping into international 
broadcasting due to fears of technical incapacity. There was a 
tendency to wait for the "perfect thing" (Mansell, 1982: 3). On the other 
hand the US foreign transmissions set an example and brought into 
limelight the concerns and ambitions that were attached to 
international radio broadcasting by the British. Eckersley, the Chief 
Engineer of the BBC talked of the "Empire consolidation by wireless"; 
Beadle, who at the time became the BBC Station Director at Belfast 
after his return from South Africa, regarded communism and nascent 
nationalism in the empire as a grave threat to civilisation. He saw the 
import of broadcasting not in its ordinary propaganda functions but 
claimed that "(I)t is a means of intercourse which will bring about 
familiarity with the everyday affairs of the empire. " (Mansell, 1982: 9) 
However the meaning of broadcasting, at that time, was still narrowly 
conceived. The BBC had a vision of broadcasting only to the white 
and the British through the Empire Service: 
"The exclusion of people of other colours is justified -at least 
at present- by the fact that the field of appeal of European- 
type programmes is substantially limited to Europeans and 
also by the fact that, in proportion as native populations 
develop an interest in broadcasting, the local service (in the 
colony concerned) will provide the natives with 
programmes of their own type. "6 
The formula that was preached in the above statement was 
bound to be defunct in a few years. The technology of broadcasting, 
and broadcasting to long distances brought with it the capacity to 
"carry culture" to broad masses, broad yet difficult to segment and 
differentiate. This meant a challenge to self -referential British 
superiority but also a possibility for new techniques of government. 
The relativisation of cultural issues and differences necessitated by 
international broadcasting first led to a confusion in Britain. The initial 
"BBC Memorandum" (cited in Mansell, 1982: 12-13). 
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strategies of the Empire Service were on shaky grounds, caught 
between old traditions and fresh capacities. In Mansell's words, "there 
was not enough hard evidence on which to base any firm 
conclusions. Decisions about what immediate steps to take would 
have to be a priori and speculative. " (Mansell, 1982: 14) 
When the war began, radio broadcasting was raised, all of a 
sudden, to a status of an extremely important vehicle for propaganda. 
Hitler was known for his belief that "in war words are acts. " He has 
written in Mein Kampf, "(O)ur strategy is to destroy the enemy from 
within, to conquer him through himself. Mental confusion, 
contradiction of feelings, panic- these are our weapons. "7 The 
techniques of German propaganda, despite its harsh overtones, were 
quite sophisticated since they were enveloped in psychological 
mechanisms. One should note that the strategy of "conquering the 
enemy through himself" is a particularly modern technique. The 
British were more hesitant in reconciling the "discourse of truth" and 
the direct targets of propaganda, which led to seemingly contradictory 
performances, to splits between appearances and intentions, to 
indirect ways of achieving goals. Lots of energy and knowledge had 
to be put into this complicated task. While on one side the British 
"black" radio broadcasting based on the use of "deceit and 
fabrication" continued -only as a "fringe activity" in Mansell's words 
(1982: 55) - there was a debate concerning the role of radio, and of 
the BBC, in the war. Many believed that "no effective propaganda 
policy can in the modern world be based on lies" (Mansell, 1982: 56). 
Moreover, radio in Britain, was considered a service to the public as 
well as an art, even if a minor one, but definitely not an instrument of 
state (Ibid). The British, as a nation "regarded propaganda as suspect 
and were instinctively averse to the deliberate perversion of truth as a 
policy to be publicly adopted by Government in the pursuit of national 
ends. " (Ibid). So the British seemed to stick to the policy of "truth" 
instead of "lies" of which the Axis propaganda made ample use. The 
policy of truth had wide effects all around the world, as well as 
consolidating the image of the "the truthful humanistic British" through 
and after the war. The image still remains with us, even in some 
cited in Mansell (1982: 55). 
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relatively critical assessme-nts. Mansell who himself has worked in the 
BBC World Service writes, retrospectively, that: 
"The BBC itself, by its steadfast and consistent attachment 
to the truth, often against considerable pressure and in spite 
of the irritation it caused and the attacks it attracted, played 
a decisive role, not just in securing that moral victory, but in 
winning for Britain the gratitude and respect of those it had 
addressed throughout the war. "(Mansell, 1982: 56) 
Barry has referred to the BBC World Service, from a different 
angle, in his discussion concerning the role of free and active 
participation in the internal cohesion of national and international 
community. He argues that "the function of the BBC World Service 
was to advance the cause of freedom and liberty not through 
propaganda, but by simply telling the truth, thus making it possible for 
individuals to judge for themselves. " (Barry, 1996: 131) It is highly 
significant at this point to contextualise the strategy of "telling the truth" 
to see how and why the performance was knitted and presented. The 
expansion of the international broadcasting services provide some 
material to look at the issue from another perspective. 
There was a sudden growth of overseas broadcasting following 
the outbreak of the war. This had to be coupled with changes in the 
conception of the potential audience. "Old ways and the old self- 
sufficiency were swept aside as solutions to the problems of swift 
expansion had to be improvised and fresh minds addressed 
themselves to the new task of speaking to foreign audiences. " 
(Mansell, 1982: 96) The first foreign services, apart from the Empire 
Service, were Latin-American and Arabic Services, followed by 
French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Turkish all founded in 1939. 
One year later the BBC World Service was broadcasting in 34 
languages, including some dialects. Despite the fast expansion there 
were still some reservations within the BBC concerning foreign 
broadcasting. Cecil Graves, who was the founder of the Empire 
Service and a successor of Ogilvie as the general manager, in his 
correspondence with the Ministry of Information, stated his concerns 
of "risk of reprisals", for example, that the German audience may 
consider the BBC transmissions as propaganda (Mansell, 1982: 97-8). 
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The British had to build an image that was clearly different from 
German propaganda giving it a "very careful thought" in Graves' 
words. Nevertheless the opportunities that radio broadcasting 
provides for the solution of "colonial problems" were more clearly 
understood by that time. The head of the African Service Grenfell 
Williams talked of "Africa being born" and pointed to vast untapped 
audience coming up. He believed that the experience of the people in 
Britain in tackling some of their own problems may be of some use to 
the people of the colonies tackling similar problems (Mansell, 
1982: 195). This fitted in with the context of nationalist awakenings in 
the colonies, and corresponded to the will of the British to influence 
their development. The British now were aware that they had to be 
attentive to what was happening outside their territory; their attitude 
now radically differed from the early days of the Empire Service. 
Anyway, the term "empire" was to be dropped soon and replaced by 
"commonwealth". In those years the BBC monitoring service rapidly 
developed keeping a close eye on all that was broadcast by other 
countries. There appeared a novel concern to know the listening 
habits of foreign audiences in order to be able to address their 
sensitivities. Also the image of the BBC broadcasters was carefully 
tailored. For example German Jews were not accepted to the German 
Service because the BBC was anxious not to give the image that 
foreign language services were "run by emigr6s and were pursuing 
emigr6 rather than British objectives. " (Mansell, 1982: 107) So varying 
concerns had to be creatively combined and presented within a 
unitary image. 
On the other hand the problems of autonomy of the BBC had to 
be balanced with the growing need of government control. The M. 0.1 
was set up on the outbreak of the war with intentions to bring 
broadcasting under a more strict control. Several formula for changes 
in the internal organisation of the BBC were debated at this period 
causing tension, worries and criticisms by some BBC staff. Yet the 
BBC was very cautious not to declare its loss of autonomy to the third 
parties, keeping, at least in appearance, its independent and 
impartial image despite institutionalized government control within the 
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BBC, ranging from "guidance" to "editorial supervision". 
The Turkish Service was founded in such an atmosphere, on 20 
November 1939. When it first started, the transmission consisted of a 
single 15 minute news bulletin each day to grow in due time, both in 
scale and scope. The significance of the Turkish Service probably lies 
in its being one of the most problematic of foreign services. While 
there was already some accumulated knowledge which availed 
setting up policies for the Arabic Service, the Turkish Service had to 
start from scratch. It meant "broadcasting to a country which was more 
remote from the war than the Arab states of the Middle East and with 
policies less close to those of Britain. " (Mansell, 1982: 205) Turkey's 
position was considered to be more similar to the Persian case. Yet it 
was suggested in October 1939 by the M. O. I. that the envisaged 
news service should be handled by the Arabic Public Relations 
Officer. 8 The Turkish Service had a long way to go before coming 
near to grasping the differences between Arabic and Turkish 
audiences. Of course it also had to address several other confusing 
specific cultural problems, sometimes causing turbulences within the 
department and tension with other government institutions. 
4.2. Debates and Strategies 
a. Propaganda 
The concept of propaganda was a matter of debate all 
throughout the war for the British. The issue was problematised to a 
great extent and was mingled with all sorts of cultural and technical 
issues such as the interests of the local audience, the proper use of 
the Turkish language, the image of the BBC broadcasters, the right 
topics to be chosen for talks, the significant target group to be 
addressed, the quality of reception, the level of penetration etc. But 
most important of all, "reliable" news was considered as a hook for 
propaganda items. The Monthly Intelligence Report of the BBC 
Overseas Intelligence Department, in its evaluation of the situation 
8 BBC Written Archives, 8 October 1939, "Interview with Professor Rusbrook Williams", 
R 13/2 04. 
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regarding the Middle East in 1940, states that the Axis propaganda 
has led to suspicion among the local audience while in the British 
case 
"there seems no reason to fear that our policy would be the 
object of such suspicion. Relying upon the excellence of 
our news to attract a considerable number of listeners, we 
could confidently hope that a considerable number would 
continue to listen afterwards to our propaganda. "9 
So the news was the main field around which propaganda was 
organized. The term "positive propaganda" -as something versus 
"negative propaganda" used by the Axis forces- was coined by the 
British to denote the techniques involved for presenting information in 
the news. The news was designed to be heard as objective, cool and 
straightforward; they were not supposed to be populated by 
unnecessary editorial comments; not to exaggerate the victories of the 
British; neither be aggressive towards the enemy. The policy found its 
legitimacy and gained strength by the voluntary complicity of the 
target populations as a result of their willingness to take the 
"truthfulness" as granted. The British were basically content with this 
kind of policy for the Turkish Service until when "the Turco-German 
Non-Aggression Pact" was signed in 1941, which caused worries and 
further debates between the BBC and the Government, concerning 
the policy of propaganda. In July 1941, the BBC Monthly Intelligence 
Report touched on the issue of "BBC Propaganda and Policy" and 
referred to a need of change of policy. It was noted in the report that, 
"It was, in fact, agreed with the Ministry of Information that 
arrangements should be made for 'a more vigorous (propaganda) 
line to be taken without undue sacrifice of objectivity. "" 0 On 20th of 
August 1941 a meeting was held at the FO with the participation of the 
members of the FO, the M. O. 1, and the BBC. The agenda consisted of 
two items: 1. To consider the present state of our Turkish propaganda 
in the light of recent disquieting developments in Turkey; 2. To decide 
what measures can betaken to improve our propaganda. " 
9 BBC Written Archives, 19 August 1940, "Monthly Intelligence Report", E2/425. 
10 BBC Written Archives, July 1941, "Monthly Intelligence Report", E2/425. 
BBC Written Archives, 20 August 1941, "Propaganda to Turkey", El /1259/1. 
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Rice from the M. 0.1 stressed in the opening of the meeting that 
there was not enough supply of information coming from Turkey "to 
enable them to counter German propaganda effectively and 
promptly. "12 Her remark was significant since it pointed to the dialogic 
character of the produced truth. The objective truth had to be built on 
the subjective sensitivities of the addressee. Professor Williams, 
again from the M. O. I. brought up a similar point: 
"... hitherto the most effective propaganda in Turkey had 
been done by the Turks themselves and it had not been 
considered necessary for us to set up elaborate machinery 
in Turkey. But the recent developments in Turkey now 
rendered additional machinery essential and it was most 
important that we should have someone energetic in 
Istanbul to entertain editors, organise listening groups, 
obtain information and report it rapidly, and promote the 
distribution of British films, etc. "13 
Kirkpatrick from the BBC complained that "the BBC was not 
being kept informed sufficiently. " 14 So it was agreed that a telegram 
should be drafted to "Angora" to incite further organisation for 
providing the flow of more information. 
It is worth noting that the seemingly rational efforts to gain more 
information, at the present situation, concerning Turkish sentiments 
were coupled by sentiments on the British part. There was frustration 
as well as resentment towards the current Turkish attitude. The 
September Monthly Intelligence Report of 1941 covered this issue 
under the topic "The 'Ivory Tower' of Neutrality", with strong words 
against the heedless Turks: 
49 "* Ahere can 
be no other country where people , at least 
those in government positions, have such confidence in 
being able to remain outside the war. The result is that, 
when anything happens which might threaten their 
complacency, the rulers of the country and the press get 
hysterically indignant and behave as if the German 
invasions of the smaller European countries during the last 
two years had never happened at all. "15 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 BBC Written Archives, September 1941, "Monthly Intelligence Report", E2/425. 
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The report blamed the Turkish people for their "prevalent 
hysteria" and lack of "realism". 
Whatever the sentiments were, the British Government 
Departments and the BBC were not in a position to act sentimental on 
the issue. As part of a hegemonic imperial policy , they had learned 
now that they have to deal with differences with utmost care. They 
could not afford to be parochial anymore. So a range of strategies, 
dwelling both on general and specific points, were developed by the 
M. O. 1 and were debated with and within the BBC. The letter that Rice 
from the M. O. 1 wrote to Stephenson (BBC) in October 1941 is full of 
new suggestions for the Turkish transmissions. 16 The need for 
criticising enemy propaganda in broadcasts, thus stepping into the 
realm of "negative propaganda", is emphasised among several other 
suggestions which range from psychological to linguistic issues. The 
suggested new perspective was supported by a letter arriving from 
Edison Swan Cables Ltd. representative in Turkey, stressing that 
".... a higher note of offensive and aggressive spirit with 
more dynamism would be under the circumstances, of 
greater propaganda value. Neutrals and nationals of young 
and recently awakened national life are likely to be more 
impressed with this kind of propaganda than with the less 
aggressive though more subtle in character. "17 
The argument was in favour of a change in the propaganda 
policy. Given the fact that Turkish people were more prone now to 
take the German propaganda as seriously as the British one, 
therefore not in a position to take the "truthfulness" of the British news 
for granted in their position of "ivory tower of neutrality", the BBC had 
to advance new and more realistic tactics to influence the addressee. 
They had to shape their utterances with regard to other words about 
the same object and to an anticipated response of the Turkish 
audience. Therefore the suggested new tactics were not just 
subjective and aggressive. They were based on a comprehensive (as 
far as possible) analysis of several aspects, which almost acquired a 
social scientific nature and led to serious debates. Rice's suggestions 
16 BBC Written Archives, 31 October 1941, "Turkish Broadcasts", E9/37. 
17 [bid. 
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were debated within the BBC and then reported back to the M. 0.1 to 
be commented on. The report bearing the title "Notes on BBC 
Comments on M. 0.1 Suggestions for Turkish Broadcasts" by Rice 
came with a long paragraph concerning the problem of propaganda. 
The paragraph opens by further problematisation of the issue: "The 
question of the relative merits of negative as opposed to positive 
propaganda is not easy to establish. Nevertheless, at the moment, 
the following reasons seem to favour the inclusion of a certain amount 
of so-termed 'negative' propaganda in the BBC broadcasts. " 18 The 
listed reasons are worded with a gusto for analytical thinking: 
"(i) Since we have up-to-date only met with a relatively 
small number of important military successes, too much 
positive propaganda is likely to savour of 'boosting', and 
may fail to impress new listeners. 
(ii) We are debarred from using anti-Axis material in our 
printed propaganda, and in our films, since references 
detrimental to our enemies are banned by the Turkish 
censors. We are thus only able to refer to positive 
propaganda in our printed and visual propaganda, and it 
would therefore seem desirable for the BBC to fill the gap 
created by Turkish censorship regulations, and devote a 
certain amount of space to showing up the enemy. 
(iii) Intensive positive propaganda- which I referred to as 
'boosting' in my memorandum should perhaps be reserved 
until the turn of the tide; though at present we should, of 
course, avail ourselves of every event and opportunity likely 
to keep our achievements well in the eye of the Turkish 
people. Nevertheless our achievements not be unduly 
exaggerated, and should be combined with an aggressive 
spirit vis-a-vis the Axis. " 19 
Another interesting point which was debated between the BBC 
and the M. 0.1 was the need for a charismatic figure to symbolise 
Britishness. Rice suggested devoting "some space to the Royal 
Family. (Since) Hitler figures quite prominently in the German 
broadcasts, and in6nO in the Turkish. "20 The BBC's reply was not 
very supportive, they suggested instead that Churchill should be the 
equivalent of such a figure. Rice insisted on her previous point 
16 BBC Written Archives, 18 November 1941, "Notes on BBC Comments on M. 0.1 
Suggestions for Turkish Broadcasts" , El/1259/1. 19 Ibid. 
20 BBC Written Archives, 31 October 1941, "Turkish Broadcasts", E9/37. 
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arguing that Churchill should not be depicted as the equivalent of 
Mussolini or 1n6nO. "Surely to do so is not only contrary to accepted 
policy, but also falls in with the German picture of Churchill". 21 In all 
these discussions we see the painful effort to carefully delineate 
boundaries, for example in the case of the image of Churchill; to 
counter current policies of other forces and to leap over the obstacles 
set up by the Turkish; yet to impress the Turkish people by disguising 
the inherent particular concerns and struggles and by adopting a 
universal image of impartiality and truthfulness. We see that the 
speaker shapes his/her utterance from the outset according to 
envisaged needs and conditions of the addressee, but also by 
referring to a superaddressee, "the truth" which has been a given for 
that moment yet something which has to be reproduced and 
reorganized within each moment. Each utterance, namely each 
argument advanced by either the BBC or the M. O. I. are 
simultaneously interactive with each other, with the "enemy" and with 
the imagined addressee, in its reference to the superaddressee. 
In 1942, the M. O. I. produced a "General Editorial Guidance for 
BBC Turkish Service"22 full of 'do's" and "don'ts" for future 
transmissions. I quote the whole report for its outstanding value in 
conveying the techniques of the fabrication of "truth": 
"1. When reporting successful military operations emphasis 
should be given, whenever possible and in the light of 
official information released, to the factors of precise timing 
and excellent equipment. Such operations should be 
presented as cumulative proof of our growing strength. 
2. In presenting news of the Russian war, care should be 
taken not to substitute in the minds of listeners- Russia for 
Germany as the imperialist aggressor. Accent should be on 
'continued German reverses' rather than on 'continued 
Russian victories', though this injunction will apply more 
forcibly if and when Russian troops advance beyond their 
own frontiers into enemy territory. 
3. If occasion should demand the news-reporting of awards 
for heroism in any way connected with an Allied withdrawal 
or other reverse, care should be taken not to present such 
exploits in the light of attempted extenuation for the reverse. 
The general course of the war may be assumed to have left 
21 BBC Written Archives, 18 November 1941, El/1259/1. 
22 BBC Written Archives, 7 May 1942, "General Editorial Guidance for BBC Turkish 
Service", El/1259/1. 
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listeners sceptical and prejudiced in this respect. 
4. News of Allied war production should always be based 
on official figures as and when published. The impression 
given should be one of solid achievement. 
5. In presenting to Turkey news of neighbouring or 
Mediterranean countries (in itself a desirable object) 
meticulous accuracy must always be ensured: Turkey is 
clearly in an advantageous position to obtain cross-checks 
on such news. In particular, reports of troops movements, 
etc. in neighbouring countries should never be given when 
official confirmation is lacking. 
6. Every opportunity should be taken of giving emphasis to 
(favourable) news tending to throw importance on Turkey's 
status as a friendly neutral. 
7. The activities of Turks resident in this country may be 
regarded confidently as of interest to one or another section 
of our listeners. 
8. Every opportunity should be taken of giving 'London 
date-line' reaction to major domestic events inside Turkey. 
9. It is important to project the uninterrupted progress of 
'peaceful' scientific and cultural development in this 
country. We should establish our lead as a 'humanistic' 
nation. 
10. It is important to maintain our stand as a nation 
absolutely united. When leading personalities make 
statements or appeals on this theme, it should usually be 
possible- excluding unforeseen developments- to present 
these in the light of reiterated affirmation rather than in that 
of an appeal necessitated by deterioration of public 
opinion. Such treatment should not be allowed to exclude 
recognition of the fact that many other sources of news, 
apart from the BBC, are available to Turkey. " 
Some of the techniques suggested here are worthy of further 
attention. First it should be noted that emphasis is laid on factors of 
"precise timing" and "excellent equipment" to convey the "growing 
strength" of Britain. Here strength is operationalised in terms of 
scientific and technical superiority. The military contest between the 
forces are translated into a war between the "civilised" and the 
6ý others". The stance is furthermore supported by techniques of 
empiricism relying on "official figures" and "meticulous accuracy" to 
produce an "impression" of "solid achievement". Yet the empiricism 
involved is based on subjective and relative factors more than on self- 
referential essential facts. Within this context, differences, such as 
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between Russia and Germany are carefully demarcated; the location 
and the situation of Turkey is carefully analysed with reference to 
neighbours and to Britain. "Meticulous accuracy" is needed not for its 
own sake but because "Turkey is clearly in an advantageous position 
to obtain cross-checks on such news. " Psychological factors 
regarding Turkey are also considered. The desired outcome of the 
suggested techniques finds its perfect expression in the statement 
that , "it is important to project the uninterrupted progress of 'peaceful' 
scientific and cultural development in this country. We should 
establish our lead as a 'humanistic' nation. " (emphasis added) The 
inverted commas for the words "peaceful" and "humanistic" cast a 
doubt on their usage, though they may have been used to accentuate 
the meanings of the words. But they nevertheless point to a 
constructed image that Britain, amidst the present factors, had chosen 
for itself and had carefully and "scientifically" fabricated in interaction 
with other forces. 
So "telling the truth" was the name of the basic strategy for the 
British propaganda. Yet the listeners, especially those "nationals of 
young and recently awakened national life" were never left alone to 
judge for themselves. They were given the impression of doing so by 
the employment of techniques, which, though manufactured 
according to partial interests, produced an effect of truth. Thus "truth" 
was fabricated as a result of a certain paradigm of government which 
had to be different from the German one for many reasons. The 
German propaganda was shaped according to a paradigm of 
"opposition" employing strategies of "criticism", "provocation", 
"debasement". For example, the German propaganda to India was 
asking why Indians should die for Britain if they remained to be a 
subject nation (Mansell, 1982: 206). Similarly, an instance of German 
propaganda to Turkey implied that Turkish nationalism was artificially 
instigated by Britain. 23 The German propaganda, as reported by the 
British Information Office in Turkey, was full of critical remarks towards 
the Turkish, such as "insult to the Turks about the state of their 
roads. "24 I think these examples point to a different kind of strategy for 
23 BBC Written Archives, June 1941, "Monthly Intelligence Report", E2/425. 
24 BBC Written Archives, 1940, British Information Office to the BBC, E9/37. 
154 
propaganda which aims to produce alarm and discontent. On the 
other hand, the British adopted the all encompassing hegemonic 
status of "government" in their propaganda conveying a picture of 
progress and solid achievement of civilisation. They claimed to 
represent all differences, while carefully manipulating them, within the 
scope of universal humanity. They used the techniques of "cool 
objectivism" instead of "aggressiveness" to represent their identity; 
and used "flattery" instead of "criticism" to represent the other. The 
image thus produced, was highly successful -partly due to the 
outcome of the war. Turkey, has yet never been in a position to 
challenge the dominant codification regarding the British policy in 
broadcasting during the war. 
b. Strategy of Flattery 
As the strategies of propaganda were being discussed with the 
participation of government departments and the BBC there appeared 
the need of a better "flow of information" from Turkey. The desired 
information included the reaction of the Turkish audience to the BBC 
broadcasts as well as to German and other broadcasts. Professionals 
and scholars were mobilised around this need. For example, Prof. 
Arnold Toynbee, known for his interest in Turkey and the Middle East 
was corresponding with the BBC sending press cuttings to the Turkish 
Section on items of the German broadcast in Turkish and also of 
German propaganda by some Turkish newspapers. 25 The British 
Information Office in Turkey has been reporting back the reactions of 
Turkish people to the BBC programmes, mainly regarding the news. 
One of the reports was that Martland, a British man, after his recent 
trip through Anatolia, "was impressed with the way Turks tuned in to 
London at 6: 55 pm local time at every small village he stopped in. "26 
While the positive reports aroused feelings of success for the British 
for a brief period of time, it could not stop them from being puzzled 
and bewildered soon again on certain issues including the reactions 
2-5 BBC Written Archives, 17 January 1940, From Prof. Arnold Toynbee to the BBC, 
E9/37. 
26 BBC Written Archives, 1940, From British Information Office to the BBC, E9/37. 
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of the audience. The questionnaire that Lawrence from the BBC had 
designed generated some information though not very clear. It gave 
the impression that "listeners follow all the war news with 
enthusiasm", that "radio listening is very extensive in Istanbul both in 
private hours and coffee shops" that "the BBC is appreciated on 
account of the pure Turkish accent of the announcers" compared to 
non-Turkish accents of German and Italian broadcasts. 27 It was also 
known that "Turkey is ready to accept a good deal of material from us 
(Britain) for use in their local broadcasting service" and that the 
newspapers were willing to publish talks broadcast by the BBC 
(home or overseas services). 28 This willingness was what Williams 
later referred to: "... hitherto the most effective propaganda in Turkey 
had been done by the Turks themselves and it had not been 
considered necessary for us to set up elaborate machinery in Turkey. " 
Few months before the need arose to revise or set up the machinery 
of propaganda in Turkey, the British could somewhat rely on the 
prevalent Turkish attitude: "There is therefore no need to devise 
means of persuading the Turks of the justice of the British cause; they 
take this for granted. "29 However, even in 1940 (before things were 
more complicated with the Turco-German Non-Aggression Pact), 
Burton from the British Information Office admitted that they have no 
facilities there "for any kind of systematic listener research. "30 There 
were always problems, concerning the "perfect thing", such as the 
lack of precise information, the proper use of language or the 
presence of "atmospherics" that barred a clear reception. 
The idea of expanding the transmissions in Turkish, and the 
content of new programmes had already been put on the agenda in 
that context. Every new suggestion concerning talks, features, music 
broadcasts, although initially regarded as less important and basically 
situated around the news to accentuate the effects of propaganda, 
27 BBC Written Archives, May 1940, "Answers to Questionnaire from Mr. Lawrence of the 
BBC on Turkish News", E9/37. 
28 BBC Written Archives, 27 May 1940, "Broadcasting Material for Turkey", R1 3/204. 
29 BBC Written Archives, 13 February 1941, "Monthly Intelligence Report", 13 February, 
part 11, para. 17, E2/425. 
30 BBC Written Archives, 27 April 1940, From H. M. Burton (British Information Office) to 
J. Lawrence, E9/37. 
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opened up a new field of debate; and introduced a new 
problematique which could not be reduced to mere propaganda. The 
idea of extension came with a package of cultural issues. So every 
suggestion to expand the transmissions had to be problematised 
within the context of culture and cultural differences. It was enveloped 
with the desire to know more, and even be able to understand, the 
"target" but the frustration of not being in a position to know it all. I will 
be analysing the problems of "translation" and "non-knowledge" in 
this context in the following part; here I wish to point to how culture 
was defined as a realm of struggle and what strategies were 
involved. 
The introduction of English lessons for the Turkish was one of 
the significant examples within which technical problems had to be 
translated into cultural ones. In 1940, there was an opinion that "the 
desire to learn English is pretty general in Turkey now. "31 Yet English 
Lessons for the Turks was a problematic issue and generated a long 
lasting discussion among the British executives. The problem of 
cultural standard was a difficult one. Comparisons with the Arab 
listeners produced more confusion. The initial question was: Whether 
English lessons produced for the Arabic audience would be 
acceptable in Turkey? 32 A year later, in 1941, the BBC was still 
unable to answer the question. Hillelson, then the Director of Near 
East Services to which the Turkish Service belonged, wrote to the 
M. O. I. that they "still have to decide whether the lessons (English) 
should closely resemble given in the Arabic programme. "33 The 
Ambassador in Turkey was also involved in the debate suggesting 
that series of English lessons should be produced specifically written 
for Turks using Turkish names. He also suggested some names 
which were not easy to transcribe for the BBC members when they 
had to report them to the M. O. I. ("Can (Jan), J (? i)han.... "). 34 The need 
to know more about the Turkish culture -standards, names, 
31 BBC Written Archives, 14 March 1940, From British Embassy to M. 0.1, E9/37. 
32 BBC Written Archives, 27 March 1940, "English Lessons in Turkish transmission", 
E9/37. 
33 BBC Written Archives, 23 July 1941, From S. Hillelson (BBC) to H. Hurst (M. O. I. ) with a 
reference to "BBC Internal Circulating Memo", 2 April 1940, E9/37. 
34 BBC Written Archives, 29 July 1941, From S. Hillelson (BBC) to H. Hurst (M. O. I. ), E9/37. 
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conventions, etc. - and the. differences of it from the seemingly more 
clear object of the Arabic culture had a big impact on previously 
established frameworks. The Orientalist framework could, according 
to Said, essentialise the Orient as a unified object (1995). But now 
the framework had to be extended and diversified according to the 
needs of the BBC foreign broadcasting services, dwelling not on 
common points but on differences within the Orient. This did not only 
mean the necessity to be more specific about indigenous cultures but 
to be able compare and relativise them according to each other and 
according to the central space of the transmissions. The BBC Internal 
Circulating Memo, dated 2 April 1940, stated the problem quite 
clearly; it warned against the "impairment of the service to Arab 
listeners for the sake of those in Turkey. " The argument advanced in 
the report is significant: "A shot fired simultaneously at two targets 
usually hits neither. "35 
1942 was the year when the heated debate around cultural 
strategies regarding the specifics of Turkey took place. The debate 
was closely associated with propaganda matters. Rice had already 
posed the most important question for the Turkish case, in October 
1941, in her letter of suggestions to the BBC. She had pointed to a 
complex situation. The Turkish Radio and newspapers, despite their 
more distanced present attitude to Britain, continued to quote 
extensively from the British sources including official British war 
bulletin. Thus "by repeating this sort of information", she argued, the 
BBC Turkish Service was perhaps not putting its "precious time to its 
most valuable use, but are instead duplicating material put out by the 
Turks, or already put out by US. "36 The vicious cycle in the duplication 
of news pointed to the limits of the efficiency of the production of 
"objective" facts. There had to appear a subjective viewpoint to 
connote the British identity. The BBC Turkish Service could not assert 
its identity if it did not establish its difference from the Turkish sources 
and Turkish identity. But to complicate the matter even more, it was 
not all among the intentions of the British to talk directly about or to 
declare officially their subjective viewpoint. It had to be embedded in 
35 BBC Written Archives, 2 April 1940, "BBC Internal Circulating Memo", E9/37. 
36 BBC Written Archives, 31 October 1941, "Turkish Broadcasts", E9/37. 
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a style which should be heard as the truth by the Turkish, yet have a 
positive impact on their viewpoints and feelings while marking the 
difference of the British identity. The suggested strategy by Rice was 
"to say more about the Turks themselves. " A month later, the BBC 
management with reference to her suggestions quoted the argument 
as "the desirability of echoing (for flattery purposes) cultural and other 
local events in Turkey. "37 Thus the phrase "flattery" was coined as the 
name of a new strategy, and culture was introduced as an important 
realm for propaganda. 
Culture as a realm of propagandist strategies proved to be more 
difficult than it seemed. Immediately a dispute over "Turkish 'flattery' 
items" followed. First of all it was now admitted that related 
departments such as the Turkish Service and the M. O. I. had lacked "a 
knowledge of Turkish and Turkey" before. 38 This was going to be 
compensated by the addition of new staff, such as Lamb in the M. 0.1, 
who claimed to have a satisfactory knowledge of Turkey. This was 
also a reply to a recently asked question: "Are Englishman with a 
firsthand knowledge of conditions in Turkey? "39 which was "entirely a 
new idea" with which the BBC had to deal. Still, the BBC was more 
reserved than the M. O. I. about the use of "flattery" items. According to 
Hillelson, the main object had to be, "to give instances of Anglo- 
Turkish cooperation; to mention major internal events where 'reaction' 
from London might legitimately be expected; and to introduce flattery 
items with an Anglo-Turkish rather than a purely Turkish 
background. "40 Bowen, from the M. O. I., disagreed with the point. He 
instead argued that "the fact that we notice purely Turkish events 
should indicate in a flattering manner that we are interested in their 
domestic affairs. "41 The assumption was that the Turks wanted to hear 
more about themselves, especially seen in the eyes of the British , 
which pointed to a sophisticated psychological mechanism. The 
assumption had, again, been already worded by Rice: "Foreigners' 
37 BBC Written Archives, 22 November 1941, "Mrs. Talbot Rice's suggestions", E11/259/11. 
38 BBC Written Archives, 3 March 1942, From M. O. I. to BBC, E9/37. 
39 BBC Written Archives, 19 May 1941, "Turkish Intelligence", R13/204. 
40 BBC Written Archives, 7 March 1942, From BBC to M. O. I., E9/37. 
41 BBC Written Archives, 7 March 1942, From M. O. I. to BBC, E9/37. 
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impressions of one's own country, though frequently weird, are 
invariably fascinating, and Turks are probably as amused by such 
accounts as most nationals. "42 But in the new context the reference to 
local culture was something more than reporting a foreigner's 
impressions of the native country. The strategy of "flattery" had to 
make use of the local culture which was going to be broadcast in 
Turkish by the Turkish announcers in the service, while it should 
retain its British context. That was the reason why the strategy was 
difficult to formulate and implement. 
The attempts of "flattery" that followed, such as broadcasting 
special talks on Turkish national anniversaries; of broadcasting 
"HalkeVP'43 celebrations in London; the use of a Turkish comic 
character "Tombul Teyze" in a BBC programme were all grounded on 
the principle of "convincing the Turks" that the British "look upon them 
as a people of integrity and distinction. " 44 In terms of news, the M. O. 1. 
formulated suggestions regarding broadcasts to Turkey and Iran. As a 
result of various considerations and comparisons, Turkey was finally 
grouped with Iran to be discussed together in terms of new policies. 
Because it seemed evident now that Turkey should not be treated in 
the Arab context. A comparative analysis showed that: 
"... by broadcasting news items of Arab origin we appeal to 
the legitimate interest which each Arab country takes in the 
affairs of the sister countries; and that it therefore becomes 
comparatively easy to combine 'flattery' values with 'news' 
values. In the case of the Turkish service the editor is bound 
to be more critical in regard to the appropriateness of a 
London dateline, in order to ensure that the object of 
'flattery' is not defeated by presentation in an unsuitable 
context. "45 
The first point in the suggestions for the BBC broadcasts to 
Turkey and Iran was that they should reflect "a well-informed and 
42 BBC Written Archives, 31 October 1941, "Turkish Broadcasts", E9/37. 
43 People's Houses, which were established in 1932 in Turkey were to have a London 
branch in the beginning of the 40's. 
44 BBC Written Archives, 1942, From Controller Overseas Publicity to Ivone Kirkpatrick 
(BBC), R34/904. 
45 BBC Written Archives, 22 July 1942, "Suggestions Regarding Service of 'Local' Turkish 
and Iranian News", E9/37. 
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sympathetic knowledge of. local events and personalities. "46 But the 
report made clear that this did not mean a "mere rebroadcasting of 
local events". The BBC should be provided with comprehensive 
information on political, economic and social developments in order 
to project Turkey to Turkey. In cases where "direct" broadcasting of 
local news takes place, the object should not be "to give information 
about events but rather to flatter the audience by showing British 
interest in their affairs and, in the case of items of political 
significance, to reflect British reaction. " The strategy of flattery that 
should be implemented in the broadcasting of news to Turkey and 
Iran was underlined by defining a technique: "A profitable method of 
exploitation, therefore, is that of the 'advertising' technique. " An 
example cited in the report for the technique was to draw the attention 
of listeners to, say, a coming important orchestral concert in Turkey 
and perhaps to "invite them to listen to a brief gramophone extract of 
one of the pieces". 47 In this way Western music would be signified as 
something originally British, since British would successfully give the 
impression that they already possess an original recording of a future 
performance in Turkey. On the other hand it would flatter the 
audience, especially the "modernising elite" by supporting their effort 
in cultural progress. It would refer to a local event and flatter them by 
showing the interest of the British yet would be a way to assert the 
British point of view. 
The "advertising" technique is worthy of further discussion in 
terms of its impact on the construction of Turkish national identity. It is 
known that the Turkish avant-garde at that period had adopted a 
mission to disseminate the values of the "Western civilisation". The 
Western way of life, as it was mediated by the Turkish elite, was 
advertised to the Turkish people. One significant medium for this was 
the Turkish radio broadcasting. For example, Ankara Radio allotted a 
considerable broadcasting time for either live or recorded Western 
"classical" music to improve the tastes of the public. But the "Western- 
ness" involved was associated with the central space of the Turkish 
elite, therefore it was part of Turkish identity. On the other hand they 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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had a similar strategy as the British to bring out the "local" colour in 
Turkishness. For this end, they referred to "folklore" and processed 
folkloric material to project the "authentic" culture of the Turkish 
people in Anatolia to themselves as seen from the eyes of the elite. 
This could also be called a "flattery" technique. So as the Turkish elite 
were in an effort to mark their own identity (or difference) in relation to 
the people, as the "essence" of Turkishness; the British were 
developing techniques to project the image of the Turkish elite to 
themselves but only to mark their own difference (and identity). 
Therefore a contestation between the two identities which were being 
formed on the boundaries was inevitable. This led, in few years, to 
uneasiness on the part of the Turkish elite regarding the BBC 
broadcasts, while leading to a feeling of contempt in the British 
authorities towards the Turkish elite. Culture, now despatialised and 
respatialised via broadcasting technology, was a common realm of 
struggle for both parties. 
The BBC was aware that the dominant character of broadcasting 
of the foreign services should be metropolitan. For example, the 
Arabic service from London was regarded working "in harmony with 
the Arab urge towards the strengthening of their common nationhood" 
yet it "never lost sight of its role as a British station speaking to Arabs. " 
(Mansell, 1982: 204) Therefore the spatial aspect of culture 
transmitted through broadcasting was important. The BBC Foreign 
Services always tried to signify the space of their broadcasting 
through various signs associated with Britain, and specifically 
London. Various sounds were used to signify and define the space. 
The broadcast to Germany made use of the sound of the nightingale 
in Bagley Woods as a token of Britain's peaceful intentions (Mansell, 
1982: 98). The programme called "London After Dark" which was 
beamed at the United States broadcast sirens and then the unhurried 
footsteps of the crowd "to convince Americans that Londoners took 
their air raids without excitement. " (Mansell, 1982: 191) The news 
programme in all services always started with the time signal of the 
Big Ben. All of these spatial signs -though essentially simulations - 
were implemented to connote the distinct space of the broadcasting, 
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that is the space of the speaker, therefore the directionality of the 
utterance. However in most cases, the directionality was not "directly" 
conveyed. "London Calling Turkey" was an interesting programme in 
this sense. The scene was laid in "Stamboul" Restaurant in London 
where a number of Turkish guests gave brief messages to their 
friends. The scene corresponded to a British reproduction of 
Turkishness in London. Therefore the messages of Turkish people to 
Turkish people mediated by the reconstructed space -a metropolitan 
space that internalises both the centre and the local- played an 
important role in the projection of Turkishness to Turkey. The local 
was reprocessed through the eyes of the metropolitan culture and 
transmitted by the local people -dislocated local people- to listeners in 
their private sphere. This leads to a dislocation and respatialisation of 
the local culture; whereby the local or native people are driven (by 
their flattered sentiments) into a confrontation or a dialogic 
relationship with the metropolitan (and hierarchically superior) 
version of their own story. A similar mechanism applied when, for 
example, the BBC broadcast a concert by a Turkish violinist. 
It was also inevitable that the identity of the Turkish announcers 
be determined within the context of respatialisation of identity. The 
Turkish Service had a British editor and the Turkish announcers' 
autonomy was confined to reading the translations of edited scripts 
(originally written in English). Although they enjoyed some freedom in 
participating in some live broadcasts, their output was strictly 
controlled. Indeed most of the policy debates took place without their 
knowledge and involvement, as was true for all the foreign services. 
As Mansell states, most of the "native" employees in the services, 
"had little awareness of what went on beyond the confines of their 
own service. " (1982: 94) However, they were given the impression 
that they were the ones to define the tone of the service. Their identity, 
in this context , was highly critical 
for the BBC executives and also for 
the addressed public. It was not only the language used in the foreign 
services but the identity of the speaker as well, that mattered. The 
Portuguese Service is known to experience a significant problem in 
this sense. A Brazilian employed in the Service caused huge 
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problems in Portugal. The BBC had to learn from its mistake. "The sort 
of ridiculous thing we do! It would be much better to have a 
Portuguese broadcasting to Brazil than a Brazilian broadcasting to 
Portugal for obvious reasons. "48 The "obvious reasons" belonged to 
the logic of identification within power relations. So when a 
suggestion was made by Rice, that one of the senior Turkish 
announcers, Kartal, could write and broadcast a leading article, the 
problem of identity had to be thoroughly debated. The BBC opposed 
to the idea arguing that it was neither "practicable nor desirable" for 
Kartal to write and/or broadcast such scripts. Since a leading article 
should "tell the audience what London thinks about the topic of the 
day, not what is thought by a Turk resident in London. It is in the latter 
capacity that Kartal has always been projected"49 Here we see the 
critical edge over which the projection of identity was designed. It was 
desirable to project a Turkish announcer's identity as "independent" 
to offset any suspicion in Turkey that Kartal merely says what he is 
paid to say. The BBC believed that they "set great store by 
maintaining his reputation as an 'independent' commentator. " On the 
other hand, he would not be allowed to speak in the name of London. 
He was there to deliver "a carefully edited report which itself reflects 
the tone of our official directives. "50 Paradoxically his "reputation for 
independence" was the condition of carrying out the British viewpoint. 
This was made possible by his carefully trimmed identity. His identity 
was a "Turk resident in London". He was a Turk based in London, 
speaking from the space of the metropolitan culture. While his 
difference had to be carefully constructed, his Turkishness had to be 
reconstructed through a mediation and respatialisation (through his 
residency in London). 
The subtle technique of identity/difference wisely implemented 
by the BBC probably seemed too subtle to the members of the 
government departments, in the case of urgent concerns due to the 
war. In fact, the suggestion raised by the M. O. I. was based on the 
48 BBC Written Archives, 1940, "Notes for the BBC by Richard Stokes", E9/37. 
49 BBC Written Archives, 15 November 1941, "Comments on Report on Turkish Service", 
E9/37. 
50 Ibid. 
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Turkish authorities' worries. that a "high degree of liberty is afforded to 
Kartal by the BBC". 51 The Turkish Ambassador had reported to his 
government in the fall of 1941 that the broadcasts of the Turkish 
Service bearing criticisms towards Turkey's pact with the German 
forces "had been made without the knowledge or the approval of the 
BBC or the British government. "52 The impression was a result of an 
important misconception. It was due to a misconception of Kartal, 
regarding his own role in the service, which had, in fact, been created 
by the BBC executives. Kartal taking his image too seriously had 
"given the Ambassador an exaggerated idea of the part which he 
plays directing our Turkish broadcasts. " 53 The M. O. I. thought that the 
worry due to a misconception could be compensated by bringing 
Kartal closer to the "centre", an idea to which the BBC opposed 
pointing to Kartal's carefully tailored image. On the other hand, it is in 
the documents that Kartal's father had asked him to return to Turkey 
after his talk on the signing of the Turco/German Pact. 54 This reaction 
seemed to reflect more about the truth since it demanded the 
alteration of his space of utterance, his status as a "Turk resident in 
London". In the following years the Turkish authorities' worries about 
the Turkish people working in the service continued. There were 
attempts mediated by the Ambassador to "handle recruitment 
problems in collaboration with the Turkish Government"55 which did 
not go beyond being mere attempts. The BBC was mostly successful 
to keep the attempted interventions of the Turkish authorities at a 
distance and keep up the image of "independence" within the service 
while employing techniques of "stricter control" over Turkish 
announcers' output. 
The debate around Kartal conveys important things: how 
identities are constructed on the boundary of play of force lines ; how 
they refer to a certain signified space yet being partially located 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 BBC Written Archives, 9 October 1941, From Neville Barbour (Near East Intelligence 
Officer), El/259/1. 
54 BBC Written Archives, 9 July 1941, "Overseas Divisional Meeting", R13/204. 
55 BBC Written Archives, 5 August 1942, "Staff Recruitment for Turkish Service", 
R 13/2 04. 
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outside themselves; and how they involve necessary misconceptions 
and gaps via interpretation. Turkish authorities' attitude is especially 
significant for the latter point. The Turkish authorities' mistrust of their 
own people, determined by the rationale of their way of government, 
sets the context of their interpretation of the British policies. They tend 
(or seem) to forget the enmities with the British, only two decades ago 
during the national liberation, and choose to act as if they are ready to 
believe in the "objective" stand of the British. They willingly lend 
themselves to be the object of the strategies of flattery. In this context 
the inauguration of London broadcasts had been regarded as "an act 
of courtesy". 56 In the same manner the British have employed 
strategies of flattery by denying, in appearance, the sentiments of the 
recent history, for example by broadcasting a translated message on 
30th of August, the anniversary of the ceremony at the tomb of the 
unknown soldier in Turkey (a victory against British aspirations). 
However, the recalcitrant elements and the gaps within the dialogic 
relationship persisted and caused, despite being a condition of 
identity, uninterpreted resistances and uneasiness on the side of the 
Turkish. Similarly the British fell prey to misinterpretations and were 
frustrated in achieving "perfect" results from their painfully debated 
strategies. Culture as a realm of struggle becomes, in this context, 
also a realm of unmanageable differences embedded in history, and 
of "non-knowledge" involved in any act of translation. 
4.3. The Tricks of Translation 
The BBC, while trying to make a sophisticated use of local 
culture, was not exempt from having feelings toward that culture. For 
example the use of "Tombul Teyze", a Turkish comic character, 
seemed to be a bright idea at first but also arose feelings of disgust. 
Stephenson, the Assistant Director of Near East Services, in his reply 
to Rice (who seemed to be full of creative suggestions) said that he 
regretted "the somewhat obscene tendency in Turkish popular 
period icals. "57 Feelings of disgust were soon coupled by feelings of 
56 BBC Written Archives, 5 December 1939, From M. O. I. to BBC, E9/37. 
57 BBC Written Archives, 25 March 1942, From BBC to M. 0.1, El/1257. 
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frustration. The BBC had always been keen on getting feedback from 
Turkey whenever possible, even just after the opening broadcast on 
20 November 1939. The reported reactions were generally positive 
but there were criticisms concerning the language and the style of 
delivery in the transmissions. The translation of phrases was found to 
be problematic by the Turkish. These initial reactions foreshadowed 
the persistent future problems in the Turkish Service. The problems 
concerning translation -not only in terms of language but also in terms 
of interpretation of cultural standards, values, conventions, desires, 
demands, etc. - persisted all through the war years and even after, 
despite all the efforts to know more on Turkey. 
The BBC, while it had to make use of every useful cultural 
material to support its policies, especially the strategy of flattery, was 
afflicted with problems of interpretation. In 1942, Rice informed the 
Director of Near East Services about an important cultural "discovery" 
of hers. She provided the BBC with "a poem on Turkish soldiers of 
the IXth century" written by "Ibn er Rumi" to be quoted should Turkey 
become involved in the war. The poem described "Turkish soldiers of 
the Caliphate" with phrases such as: 
"... They have tongues of which the mouth never returns to 
health, it is as if the saliva of death kept dropping from them. 
They seem to be thirsty for blood, the place where they go 
to drink is not that by which they leave. "58 
Rice, probably influenced by an Orientalist framework could not 
distinguish the "modern" Turks from those (and they would not call 
themselves Turks anyway) in the ninth century. She had difficulties 
interpreting the changed context of the modern Turkish identity which 
was based on a selective appropriation of its supposed historical 
heritage. Hillelson's reply was again based on an interpretation but 
on a firmer ground: 
"I do not think that it is really suitable for quotation in a 
propagandist context. The poet does not mean to be 
complimentary to the Turks whom he describes as 
ruthless, irresistible and destructive in terms applicable to 
Hulagu's Mongols and to the popular conception of Nazi 
Panzer troops. If the Turks fight on our side we shall do 
well to insist on their 'invincibility' but it is a far carry from the 
58 BBC Written Archives, 30 March 1942, "Ibn er Rumi's Poem on the Turks", E1/1257. 
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slave troops of the Abba'sid Caliphate to the modern 
Turkish army. "59 
There were also other instances in which, whether "Attila and 
Tamurlane" were Turkish national heroes had to be discussed. 60 In 
all of them one can see the efforts (and failures) of translation of 
Turkishness. 
But the use of proper Turkish was especially a difficult matter. 
Stephenson argued that "the question of style of language to be used 
in translation is exceptionally difficult in Turkish, as the language is in 
such a state of flUX. "61 This was part of a debate whether Ottoman 
words are proper to use, and if not, then what was "modern Turkish"? 
The debate also addressed the question if criticisms were due to 
failures of the service or the ambiguity of the Turkish language. In a 
meeting about the conduct of Turkish Service, with the participation of 
the BBC and the M. O. I., "criticisms of language" were raised as a 
topic. It was believed that some of the criticisms "reflected the different 
outlook of 'old Turks' and 'young Turks"'. But it was admitted that the 
"standard of linguistic presentation and announcing was not as high 
as could be desired. "62 However, the members in the meeting were 
still perplexed with regard to the nature and severity of criticisms. The 
criticisms ranged from the use of too archaic and long sentences, 
alterations of meaning due to the choice of words, the grammar of the 
language used to the accents of the announcers. It was reported that 
some Turkish journalists had to refer to the English translations in 
order to understand the meaning of broadcasts. 63 
The BBC was keen to solve the problem. The initial reaction to 
criticisms was to solve the problem by gathering more information. In 
1942 a questionnaire was designed for travelers from Turkey. One of 
the questions was: "Were any comments heard on the language, 
accent and subject-matter of BBC transmissions in Turkish? "64 The 
býl BBC Written Archives, 5 April 1942, From BBC to M. 0.1, E1/1257. 
60 BBC Written Archives, 17 June 1941, From The British Council rep. in Ankara, E9/37. 
61 BBC Written Archives, 5 December 1939, BBC Internal Circulating Memo, "Turkish 
Broadcast Reactions", E9/37. 
62 BBC Written Archives, 14 July 1942, "Turkish Service Meeting", E1/259/1. 
63 BBC Written Archives, 28 June 1942, From M. O. I. to BBC, E9/37. 
64 BBC Written Archives, 19 May 1942, "Questionnaire for Turkey", E9/37. 
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questionnaire did not prove to be of much help. There was also the 
need to diagnose the reasons leading to the problem. One idea was 
that the Turkish people, especially the publishers were guilty 
because they "have never troubled to produce any really 
comprehensive dictionary. " 65 It was suggested that the British officials 
in Ankara should send a copy of the chart of the new words, issued by 
the Language Institute. A year later, it was suggested that a small 
library should be installed in the Service for the use of "all those 
connected with the Turkish Service, with a view to keeping in touch 
with the developments in the intellectual and public life in the 
country. "66 Three years later, in 1945, the BBC was still busy with 
language criticisms. Hillelson had to state the problem once more: 
"The real point, however, is whether we are dealing with 
occasional lapses due to the rapid pace of news translation, 
or with general lack of competence, and I feel that no case 
for the latter assumption has been established. "67 
This was followed by a decision to contact a Turkish scholar, 
Fahir 1z from SOAS as critic and adviser for translations. But in 1948 
there was a growing doubt whether the language criticisms can be 
evaded at all. The report called "Language of Turkish Service" 
asserted that the main problem was "the fluidity of the Turkish 
Language". And argued that it was not possible "to conform to the 
standard of 'correct Turkish' as envisaged by some critics. It seems 
improbable that any station outside Turkey itself could keep in day to 
day touch with the neologisms of the language. "68 The report also 
talked of an "anxiety" of the British authorities to be "as up to date and 
as correct as is possible". Still, the attempts to ridicule the language 
reform in Turkey did not relieve the anxiety. It is interesting to see that 
a service which was basically set up for propaganda purposes had to 
busy itself with such detailed problems of linguistic precision; but it 
was inevitable since its basic medium was language and culture. It is 
also striking that the whole process was afflicted with gaps in the 
65 BBC Written Archives, 5 October 1942, "Criticism of Turkish Broadcasts", E9/37. 
66 BBC Written Archives, 13 April 1943, From BBC to M. O. 1, EII/1257. 
67 BBC Written Archives, 25 January 1945, From BBC to Press Office, British Embassy in 
Ankara, E1/1257. 
68 BBC Written Archives, 7 May 1948, "Language of Turkish Service", R13/204. 
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translation activity. The British were split between two considerations: 
to control the output as strictly as possible, therefore, limit the 
participation of Turkish people in the editorial process and use 
basically translated material; but on the other hand, to be able to 
influence the audience, therefore, the necessity to know more and 
take the criticisms seriously. There was a split between the will to 
know and the impossibility of perfect knowledge. 
Another concern was about the announcers' style of delivery. It 
was reported that Ozbekkan, a female announcer, was disliked by 
"educated Turks" because of her tendency to overstress her verbs at 
the end of her sentences. Rice had spared some space for the 
problem in her report on "Turkish Broadcasts". She said that she was 
"more than surprised by these adverse criticisms" since she had 
"always admired her language and her diction. " However, Rice felt 
that she, herself, had to come up with a comment on the problem and 
suggested that the last sentence in the final item in the broadcasts 
should end "with a flourish. " She was not sure if "modern Turkish" 
could easily lend itself to "sonorous endings" but believed that "the 
effectiveness of the BBC broadcasts would be increased if they could 
be achieved. "69 Rice's confusion regarding the matter, and her 
frustrating inability to master the proper use of accents in a language 
that is basically alien to her is significant here. On the other hand, it 
was obvious that the criticisms could not be easily evaded, especially 
when they came from the most pro-British people in Turkey. Sertel 
was one of them. He was the editor of the newspaper Tan known for 
its pro-British attitude. Sertel had been vigilant in his criticisms not 
only about the language of the BBC broadcasts, but also about the 
content such as the news: 
"With reference to the manner of working there certainly 
seems to be something radically wrong but I do not venture 
to say anything, that is really the internal workings of the 
BBC. As I understand the subject matter is being given out 
according to measure and items are being added to fill the 
gap ... the most essential thing to be followed in this 
measuring is the quality of the substance which should be 
tD& BBC Written Archives, 31 October 1941, "Turkish Broadcasts", E9/37. 
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given in a clear language free from propaganda. "70 
For the British authorities the solution lay neither in improving 
their knowledge (since it seemed impossible) nor in introducing a 
radical change such as replacing translated material with material 
originally produced in Turkish (there were some attempts toward this 
end but had to remain very limited). The solution lied in the 
interpretation of the problem. Tristram, a British official in Turkey, had 
already formulated a key problem in 1942. He had argued that it was 
"the 'intellectuals' who object not only to the style and, even, grammar 
of our Turkish transmissions, but also to the announcers' delivery. The 
less cultured man in the street appears satisfied with both style and 
subject matter. "71 The distinction made between the "intellectuals" 
and the "man in the street" became a guideline for the solution of 
many problems related with cultural translation, especially in deciding 
the subject matter of talks and the kind of music to be broadcast. 
However, the distinction was a tricky one. It was again related 
with problems of identity/difference. Tristram knew that the British 
could not "disregard the views of the 'intellectuals': they run the 
country. " 72 The BBC broadcasts had to address the ruling people if 
they sought any impact on national policies. But on the other hand, 
the British were now aware that there was no easy reconciliation with 
the aspirations of the Turkish elite. There was a competition between 
the two parties. The Turkish elite had to dislike the BBC 
transmissions, continuously problematising and obscuring what is 
"modern" in Turkey, if they wanted to have a distinct power. They 
claimed to be the only source of "modernity" in the national project. 
They opposed to any translation of Turkish modernity by the Western 
world since it could deny the significance of their agency. They had 
already translated Western modernity as a component of Turkishness, 
and it was a distinct object now: the Turkish identity. Therefore, 
though stricken with the desire to know how the Western world saw 
70 BBC Written Archives, September 1942, "Remarks passed by Turkish journalists on 
their visit to the BBC Aldenham", E9/37. 
71 BBC Written Archives, 14 September 1942, "Turkish Service: Tristram's note on 
language difficulties", E1/259/1. 
72 Ibid. 
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them, they would not want, to adopt the image produced by the British. 
This is perhaps why the Turkish Ambassador had not been in favour 
of the decision of the Turkish Service to expand cultural items "to vary 
war news", for "some incomprehensible reason. "73 Something had to 
be left unspoken, in Zizek's terms, for the Turkish reality to exist. But, 
of course, the Turkish authorities could not oppose the BBC Turkish 
transmissions directly since they regarded it also as an approval of 
their existence in government. So they were split in their reactions. 
There are striking examples associated with the splits and gaps 
within the field of translation of cultural values. Music proved to be 
one of the difficult ones. Broadcasting of Western music, at first sight, 
seemed more suitable for the purposes of the BBC Turkish Service. 
However the proliferation of strategies due to arising difficulties, led to 
certain reversals. Turkish music gained prominence as time went on, 
with the intention to appeal to the tastes of laypeople, in the case of 
severe criticisms from the intellectuals. In 1947, it was decided to play 
less Western and more Turkish music in the Turkish transmissions. 74 
Of course, though paradoxically, this led to further criticisms from the 
Turkish "intellectuals". They were against an image of Turkishness 
represented by Turkish music. But at that time, the British could 
interpret away the problem by a new policy. The Turkish 
"intellectuals", though they run the country, were regarded as 
snobbish who were "apt to show off their education and social origin"; 
and it was believed that "the standards they set are not generally 
acceptable". 75 The BBC justified a more populist policy: Mango, who 
was employed by the BBC Turkish Service in 1947 (Service Director 
in 1959) states retrospectively that the Turkish Service gained a 
distinct reputation, in these years, by playing the kind of music that 
Ankara Radio banned for being "tasteless". 76 Of course, one has to 
note that the war was over then, and the impact on the ruling group 
73 BBC Written Archives, 2 April 1943, From British Council, Ankara to British Council, 
London, E1/259/1. 
74 BBC Written Archives, 11 July 1947, from Valerie Gordon Smith to all Turkish 
announcers, E1/259/1. 
75 BBC Written Archives, 1948, "Memorandum on Standards of Language and 
Translation in the Turkish Service of the BBC", R13/204. 
76 8 February 1995. Interview. 
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was a lesser consideration. So the BBC could invest on a certain 
dynamic in the Turkish society, on what was denied in the 
representation of the Turkish national identity by the elite and what 
was reckoned to be liked by the people. Yet Mango, at the time, 
seemed more sceptical about the use of populist policies: "The 
inauguration of Istanbul Radio (1948) will probably mean that we 
shall lose many of our 'lighter' listeners who are mainly attracted by 
our two weekly programmes of Turkish music .... we cannot compete 
with Turkish state broadcasting in the fields of Turkish as well as of 
Western MUSiC. "77 The populist policy also had its drawbacks and 
limitations. 
I have been arguing referring to several examples that the history 
of the BBC transmissions in Turkish, particularly during the war and 
immediately after, entailed a complex dialogic interrelatedness full of 
uncertainty and ambiguity; and that the techniques and mechanisms 
of projection of identities were shaped within the obscure field of the 
play of force lines. It is clear that the translation of culture, within this 
context, was not less complex. However, one should not think that the 
historical process evolved from ambiguity to clarity with time. All the 
efforts for more knowledge in this process have been rendered 
problematic by the intrusion of various factors, especially by 
antagonistic interests. It was only the changing circumstances, the 
changing context that induced the search for new strategies. Then 
how did certain codifications, such as the discourse of truth, emerge 
and were consolidated? Perhaps, for this, the positive functions of 
"non-knowledge" in the production of "reality" have to be 
acknowledged. 
4.4. Normalisation and Representations 
Keyder argues that national identities have been consolidated 
only after the Second World War, not only in peripheral countries but 
also in Europe. 78 The post-war period has witnessed an attempt to 
reinstitutionalize the functions of the state within national boundaries, 
77 BBC Written Archives, 7 October 1949, "Istanbul Radio", E11/1258. 
78 "The Crisis of Modernity", Goethe Institute Conference, Istanbul, March 1997. 
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equipping the state power. with effective tools of government. Keyder 
refers to welfare states within this context. It can be said that the 
cultural realm was reorganised along these lines. The dialogic 
character of relationships between cultures, as can be seen in the 
transmissions of the BBC World Service during the war, gave way to 
more monologic presentations of national identities. This was 
accompanied by more fixed definitions. It can be noticed that in the 
post war period, the BBC Turkish Service also adopted a more clear 
cut and seemingly a more consistent definition with regard to its 
functions and its target. This was not due to its improved state of 
knowledge, but to a reorganisation of knowledge in a different 
context. 
Hence I argue that the discourse of truth emerged as an efficient 
discourse only after the war. The reasons were manifold. First, as I 
have said above, the reestablishment of national boundaries and of 
the international order, with a new role for Britain, was an important 
factor. Second, this had to be accompanied by a certain loss of 
memory, a certain "non-knowledge" with regard to past positions and 
struggles. And third, the circulation of technical equipment and know- 
how, although not overtly charged with any ideological meanings, 
contributed to the consolidation of certain identities within an 
hierarchical order, giving support to certain discourses. 
One of the important facts of the post-war period recognised by 
the British, was the Turks' desire to be accepted as part of the 
European world. Consequently it was advised by the government that 
the Turkish Service should become part of the European Services in 
the BBC World Service: 
"Turkey now regards herself more as a European country 
than as an Arab country and has recently been admitted to 
the Council of Europe. The FO in their organisation also 
treat Turkey as a European country. It is therefore 
considered more appropriate for the Turkish Service to 
become part of the European Services, where it will be 
possible for the Service to be more effectively operated in 
the European environ. "79 
Also the separation of Turkish and Persian section, which have 
79 BBC Written Archives, 19 October 1949, R13/204. 
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hitherto been combined. under one Programme Organiser was 
suggested. The BBC opposed to the idea. The Assistant Head of 
Eastern Services wrote that he could see the chief argument for 
attachment to Europe is "Turkish amour-propre". However he 
advanced the following arguments for retaining the present 
organisation: 
1. From the point of view of geography Turkey is 
overwhelmingly Asiatic. 
2. Turkish outlook is still largely based on Eastern and 
Islamic and not on European and Christian tradition. 
3. Linguistically, historically and, to a great degree, 
culturally Turkey is still to a large extent, part of the Asiatic 
world, e. g. the popularity of the Turkish service is largely 
due to its use of Oriental (Turkish) music. The Turkish 
language still has, and is likely to retain, very strong traces 
of Arabic and Persian vocabulary and ways of thought ....... 80 
Nevertheless, as from 18 June 1950 the Turkish Service was 
transferred from "Eastern" to "East European" Service. 81 It was clear 
that the new political concerns around building an anti-Soviet bloc, 
and Turkey's position within that context, played an important role in 
this decision. Yet the British officials could separate the political 
concerns from cultural evaluations more distinctly now. The anxiety 
producing love/hate relationship with the Turkish object had given 
way to more clear cut distinctions. Turkey, though not essentially 
regarded a modern European nation, could be integrated to the 
European Service for political reasons. The realm of culture that was 
problematised for political reasons in the beginning of the foreign 
transmissions could be handled as a relatively separate object now. 
The adoption of populist policies in the Turkish Service was already a 
sign of that. The relativisation of culture that has started with foreign 
transmissions led to a relativistic attitude toward culture. Only then, 
the disturbing contestation between the Turkish elite and the British 
authorities in terms of the representation of the Turkish national 
identity in broadcasting, could be transformed into a competition for 
an audience. This meant normalisation of the relationship between 
bu BBC Written Archives, 5 July 1949, EII/1259/3. 
81 The decision could also imply that "Slav" countries were being "oriental ised" and were 
positioned half way between the Orient and Europe. 
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the two parties. 
The normalisation of the relationship entailed codified ways of 
looking at each other. The British could finally assume that they know 
the Turks. John Mair, Turkish Programme Organiser, produced a 
report on his visit to Turkey in 1951. In this report, Mair evaluates the 
Turkish situation more freely and with less anxiety, compared to 
previous reports. He mentions "... the Turks' fierce desire to be thought 
modern". But he feels free to name it as a "pathological desire". 
According to him, Turkish people are, in many ways, far from being 
modern. The only tradition "of which they are still openly proud is a 
military one. " And they seem to lack taste for arts. "Imagination does 
not seem to be one of the main Turkish characteristics, and the lack of 
it is reflected in a low level of artistic activity. " So without the need of 
problematising culture and ways of knowing it anymore, he formulates 
the aims of the Turkish Service: 
".... to keep the Turkish public informed of world events, as 
seen from Britain, by means of an accurate and efficient 
news service; to help strengthen the existing friendly 
relations between the Turkish and British peoples; to 
explain and if possible secure support for British Foreign 
Policy, and to try and familiarise the Turkish audience with 
British ways of life and thought. But to do this we obviously 
have to sugar the pill, and I think in general we must keep 
our programmes lighter, improve presentation, and relate 
everything possible, even to the point of exaggeration, to 
the Turkish outlook. "82 
We see that all the previous strategies, those related with news 
and flattery were integrated in the new formulation. However the BBC 
could adopt a lighter attitude now, without being torn by the need to 
know more about "modern" Turkey. "To sugar the pill" seemed 
enough. In this context non-knowledge, as to the origins of its own 
splits and gaps, played an important role. The BBC Turkish Service, 
once regarded as one of the most problematic serviceS83 , codified its 
own history after the war in terms of the assured superiority. 
82 BBC Written Archives, 14 July 1951, "Turkey: Reporl on a visit from 23 May 1951 to 19 
June 1951 by John Mair, Turkish Programme Organiser", E1/1260. 
83 The Controller of Overseas Services wrote in 1942: 1 wonder if there is any service 
over which there has been so much vacillation, in both policy and practical fields... " BBC 
Written Archives, 4 June 1942, E9/37. 
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Moreover, the BBC could easily deny, perhaps even without 
deliberate intention, the themes of struggle that have busied a series 
of government departments in recent history. 
In 1967, the BBC could advise Turkish Radio and Television 
(TRT) that they should not plan their output in the light of other 
people's practice. "Broadcasting after all is a tool to help you solve 
your own individual or national problems of communications, and 
Turkey's are obviously quite different from ours. "84 Or in 1955, the 
reply to the London Military Attache's question about "independence", 
assured him that 
"... there is a safeguard against any Government attempting 
to use the BBC as an instrument of propaganda for its 
policies ... In short, the Government does not control the BBC; the Corporation acts not as a moulder of public 
opinion but rather as a reflector of the views and opinions of 
all substantial sections of the community. "85 
Both of these comments openly contradict the earlier practices of 
the BBC, which had been so keen to interfere with other "national" 
broadcasting systems, itself being under strict government control. 
But in terms of the new codifications, the BBC could act as if these did 
not happen. Communication with Turkish broadcasters could 
continue on the basis of the newly constructed representationS. 86 The 
discourse of truth was a product of such a process. The Turkish 
broadcasters, being in a situation to negotiate both "margins" and the 
"centre" retained slight suspicions regarding the self representation 
of the BBC. But, since this representation became a social fact in the 
new world order, they had to identify themselves with some 
mastersignifier to guarantee their place in the symbolic network. So 
they continued to look to the BBC as a model for their own practices, 
asking for technology, know-how, training etc., in the post war period. 
A slight suspicion, for example, was about "independence". The 
Turkish broadcasting system was to be based on the British model but 
b4 BBC Written Archives, 12 December, 1967, El/2,432/1. 
85 BBC Written Archives, 28 July 1955, From Acting Chief Publicity Officer to London 
Military Attache, E9/37. 
86 Representation serves as a means for making sense of life world, in Rabinow's terms 
(1986: 257) and it becomes a social fact. 
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the Turkish authorities had difficulties in interpreting the model of 
independence. They did not really believe that the BBC was 
independent. Therefore they posed questions about independence to 
the BBC. The BBC Acting Chief Publicity Officer consulted 
government departments before he drafted a reply. The words of 
Camacho, regarding the issue, bear elements of truth, of the truth that 
had been excluded from the discourse of truth: "it is extremely difficult 
to persuade anybody at all outside the Commonwealth and, up to a 
point, the United States that the BBC is, in fact, independent. " 87 
Looking back to the history it is not difficult to guess why this has been 
so! 
The new representation of the British identity masked all 
previous attempts of propaganda and manipulation, as well as nasty, 
even racist remarks that had been uttered about other people. For 
example, the phrases in a report from the British Information Office in 
1940, concerning a Turkish man, that he is a Jew but "he is a very 
good type, and one would not suspect, from his personal appearance, 
that he was either a Turk or a Jew! "88 had to be buried in the 
archives. In the same manner, the Turkish Ambassador's words, in 
1942, about the series of talks on "British Democracy" in the Turkish 
transmissions, being boring and unnecessary89 was never interpreted 
later, either by the Turkish or the British. All the failures of 
interpretation of the British in the realm of culture had to be projected 
as the failures of the Turkish, in the hierarchical symbolic network. So 
it was the Turkish, who, with their "characteristic resistance"90 , have 
made things difficult for the British . 
The Turkish on the other hand, built a representation of their 
identity on the denial of previous and present inequalities in the 
relationship with the British, and left their "characteristic resistance" 
uninterpreted, which was in fact an important constituent of their 
identity. In 1956 Naci Serez, Programme Director of Ankara Radio, 
offered the BBC a suggestion of a programme that he himself had 
b7 BBC Written Archives, 26 July 1955, E12/974/1. 
88 BBC Written Archives, 1940, From British Information Office to BBC, E9/37. 
89 BBC Written Archives, 7 August 1942, "Interview with Turkish Ambassador', E9/37. 
90 BBC Written Archives, 4 September 1959, "Relations with Turkish Radio", E1/2,432/1. 
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designed, "in return for the most helpful co-operation we always had, 
especially from the Turkish Section". 91 The BBC had no intention of 
taking a programme suggestion from the Turkish but did not neglect to 
"enquire for further details, thereby showing some interest. "92 The 
Turkish broadcaster had a self image built on denials and 
misconceptions, while the BBC could be politely indifferent to the 
suggestion -whereas it could not have been that easy a decade ago- 
denying its former craving for every material related with the Turkish 
culture. The non-knowledge, at the end, of the constitutive dynamic of 
the dialogic interrelatedness, has contributed to the consolidation of 
identities, thus the discourse of truth that the British long before 
referred to as a superaddressee. 
I wish to conclude this section by commenting briefly on the third 
point, that of the supposedly neutral field of technology and know- 
how. It is known that the relations between the British and the Turkish 
broadcasters have started before the foundation of the Turkish 
Service. The broadcasting transmitter in Ankara had been built by 
Marconi. Marconi had written to BBC in 1937 to forward a request of 
Ankara Radio, which asked for records that the BBC no longer uses. 93 
In the same year Hayreden, the director of Istanbul Radio visited the 
BBC. He had several questions to ask to the BBC, concerning the 
methods for arranging the payment of copyrights, performing right 
fees; the methods of contact between the BBC and the listening public 
and the press94 ; the use that was made of regional contributions in 
the London programmes and vice versa. 95 During and afterwards the 
war, requests of the Turkish for technology, broadcasting material and 
skills continued. This was evaluated by the British as part of a general 
plan of export and marketing to Turkey. In 1944, it was envisaged that 
Turkey will 
"become a big potential market for our capital goods 
industries. I think that a big part could be played by the BBC 
in drawing attention to the efficiency of British industrial 
91 BBC Written Archives, 30 January 1956, From Naci Serez, Ankara Radio to BBC, 
E-1/2,432/1. 
92 Ibid. 
93 BBC Written Archives, 11 July 1937, BBC Internal Circulating Memo, E11/1256. 
94 BBC Written Archives, 1 November 1937, BBC internal Circulating Memo, ?. 
95 BBC Written Archives, 9 November 1937, BBC Internal Circulating Memo, E1/1258. 
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scientists and designers and in impressing on the Turkish 
listener that Britain can and does deliver the goods. "96 
The contacts concerning these issues formed an "ordinary" trade 
line between the two parties that has not been problematised as 
much as the cultural issues. The contacts seemed to be based on 
simple interests and needs. 
However, goods and technology, themselves, were vested with 
meanings which have to be analysed as part of "ideological" 
constructions. I will give two examples, coming from the experiences 
of those people who were not in any position to determine policies. 
Yet they bestowed meanings and identity to their radio sets. One 
example is from a Turkish village. A radio-dealer selling English 
Ferranti sets reported in 194197 , that the villagers were very unhappy 
because of poor reception; unhappy "because although the sets are 
English, they cannot get the London station on them. " The villagers 
had felt the sets that they use in their local life had a distinct and, 
probably, a superior identity. The other example is again from an 
experience in an Anatolian town, this time lived by some British 
engineers in 1942. While they were in Sivas, they purchased "a 
magnificent, spot new, Marconi 7-valve set". The Forces programme 
was "the most pleasant and the easiest to tune. " With their set they 
could get "at least three times the volume" that they normally 
required. They "reserved 'full-blast' with the windows open for 'God 
Save the King', 'Land of Hope and Glory' and 'There'll always be an 
England', just to give the locals a treat. "98 It is clear that the 
nationalistic aggression felt in the above passage is very much 
attached to the technology. In both examples we see a translation 
activity, that attributes meanings to a technological equipment within 
an hierarchical order. Cultural translation occurs, in this case, within 
both a discursive and a non-discursive context. 
Thus London called Turkey in various, though not always 
consistent, ways to which Turkey has replied by a complex set of 
ub BBC Written Archives, 20 October 1944, "Post-War Broadcasting in Turkish", 
E1/1259/2. 
97 BBC Written Archives, August 1941, Monthly Intelligence Report, E2/425. 
98 BBC Written Archives, 24 September 1942, El/1257. 
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reactions. However, the dialogic nature of the relationship, finally, 
remains hidden in the monologic representations of national 
identities. 
4.5. The Dialogism of Truths 
We have seen that the BBC Turkish Service worked hard to 
implement a policy of "truth" during the war, which was to be identified 
with the British cause in the aftermath of the war. But as can be 
observed in what may be called the normalisation period after the 
war, the codification of representations masked the previous anxieties 
and fantasies of the BBC Turkish Service regarding its object of 
knowledge. The BBC Turkish Service had relied on preformed 
images of Turkishness in handling its audience. The new sources of 
knowledge, on the other hand, were provided from discrete 
experiences of those who visited Turkey; from those who claimed to 
have some sort of understanding of Turkish culture and psychology. A 
statement like, "Mr. Lubin said a Turkish friend asked him what 
'spitfire' meant in English and showed great satisfaction when he was 
told"99 could lead to a programme suggestion. 100 However, the 
strategies of truth, not always based on "objective" knowledge, did 
not produce a distance to the truth itself for the British subjects. 101 
Fantasy and knowledge were bridged and presented in a "rational" 
framework; as Agamben notes, they were non-contradictorily united in 
the assumed rational subject. 102 
In opposition to this, the Turkish elite could not easily produce 
and sustain a single truth. There were two contradictory 
99 BBC Written Archives, "Conversation with Mr. Lubin of Imperial Chemical Industries", 23 
September 1940, E9/37- 
100 "A talk on the types of machines used by the British and the meaning of their names 
might it seems go down well in Eastern Europe and the Levant. " Ibid. 
101 There is a predominant claim in Britain that the World Service served, and continues 
to serve humanistic purposes (Mansell, 1982; Tusa, 1992; Walker, 1992); and it gained "a 
golden reputation" during the war (Walker, 1992: 12). A handbook, BBC at War, written 
by Antonia White and published by the BBC, emphasises the "scientific" way the listeners' 
interests were investigated during wartime (25). 
102 Agamben points to the changing role of "mediating imagination" in history: "For 
Antiquity, the imagination which is now expunged from knowledge as 'unreal', was the 
supreme medium of knowledge... " (1993: 24) But in the modern world, "the function of 
phantasy is assumed by the new subject of knowledge: the ego cogito. "(1993: 25) 
181 
considerations: one was to produce representations to convince the 
West that they too were Western, the other was to defend the distinct 
identity of Turkishness against the West. Imagination and fantasy 
attempted to bridge the gap between these considerations, but 
second-order reflections, due to the projections of the West which 
always evoked a lack, led to splits in the subjects. 103 The accounts of 
Ankara Radio during the Second World War demonstrate the split 
quite clearly. 
It was always emphasised that the Turkish nation presented an 
exemplary role in the war: an example of truth, peace and civilisation. 
Ankara Radio's broadcasting during the war was shown both by the 
government and the broadcasters as an evidence of this. However, 
the marginality of Turkish Radio and its pragmatic attitude to various 
"truths" articulated by foreign radio stations also manifested itself in 
statements about Turkish Radio. Sarper, in his article, called "if they 
would have listened to us, too", put it clearly: 
"... for three years we have been listening to transmissions 
from Germany, United States, Bulgaria, Palestine, Croatia, 
Britain, Iran, Italy, Rumania, Russia, and Syria .... We must 
admit that in the first days we felt a bit dizzy. How could we 
not feel dizzy? The way all those big communities that we 
have felt ourselves close to because of their contributions to 
civilisation and humanity, in science, technique and arts, 
contradicted and differed from each other in explaining the 
"right" and the "truth" did not fit into any standard that we 
believe in and know of. The experience of those three years 
has awakened us .... equipped us with a critical faculty that 
can assess the difference between explanations and 
events. .. But there is also Ankara Radio in the world. It has been 
transmitting its modest and courageous voice to the world; if 
they would ever listen to us, too .... We give news regarding 
ourselves, those who want to know us should listen to us; 
our domestic news are modest and sincere. And we give 
world news to the world, and we give the news by 
distancing ourselves from hatred and fear. "104 
One can see, in the above statement, all the features of a 
103 Koqak argues that the Turkish modernists had "an uneasy consciousness that 
attempted to hide from itself its very pretensions" (1996: 20). 
104 Selim Sarper, "Biraz da Onlar Bizi Dinlese", Radyo, Vol. 1, No. 8,15 July 1942, p. 2. 
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pragmatic approach to "truth" in Ankara Radio's self -positioning 
during the war. Turkey, by its "distance to hatred and fear" was 
considered as pure and exemplary, and uncontaminated by the West. 
On the other hand, Turkey which was open to the West, never 
stopped listening to those that contributed "to civilisation and 
humanity, in science, technique and arts". Similar to Western objects 
that were appropriated and utilised in everyday life, the various 
"truths" were also objectified and put into a hierarchy according to 
emerging needs; they were utilised to secure the power of the ruling 
elites in Turkey. The ongoing negotiation of truths made the Turkish 
discourse on truth very elusive. This was one of the things that the 
BBC Turkish Service found so difficult to deal with in developing 
appropriate strategies. 
The discourse on truth was also elusive due to the existence of a 
wide range of tactics'05 that sustained it, albeit remained invisible. 
Turkish Radio resorted to certain tactics while propagating an 
openness to the West. It was announced to the Turkish audience that 
they were free to listen to the "foreign" radio stations during the war: 
"It is both curious and permissible to listen these 
transmissions. Curious, because a Turk has a habit of liking 
games of wit. Permissible, because a Turk's awareness 
has developed to an extent that he can differentiate those 
messages that are against our national interests from 
others, and he has the capacity to read off the danger in 
them. " 106 
The message conveyed by this announcement did not only 
contradict the policy of heavy censorship on domestic news107 , for 
example; but also was refuted by certain tactics. Suat Osmanoýlu's, a 
10S I use the term "tactic", referring to de Certeau, as "a calculus which cannot count on a 
'proper' (a spatial or institutional localization) distinguishing the other as a visible totality. " 
(1988: xix). A tactic is fragmentary and fluid, by contrast to a strategy which is associated 
with an institution, refers to an other in a discourse, and connects to power in a more 
stable and consistent manner. 
106 Radyo, Vol. 1, No. 2,15 January 1942, p. 42. 
107 During the war, the Turkish government maintained strict control over the press. A 
number of laws and press regulations imposed fines and jail sentences upon writers who 
published articles designed "to disrupt public confidence in the State, or in one or a few of 
the officials of the State", as it was put in the press law. The newspaper editorialists 
emphasised world affairs in their writings because "criticizing the national leader (inbnO), 
the government, and the CHIP (RPP) was strictly forbidden" according to Nadir Nadi, one 
of the leading journalists of the period (Weisband, 1973: 72-3). 
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technician in Ankara Radio, account of the war years is very 
interesting to compare: 
"Italians transmitted Turkish programmes. They now and 
then made an audience requests programme, reading 
names from the letters that they received from Anatolia, 
Central Anatolia or Eastern Anatolia. We were upset when 
we listened to those programmes. Then an investigation 
was made to find out those names and addresses 
announced by the Italian Radio. And it was found out that 
they were fake. Then, seeing that it can be dangerous, we 
looked for a way to distort these transmissions. By making a 
small transmitter and using a small aerial we started 
producing atmospherics every night, a minute to six o'clock. 
... We heard from people that they liked the music transmissions on Bari Radio, but sometimes could not 
listen to it because of the atmospherics. Whenever I heard 
this I would feel a big joy inside, though I would say to them 
'God knows who is jamming it! ". 108 
Turkish Radio did not only try to minimise the harmful effects of 
propaganda when it employed its tactic of distortion. The messages of 
propaganda, both from the Axis and Allied fronts, already made their 
way easily to Turkey, especially in the form of world news. Anatolian 
Agency news, that Ankara Radio was dependent on, were generally 
taken from the German DNB (25%) and the British Reuter (50%) 
agencies (Kocabaýoglu, 1980: 247). Furthermore, the BBC sources 
point to the fact that the British viewpoint was extensively quoted in 
Ankara Radio's transmissions, and most of the BBC talks were 
published by the Turkish newspapers. Osmanoglu's memoirs, also, 
reveal Ankara Radio's "cooperation" with the USA, by taping 
significant talks, such as Roosevelt's speeches on American Radio, 
and distributing them to the Turkish newspapers. 109 On the other 
hand, some foreign transmissions of Ankara Radio, that would count 
as counter-propaganda, were prepared by foreigners! The 
programmes targeted to Britain, for example, were made by the British 
Council officials up until 1945 (Kocabaýoýlu, 1980: 244). All these 
examples point to the technical limitations of Ankara Radio in 
compiling world news and in preparing foreign programmes. But they 
108 Ankara Radio Sound Archives, "Radyc, Anilan", Elgin Ternel, TRT Radio Programme. 
109 Ibid. 
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also indicate the economic and technical dependency of the Turkish 
regime on the West. Therefore, the permissive policy of Turkish Radio 
can be interpreted as giving in to the demands of the West. However if 
one accepts the argument that Turkey used its negotiating powers, 
especially that arising from its specific "geopolitical" position, in the 
arena of politics during the war, and could afford a relative 
independence from the West (Deringil, 1994), then the strategy of 
openness should also be thought as a way of relating to the adopted 
truth of the Westernised Turkey. Which means that Turkey had to 
design its external reality according to the projected expectations of 
the West. The tactic of distortion, in this context, can be interpreted as 
an attempt of distancing oneself from that truth, and as a symptom of 
another order of truth. 
The one order of truth belonged to the supposed "internal 
essences"; while the other belonged to the external forms. Against the 
assertion of the West that only the West was rational and capable of 
modernity, the nationalists responded by demonstrating that "their 
own nation was perfectly capable of replicating the Western 
experience" (GCjlalp, 1997: 56). Those forms that replicated the 
Western experience, as a replica of the real, belonged to the domain 
of the external and the visible. This was endorsed by the West, for 
example by the strategies of flattery of the BBC that I have discussed 
before. It was both constructed as a display for the West, which was 
recognised and processed by the West. For example, the decision to 
open a branch of a People's House in London can only be explained 
as a display for the West, since these institutions were initially 
designed to "go to the people" in Turkey. Yet, the BBC was keen to 
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use it as an item of flattery"O, hence affirming the reality of the 
display. 
However, the "essence" of the nation, translated into 
Turkishness, could not be articulated and signified as easily. The form 
went against the "essence", the outfit against the inner self. The elites 
wanted to believe that these were non-contradictory: 
"... the outfit does not kill the self! Wearing hats did not 
change the Turkish head that thinks in human but also in 
Turkish terms; the Western culture did not kill the Turk's 
humane but Turkish feelings. "' 11 
The belief, that the truth replicating the Western experience did 
not contradict the inner truth of the self could only be grounded in 
fantasy since there was ample evidence that they did contradict each 
other in practice. The elite imagined that they could mediate (that 
was the raison d'etre of their power) between the two orders of truth 
as long as they used cultural and technological means creatively, to 
produce and sustain a nationalist fantasy. Yet, the dialogic analysis 
of truth(s) in this chapter shows that fantasy could count as real within 
the British regime of power and truth' 12 , whereas in the Turkish case 
the fantasy could not be accounted and legitimated in a "rational" 
framework. In the next two chapters I will attend to the works of 
fantasy on radio, radio talks and drama, to analyse the elements that 
11 OFor example, Brigadier-General Sir Wyndham Deedes made a special speech on the 
BBC on the day the London People's House opened. He included in his speech all the 
points he thought the Turkish wanted to hear: "It would not, I think, be an exaggeration to 
say that there is no example in history -at all events I know of none- in which a country 
has carried out such radical reforms in so short a space of time- a bare twenty years- with, 
let me add, so little domestic disturbance... " He talked about how Ankara represented a 
break with the past, how the new dress code introduced a Western style, and how women 
were emancipated. He especially dwelled on the role of the People's Houses: "So typical 
is it of modern Turkey that we got permission a year ago to open one here in London. " 
BBC Written Archives, "Turkey Today", broadcast on Eastern Service Red Network, 23 
January 1943. Wyndham Deedes was very popular with the Turkish audience. He 
received letters from Turkish people who spelled his name the way it sounded in Turkish: 
"Dim diz efendi". Interview with Andrew Mango, 8 December1995. 
111 Izzettin Tuýrul Niýbay, "Hasan Ferit Alnar", Radyo, Vol. 2, No. 16,15 March 1943, p. 4. 
112 1 have cited several examples, in this chapter, to demonstrate this. John MacKenzie 
also notes that the BBC operated in a political climate, between 1923-1953, that would 
not tolerate anything that attacked "Britain's complacent sense of superiority" (1986: 187). 
In the mid-forties, the BBC propagated the idea that "England is the single country in the 
world that, looking after its own interests with meticulous care, has at the same time 
something to give to others. " (cited in MacKenzie, 1986: 177) 
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were employed to make sense of the social fantasy. The gendered 
conceptions of nature and civilisation stand out as significant 
devices. 
187 
Photograph of a "traditional" family listening to the radio. 
(Radyo, 1/3: 34 , 15 February 1942) 
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CHAPTER 5 
Radio Talks 
In a comic strip published in Radyo in 1942 ,a man asks another 
man : "Haven't you found a woman to marry yet? " "No", says the other, 
"I have bought a radio set instead; it gives me all the gossip from the 
world, takes care of my health problems, entertains me with music, 
satisfies all my interests in various areas from sports to theatre. 
Furthermore, I can shut it up whenever I wish to. "' The comic strip 
points to the attempt to position the radio in everyday life. The radio is 
shown as man's best companion in the private sphere, which will 
even act as a substitute for women. But what produces the humour in 
the strip is the operation of language which substitutes the machine 
with a human being while referring to a widely acknowledged 
"problem of control" of men over women in the men's world. The idea 
is that the machine can be controlled by men; it, finally, gives them 
the desired freedom in addition to "feminine" pleasures. But only in 
the alienated form of an apparatus. The radio does not possess any 
meaning in itself. The radio set is a technical artifact which can only 
be made sense of in a metaphorical way. The metaphor here, radio 
as a compliant woman, brings to view the contrasts of the natural and 
the technical; of the body and the ideal in Turkish national discourse 
which both circumscribed and was produced by radio broadcasting in 
the mid-30's and the 40's. 
In this chapter I concentrate on radio talks to show how the elite 
defined themselves as representatives of the nation in their 
accommodation of various contradictions and divisions, regarding 
time, space, gender and language. I shall argue that there is a link 
between the questions addressed in radio talks and the kind of 
authority the national elite (predominantly men) pursue. 
I begin by talking about the format, the "radio talk", that featured 
significantly in the broadcasting of Turkish Radio since its 
Ramiz, Radyo, Vol. 2, No. 13,15 December 1942, p. 23 
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41 national isation" in 1936-The "immediacy" and "directness" of the 
format appealed to many intellectuals of the period who contributed 
to talk programmes. Along with certain named individuals some 
associations, such as the Red Crescent, were also allotted air time on 
Ankara Radio. The subject matter of such talks covered a wide range 
from "technical inventions" to "legal" matters. What I specifically 
discuss in this chapter, are the talks delivered by "intellectuals", 
mostly male doctors, on everyday life. The education of children, 
family life, the position of women, sports, love, discipline and 
entertainment were among the themes covered by these talks. In the 
second part of the chapter, I look at these talks more closely to 
demonstrate the intricate, sometimes problematic, mediations 
between the body and the nation. This involves the redefinition of 
"modern" forms of everyday life as opposed to past traditional forms. 
These new forms were discussed on radio within a new paradigm of 
authority, which was pedagogical and "scientific". 
Thirdly, I take up the mediating concepts or the "operators" 
(Strathern, 1995) that regularly figure in these talks, such as the child, 
the youth, and the women (who were employed to ground one 
discourse in another) to analyse the dynamics of projection that the 
elite engaged themselves in to fix the supposed origins, unity and 
superiority of the nation. The boundary management between the 
elite and the people; Turkey and the West; and the public and the 
private are revealed through certain metaphors that instrumentalise 
certain images of civilisation in a matrix of nature and culture. 
However, here, we see that the links between nature and culture are 
handled differently from what is considered to be the Western 
"conventional symbol isation", in Strathern's terms. Primarily, I refer to 
her argument (1995) to contrast the way that the distinction between 
nature and culture is figured in Western and Turkish national 
discourses. Occidentalism, I argue, accounts for the differences. 
5.1. The Radio Talks 
Prior to the nationalisation of Istanbul and Ankara Radios, music 
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programmes dominated. Turkish broadcasting. 2 I pointed to the 
problems attached to this fact by the elite in Chapter 3. The perception 
of radio as a "music box" was severely criticised while the educational 
and disciplinary functions of the radio were emphasised. These 
functions were automatically linked with "verbal programmes" among 
which radio talks figured with other forms such as dramas, news and 
radio journals. The percentage of these kind of programmes 
increased significantly after radio was put under state control. 3 
In the preparatory period before the official inauguration of the 
national Ankara Radio in 1938, we see a growing emphasis on the 
proliferation and variety of "verbal programmes" . Starting 
from 1935 
new subjects which were delivered in verbal forms were introduced. 
A weekly programme based on newspaper news came in addition to 
the regular news report (which only lasted for 10 minutes and 
attracted the least attention from the broadcasters until the Second 
World War); teaching foreign languages (German and French); 
programmes to promote certain institutions such the Red Crescent, 
the State Monopolies Department; and programmes to inform on 
recent developments in science and technology ( "The Pilot Speaks", 
the "Technics Hour") were among "educational" verbal programmes. 
Art and literature were covered in programmes such as the "Literature 
Hour" and the "Poetry Hour". Children's programmes were introduced 
(the "Children's Hour", "Advice to Children", "Tales to Children"). 
Programmes that addressed peasants ("Agricultural Office Hour", 
"Meteorology Hour", "Beekeeping Hour"); and health and domestic 
life ("The Doctor Speaks", "The Dentist's Hour", "Child Care", "Advice 
to Housewives") were produced. The latter gained particular 
prominence. "Economics", "Legal Information", "Savings and National 
Goods" and "National Epics" were among other verbal programmes 
that went on air in these years. 
The radio, therefore, was transformed from a "music box" into a 
box that talked. The assumed immediacy of speech was privileged in 
2 The percentage of the so called "verbal programmes" were very low between 1927- 
1936, approximately 14%. Koqabaýoýlu compares the fact with some European stations, 
such as Viennese Radio and the BBC in which the percentage of "verbal programmes" 
was never below 25% (1980: 73). 
3 It reached approximately 30% of total air time (Kocabaýoglu, 1980: 165). 
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its association to education and discipline. The general principles and 
aims of the verbal programmes, formulated by the Director of Ankara 
Radio in the beginning of the 40's, were: "To give the best examples 
of Turkish language in terms of both pronunciation and delivery"; "to 
give positive and helpful information in an entertaining way -avoiding 
snobbery, to have educational influence, and to avoid matters that 
can be harmful for the moral health and the tastes of the youth and 
the people", and "to raise the level of artistic appreciation 
(Kocabaýoglu, 1980: 223). These principles showed the determination 
to regulate the content and the form of the "verbal programmes" which 
had featured sporadically and in an unorganised way before in radio 
broadcasting. The transformation of the radio's mission, and the 
definition of its main function by "talking" brought into focus, more 
clearly, the question: Who is listening? Echoed in a prominent 
Kernalist journalist's words the question was raised for discussion: " 
Whom are we going to inform? Whom are we going to entertain? "4 
The question was answered in different ways. There were people like 
Baltacioýlu, who insisted that radio had to be transformed into a 
people's university with 70% of its programmes allotted to courses 
such as philosophy, sociology, psychology, history, geography, the 
history of Turkish revolution, child education, health, agriculture and 
theatre. Most members of the elite agreed that the radio had to 
address the people, that is the people in the towns and villages, with 
specific emphasis on children's education. The radio, it was argued, 
had been oriented in the past mostly for the rich people in the big 
cities. 5 This had to change if the new mission of discipline and 
education was going to be fulfilled. The newspaper Cumhuriyet's 
questionnaire on the same question raised similar concerns from the 
4 Nadir Nadi, "Ankara Raclyo istasyonu Faaliyete Gegmeden", Cumhuriyet, 23 July 1938. 
5 Yeni Ses, November 1939, p. 23; Sefer Aytekin, "Kby Raclyolarindan istifade Edilemiyor", 
Yeni Adam, No. 252,26 October 1939, p. 5. 
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readers. 6 The new need to address "the people" was conceived as a 
general problem of content and form. Radio talks and radio dramas 
were thought to be forms that had special educational value. 
It's significant that the worries concerning whom the radio 
broadcasting should address were confined to what the elite had to 
do: how they had to make the talks more interesting and higher in 
"educational value". The question of what "the people" may want or 
need remained mostly absent from the discussions. ýerif's argument, 
for example, for a more "scientific" diagnosis of audience reception 
remained marginal. He, in an article on the social psychology of radio, 
said: 
"... the people addressed to is not an empty gramophone 
disc to be recorded on; it is not a passive machine that 
absorbs things; it is not "a slippery kind" of organism. It has 
its own tastes, own conception of life. Therefore, it has a 
certain kind of receptivity for incoming effects, which 
consequently determines the eventual reaction. This is why 
it is not enough just to address the people in transmissions. 
It is also necessary to investigate how they receive these 
messages, where they positively react or where they do not 
react at all, scientifically and seriously; and take these 
results into consideration when designing programmes. "7 
The "scientific method", however, was interpreted quite 
differently by those who actually delivered the radio talks. They were 
mostly convinced that the "popularisation" of certain essential 
subjects made them accessible to a larger audience. Therefore, 
issues regarding the use of language were more central to the 
debates on radio talks. 8 The audience, against ýerifs warnings, was 
posited as a passive entity. The activity attached to the elite in 
6 Most of the readers' concerns were around radio's former status serving the rich. They 
thought that radio had to address the people, that is the poor and the rural population in 
Turkey, it the new mission of the radio was going to be achieved. The populist concerns 
were coupled with concerns to put radio in the service of the Turkish revolutionary 
principles. One reader said, the radio must be active in "kneading the society with the 
principles of inkilap, spreading around the Turkish culture and making the world hear of 
the Turkish voice. " Cumhuriyet, 12 January 1937. The association of popular concerns 
with the idea of reaching the "world" was a common feature of the period. 
7 Muzaffer ýerif, "Radyonun Sosyal Psikolojisi", Oluý, Vol. 1, No. 4,22 January 1939, p. 59. 
8 Journals such as Yeni Adam and Yeni Ses raised criticisms of language used in the 
radio programmes, arguing that it was not accessible to those with lower levels of 
education. 
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defining and achieving the goals in radio broadcasting, and the 
centrality attached to "verbal programmes", make them, especially 
radio talks and radio drama significant for analysis. In them, I argue, 
one can look for the mechanisms of political subjectivity which posited 
a subject and an object, separate yet through mediations were linked 
to each other in the assumed unity of a national discourse. 
The format of the radio talk, curiously stands in a tension with 
these mechanisms at work. Radio talks are usually designed to be 
part of "everyday life". The "dailiness" of broadcast talks which 
constitute the "background and foreground of our everyday dealings 
with each other in a common world" (Scannell, 1996: 5), however, 
clashed, in the case of Turkish Radio, with the inscription of "another 
world" that was usually regarded as standing above or alien to the 
ordinary people. The simple and "chatty" style of radio talks on 
Turkish Radio, were blended with authoritative inserts that aimed to 
teach the audience what is good and desirable. The chat was 
meaningful as long as it upheld a distinct, and usually alien, voice 
associated with authority. The ordinariness of the talk was disrupted 
by the insertion of "foreign" examples and names. The talks aimed to 
be "natural" and popular but were trapped in an "artificial" world. 9 
The spatiality of radio talks was especially problematic. Spatiality 
raises the issue of direction. "It asks, towards whom do programmes 
point? " (Scannell, 1996: 11). What Scannell calls the "normal isation" 
of output in broadcasting requires an understanding that conceives of 
the audience's being in a separate space. For example, Scannell 
says, a "growing sense of talking into the void contributed, in the BBC, 
to the creation of listener research to answer such basic questions as 
who is out there listening, when can they listen and do they like what 
they hear? " (1996: 11). In the case of Turkish Radio, however, not 
only the listening habits but also the reactions of the audience were 
absent from the "meaning" of the programmes. The audience was 
assumed to be there although "absent" . 
On the other hand, a sense 
of talking to the void did not lead the elite to know more about their 
9 The artificiality of the talks -the subject matters, language and the style- were criticised 
by intellectuals of the period, among whom Baltacioglu was a consistent critic. Yeni Adam, 
No. 252,26 October 1939, p. 2,5. 
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target ; instead, the disturbance of the act (talking to the void) was 
projected back on to the talk itself, problematising its style, its form 
and content. It was the talking subject who had to develop himself in 
order to come close to an idealised form of speech. The space of 
talking as well the space of listening were denied and replaced with 
an idealised space of the nation which the voice of the radio signified. 
In this sense, the communication model, of talking and listening, was 
fractured. The timeless and spaceless subject who talked without 
hearing was, at the same time, the object; the nation itself. The elite's 
obsession with self-discipline led it to adopt the ideal form of speech, 
that in principle embodied the people. This points to the critical role of 
the radio talks in Turkey in expressing the national ideal. Yet it also 
indicates the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of it. 
5.2. The Language, the Body, and the Nation 
In this section I will be looking more closely at some radio talks 
that featured regularly for certain periods on Turkish Radio, from the 
1930s to the end of the 1940. These talks do not only take very similar 
topics, but also employ similar strategies for securing an authoritative 
voice. I will be referring here, to talks delivered by Selim Sirn, Kazirn 
Nami Duru, Dr. Behqet Kamay, Dr. Galip Ataq, Dr. Celal Ertuý. 10 What 
makes these talks significant for my analysis, as I have noted before, 
is the "dailiness" in their subject matters, as opposed to rhetorical or 
jargon-ridden "Economy" or "History" talks. The former are addressed 
to the so-called ordinary people in their domestic settings. They talk to 
the family, both men and women, and sometimes children. In this 
sense, they are also different from talk programmes targeted 
specifically to "housewives". 
Before I go into the recurring themes in these talks I would like to 
comment briefly on two of the programme producers: Selim Sirn and 
10 Also published as books: Selim Sim, Radyo Konferanslarlm (My Radio Talks), 1932; 
Kazim Nami Duru, Ankara Radyosunda Sdylediklerim (What I have said on Ankara Radio), 
1937; Dr. Behýet Kamay, Radyo Konferanslan: Sajllk ve Sosyal Bahisler (Radio 
Conferences: Health and Social Issues), 1941; Dr. Galip Ataq, Radyoda Evin Saafi (The 
Home's Hour on Radio), 1943; Dr. Celal Ertuý, Radyoda Pazar Sohbetleri (Sunday Chats 
on Radio), 1945. 
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Dr. Galip Ataq. These brief background stories provide an entry into 
the links between the radio talks and other practices and discourses 
of the period covered here. 
Selim Sirri gave talks on Istanbul Radio starting from the 
beginning of the 30's. These were, according to Kocabaýoýlu, 
exemplary of what was called the "talks of educational value" (1980: 
99). They were easy to understand, and employed a language that 
was "appropriate to microphone" (Kocabaýo§lu, 1980: 99). Selim Sim 
was a late Ottoman intellectual, a Young Turk, who had discovered 
the importance of "national culture", especially of "folk dances" in his 
years in Stockholm from 1907. He went there to study physical 
education after completing his degree in engineering. Impressed by 
the preservation and reappropriation of folk culture there in Sweden 
he became active, and continued after the foundation of the 
Republic, in research on folklore and folk dances. He believed that a 
dance based on folk dances in the Aegean part of Turkey zeybek 
could be adapted to "salon" life in modern cities and be turned into a 
modern "national dance". His emphasis on getting rid of vulgarity and 
ending the exclusion of women in zeybek were attempts to give the 
dance a "civilised" and refined character. " Selim Sirn's interest in 
"physical" education and national culture set the framework and the 
tone of his radio talks. 
Dr. Galip Ataq was the General Director of Haydarpaýa Emrazi 
intaniye Hospital. His talks on Ankara Radio from the beginning of 
the 40's were presented with the name "Home's Hour". It was a 
programme which touched on "various subjects" (not only those that 
interested women but the whole family) in an entertaining and simple 
style (Kocabaýoýlu, 1980: 238). When his radio programme started in 
1941, he was still living in Istanbul as a practicing medical doctor and 
had to send his talks by post to be read on Ankara Radio. But a year 
later he moved to Ankara and was recruited by Ankara Radio as a 
11 In 1925 he himself performed his zeybek with a female student of his on the stage for 
Mustafa Kemal. Mustafa Kemal appreciated the dance, asked him to perform it once more 
with his dinner jacket. After the performance Mustafa Kemal spoke to the audience: 
"Ladies and Gentlemen! Mr. Selim Si rri gave a civilised form to zeybek as he revived it ... We 
can now say to Europeans that we have a perfect dance and we can perform it in salons 
and on stage. Zeybek dance can and should be performed in every social setting 
together with a woman. " (Tarcan, 1948: 3) 
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member of its staff. 12 His talks were very "popular" although he never 
read them himself. The reason for the popularity was explained by 
T6r, the director of Ankara Radio, as due to his "mastery of the 
technique for writing for radio" which did not address "only a small 
group" but was interesting for "young girls and boys, mature and old 
people, the illiterate and intellectuals, officials and other 
professionals". 13 T6r introduced the concept of "vulgarisation" (a term 
used by Westerners14 , he noted) to account for the success of his 
talks. This meant treating a subject in a way that is accessible to all. 
But, he added, in order to achieve this one had to have a "universal 
culture". 15 In an interview with the presenter of the talks Ataq said that 
he tried to cater for different tastes and interests in the talks he wrote: 
"I receive telephone calls after each talk. The listeners 
calling one after another tell me their opinions on the talk. 
Some are critical, others praise it. Some even threaten me. 
Sometimes they come to the hospital I work to talk to me. I 
had some idea of how difficult it could be to please people 
from different levels of culture and life styles before. But 
after I started producing for radio I realised the full extent of 
the problem. If you compliment plumpness in a talk, the slim 
women will feel susceptible; if you compliment dark 
complexions those who are fair will be upset ...... 16 
The account on Atag's talks conveys some important points that 
shed light on the circumstances of production and reception of radio 
talks. The technique of "vulgarisation" was regarded as one 
necessary condition of reaching the people. The talking person had to 
deal with the "level" of the audience. However by doing this, he stood 
above them since the technique required a "universal culture" which 
was synonymous, in this case, with Western culture. Here we see 
how a certain kind of authority was envisaged and implemented 
through radio. Ataq had a "fatherly" attitude, in T6r's terms, which 
12 His weekly talks were first broadcast in the mornings (8: 15) but later were moved into 
the evening band (21: 00), and after 1944 were broadcast 3 times a week until his death 
in 1947. 
13 Vedat Nedim Tbr, "Galip Ataý", Radyo, Vol. 2, No. 13,15 December 1942, p. 6. 
14 The term means popularisation in French and does not have the negative 
connotations it has in English. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Baki SOha, "Evin Saati Muharriri Dr. Galip Ataq'la Bir Saat", Radyo, Vol. 1, No. 9,15 
August 1942, p. 9. 
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attended to the needs of the public in an understanding way, without 
snobbery. Yet he, by his "vast knowledge" of "various topics", stood 
as an authority figure. He knew everything from hair care to child care! 
In this way, the matters of everyday life were redefined in the light of a 
new quasi-scientific knowledge which was informed by "civilisation". 
The other important point in Atag's account, concerns the reception of 
the talks. We see that the abstract concept of the people -the ideal 
audience- , in practice, came to mean those people either in Istanbul 
or in Ankara who could telephone or visit Ataq, other than a few who 
wrote to him. He was quite sarcastic about them in the interview, he 
mocked the trivial questions asked by them. 17 The sarcastic attitude 
which also set the tone of his talks points to the unbridgeable gap 
between the ideal and the actual. The notion of the people, which 
functioned as a justifying principle of the elite's activities, for example 
in radio broadcasting, was despised wherever the audience 
expressed itself. In fact, the triviality mocked in the audience reactions 
is no different than the triviality of the topics in the talks. The technique 
of "vulgarisation" translates into the feminisation and infantalisation of 
culture through radio broadcasting which I will be commenting on in 
the third section. 
The two cases, that belong to two different decades, of Selim 
Sirn and Galip Ataq present the problem -of the talk and the 
audience- in its diverse aspects. Selim Sim grounded his talks in the 
ideal national culture which, in turn, provided him with a policy for 
disciplining the bodies. Ataq took the triviality of bodies as a starting 
point and arrived at a sarcastic quasi-scientific discourse on them. In 
both of them the body was posited as the site of "national 
construction". If the former is an example of the embodiment of the 
ideal, the latter regards the disembodiment of the actual, both of 
which was made possible by the symbolic voice of the radio. Both 
processes are linked to the fetish object of the nation incarnated in the 
voice. According to Zizek, the formula of fetishism is "I know, but 
nevertheless... " (1996: 245). The formula is differently interpreted in 
17 He said, "You would be amazed by those letters that came from the listeners. All kinds 
of complaints, from their husbands, sons or mother-in laws ... 
Some would write pages just 
because of a pimple.. Some complain of their landlords or neighbours... " "Evin Saati 
Muharriri Dr. Galip Ataq'la Bir Saat", Radyo, Vol. 1, No. 9,15 August 1942, p. 9. 
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the two cases above. Selim Sirn's attitude seems to fall within, what 
Zizek calls, a totalitarian framework of authority which would say: 
"Although 'we know very well' that we are people like others 
-at the same time consider ourselves to be 'people of a 
special mould, made of special stuff' -as individuals who 
participate in the fetish of the Object-Party, direct 
embodiment of the Will of History. " (Zizek, 1996: 252) 
On the other hand, Ataq preserved and expressed a distance 
towards the symbolic fiction of the Other by his cynical attitude (also 
by not reading his talks himself). His distanced attitude puts the 
symbolic fiction of the Other (the notion of the people) under question. 
The actual audience that he despised stands in contradiction to the 
idealised image of the audience. Yet, what was never put into 
question is the idea that the elite was made of "special stuff" (in 
having access to Western culture), in Zizek's words. This points to the 
slippery ground of political subjectivity in the Occidentalist framework, 
which oscillated between a serious faith in the national ideal and a 
sarcastic distanced attitude towards it, which nevertheless made of 
itself a fetishistic object expressed in the "voice" of radio. More 
importantly, it points to the nature of the self-disciplining activity of the 
elite that treats its own subjectivity as a national object ; that attempts 
to curb the lack of faith in itself but paradoxically finds pleasure in its 
expressions. It is no surprise that "vulgarisation" and "glorification" 
were simultaneous strategies and were praised by the same people, 
at the same time. Indeed, it is possible to argue that the kind of 
authority that emerges, in this case, stands detached from its subject. 
It nurtures both its subject and its object. It is pedagogical -it 
understands, forgives, mocks and educates. Although regarded as 
"fatherly" it resembles a maternal authority that attends to the bodies 
and all the "trivial" topics associated with it. 18 The maternal authority 
resides in the voice; encompasses and transforms all the conflicts, all 
the divisions and splits of both the subject and the object. It alludes to 
18 Lacey argues that the history of radio "had been the history of a development away 
from intellectualism to maternalism" which resonates in dialogue, drama and human 
interest. She also links this to the location of radio in the home, its intimate address, its 
sensory appeal, which grounds radio in the female realm. In Nazi Germany radio's true 
spirit was Muttergeist. (Lacey, 1993: 118-9). 
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the symbolic fiction of the nation but retains, within itself, the pre- 
linguistic immediate and "pure" enjoyment (not always making 
meanings but sometimes playing with the words, as a child will play 
with objects of pleasure). This I argue, is linked to the inability of the 
elite to recognise their "true" place in the world, to the disavowal of 
reality which is full of threats, to being forever trapped in youth. The 
content of the radio talks endorse the above argument.. 
I will now look at the recurring themes in the talks. These can be 
grouped in categories such as: the family, the body, the child, the 
youth/ideal, joy, and women. 
a. The Family 
The nuclear family was promoted in several talks in opposition to 
the traditional forms of extended family. Thus, the roles of the women 
and the men were redefined through radio talks. While the role of the 
new women were put in more ambivalent terms, which will be 
analysed in more detail under the heading of "women", the tasks 
awaiting the new men were set more clearly. Selim Sirri reminded 
men that the age of the "dictatorship" of the father was over. In the old 
times, men were absent in the private sphere leaving many duties, 
such as child care to women; "children could put their demands to 
their father only through the mediation of the mother" (1932: 212). 
Now this had to change, the new family should be based not only on 
respect but also "love" among its members. According to Duru, both 
men and women had "duties" in the family, which was directly linked 
to the nation. While women "naturally" had more compassion for their 
children, and men lacked it, men had to educate themselves in order 
to become good fathers. "We" he says "lack the art of fatherhood" (43). 
A good father was one "who thought of the child more than himself; 
who wanted the child to be better than himself; and who tried to learn 
his duties and fulfilled them. " (Duru, 1937: 8) (emphasis added) In the 
same manner, the mother had to learn to combine her "instinctual 
motherly love" with "virtues of social motherhood". Because Duru 
continues, "the family is the smallest cell of the society", and the 
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"health of the nation" rises upon the health of the family. Turkish 
society, according to him, lacks a "scientific and civilised" family. The 
same theme rebounds in Atag's talks: "What we call the people is 
made up of families. If we compare the people to an organism, 
families are the cells. " (1943: 52) 
It is interesting that fatherhood as well as motherhood were 
redefined as objects of national discipline in the radio talks. 19 It is 
known that totalitarian regimes, such as Nazis, invested mothers with 
national duties through radio broadcasting (Lacey, 1993) which in 
turn contributed to a "science" of motherhood. But Turkish Radio also 
put emphasis, sometimes more distinctly, on men's duties. Men, it was 
argued, should assume their role in the private sphere as part of their 
public duties. The most explicit challenge in this is to the Islamic 
traditions which privileged men's duties in the public community, 
which gave them rights to marry up to four women as well as 
entrusting the responsibilities of child care and domestic life to 
women. The segregation of women and men, and consequently of the 
public and the private were to be reorganised in the ideal "civilised" 
national life. The first thing to be attended for this end, was correcting 
the indulgent sexual behaviour of men, orienting and re-educating 
them for family life. 
Men had to be made responsible for family life. "Men and women 
have duties for the family, for each other as well as for the country. " 
(Ertug, 1945: 29) In the Turkish family (the re-invented tradition 
against the Ottoman family) "the proud, influential man cares for his 
wife, for the children ... puts all his effort in them. " (Ertuý, 1945: 35) This 
does not mean "a henpecked husband" adds Ertuý, which had been 
a fearful label for men in Ottoman life. The justification of the new role 
lies in a "civilised" family. Although, many radio talks insisted on the 
changes that men had to undergo in family life, the change was 
essentially linked to the stable figure of women. Women who just had 
19 In the first decades of the Turkish Republic, certain aspects of Ottoman patriarchy were 
condemned; "the remote, authoritarian father figure began giving way to a new intimacy 
and paternal involvement. " (Kandiyoti, 1997a: 123) Kandiyoti adds to her previous point 
in a recent text: "We have to entertain the possibility that defining responsible social 
adulthood in terms of monogamous heterosexuality may not only have been a matter of 
proscribing co-wives, concubines, and child brides but may also have been about taming 
other, unruly forms of male sexuality. " (1998: 280) 
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to integrate the social and national duties to their already positive 
"sacrificial, compassionate, giving" roles, were entrusted the duty to 
look over men's new roles. "if women did her best at home, took care 
of its cleanliness, its order, and trusted her husband, supported and 
motivated him in his efforts, then why should a man go astray? " 
(Ertuý, 1945: 37) The man was put under women's supervision in his 
transformation. 
Dr. Ertug in his "Sunday Chats" also presented psychological 
explanations for the ongoing problems in the family. He contrasted a 
notion of love in men which sought "unattainable" objects and found 
expression in old Ottoman poems with the more mature love in the 
family life. Love in the new family life meant order and integrity. It was 
blended with the national "mission". He referred to Freud to account 
for the common "bride" and "mother-in-law" conflict. He argued it was 
due to "subconscious" reasons that the wife and the mother competed 
for the same man. He suggested that they should not live in the same 
place. This was a suggestion that went against the tradition of big 
families. Dr. Ataq provided another "scientific" framework to argue that 
love between man and wife was the most developed form of love. 
Against the "superstitious belief in Turkey that love brings bad luck to 
marriages", he claimed love between man and wife, although different 
from "great love" or "sexual love" was nevertheless love: a social 
bonding which rises upon natural laws. He referred to the role of 
"hormones" which may, due to their "complexities", cause problems in 
a marriage. For example, the reason for extramarital tendencies of 
men was their hormones were too complex (1943: 97). 
In both cases, we see that new "scientific" discourses were 
employed to explain traditional ills. The new family life was linked to 
principles, different from traditional and religious ones, concerning 
individual psychology and biology. However, the new discourses did 
not envisage radical changes in the society but just a revival of 
"Turkish family" life with new roles for men and additional tasks for 
women. The treatment of the "family" in radio talks can be 
summarised in three points: 1) radio was thought to intervene in the 
private sphere, re-defining the boundaries between the private and 
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the public; 2) men were entrusted with new duties in the private 
sphere as part of their public mission, 3) women were called to duty to 
take care of men, to understand and support them in their difficult task 
of change. 
b. The Body 
Selim Sim's many talks were devoted to the importance of "body" 
in national education. He used several metaphors for the human 
body. One was "machine". He talked of the "motor" in the child. In a 
similar fashion, he saw old age caused by the "improper working" of 
the machine(1932: 70). At other points, he mentioned the body 
resembling a plant. "A child is like a plant", he said, while "the school 
is the garden, and the educators are the gardeners. " (14) Another 
metaphor for the body was "army". He talked of the army of the body 
with the head as commander and other organs as officers (68). All 
these contradictory metaphors made sense only in the context of 
educating and disciplining the body. Whatever the metaphor, the 
body was something to be constructed -to be built, to be grown up. It 
was an instrument that aided the struggle for civilisation. "Physical 
education is both a social and a national issue, a vital one. To take 
care of the education of the body is a national duty for those who love 
their country". (116) 
He talked of the importance of "food", "air", "water", "sunshine" 
and "sports" as basic elements that nurtured the body. He gave 
several examples from Western life styles and Western thinkers to 
support his points. For example, he referred to Europeans and 
Americans who, because they had understood the value of fresh air, 
kept their windows open all the time, did sports and went on walks. 
"They do not stay inside, at home or at coffee houses, spending all 
their time talking". (73) The relation to nature, fresh air in this case, 
was articulated in terms of a life style; the Western one was praised 
and the Turkish one was denigrated. Selim Sirri thought that the 
Turkish life was "artificial": "We have moved away from nature. It is 
necessary to return to nature and know how to benefit its blessings. " 
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(97) So even natural life. had to be constructed in the Turkish life 
together with the body. 
Taking up a similar theme, Duru also talked on the importance of 
nature. He posited it as the source of all knowledge against 
"superstitions". Nature, according to him, provided the better means 
for education: "When we were children we were not very much 
interested in life. The children of today are closer to life and nature. 
They go out of their classrooms to have a walk in the green. " 
(1937: 67) Sports were something that all radio talks dwelled on. 
Using a "scientific" language, words such as " oxygen", "carbon 
dioxide", "ultra-violet" and "infrared" rays, Dr. Kamay made ample 
reference to the importance of sunshine and sports. The stadium was, 
according to him, the most valuable kind of school. He said that the 
spread of sports activities in a nation was its "measure of civilisation 
and progress", and this was "a scientific, positive fact and principle. " 
(1941: 48) In a similar manner, he took eating habits to be a measure 
of "civilised" life. He talked about the role of vitamins, of fresh fruit and 
vegetables for healthy and efficient bodies. This, too was linked with a 
life style, the exemplary case being the Western one. In comparison 
with examples of Western cuisine, he argued, "(W)e too have to 
simplify our food which means that we have to make a revolution in 
our kitchens. " (70) 
The body appeared in these talk imbued with meanings: 1)The 
body was set as the site of the construction of national life; 2) the 
body was the smallest unit of discipline, and 3) the body was the 
measure of civilisation. 
c. The Child 
Child care, child education and pedagogy were the most 
common topics of the radio talks. The child became a special focus of 
attention in these years. This was in accord with the demands of the 
age: "never in humanity before children have attracted such 
attention". (Selim Sim, 1932: 11) This was the "age of the child". Selim 
Sim referred to Rousseau's Emile and several pedagogues in Europe 
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who had taken the child. as an object of analysis and discipline. 
Therefore, he argued along with the "question of economics" and the 
"question of women" there is a "question of the child". Selim Sim's 
talks concentrated on the examples of institutions for children, such as 
kindergartens in Germany, France, Italy and Hungary; on methods of 
discipline and education such as "boy scouts" developed in Britain. 
His primary arguments were: that "we do not give enough importance 
to children" (28); that children have a world of their own; and " we 
should stop making children like ourselves"(195). The third point is 
especially an important theme in his talks. In a talk called "The Future 
Children", he referred to a questionnaire directed to some French 
pedagogues and published in the journal Les Annales . One of the 
questions inquired about the specialists' own experience of childhood 
in comparison with the envisaged education of future children. While 
the French thinkers evaluated their childhood primarily in positive 
terms, Selim Sim said, if he were to reply the question, he would be 
critical of the form of discipline he experienced in his childhood: "I 
would definitely not give the same kind of education and discipline to 
my children. The old kind of discipline made people hesitant, timid 
and helpless. " (53) The harsh methods of older forms of discipline 
had to be replaced by dialogue and understanding; "to talk and to 
make children talk": "verbal communication" was the most powerful 
instrument. The fantasy that concerned the power of "talking" is a 
theme that recurs in other radio talks, and needs further comment in 
its connection to the medium of radio, which I will come back to later 
in the chapter. 
The pedagogical methods that were suggested in child care and 
discipline made it clear that this was a "national" issue. "Every child" 
said Duru, "is a national being. " He, too, referred to Rousseau's 
Emile and to other philosophers, such as Montaigne's and Spencer's 
works. He claimed that the best of contemporary European 
pedagogues were, at the same time, medical doctors. 20 His 
diagnosis, as a doctor, of the "child problem" in Turkey pointed to the 
lack of institutions and means that would secure a "separate world" for 
20 Dr. Ertug, in his talks, also mentioned the importance of the medical doctors in "seeing 
through" people (1945). 
205 
the child; and to the hars. h and authoritarian methods of discipline 
which were heritages of the old regime. Hence the new methods 
symbolised the new order in Turkey. He suggested that the People's 
Houses could be the locations for bringing together the Turkish 
mothers and creating a new atmosphere for children. 21 At some 
points the notion of the child was equated with the new nation itself, 
which found its expression in statements such as: "The victory of 
humanity will be completed by the victory of the children. " (Duru, 
1937: 16) 
The idea that child care is, by itself, a new science was a 
common theme in the talks. The child was redefined as a new object 
of discipline: 1) it was regarded as a symbol for the future with a clear 
break from the past, 2) it was treated as a symbol of the nation, 3) 
"scientific" child care and discipline were posed as the necessary 
conditions of civilisation. 
d. Youth 
Another common theme in the talks was the emphasis on 
"youth" and related themes such as resisting old age, preservation of 
health and beauty. These themes were significantly linked to the 
national ideal. As opposed to the Islamic ideas of fate, and the 
mortality of man in relation to God, nationalist discourse praised the 
values of youth and the will power to stay young. In his talk, "The 
Hints for Staying Young" Selim Sim said that "youth is a privilege, an 
honour" as well as being "the happiest stage of life" (1932: 64-65). 
Before revealing the secrets for staying young in his talk, he reminded 
the listeners to make their pen and paper ready to note down 
"important" hints, but what followed was an abstract argument 
instead of practical hints. "To get old means dying little by little each 
day. Then what does one should do not to die? "(66) The answer was: 
21 It is interesting that it was one of the principles of the People's Houses not to admit 
little children to meetings: "There will be no little children in the meetings and 
performances in the People's Houses. Since the goal of the People's Houses is the high 
ideal of development (training, growing up are other meanings of the word used 
"yeti§me"), children who would disturb the silence and the order should not be given place 
in our Houses". CHP Halkevleri 6jreneji, 1935, Ankara, p. 22. Real "children" and the 
idealised notion of the child contradicted each other in practice. 
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"a continuous struggle". He introduced the "army" as a metaphor for 
the body in that context. In his subsequent talks he finally mentioned 
the "essential" factors that contributed to staying young: fresh air, food, 
water, sunshine, and sports. It is striking that the emphasis on youth 
had a naive implication that death can be avoided. Old age meant, 
according to him, that the body (the machine) was not working 
properly. Therefore, if the machine was taken good care of, old age, 
and consequently death could be avoided. He cited a phrase that 
"people do not die but they slowly commit suicide". (70) 
Dr. Kamay took up the same question, a decade after, in his talk, 
"Youth and Old Age": "Is it possible to stay young and not get old? " 
(1941: 60) He argued that it was: "Science and experience have 
shown us that it is possible to postpone old age; stay young for a long 
time; and when finally old age arrives, to be still robust by abiding to 
the principles of health, by disciplining the soul and the body, by 
avoiding debauchery and bad habits, and by practicing rules of 
hygiene. It is even in our capacity to make life longer. " (60) This was 
possible just by resisting the intake of "poisons". His definition of old 
age was the slow and constant poisoning of the blood. He, too, 
believed in the maxim that "Human beings don't die but they kill 
themselves". (61). If people could say no to alcohol and tobacco, if 
they took care of their bodies, if they could be happy, and if they could 
keep their "psychology strong" by keeping away from "psychological 
ills and deficiencies" (63) then they could stay young. The desirable 
examples were to be found in Europe and America; the Westerners, 
by the help of the "progress of civilisation", and of the "progress in 
health" specifically, had been able to reduce the "death rate" (61). 
The idea of staying young found its most absurd expressions in 
Dr. Atag's talks. After receiving a letter of complaint from his female 
listeners that he primarily talked on issues concerning the young 
people, he devoted some of his talks to the particular "problem of 
staying young" that most women had. However, instead of the naive 
belief that old age can be postponed, he adopted a sarcastic style 
which made references to "appearing young" instead of actually 
"Staying young". He said, "women should make themselves appear to 
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be at the age that they want to be ... A life struggle for women is to 
resist old age". (1943: 33) He talked about the role and the history of 
make-up in civilisation as an antidote for old age. "it is a denial of 
civilisation" if one considered make-up as "artificial beauty". (34) He 
suggested to women that they should have their portraits painted 
around the age of 30. Keeping that on the wall of their grooming 
rooms, they should, by the help of make-up, try to create the same 
image on their faces in the years to come. Ataq, in this way, subtly 
mocked the women's so-called obsession of staying young. But he 
combined his mockery with some actual medical hints for hair and 
dental care. In his talks, like the others, youth was praised but it was 
expressed in a language that stood on the brink of "reality" and "non- 
sense". Therefore it is difficult to assess the seriousness of some of 
his hints, such as "you should not eat fish because then your skin will 
be like fish skin" (91), or "women who take arsenic will have a 
beautiful complexion and long and healthy hair" (92). He, like others, 
pointed to the importance of fresh air and a natural setting for beauty 
and youth, but his suggestion that people should live in villas in 
suburban areas, or if that was not possible, on the top floor of high 
buildings -so that they will have beautiful complexions and strong 
hearts- reflects an attitude that mocks both the issues touched upon 
and himself talking on them. Some topics that he chose to talk on, 
such as sneezing and the gender differences in sneezing, enhanced 
this ambivalent attitude. 
Atag's emphasis on youth provides another perspective in 
thinking about the youth and the ideal. Selim Sim talked about the 
ideal as a force that shaped the present . Youth had to have an ideal 
which will in turn give it a desired form. The analogy was with the 
sculptor carving out a piece of stone to bring out the idea or the ideal. 
He elaborated, in his talks, on the path to the ideal whose subject was 
the young people who stayed forever young. Ataq, on the other hand, 
mocked the ideal by trivialising or "vulgarising" it. The ideal was a 
desired, but once popularised and ferninised, also a disturbing theme 
in nationalist discourse that needs further reflection in relation to 
women's roles. 
208 
We see that in many talks there was a common emphasis on 
staying young. Youth was treated as 1) the present stage of the nation 
as well as the desired stage of life, the ideal, 2) death was denied in 
link to it, and 3) the methods of staying young were associated with 
the "progress of civilisation". 
Joy 
Turkish Radio often talked of the need to be happy and joyful in 
the period that I have researched. This was usually coupled with a 
diagnosis of a lack in Turkish society. "We Turks", said Selim Sirri, 
"are usually quiet, reserved, proud and a little melancholic. These 
characteristics are due to the kind of discipline and education that had 
been given to us. " (1932: 189) The nation, therefore, had to learn how 
to be joyful. "Joy" was a matter of "discipline and determination" (193). 
It had also beneficial effects on health and youth of the body. 
Dr. Ertuý, in his talk, "Be Joyful! " referred to the same deficiency 
in Turkish culture: "The real Turkish self, its happy, honey-tongued, 
optimistic characteristics had been deteriorated by those bigots who 
churned up the country in the name of religion. " (1945: 123) So, as 
opposed to the ills of the recent past, the present and the future had to 
be constructed on the basis of different sentiments. Serious and sober 
faces had to be replaced by those with a big smile. He admitted that 
the task was not that easy. The Turks were "constructing a new 
building on the ruins of the old. " (125) The stones for the new building 
were there; it was only a matter of creating the new cement that 
would glue them to each other. New sentiments, such as joy and 
optimism, were regarded as the cement of the society. This also made 
reference to the national cultural policies which despised alaturka 
music: "Don't try to entertain yourself, " said Ertuý, "with those songs 
that are full of sighs (ah, of, aman)" (127). Ertuý's positive examples 
came, non-surprisingly, from the West. Americans, for example, could 
even find joy in risks, they were imbued with courage and initiative 
which brought them success. Ertuý also linked joy and laughter with 
long life. 
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Ataq was more specific in his suggestions. He talked, in a 
mocking way, of the religious rites on religious holidays (which were 
boring and gloomy). He suggested, instead, that people should go to 
a theatre or a vacation on religious holidays. He advised secular 
forms of entertainment which were "civilised". However, he also 
warned against the dangers of the new forms of entertainment. 
According to him, movies, for example, could be harmful to children, 
therefore the potential dangers of the cinema should be countered by 
adults talking to children after seeing a movie. 
We see that while contemporary forms of entertainment 
(predominantly for men) such as sitting in coffee houses, drinking 
alcohol, listening to alaturka songs were denigrated in radio talks, 
instead, joy and happiness were praised as new national sentiments. 
However, the general absence of concrete suggestions for 
entertainment in the talks, gives these sentiments a symbolic 
character. They link to the ideal that is set in terms of a comparison 
with the West: in terms of what "we" lack and what "they" have. The 
construction metaphor used by Ertu6 makes it clear that the judge 
who will assess the desired changes will be those looking from 
outside: "Only those watching us from outside will see the difference 
(the difference between the past and the present). " (1945: 125) 
The new ideal sentiments of the nation, specifically joy, 
represented a change in the character of the people which was 
opposed to past characteristics ascribed to Turkish culture. Joy was 
regarded as, 1) an ideal sentiment of the nation, a sign of 
"civil isation", 2) as a signal of unified cooperation in the construction 
of the nation, 3) as a disavowal of reality that was stricken with 
problems and divisions. 
f. Women 
As I have shown in the section on the "family", the "problem of 
women" was the most complex issue addressed by the radio talks. 
There were a number of twists in handling the issue. On the one 
hand, women were seen to be a guarantor of "civil isation", in for 
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example Selim Sim's argument that women should take place in 
public life, thereby correcting the ills of the past order. 22 Women, on 
the other hand hand, were vested with "essential" duties in the private 
realm, the most important of which was motherhood. The two aspects 
had a critical balance. It is not mere coincidence that Selim Sirn 
referred to the image of the "double edged sword of civilisation" when 
he was talking on women and sports: "One should not forget that the 
arms of civilisation have double edges; using them is subject to 
knowledge. Otherwise they cut one's hands. " (1932: 142) It is also 
significant that he, who had preached European life styles regarding 
several other subjects, was cautious on the issue of women's public 
activities: "The worst thing in the world is to imitate others. 'American 
women do this, British girls do that ... so we have to do it ... What is our 
difference from thernT. I totally disagree with this claim. " (145) There 
appeared to be a dislike for a comparison with the West if it 
concerned women. 
Women were regarded as both the sign of change, and as the 
most stable factor in the society. A woman had to change without 
actually changing her primary position and roles. She had to show the 
world the "superior" civilised state of the Turkish nation23, but she also 
had to be altruistic, in Selim Sim's words, to be willing to give up, to 
sacrifice her individual ambitions. Selim Sim, in his talk "Women in 
the twentieth century", argued against European feminists, and 
warned the Turkish women against the dangers of "becoming like a 
man". If women competed with men, it could be detrimental to national 
life. However, he also argued for the education of girls. It was 
necessary for them to be good mothers and educators. In connection 
with this role, he praised womanhood: "Woman is like a sun which 
warms, illuminates and makes life. " (271) The woman was both a 
fearful and glorified figure. 
However, the boundary between the private and the public was 
22 For example, he linked the "sick" alaturka music to the fact that women were absent in 
the community life (Selim Sim, 1932: 271). 
23 According to Baltacioýlu, the rights given to women by the Turkish Republic symbolise 
the authenticity of the "Turkish Revolution" ; it shows that it is not a mere imitation of 
European societies. Ismail Hakki Baltacioýlu, "Yeni DevIetin KOItOr Programlan", Yeni 
Adam, Vol. 2, No. 66,4 April 1935. 
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not a simple line dividing motherhood and the public activities of 
women. The boundary was constantly problematised and re-drawn 
within the national project by the male elite. The private duties of 
women usually transcended the private domain. Women as mothers 
were treated almost like a collective political subject and given the 
national duty of realising the project of "Turkish motherhood". "Unite 
Turkish Mothers! " said Duru, "if you unite, your love will become a 
sacred power to which the whole world will bow. " (1937: 31) Public 
duties, on the other hand, were fashioned after the model of 
motherhood. Women were regarded as suitable for posts such as 
school teachers and nurses, since they had the "natural" 
characteristics of compassion and care. The "real" woman, in Ertug's 
words, was a dependable and powerful figure in the national life both 
as a mother, a wife, and a professional which could safeguard and 
nurture the nation. 
Sexuality, especially the sexual desire, of women was never 
mentioned in the radio talks. The subjectivity of women was denied. 
Nevertheless most of the radio talks addressed "feminine" issues 
such as hair care, beauty of the complexion and problems in the 
domestic sphere. Everyday life, which the radio talks felt that they had 
to touch upon, had a "feminine" character. 
"Women" figured in the national discourse conveyed by the 
radio talks as a complex and contradictory issue. 1) Women were 
glorified for their capacity for the "natural" national tasks, 2) women 
were set as objects to be kept under control against the "excesses" of 
"civilisation", 3) women became the "matter" of the radio talks, thereby 
contributing to the "feminisation" of culture. 
5.3. Nature, Culture and Civilisation 
The themes taken up by the radio talks between the early 30's 
and the late 40's in Turkish Radio provide rich material for thinking 
about the Occidentalist fantasy in Turkish nationalism. It becomes 
clear that Occidentalism did not simply mean, for the elite, a division 
between "us" and "them" (the West). The civilisation, represented by 
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the West, was imagined and linked to the Turkish nation in the most 
intricate ways. Several metaphors and operators were implemented 
in order to imagine and assume a homogeneous nation which was 
"genuinely" Turkish, and which rapidly bridged the gap with the West. 
The assumptions were enhanced by the medium of radio which 
talked to "the people". 
"Talking" was regarded as an efficient vehicle for making things 
happen. The emphasis on "talking" as one of the disciplinary methods 
of the new order, especially in the disciplining of the child, had 
analogies to radio as a talking apparatus. When Dr. Ataq suggested to 
parents to talk to their children after they had seen a movie to "correct 
and counter the harmful effects", the hidden reference was to his own 
talk which aimed to give the "correct" interpretations on matters of 
everyday life. Or when Dr. Ertug talked on the need to be joyful, he 
imagined the medium carrying the waves of joy : "I would very much 
like to send you effects through radio waves that would make you 
smile, that would make you forever happy. " (Ertuý, 1945: 124) In a 
similar manner, Duru believed if radio transmissions had a wider 
reception, "thousands of Turkish mothers would be activated by his 
words and take the initiative" for the "sacred unity of the Turkish 
mothers" (1937: 31). Selim Sirn ended his series of talks by a talk 
devoted to the question of "how to talk". He dwelled on the technique 
of talking, the articulation of words, pronunciation, style of delivery to 
make the point that talking should aim at "clarity, truth and beauty"; it 
should "convince, excite and make people think" (1932: 345). These 
concerns reflect a self-conscious attitude to the medium. Talking on 
radio (an ideal example of talking24 ) was thought to have automatic 
effects transforming the audience (except in the case of Ataq who had 
a less idealised vision of the audience). In this way, radio technology 
was conceived as an "extension" or an "apparatus" that constructed 
24 Dyson argues that "the ideal radio voice represents the world for the listener from the 
anechoic space of the studio -a space which acoustically is, in the jargon of sound 
technicians 'dead"'... Distortion and interference, on the other hand, suggest a reduction 
of presence through contact with the external world, by aurally evoking another place and 
time, the illusion that the voice is 'present' with the listener. Sound technology echoes 
these beliefs. in fact, the success of microphone design is measured in terms of the 
credibility of the presence it simulates, indicated by the clarity, the central stereophonic 
perspective, the volume, crispness and articulation of the voice it amplifies. " (Dyson, 1994: 
178,179) 
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and aggrandised the political subjectivity of the elite. The elite 
imagined themselves creating the nation in their own image by talking 
on radio. 
However, talking also conveyed "disturbances" which were 
produced at the points of contact with reality. Ataq knew that in a 
fifteen minute talk, the basics of child discipline could not get across to 
the audience (1943: 51). It was evident in Ertu6's and Duru's 
comments that radio broadcasting was limited both in its capacity to 
carry "joy" and in its geographical diffusion. "Disturbance" found its 
best example in Atag's talks, which mocked both its subject matter 
and himself talking on them. There were mismatches, that forced its 
way into the language, mismatches between the subject and the 
object of the nation despite the attempts to unify them in the act of 
talking. 
The mismatches usually surfaced themselves in the form of 
contradictions. Selim Sim, who was an admirer of subtle techniques 
of the Western discipline argued, in one of his talks that referred to 
German methods of education and discipline, that propaganda was 
not the best means of influencing children. "You are not supposed to 
lecture to children on how to love and defend their country. It is the 
nature of acts that they learn from. Children go around their country, 
visit its mountains, forests, rivers... and they love the beautiful country 
they have liked so much, and because of this love they undertake the 
mission of working and fighting for it. " (1932: 61-2) However, in his 
only talk that directly addressed children, he did just the opposite. He 
talked on the love of country and lectured on ways of conceptualising 
it (246). Hence, he couldn't bridge the gap between the act and the 
word. Primarily talking to the children in the big cities, he did not 
himself believe that they would ever go visiting around the country. 
And against this fact he chose to talk on the subject as a way of 
compensation, as a way of constructing the required "love" . 
The most apparent mismatch was in the case of women. The 
discourse that praised "civil isation" contradicted the discourse on 
harnessing the excesses of civilisation in the case of women. In a 
similar manner, the youth that was so praised in the talks was in no 
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way linked to the participation of young people in power. Children, 
who were posited as the future of the nation were, in practice, barred 
from many public activities, for example in the People's Houses. 
Therefore the most favourite subjects of the talks, children, youth and 
women, had more of a symbolic value than pointing to the actual 
objects of discipline. They acted as "operators" that linked the concept 
of "civil isation" to the Turkish national ideal. 
The "unity" posited in the ideal regarding the origins and the 
future of the nation was constructed in opposition to existing divisions. 
The divisions of ethnicity and language; the divisions between "the 
people" and the elite; between men and women; between the past 
and the present; and between the West and Turkey were to be 
handled and covered up in the assumed "unity" of the nation. Yet 
these divisions made their presence felt by forcing their way into the 
talks. 25 The radio talks had a dialogic character, in this sense; since 
they also talked to those concerns -regarding the divisions in the 
social- which the elite themselves were aware of but wished them 
away through their own activity. It is possible to point to several 
examples in the talks which were dialogically produced. 
Ethnic divisions were countered by the idea that the new 
principles of discipline and education could produce a "national 
character". Thus, "those remainders of communities, which lack 
history and culture, will be discouraged to stick to different 
identities ... then those people, whatever their origins are, will be united 
under the banner of Turkish nationalism. " (Duru, 1937: 72) The 
promotion of the best examples of Turkish language26, for example on 
radio, would contribute to this end for it would change the "souls" of 
the people. 
The division between men and women were handled again in a 
dialogic manner. Selim Sim responded to the "feminist" arguments 
2.5 Rose talks about the "moments of excess" in the case of "disavowal" which " always 
has something of the overstatement about it. " (1984: 37). 
26 Duru talked about "talking Turkish" that would not only influence "those remainders of 
other communities" but even "the foreigners, who would come running to learn our 
language, to know our culture. Then Turkish land would be the centre of the civilisation in 
the world. " (1937: 73) This links with the concerns of the elite, specifically regarding radio, 
of "making the world hear our voice. " It also links with the BBC Turkish Section's strategies 
that invested on this need to be heard and complimented. 
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that insisted on the equality of men and women. Arguing against 
these, he insisted on the "special" condition of women in Turkish 
society which gave a particular importance to motherhood. Indeed, 
Selim Sirn responded to several hidden worries and questions in his 
talks. The concern that "some say that we are not capable of 
progress" , which pointed to the division between the West and 
Turkey , was answered by examples from the West: "Great men" such 
as Edison, Wilson, Faraday or Rousseau who had a deprived 
childhood had succeeded through their will power (1932: 226,231-4). 
In this way, the internalised Orientalism, and the consequent feelings 
of inferiority of the Turkish people, were addressed. 
The comments on Turkish nationalism in the talks were also 
geared to respond to and interpret the "Western gaze". Duru argued 
that Turkish nationalism was not "monopolistic" like Western 
nationalisms, and this was a fact "whatever the foreigners and the 
enemies said" (1937: 71). Duru's words on Turkish national character, 
that it praised truth and reality, that it did not fall prey to mere illusions, 
sound defensive. And when he said that the Turks do not boast of 
their national characteristics at a point when he was boasting, his 
discourse becomes contradictory. This attitude, split between the 
internalised negative values ascribed by the West or by the projected 
Western gaze, and the positive values attached to Turkish nationalism 
was reflected in the ambivalence toward the West. The West, which 
had recently been an enemy in the national war was, at the same 
time, regarded as the model of civilisation. Duru's attempt to handle 
the ambivalence is significant: 
"Once, I too read that nationalistic poem against the West 
that went, 'I am a Turk and an enemy to you even if I were 
left alone in the world'... It was the Western imperialism that 
strove to destroy us, not the absolute West; but, who could, 
in those days of immense pains, differentiate the silent 
Western humanity from the mean Western imperialism? 
Today we are powerful; the imperialists who have failed to 
destroy us compete with each other to be our friends. " 
(1937: 74) 
The "Turk", against all pains and difficulties, created and 
empowered himself, according to Duru. The reference to the "Turk" 
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here reflects back on the talking subject. The elite, defined 
themselves as those who could create the "genuine" Turkish nation 
through their mastery of Western techniques and through their 
creativity. However, in order to project their self-image to the nation, 
by containing its divisions and assuming a purity, they had to go 
through several mediations. So that they can make themselves 
believe in the project, and be convinced to love their new missions. 
The point that I have made before, that the radio talks were mainly 
addressed to the elite themselves finds support in Selim Sim's 
statement: "... excitement is an electric power that agitates the whole 
nation. But that current should, first, be wound around the spool ... In 
order to convince others one should first be convinced himself. " 
(1932: 197-8) 
The mediating concepts or the operators were necessary to 
postulate the "unity" of the nation, in time and space. The elite 
traveled through these to arrive at the equation of the subject and the 
object, that is, their own political subjectivity and the nation. The 
images of civilisation, culture and nature were deployed to link the 
real and the ideal. As I have shown, the body was regarded as the 
site of construction of the nation in the radio talks. However the body 
was paradoxically both a natural and cultural territory. It provided a 
natural resource which had to be culturally processed in order to be 
"naturally" linked to the nation. The nature of the body was conceived 
in cultural metaphors, while culture was fixed in imaginary "natural" 
origins. The nation, therefore, was both a given (a natural resource) 
and something to be constructed. Construction was set in terms of 
education and discipline. This resembles the formula that Rousseau 
has presented in Emile (which was often cited by the radio talks in 
Turkish Radio). Rousseau saw education as something that gives 
back to culture the nature it has destroyed (Rose, 1984: 44). But the 
paradox of Rousseau's work lied in the fact that "the recreation of a 
natural man can only be a highly artificial process", which meant that 
nature "is not something which can be retrieved, it has to be added. " 
(Rose, 1984: 44) 
The "natural" supplement to culture came through the categories 
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of the child, youth and women in Turkish national discourse. These 
categories were treated as essential and natural depositories of truth 
which could by-pass the contradictions and divisions of the existing 
culture. Curiously, they symbolised the origins, the present and the 
future of the nation at the same time. They symbolised the ideals of 
the elite (immortality, joy, innocence, love and care), and were 
regarded as an antidote to the degeneration of the past order (since 
they belonged to nature and therefore existed partly out of culture). 
The way culture was contrasted to nature, however, significantly 
diverges from "the conventional Western symbolisation" (Strathern, 
1995a: 189). According to Strathern, the Western symbolisation of 
culture and nature indicates an opposition that works within a logic of 
control and colonisation. Nature is regarded as something to be acted 
upon, while culture is an artifice. But culture is legitimised by being 
grounded in nature and natural differences. Gender, according to 
Strathern, plays an important role in this legitimisation. It acts as an 
operating agent that grounds culture in nature. 
But the Turkish national discourse, conveyed by radio 
broadcasting, articulated a different matrix. Culture as the domain of 
national "authenticity", and embodied in the elite was fixed and could 
not be dealt with in a reflective attitude. The artificiality of culture, 
including the arbitrariness of language (even more so because of the 
new language imposed by the elite by the Language Reform) was 
treated as non-problematic. Rousseau's skepticism toward language 
ii as a flaw on the world which breaks up the essential continuity of 
nature and damages our relationship to it" (Rose, 1984: 46) was not 
shared by the Turkish elite. They considered language and talking as 
efficient means of constructing the ideal. On the other hand, the 
concept of nature was problematised. Turkish nature had to be 
reconstructed upon a new model; hence, the references to the body 
and Turkish characteristics. Nature was seen through the eyes of the 
Western civilisation, which had ascribed and fixed "natural differences 
and deficiencies" in it. Turkish nature had to be cultivated along the 
principles of the Western civilisation. Therefore, what was contrasted 
to each other was not nature and culture, but nature and civilisation. 
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Civilisation was treated as. a technique, as an apparatus or a leverage 
that would trigger the dynamics of change and transform the natural 
realm, the children, the women, and the youth, bridging the gap with 
the ideal. Culture, on the other hand, lacked any kind of inherent 
dynamic. It was reduced to the activities of elite, to talking, to will 
power. It lacked any spatial or temporal dimensions, especially in the 
case of radio. It was thought as immediate and directly embodied in 
the subjectivity of the elite. 
But from another aspect, Turkish national discourse operated 
within Rousseau's paradox. If nature was something to be 
constructed it could not be retrieved. It could only be added to 
legitimise culture, to encompass and absorb what is arbitrary within a 
universal system. The "natural supplements" that mediated between 
the subject and the object of the nation stood paradoxically as the 
images of the ideal. In this way, the culture was distanced from the 
elite's immediate actions, and were infantilised and ferninised as an 
outcome of the maneuver that contrasted nature and civilisation. The 
elite, unwillingly (against their assumed authority positions) identified 
themselves as "forever young" sons of the nation which was a mother 
to all. 27 In their projection of the "mass" and the "ideal" in radio 
broadcasting, they inserted "female characteristics" into the activities 
of the public domain. 28 This was coupled by the "feminine" 
iconography of the regime. 29 A parallel national iconography was 
27 1 use the term "unwillingly" here, because contrary to Renan's welcomed idea of the 
"will to nationhood" in Turkey, the national identity was a product of a complicated 
process. In Bhabha's terms, "identification of the subject of cultural discourse is dialogical 
or transferential in the style of psychoanalysis. It is constituted through the locus of the 
Other which suggests both that the object of identification is ambivalent, and, more 
significantly, that the agency of identification is never pure or holistic but always 
constituted in a process of substitution, displacement or projection. " (1990: 313) 
28 Lacey points to a very similar process in German Radio, starting from the Weimar 
period. (1993: 35) 
29 "in the first decades of the republic, the modernity of the new state was most 
eloquently signaled through images of women that became central to the iconography of 
the regime. " (Kandiyoti, 1997a: 125) 
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centred around the children. 30 The infantilisation and feminisation of 
culture were determined by the Occidentalist framework that 
circumscribed the process of the identification of the subject, and the 
definition of the object of the nation with reference to a Western 
model. The national ideal, through the aid of the techniques of the 
Western civilisation, was invested in the symbols of the child and the 
woman. This gave radio its distinct maternal authority. In the following 
chapter, I will analyse some examples of radio drama, especially 
those labeled as "domestic drama", to further explicate the 
connections between gender and the nation, and the maternal 
authority of the Turkish radio in the Occidentalist fantasy. 
Ju Not only the day the national parliament was founded was turned in a national 
children's holiday (23 April), and children were symbolically linked to the nation in many 
other events and performances, there was also an analogy of the child and the nation in 
the national discourse. Nafi Atif said in an article on discipline and education, in the 
People's Houses' main journal Olkii, that the new pedagogical views treated the child as 
separate from the adult, and not as a "smaller version of the adult". He argued that this 
perception implicated an analogy to Turkish nation. " Turkish nation, by severing itself 
from all the ties that hindered its survival and growth, is getting ready to show the 
originality of its body (constitution). " "Terbiye Anlayqnda ilerleyi§", Olkii, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
February 1933, p. 127. It is interesting that the originality of Turkish nation was fixed in its 
childhood, which was nevertheless inferior to adulthood. 
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The "magical door" of radio drama in the studio of Ankara Radio. 
(Radyo 
, 1/8: 14,15 July 1942) 
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CHAPTER 6 
Radio Drama: Gender and the Fantasy of the Nation 
I have pointed in the previous chapter to the conceptual matrix 
within which radio talks figured as part of the highly valued "verbal 
programmes" on Turkish Radio. Drama was another important, if not 
the sine qua non, feature of Turkish radio broadcasting since its 
national isation. Drama was regarded as especially an advantageous 
form through which national ideas could be transmitted in a "lively" 
style. But to the extent that radio drama moved "between dream and 
reality, the inner world of the mind and the outer world of concrete 
objects" (Esslin, 1980: 184) they have led to "framing errors" (Crisell, 
1994: 162). This not only occurred on the part of the audience, as it 
happened in Britain or the USA such as "sending flowers to the studio 
after the death of a character in a soap opera" (Crisell, 1994: 162), but 
also on the side of the radio staff in Turkey. An actor's memoirl from 
the beginning of the 1940s is striking. During the broadcast of a radio 
drama when, in the opening of the play an officer starts criticising the 
army in a bar , some "men" rushed to the control room of Ankara 
Radio to stop the transmission. Despite the fact that the play had been 
submitted to the control of the Ministry of Press and Publications, and 
even to the General Staff before, those in charge of censorship in 
Ankara Radio could not wait to see the twist of the story which was 
about an officer who pretended to be in opposition to Turkish army to 
trap some secret agents. So even the radio staff had "framing errors". 
Fiction and reality came closest to meeting in radio drama. 
If the BBC Turkish Service saw news programmes as essentia12 
to its manufacture of "truth", Turkish Radio, on the contrary, resorted 
to fantasy as a means of representing and safeguarding the national 
1 Ankara Radio Sound Archives, "Radyo Anilan" , Elgin Temel, TRT Radio Programme. 
2 In a document called "Post-War Broadcasting in Turkish", Mitchell stresses that "the 
primary appeal of our broadcasts will continue to lie in their news content. " The BBC 
Written Archives, 20 October1944, E1/1259/2. 
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truth. 3 It is interesting that - the BBC only repeated4 what was obvious 
for Turkish broadcasters in 1966, in its reply to the Turkish 
broadcasters' request of information on "educational programmes". 
The BBC advised the dramatic form: "A good deal of the Drama output 
presents contemporary social problems in a way calculated to lead to 
discussions. "5 The BBC, in the previous years, though aware of the 
appeal of dramas for Turkish broadcasting, had been skeptical about 
their quality. 6 Nevertheless, whatever their quality was, radio dramas 
and the dramatic form were at the foreground of cultural and 
educational programmes, since the beginning of the 40's. 
Then the question arises: Why was fantasy privileged to "factual" 
output -such as the domestic news and features programmes or 
documentaries- in Turkish radio broadcasting? Or to put it in other 
words, why was the tendency to take fantasy for reality? In this 
chapter I analyse the dramatic form of representation on Turkish 
Radio to reflect back on the questions raised before. That is: what do 
the fantasies staged in radio dramas convey about the elite's 
conceptual isation of the nation and the West ? And how are these to 
be linked to the gendered representations of "civil isation", regarding 
technology, bodies, space and time? Finally, what do they tell us 
about Occidentalism and governmental ity? 
I have shown that the format of the radio talk allowed its "author- 
speakers" an extended authority -supplemented by the technology of 
sound production- which equated talking with making things happen. 
The body was posited as the site of national construction in a matrix of 
3 Although the news and the news programmes consisted approximately 60% of verbal 
programmes in the 40's, the amount of domestic news, features and documentaries were 
negligible in comparison to foreign news (Kocabaýoglu, 1980: 224). 
4 In 1949, the BBC had sent a copy of "The Right Way to Radio Play Writing" (as it 
appears in the archive document. The name of the book should be How to Write 
Broadcast Plays, 1932) by Val Gielgud (with the author's autograph on the first page) to 
Ankara Radio upon its request for information on radio dramas. The BBC Written 
Archives, 24 November 1949, E1/1258. 
5 The BBC Written Archives, 21 March1966, From: Donald Stephenson, To: Adnan 
Oztrak, El/2,432/1. 
6 An audience research of the BBC Turkish Service in 1948 stated that there was "some 
demand for plays, although the vagueness of the suggestions shows that many listeners 
are not accustomed to this form of entertainment. " The suggestions ranged from "village 
and family plays" to "vaudevilles, comedies" and Hamlet. These reflected, according to the 
BBC, the nature of the drama output on Turkish Radio. BBC Written Archives, 15 March 
1949, "BBC Eastern Services Bi-Monthly Service Report", E1/1257. 
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nature vs. civilisation. The. national ideals that portrayed "a union with 
the world" were grounded in "natural" categories such as children, 
youth and women. I have discussed that the outcome of this was the 
infantilisation and ferninisation of culture to the extent that the elite 
positioned themselves as the "sons of the nation". Here, I investigate 
more deeply both the institutional and psychological aspects of this 
subject-position of the elite in relation to the fantasies of the nation. 
First, I discuss the specific characteristics of drama on radio, 
which give the dramatic form a special status in comparison to stage 
drama: a soundscape that substitutes a landscape, and which also 
evokes an imaginary public. This I position within the institutional 
framework of Turkish Radio which privileged the dramatic form in 
educational and cultural programming during the 1940s. The 
accounts of the production of plays and the regulation of their subject- 
matter in these years provide a general framework within which the 
fantasies, both in their form and content, can be interpreted. 
Then, I go on to analyse the gendered characteristics of the 
dramas, especially what Turkish broadcasters called "family" or 
"domestic" drama. Here I discuss the centrality of women for national 
signification, discussed by several contemporary social researchers 
in its various aspects (Armstrong, 1982; Chatterjee, 1993b; Enloe, 
1989; Kandiyoti, 1989; 1991; 1993; 1996; 1997a; Yuval-Davis, 1997; 
Yuval-Davis&Anthias, 1989; Jayawardena, 1986). Women symbolised 
the "border guards" (Armstrong, 1982) or were treated as the "liminal 
case" of national identity (Norton, 1988) in Turkey. They were 
incorporated to the national project both as part of the national 
iconography and objects of control, but were excluded as subjects. 
Thus, Occidentalism made a significant reference to the role of "the 
woman" in its boundary management. 
Third, I link the constructions of gender in drama to the gendered 
constructions of change and stability. In this section, I analyse two 
radio dramas which are significant examples of "realistic" portrayals of 
man and woman in family life, as opposed to the naive symbolism 
often seen in other radio dramas of the period. These convey the role 
of women in a more complex dramatic action. They also bring to view 
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the splits of men in relation to women. Here it is possible to detect the 
significations of stability and change, imagined in terms of 
dichotomies -man/woman, urban/rural, past/present, Western/Turkish, 
in their link to the national discourse. 
The dichotomies represented through gendered terms and 
conceived within the immediate "national time" bear on the 
subjectivity of the elite. The representation of women, as well as the 
more general representation of the people, tell us more about those 
who produce these categories than the referent of the categories 
themselves. What Jordanova argues for the Enlightenment 
dichotomies of women and men, and nature and culture in the West, 
in terms of their significance for expressing the "interests of the small 
but influential elite which generated the literature"7 (1995: 64) holds 
true for this case too. Therefore, through the analysis of gendered 
dichotomies I arrive at the dynamics and tensions that make-up the 
subjectivity of the national elite given the lack of fit between 
experiences and representations. Radio technology, in this context, 
appears not as a means of a communication system but as a tool that 
facilitates the reproduction of political power. This also bears on the 
rationale of governmentality in early Turkish history which makes 
reference to a modern discourse of power but, at the same time, 
dialogically situates itself in opposition to the sway of modern 
organisational or "communicational" forms, on which I will be 
commenting in the concluding chapter. 
6.1. The Blind Medium of Radio Drama 
Radio drama was seen as a problematic form when it was 
introduced in the initial years of radio broadcasting in many countries. 
It took classical stage drama as its model but actually fell short of the 
model, for it lacked the visual elements and the public audience that 
characterised stage drama. In Britain, for example, radio drama did 
not acquire the status of art on its own for a long time, and was not 
7 Jordanova treats the Enlightenment in Europe as "a programme of reform to create a 
universe which did not yet exist. Nor did it or could it ever exist. The normative intentions 
and the stereotyped categories bore little relationship to the messiness and programmatic 
complexity of lived experience for the majority of the population. " (1995: 64) 
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taken seriously by literary and art critics, partly due to its "blind" 
medium, and partly because it belonged to "popular culture" as 
opposed to the high culture of theatre (P. Lewis, 1981). Lewis argues 
that the importance and the original possibilities of radio drama (not 
radio drama) were not acknowledged until the 60's in the BBC. But he 
notes, "once we place the BBC in a world context we immediately 
recognise how fortunate we have been and still are. " (1981: 4) The 
BBC, according to Lewis represents "the strongest traditions of radio 
drama in the world ... perhaps even the best. " (7) So, although the BBC 
did not experiment with the possibilities of the medium for a long time, 
unlike the German development of Hdrspiel (which privileged the 
aural instead of the visual and freed itself from the theatre) (Priessnitz, 
1981: 32), the BBC is still considered to have set the canon of radio 
drama. 8 
A comparative look at the BBC and Turkish Radio in the 40's 
shows that the BBC was exclusively dependent on "classical" drama 
for its radio drama output9 , whereas in Turkey, in the same years, 
radio drama was treated on its own within the Drama Department 
producing a large number of plays specifically written for radio 
besides a number of adaptations or broadcasts of stage dramas. 10 
Furthermore the dramatic form was "applied" to "educational verbal 
programmes" which ran as series and centred around domestic and 
8 Peter Lewis reminds us that the BBC is not the norm and we should look for other 
experiences, for example, North America and Australia, but it is implied in his complaints 
about the lack of interest for studying radio drama in Britain that the BBC is the canon: 
"None of the people one might expect to be sufficiently enthusiastic about the subject to 
research it and write about it -dramatic critics, literary scholars, cultural historians, 
sociologists of the mass media- have shown much interest in it, especially in Britain, even 
though BBC Radio has serious claims to provide the best radio service in the world and is 
the envy of many countries. It is therefore extremely ironic that scholars from Germany, 
which also has very high standards of broadcasting, should have not only spearheaded 
the academic study of British radio drama but also virtually monopolised it until very 
recently. " (1981: 1) 
9 The BBC Drama Department mostly broadcast stage plays with the aim of "taking the 
theatre to the people. " It acted, in Priessnitz's terms as a "National Repertory Theatre of 
the Air". (Priessnitz, 1981: 32). 
10 Radio dramas consisted up to 80% of all cultural programmes of Ankara Radio in the 
40's. They were subject to heavy censorship before they went on air. Between 1941 - 
1942, of 654 plays that arrived only 75 were considered as proper for radio broadcasting 
(Kocabaýoglu, 1980: 231). 
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everyday subjects. 11 At. this point, the comparison with the BBC 
indicates another significant aspect. It was the Features Department, 
not the Drama Department in the BBC which experimented with the 
dramatic form in the medium of radio12 (Priessnitz, 1981: 34). Much 
of its output was in the form of "imaginative documentaries" 13 
(P. Lewis, 1981: 7) rather than radio plays. In Turkish Radio, however, 
there is no data to show the presence of documentaries in the 40's; 
most of the dramatic output was in the form of radio drama or 
educational dramatic series or "sketches" which were based on 
fiction. So the contrast which singles out in the medium of radio 
seems to be between reality as fiction in the BBC and fiction as reality 
in Turkish Radio. Known that during the war the feature was regarded 
as a "publicity weapon"14 the same contrast can be observed in the 
strategies of the BBC Turkish Service and Turkish Radio. 
The dramatic form that is peculiar to the medium of radio exhibits 
some characteristics that are worthy of interest. The long debates on 
the problems of the specific genre of radio drama conveys how 
closely drama has been associated with spectacle or with "ostention" , 
in Crisell's words (1994). Ostention seems impossible in radio drama 
which, in resorting to words and sounds only, codifies the visual 
through the auditory. This situates radio drama in the realm of make- 
11 "Kimgil Ailesi" and "Rekt6ron Odacisi" were two prominent dramatic series of 
"educational" character. The former was a 20 minutes series broadcast every Sunday at 
21: 00. It was based on a life story of a large typical middle class family (written by Neriman 
Hizir, a psychologist educated in the USA and also the producer of children's 
programmes on radio) and dealt with everyday problems of family life. The latter, written 
by V&IA Nureddin, took as its hero an uneducated porter which worked for a president of 
a university and represented the "authentic", intuitive, simple and true knowledge of the 
11 ordinary" people in an environment of "high" culture. 
12 The Features Department of the BBC set up an experimental studio to explore the 
specific expressive possibilities of radio. This was stimulated by the Columbia 
Broadcasting System's Columbia Workshop (Priessnitz, 1981: 34). 
13 For a detailed account of features and social documentaries on the BBC, see 
Scan nell&Cardiff (1991: 134-152). It shows how the novel concept of "actuality" and the 
stress on the "factual" are linked to the representation of "reality". In 1932, an article in 
Radio Times emphasised that "(N)ew techniques are needed, that do not rely simply on 
commentators, not to come between the real stuff and the listeners, but to help reality 
out. " (cited in Scannell&Cardiff, 1991: 145) However, the authors also demonstrate the 
procedures through which "reality" was processed according to a certain design. 
14 "We soon realized that one of the first jobs of the feature programme in wartime was to 
explain the enemy, to shake off the polite fictions of diplomacy, and to convert in the 
public mind 'leading figures of a friendly state' to the gangsters and assassins of a well- 
armed foe" Laurence Gilliam, "The radio documentary in wartime", BBC Yearbook 1945. 
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believe more so than stage dramas. Radio drama renders "a dream 
world without a consistent solid reality" (Gray, 1981). Thus the 
distinction between fact and fiction is blurred, which in turn gives the 
medium its original capacity to play with the fluidity of the concepts. 
What is evoked in radio drama is the imagination of the audience 
which attributes meanings more freely to what is heard compared to 
what is seen. Furthermore, the soundscape of the radio drama 
invades the private realm and can be more easily interiorised within 
the temporal and spatial confines of an everyday setting. Thus, the 
symbolic and indexical signification of sounds is immersed in a 
process of cultural familiarisation15 (Crisell, 1994). 
The producers in Turkish Radio were well aware of the 
characteristics of the "blind" medium. Both radio drama and 
"radiophonic" dramatic series were designed with an aim to 
encompass all those subjects on the national agenda ("literary, 
historical, social, moral, economic, hygienic, psychological, 
geological, etc.. "16 ) and render them intelligible for the mass 
audience in a non-pedantic style. Yet the ascribed "educational" 
values shadowed the artistic considerations in the production of radio 
drama. The subject-matter was of utmost importance and under strict 
control and censorship. 17 The elements that were censored varied 
from political opposition to obscenity, but also themes of suicide, 
anxiety, and all pessimist feelings were forbidden (Kocabaýoglu, 
1980: 231). 
The second concern was to make sure that radio drama 
addressed a mass audience. The "mass" character of the audience, in 
a way, justified the selection of topics for drama. It was announced in 
the contests organised to motivate play writing for radio around the 
country that the authors were free to choose their topics, but they had 
to keep in mind that they were addressing a large mass, both in the 
15 According to Goffman, "sound substitutes become conventional ised for what would 
ordinarily be conveyed visually" (1980: 163). 
16 Kemal T6zem, "Rekt6rOn Odacisi", Radyo, Vol. 2, No. 21,15 August-I 943, p. 1 1. 
17 Baltacioglu complained that some of his plays were turned down by Ankara Radio 
because of their subject-matter. "... those who control the content of radio drama have 
fallen prey to suspicion ... Is this obscene? 
Is there a suicidal theme? Is there an anti- 
regime sentiment?. I know because few of my plays have been rejected because of this 
suspicion. " Baltacioglu, "Radyo Programi", Yeni Adam, No. 502,10 August 1944, p. 2. 
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cities and in the villages.. "The broadcast plays, whether of social, 
ethical, military or cultural character, are to be written in a style that 
aims to address directly the mass, not a specific group of people. "18 
This meant that the topics had to be oriented towards the nation. 
T6zem, the head of the Drama Department in Ankara Radio believed 
that radio dramas were very important to educate the people; they 
fostered the unification of the nation's accents and lexicons; they 
presented all national, social and factual subject-matters19 much 
more vividly and to a larger mass (compared to other media, such as 
theatre, books, press). He said, "If people get used to listening to radio 
plays, then there would be a modern stage in each living room, which 
is rich in its setting and props to the extent of richness of imagination; 
and which would make the listeners laugh and think at the same 
time. " 20 (emphasis added) 
The "blind" medium of radio drama was certainly regarded as 
advantageous in its capacity to evoke the "national" imagination, but 
there also existed views that expressed the limitations of radio drama 
as an art. Similar to the British case, theatre critics did not and do not 
take radio drama seriously. Books written on "Turkish Theatre" (Aki, 
1968; And, 1983; Ertu6rul, 1989; Halman, 1976; Nutku, 1976; 5ener, 
1971) do not give space to discuss radio drama. For example, And 
mentions radio drama only in a sentence stating that although "radio 
is an effective medium, radio drama has not reached a mature state 
due to lack of interest". (1983: 34) HaIdun Taner, a famous and 
successful playwright, when expressing his doubts about "opening 
the doors" to "local" writers gave radio as a bad example; he believed 
that this would degrade theatre and reduce it to the "level of radio or 
local film" (cited in And, 1983: 400). Catering to the tastes of the 
"mass" (a concern for radio dramas) was a problematic concept for 
18 "Radyofonik TOrk Tiyatrosunun Tarillgesi", Radyo, Vol. 1, No. 7,15 July 1942 
, p. 
14. 
19 The aim that instrumentalised radio drama for national unity and education was 
different from the BBC Radio Drama Department's in 1942, which was, by broadcast 
production, "to maintain interest in classic plays, British and foreign, and especially those 
of Shakespeare; to provide ... theatrical entertainment 
for lovers of drama cut off by 
circumstances from the theatre itself; and finally -perhaps most important of all- to 
encourage the writing of new plays specifically designed for the medium of broadcasting. 
In the last activity one may reasonably include the adaptation for broadcasting of suitable 
novels and short stories. " "Radio Drama", BBC Yearbook 1942, p. 40-1. 
20 Kemal T6zem, "Radyofonik Tiyatro", Radyo, Vol. 1, No. 7,15 July 1942 , p. 14. 
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theatre which strove to maintain its status of "high art". 21 
Actors, on the other hand, who mostly performed both on stage 
and "on microphone", found radio drama frustrating. 22 Actors, said 
T6zern (the director of Radio Drama Department) need and long for 
costumes, make-up, gestures and, most importantly, applause for 
their performance. In this context, he thought that their "sacrifice" in 
radio drama, which relied only on sound and words and lacked the 
direct response of the audience, should be specially appreciated. 23 
The only compensation for the "lack" in a radio drama was its capacity 
to reach the "mass", as an actor expressed in an interview: he found 
acting in radio drama unsatisfactory but "radio has its own 
characteristics ... 
It addresses a larger mass of people. "24 
But Turkish broadcasters, generally, were defensive of the form 
of radio drama. It is argued in a more recent booklet, that includes 
clues for writing radio plays, that radio drama is a new art form; "the 
fact that it is not performed on stage does not relegate it to the status 
of non-art. "25 However, as I have emphasised before, the main task of 
radio drama, in early Turkish history, was seen in its propagation of 
national ideas, which usually contradicted the idea of "authenticity of 
21 The political emphasis on taking theatre to the people in Turkey usually contradicted 
with the theatre as an icon of modernity and Western way of life. The vanguards 
responsible for establishing a "modern theatre" in Turkey had difficulties in finding enough 
people to watch the Western plays. (In the beginning of the 30's a play by Strindberg had 
to be performed to only three people in Istanbul). Turkish playwrights were newcomers 
into "modern drama" and had difficulties with the form. Another problem concerned the 
behaviour of the theatre audience. People had to be educated for proper theatre 
attendance. A booklet prepared by Muhsin Ertuýrul in 1924 -the long term famous 
director and administrator of National Theatre Company- warned the potential audience 
that "theatre is not a mere entertainment but a school for adults; people should dress up 
when going to theatre; they should be quiet all through the play; they should not smoke 
during the performance; the breaks between the acts have a set duration -impatience 
does not help; whistling, banging feet, unnecessarily clapping hands are not the proper 
ways of appreciation. " (And, 1983: 46) 
22 Robert Mott also talks of "pains" of actors taking part in radio drama in early American 
broadcasting. Actors experienced difficulties in adapting their ways of acting for an 
11 unseeing audience". (1990: 3) 
23 Kemal T6zem, "Alki§a Hasret", Radyo, Vol. 3, No. 29,15 April1944, p. 12. T6zem tells 
that he was surprised to see one day that the actors were in full costume in the studio, 
and demanded to perform "as if" they were on stage. Radyo journal published those 
photographs of the production of the fantastic play called "Tarihin Kaybetti6i Kiz" (The Girl 
that History Lost). So the gap between the auditory and the visual was temporarily 
bridged both for the actors and for the audience. 
24 Nuri Alfinok, Radyo ve Sahne, Vol. 1, No. 1,31 May1951, p. 40. 
25 Radyo Oyun Yazarlarl iýýin Kisa Bilgiler, TRT Basili Yayinlar MDd&10ý0 Yayinlan, p. 24. 
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art". In this sense radio drama was primarily thought of in instrumental 
terms; it was useful as an effective weapon. An earlier version of "How 
to Write Radiophonic Plays? " made this clear: "... each word, in a radio 
drama, must be used in its proper place so that a specific idea is 
realised in the imagination of the listener. "26 (emphasis added) 
Broadcasters believed (or wanted to believe) that words or signs in a 
radio drama were in direct correspondence with the signifieds. This 
was also evident in the set of rules for censorship that dramas were 
subjected to before they went on air. 27 Dramas or dramatic sketches 
were given the mission of realising the reality as seen and desired by 
the writers or producers. 28 
Radio drama, therefore, stood at the interstice of reality and 
fantasy. Fantasy was reckoned to be representing the desired reality, 
and usually was taken as reality. However, given the specifics of the 
medium, fantasy had to rely on the organisation of sounds and words 
only. The production of sound effects, for example, was very important 
in creating the reality of the fantasy. Temren, remembered by later 
26 Nezih Manyas, "Radyofonik Piyesler Nasil Yazilmah? ", Radyo, Vol. 2. No. 18.15 May 
1943, p. 16. 
27 A set of rules was published by TRT after the 60's. Radyo Oyun Yazarlarl i9in Klsa 
Bilgiler, TRT Basih Yayinlar WclbrlQýb Yayinlan, p. 24. They give an idea of how the "ideal" 
reality to be represented was linked to the content of radio dramas. The prohibitions 
regarding radio dramas were: 
1. They cannot promote disrespectful attitude towards the law. 
2. They cannot violate social and ethical values. 
3. The facts cannot be altered in the treatment of historical events. 
4. The name of God cannot be mentioned in a disrespectful manner. 
5. The political climate of the country cannot be reflected. 
6. Segregationist thoughts cannot be included. 
7. Pessimistic events cannot be chosen as a subject. 
8. Physical disabilities of people cannot be ridiculed. 
9. There can be no underrating of any professional group. 
10. Suicide should be rarely touched upon, and if so, handled with utmost care. 
11. The guilty should not run away from penalty. 
28 This does not mean that the actual radio dramas on radio were wholeheartedly 
accepted as representatives of reality by all the members of the elite. There were several 
criticisms, as part of general criticisms to radio broadcasting, concerning the language, 
style and performance quality of radio dramas. Re§at Nuri GOntekin, a famous novel and 
playwright, criticised the language of the radio dramas, while Baltacioýlu was critical of the 
artificial tone in them. Baltacioýlu said that, "instead of that idealistic verbalism that 
portrays the purity of villagers, or the self-sacrifice of women, there must be a more vivid 
and realistic literature that finds its source directly in the ambition for industrialisation and 
struggle. " (cited in Kocabaýoýlu, 1980: 181) Nevertheless the assumption that words 
could directly signify, thus, construct reality was not contested. The mediation of language 
and of reception was not acknowledged. 
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broadcasters as "an institution by himself", was the first sound 
engineer of Ankara Radio. He did "miracles" using simple devices. 
imer, first an apprentice to Ternren then a long term sound engineer in 
Ankara Radio, tells amazing stories of their invention of novel sound 
effects. 29 imer also developed certain norms that guided him when 
doing soundtracks. He used "international" music for urban love 
stories, while he selected "folk music" for rural settings. He resorted to 
recorded music in doing this. "Folk music" was already being 
processed by a systematic effort of Ankara radio and other 
institutions, so he used these samples. Thus a whole national 
landscape was simulated in the "void"30 of the studio. Even the 
sounds of nature supposed to represent Anatolia, which was glorified 
in the dramas, came from the studios in Ankara, or the recordings 
made around -for example, imer produced the sound of a stream in a 
village from the gutters in Ankara. imer took very seriously the make- 
believe world he created for the audience; sound effects in radio 
drama, according to him "replaced the setting, the space, the 
accessories, the emotional atmosphere. "31 In this way, sounds 
acquired both symbolic and indexical characters which became 
conventional ised and naturalised by repetition. This explains why, as 
Crisell argues, "studio simulations of sounds can often sound more 
'real' than the actual sounds themselves would. " (1994: 47) 
The national feelings invested in sounds and words, and 
reproduced by radio technology made possible the construction of an 
imaginary national space and a homogeneous national time. Most of 
the radio dramas broadcast by Turkish Radio exhibit the evident signs 
of effort to construct a unified national space and time. However, 
despite the instrumentalist treatment of radio drama, it would be 
wrong to find a monolithic meaning in them. Drama, which uses 
zýJ The dramas were either broadcast live or recorded on "stone" records. imer told me of 
some tactics that he applied to create a soundscape "from nil" in those productions , such as walking backwards to give the effect of climbing the stairs; rubbing starch in his hands 
to give the effect of walking on snow, etc. He even "barked" for thirteen weeks to create 
a dog in a children's series. The critics thought it was a real dog. Interview. 25 
Januaryl 996. 
30 According to Crisell, the spirit of radio resides in the fact that studio is a void, an 
acoustic canvas on which anything can be painted (1994). 
31 Interview with Ertugrul imer. 25 January1996. 
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dialogue to make its meanings often conceals the dialogic character 
of languages, rendering it invisible by using manifest dialogue "in the 
frame of a mere conversation between persons. " (Morson&Emerson, 
1990: 316). Drama, written in a style that is confined to its "author's 
ultimate semantic authority"32, in Bakhtin's words, (such as "national" 
radio drama in Turkey), appears "direct", "unmediated", and 
"referentially oriented" so that "it recognises only itself and its object , 
to which it strives to be maximally adequate. " (Morson&Emerson, 
1990: 148) It is the author which imposes from outside the 
"finalisation" on the life of the characters who speak "unself- 
consciously". 
Yet in radio drama the finalisation is never final. The "hidden 
speech centre" in radio drama, that is the author's semantic authority, 
is challenged by the medium which is geared to reach to masses; and 
which defines the drama not as an "authentic art" but as an instrument 
of reality (which goes against the author's artistic autonomy and 
authority). The significance of the specific text is immersed in the 
significance of the mass impact. The tech nologisation of drama, if we 
may call it that way, make them less of a monad by introducing 
exterior political "voices" to the text (produced by the effects of reality). 
While, in Simmel's words, the "actor's portrayal keeps us apart from 
the world of reality" (1973: 306) in the spectacle of stage drama, radio 
drama insert fantasy into reality, thus making the fantasy character of 
reality more evident. It is this character of radio drama that lends itself 
to an analysis of political subjectivity. I will now look at the 
technological imagination, revealed in radio drama, that strives to 
"change" reality. Instead of analysing the seemingly fixed content of 
these dramas, I try to bring into view the processes of the texts -the 
cracks and gaps in the dramas (the limitations of the author's 
semantic authority as far as it cannot account for the acts of the 
characters within the "logic" of the text)- to detect the hidden dialogic 
character of the national investment in dramas. The treatment of 
"women" in radio drama provides a rich source for my analysis. 
32 "In drama, for example, the author's ultimate semantic authority is to be found in the 
whole work, but may not be expressed by any character. " (Morson& Emerson, 1990: 148- 
9) 
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6.2. The National Struggle in the Private Sphere 
Women figure centrally in representations of modernity and of 
the nation. This has raised attention from researchers both in the West 
and in the context of "Third World" nationalisms. Yuval-Davis states 
that "it is women -not just (? ) the bureaucracy and intelligentsia- who 
reproduce nations, biologically, culturally and symbolically. " (1997: 2) 
However, an analysis of "women" as the subjects of the nation differs 
from a perspective that dwells on the representations of women 
produced by (mostly) male elite. Jordanova's argument that treats the 
Enlightenment in the West as a set of mental and practical activities of 
male elite "who gained influence because of their ideas and 
'knowledge"' (1995: 64) and whose concern was "to establish the 
validity of their vision of the world" (64) convincingly makes clear that 
these activities were "sexual" in their character. She points to the 
"historical importance of science, medicine and technology in the 
promulgation of myths of femininity" (65). Women, from this 
perspective, appear as the absent subjects of modernity who have 
been totalised within a category and ascribed several characteristics 
as well as missions by a group of men who attempted to dominate 
and regulate the realm of nature (and women). Jordanova discusses 
various gendered aspects of the Enlightenment process: the control 
of women's sexuality for the maintenance of the social order, the 
unveiling of women before science which turned them into objects for 
"secular and rational" male domination; and the positing of an 
ahistorical, natural power of ailment in women as an antidote for the 
ills of civilisation. 
The analysis of gender developed by researchers on "Third 
World nationalisms" (Chatterjee, 1993b; Jayawardena, 1988; Kandiyoti, 
1989; 1991; 1993; 1996; 1997a; Nader, 1989; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Yuval- 
Davis&Anthias, 1989) points to similar patterns of signification of 
gender relations. Women are absent subjects in this context too. For 
example, Kandiyoti, referring to Graham-Brown (1988), discusses 
how women, represented as the icons of modernity in Turkey, were 
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linked to a "symbolic evocation of the dynamism of the 'new' nation" 
(1993: 380). The process, according to Kandiyoti, implicated the 
control of the conduct of women as well as interpellating them as 
"national" actors. It also involved the "unveiling" of women as part of 
secularisation of government33; treating them as 'tools' for social 
progress and as boundary markers for what is modern. Yet the 
production and signification of gender in the so called "Third World" 
cannot be simply treated as part of "universal" history. The specific 
history of Eurocentrism, paradoxically, defined the universal concept 
of history and modernity (Young, 1990). The research on women and 
nationality in the "Third World", thus, attends to the differences from 
the West, introducing both structural and historical differences, such 
as the role of religion, patriarchy, state, private/public spheres and 
colonialism, in order to understand the historically specific processes 
of signification of gender. 34 
In Turkey, the signification of gender can be studied in relation 
to the translation of "modern" discourses which operated within an 
economy of subjectivity that strove to emphasise its difference/identity 
and power in relation to Western domination. What I mean by the 
economy of subjectivity denotes not only the discursive aspects of 
language, but also techniques and technology that aid the 
imagination of the self. The national elite regarded Western 
technology as instruments that can be acquired to endorse and 
extend their power both against the West and upon the Others in the 
national realm. 
Radio technology, among other technologies of the early 
twentieth century, allowed an imagination of wider and less solid 
dissemination of the effects of power. In comparison to writing for 
example, radio was employed in the control of the "mass" due to its 
apparent capacity to encompass and smooth out differences in the 
33 "Islamic regulations of the body and social space were increasingly being encroached 
upon by a new discourse that removed the body from the realm of the sacred to 
medicalize and secularize it. " (Kandiyoti, 1997a: 116) 
34 For analyses of gender relations, modernity and nationalism in early-twentieth century 
Middle East -Turkey, Iran and Egypt- see Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in 
the Middle East edited by Lila Abu-Lughod (1998). Also see Women, Islam and the State 
(1991) and Gendering the Middle East (1996) edited by Kandiyoti (1991); Reconstructing 
Gender in the Middle East, edited by G69ek&Balaghi (1994). 
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public address, thus enabling the maintenance of "a certain 
universalising account of the modern". (Huyssen, 1986: 56) But radio, 
in its articulation of a "mass culture", also brought into view the 
processes of the construction of the "mass" in modernity as a 
repressed and gendered category. Huyssen points to the coupling of 
the mass with women in the feminisation of mass culture: "the fear of 
the masses in this age of declining liberalism is always a fear of 
woman, a fear of nature out of control, a fear of the unconscious, of 
sexuality, of the loss of identity and stable ego boundaries in the 
mass. " (1986: 52) The masses, according to him, were described in 
terms of a feminine threat. 
The radio technology of the twentieth century put the elite in 
Turkey in a different position, in imagining and representing their 
modern identity, from the Enlightenment elite. The Turkish elite were 
already in an age that came to know the "threat of the mass", 
represented by revolutionary upheavals in Europe, especially the 
October Revolution of 1917. Therefore, in Chatterjee's word (1993a), 
one "derivative" aspect of modernity for the Turkish elite was to take 
the "best" of modernity while rejecting the consequences of possible 
frictions between classes and ethnic groups. The technical was 
opposed to the social. Technology, as I discussed in Chapter 1, was 
categorised as a neutral weapon of Western civilisation in Turkey, 
which was considered, pragmatically, to be in the service of national 
tasks -national unity in the political and economical fields. The 
discourse of modernity was translated into a mechanical vision of 
progress which was combined with an organicist vision of society. 
Change was celebrated in the realm of techniques while the social 
was protected against the evils of change. The elite, therefore, by 
appropriating "the most advanced techniques of civilisation" (a phrase 
that justified the introduction of radio broadcasting for example) could 
envision themselves as the carriers of civilisation given that society 
remained stable. 
The empowering vision of technology was gendered. As I have 
shown in the analysis of radio talks, the mass which was regarded as 
a passive entity was gendered as feminine, while the active shapers 
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of culture could identify themselves, with the aid of "modern" 
technology, as the protagonists of Western civilisation. But, as I have 
argued before, the identification was not without problems. The 
contradiction that can be phrased as a "change without change" in the 
national framework that opposed the active will power of the elite to 
the passive docility of the mass, or in a similar logic, the contrast 
between civilisation and nature found its most complex expressions 
around the "issue" of women which in turn bore upon the subjectivity 
of the elite. 
Women, both as markers of modernity and carriers of natural 
traditions in Turkey, stood both at the borderline of the West and the 
non-WeSt35 and, at the same time, at the borders of the public and the 
private spheres. 36 The contradictory nature of investment in women in 
Turkish national discourse could only be reflected upon in depth 
following the feminist narratives of the 80's, which pointed to a split 
between the public and the domestic personae of women (Tekeli, 
1995). 37 As it is a huge topic, here I will not venture into the field of 
women and nation in Turkey, but limit my analysis to certain 
35 The civil rights given to women in Turkey were regarded as a "proof" of civilisation. The 
nationalist propaganda portrayed women as active participants of society. But these 
images were reserved for urban women. Women in rural hinterland were depicted as 
naturally traditional and immobile (Kandiyoti, 1997a: 117-8). A prominent spokesperson of 
Kemalism, puts this rather bluntly in his memoirs: " Mustafa Kemal did not force the 
peasant women to change. Maybe this was the only exemption from his revolutions. He 
even tolerated polygamy in the rural areas. " (Atay, 1969: 412). The ambiguity concerning 
women as markers of modernity was based on a division along class and regional lines. 
This accompanied the material processes of recruitment for establishing a "ruling class" in 
which higher class women were recruited instead of lower class men. The concerns of 
class consolidation replaced the concerns of gender in that context (bnco, 1981). 
However women, as a category in the national discourse, represented both the natural- 
national and Western -civil ised worlds. Occidentalism while praising women's roles for the 
"new life" employed, simultaneously, a language of Western "demonology as a 
mechanism of social control" (Nader, 1989) over women. 
36 Kandiyoti says that "a sphere marked out as 'private' at one stage of nation-building 
may reappear with the full trappings of the 'public' at another, their boundaries being fluid 
and subject to redefinition. " (1993: 378) 
37 There is a widely accepted opinion in Turkey that the secular Turkish Republic gave 
many rights to women leading to their emancipation. This was contested by feminist 
millitants and scholars after the 1980s. While Deniz Kandiyoti describes the state of 
women in the early years of the Turkish Republic as "emancipated but unliberated" 
(1987), Arat argues that Kemalist reforms did not even intend to make any changes in 
women's lives. "By reforming some institutions that already included women (e. g., family) 
and expanding women's roles in others (e. g., schools), the Kernalist regime was able to 
reconstruct and legitimize patriarchal structures. " (1994: 72) For the earlier situation of 
women and women's movements in the Ottoman period, see (ýakir (1994). 
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representations of women on radio, and specifically radio drama, 
which give clues regarding the gendered technological imagination of 
the elite. The radio dramas centring on the "family" provide data to 
analyse the intercrossings of the public and the private. They also 
give evidence to the complex configurations of gendered conceptions 
of change and stability -the core problematic of Turkish national 
discourse. 
"Family" dramas were based mainly on the everyday life of 
fictive, "representative" families both in urban and rural areas. These 
are mentioned under different categories in articles covering 
broadcasts of dramas in Radyo journal: primarily, social and ethical 
dramas. 38 There appears to be no clear distinction between them in 
the categorisation. It is possible to say that dramas on Turkish Radio 
were categorised in terms of content rather then form. If the "family" 
was the one, "national" dramas comprised the second big group. The 
latter were about the "revolution", the heroic performances of the 
national leader, or about prominent figures and events in the national 
struggle. They were treated as epics of a newly born nation. "Family" 
dramas, on the other hand, dwelled on imagining the "new life" in 
Turkey. Thus they addressed the present and the future, while 
"national" dramas were mainly engaged with the recent past. 
However, "family" dramas were also linked to the nation in many 
aspects. Their first and most important mission was to educate 
families in new patterns of living. 39 What Mustafa Kemal had said 
about "removing myths from minds, eradicating the established power 
of the old regime" in the context of Turkish "revolution" was already 
38 The audience survey of Ankara Radio in 1948 included some comments on radio 
drama. In reply to the questions, "Do you like radio drama? Which topics do you want to 
be covered by them? " out of a total of 6639 people, 1056 said they liked them, 162 
didn't like them, 417 demanded more radio drama, 4 demanded less radio drama, and 12 
wanted no dramas at all. In terms of su bject- matters, 1810 wanted "ethical, social, family 
tragedies and emotional subjects", 1609 wanted "national subjects", 106 wanted just 
"drama", and 513 wanted "comedy" . Radyo, Vol. 17, No. 78,79,80, June, July, August 1946, p. 45. The ambiguity of the responses give an idea about the lack of regulation of 
drama in terms of form in Ankara Radio. However, content-wise "family" and "national" 
dramas were privileged. 
39 Mustafa Kemal said that "the essence of civilisation, the ground for progress and 
power reside in family life. " (cited in And, 1983: 3) 
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linked to drama as a form. 40 Mustafa Kemal, according to And, was 
the first "dramaturgist" of the Turkish Republic. He personally edited 
the scripts of the plays written for National Theatre performances. He 
was especially sensitive to issues regarding women. The portrayal of 
women on stage needed, according to him, special attention. 41 Family 
drama, therefore, assumed the task to introduce new "civilised" 
images for women, as well as, attending to the crises in domestic life. 
The post-imperial "national" identity was struck by "crises of gender 
and domestic organisation. " (Kandiyoti, 1997a: 116) These crises, 
according to Kandiyoti, were centred around establishing a 
heterosexual marital etiquette with special emphasis on the child- 
centred conjugal family, which was supposed to put an end to the 
diversity of sexual preferences, to the extreme differences in family life 
between Istanbul and rural hinterland42 , and to the existence of non- 
familial sexual conduct of men in the Ottoman regime. There was also 
a concern to promote the transition from the dictates of Islamic law to 
those of the secular family code in early Turkish history. 
Ankara Radio in the 30's and 40's, in its mission to talk to the 
nation, employed drama as a form of education and discipline to 
change both the "extravagances" of Istanbul and the "backwardness" 
of Anatolia in terms of domestic organisation. What was directly 
40 Drama was regarded by the People's Houses, for example, as "the best means to 
suggest to the people all those beautiful, good, and true feelings and knowledge". 
Halkevleri 1932-1935: 103 Halkevi Gegen Yillarda Nasil (ýallýtl, p. 15. 
41 Mustafa Kemal edited the language of the plays, in particular, to make sure that it was 
11 new" Turkish. But he also had remarks on content. For example, he made some 
alterations in the script of "Taý Bebek" which portrayed a woman as "doll-like". He 
emphasised that "We cannot think of women in this way any more! The existence of 
women constitutes the infrastructure of the nation in many aspects! From now on the 
conception of women as pretty objects should change. " Also he disliked the idea that 
"love is entertainment". He said: "We should take love seriously. " (cited in And, 1983: 9) 
42 Duben and Behar (1991), in their comprehensive research on family life from 1880 to 
1940 in Turkey, argue that against the Orientalist depictions of harem life as typical of 
Turkishness, family life showed a great diversity both in Istanbul and between Istanbul 
and other regions. The nuclear family among the Muslim population was already a 
growing fact in the nineteenth century Istanbul. Western codes were increasingly 
becoming influential in families which belonged especially to bureaucratic professions and 
trades. However there was a huge gap between Istanbul and other regions in terms of 
family codes which persisted after the foundation of the Republic. The demographic 
evidence shows that in the-1930s and 1940s Istanbul stood out as a different social 
entity. The people in Istanbul not only married at a later age, but also practiced birth 
control to have less children. While the average number of children was 7 in rural areas 
and 4 in small towns, it was 2 in Istanbul (Shorter& Macura, 1982). 
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expressed in radio talks, found its fictive examples in radio drama 
which was thought to have more of an emotional "hook" on people 
than the pedantic talks. Given all these considerations regarding 
"family" radio drama -their instrumentalist use, their educative content, 
their special sensitivity regarding depictions of women, and the 
technology of sound used for simulations of reality- I will now look 
closely at two dramas which portrayed families with special emphasis 
on the role of women in national life. 43 
6.3. Stability and Change / Women and Men 
The woman was an essential signifier for a number of concepts 
associated with Turkish nationality. Women symbolised nature, truth, 
stability, and imagined origins. "The very language of nationalism 
singles women out as the symbolic repository of group identity. " 
(Kandiyoti, 1993: 382) There are also ample references to women as 
symbols in radio dramas. 
The drama, "Tarihin Kaybettiýi Kiz" (The Girl Whom History Lost) 
can be cited as one naive example of the use of symbols. In this play, 
the girl Saadet (meaning happiness) whom History had lost, and 
who has taken refuge in Istanbul was captured by some men in the 
the black-market. History (who is a man) comes looking for the girl 
and saves her from the black-market. The article on the play says, 
"(H)istory could not let Saadet (happiness) , who has run away from 
the hell of the world and could only take refuge in Istanbul, to be a 
victim of the black-market. "44 The highly symbolic character of the 
play is decipherable with its obvious references to the Second World 
War, to the "peace" in Turkey but also to the activities of black- 
marketers in Istanbul. First it is symbolic that the "happiness" who was 
in danger in the world comes to Istanbul (Turkey being not in the war). 
Then History (which symbolises an exterior element, the Western 
civilisation) saves her from deterioration in Istanbul. It is possible to 
43 These dramas selected from a number of dramas which have been accidentally kept 
either piled in a store room in Ankara Radio or published as a book are significant in their 
"realistic" attitude in dealing with the crises of the family. They differ from those naive and 
symbolic dramas in which women are treated only as a symbol. 
44 Kemal Tbzem, "Alkiýa Hasret", Radyo, Vol. 3, No. 29,15 ApriI1944, p. 12. 
240 
argue that the exteriority of the rescuer symbolised both "pure" 
national power in Ankara and Western civilisation which in, the same 
equation, were linked to each other. It is also noteworthy that Ankara 
was the space of national broadcasting, in particular, the space of the 
drama. Purity and happiness were embodied in a young girl's body 
which symbolised the "best" of Western civilisation which could not 
survive in the West but was redeemed by Ankara Radio. 
Another example is the drama "Vadiye Dbnjjý"45 (Return to the 
Valley) in which a romantic encounter of urban and rural lives was 
symbolised by a love story of an urban man (educated in Switzerland 
and blinded due to some illness) and a village woman (who spoke 
proper Turkish and represented the high essence of Turkishness in 
her pure character). The woman Ayýe is a village teacher who works 
for the prosperity of the beautiful village, to which the blind man 
Nedim was blinded at first. However, love shows him the truth. The 
sound of Ay§e's piano playing reveals to him the real essence of 
Turkey which he could not see. He comes to love and to celebrate the 
place he really belongs. Nedirn says that he envies the beautiful life 
there which becomes even more enviable due to the opening of a 
new village school. The village is transformed by this act into a 
modern city, but into one without the ills and impurities of actual city 
life. In this play, Ay§e symbolises the stable truth of national life (which 
evokes itself through sound, very much like radio) which transforms 
the blinded Westernised intellectual to create a desired synthesis. 
In both of these dramas women lead to certain changes without 
themselves changing. Their natural and pure characters are deployed 
abstractly as a concept which has no body, no self and no 
contradictions. They are mere symbols. It is the men who have to act, 
choose between good and bad. But it is also men who are susceptible 
to deception either by "evil" forces or by their own "blindness". In the 
following two dramas these themes persist. However in them women 
are portrayed as more developed characters, not just as mere 
symbols of a concept or entity (purity or rural life). Therefore the 
40 Written by Kemal S6nmez; directed by 06uz Bora; sound effects by Tahsin Temren. I 
have found the soundtrack of the play, which was recorded in 1951, in the store room of 
Ankara Radio. 
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mechanisms involved in. the representations of women and the 
subjectivity of men in relation to those representations can be 
observed in its complexity. 
a. "The Enthusiasm of Reconstruction in a Turkish 
Town"46 
This drama depicts a series of fantasies and interweaves them 
with elements of the national discourse. Space, time and gender 
figure as significant factors in these interconnected fantasies. The 
play starts in a coffee house in an "Anatolian province". (The author 
notes in the beginning that "the local dialects inform the audience that 
the place of action is not Istanbul"). The conversations of local people 
in the coffee house, with the accompaniment of a "traditional" local 
poet, introduce a problem on which the dramatic action is based. The 
problem is: The elder brother of Attar (a local man) has run away with 
his money (that he had raised in his own town) to Istanbul, leaving 
behind his wife and children. He has a relationship with a 
"mademoiselle" there in Istanbul and lives in an "apartment" in 
Beyoglu (a district of Istanbul famous for its night life, also for its multi- 
ethnic population). But the rumour goes that he had recently lost all 
his money and is on the verge of bankruptcy. The action starts with the 
elder brother TOccar Mehmet (Mehmet the Tradesman) turning up 
unexpectedly at the coffee house. The crowd asks him of Istanbul, of 
the "green eyes" of the "mademoiselle". But they also blame him for 
what he did. TOccar Mehmet, in the position of the guilty, wants to go 
back to his family seeking forgiveness. As the horse-carriage takes 
him home with his brother and the poet he looks around the town with 
amazement: 
TCjccar Mehmet: What in earth has happened here? ... How much 
it has changed... I would not have recognised the place 
even though I was born here. 
Attar: But I had written to you about it. 
TCjccar Mehmet: I did not take it seriously then. You know I have 
46 A radio drama written by Vala Nureddin VA-nu, "Bir TOrk $ehrinde ! mar Qoýkunlugu" in 
Antalya ikinci Djnya Harbinde Nasil Gazelleýebildi? 
, 
Istanbul: Kenan Matbaasi, 1944. 
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been to Europe too ... This place is just like Europe. 
Coachmen: God forbid! ... Don't talk inauspiciously ... (The 
coachmen speaks in a dialect of Thrace) 
TOccar Mehmet: Yaa, you are right ... Europe now is an ashtray... 
Coachmen: Yaa, there it is an ashtray, here it is a rose garden. 
... See the asphalt road starts here. 
Poet: (playing his saz) 
Don't talk inauspiciously! 
What is Europe anyway, 
No error in the metaphor 
It is a donkey compared to deer... 
(They laugh) (p. 72) 
The coachmen and Attar go on telling about all the big changes 
in the town during the journey. They talk about how swamps have 
been dried, how new roads and houses with pools were built, how 
new housing has been developed for nomadic people. TOccar 
Mehmet thinks the town now looks like Nice in France. The analogy 
with the French town is immediately tied to "AtatOrk Square" and 
ln6nO Park" which make the Turkish town resemble Nice. The 
reconstruction along the coast is described by using terms such as 
"modern arrangements". TOccar Mehmet learns from his brother and 
the coachmen that new schools, an institute for girls (teaching 
domestic arts) and a People's RooM47 have been opened in the 
town. He discovers that his own son works for the Union for 
Embellishment of the Town while his daughter attends the Institute for 
Girls. He is surprised to hear that the coachman's son, has played the 
role of Hamlet in the People's Room, that his daughters play the piano 
and paint pictures. It is mentioned in the conversation that all Turkish 
young people are very talented, even a young person from Yozgat 
(one of the remotest towns in the Eastern part) had shocked the 
English in his London exhibition. However, the new changes, it is 
said, are not only confined to the realm of "fantasy". New 
technological and industrial developments also had taken place. The 
secret to this lies in the "cooperation of the people with the 
41 A form of the People's Houses in small towns and villages. 
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government", which meant that people without means voluntarily 
worked for the projects while the rich people made financial 
contributions. They have not let black-marketers to get involved in the 
finance of the projects. They have organised creative events, such as 
camel wrestling, to collect money ("of course not new year parties... or 
festivals, or garden parties" says Attar. It is stated that those garden 
parties etc. had ruined TOccar Mehmet. ) Above all, the new Governor 
who had initiated this zeal for change is praised. 
TOccar Mehmet, although struck by all these changes, oscillates 
between admiration and disbelief. Nonetheless all the doubts raised 
by him are replied by either the coachman or his brother in a 
convincing way. They assure him that they know what they are talking 
about, that they have learned so many new things, either from their 
children in the school or from radio. (The coachmen says he does not 
own a radio set yet, but he hears about things broadcast from his 
daughters. ) They argue that the war years had been particularly 
beneficial for Turkey which stayed out of the war. TOccar Mehmet 
accepts the arguments with the conclusion that "this country has fallen 
into a romantic passion for reconstruction" (p. 82). The conversation is 
often interrupted by the poet's singing songs relevant to the topic. 
When finally they arrive home TOccar Mehmet is even more 
surprised to see his house renovated. A young woman servant, with 
her clean dress and apron, who meets them at the door strikes Toccar 
Mehmet, who says that his house has been "modernised". It doesn't 
stink and the toilets are new. Attar goes in to see the "housewife" (she 
doesn't have a name but is mentioned as the "housewife". She 
speaks with a "rural accent"). He tells her that they have a guest from 
Istanbul. She suggests that she prepares some local food to which 
Attar objects: "Let your daughter cook so that she can show her new 
skills that she has learned in the Institute" to a person coming from 
Istanbul (p. 84). (Young girls were introduced to Western cuisine 
there. ) Then Attar implies that her husband wants to make up with her. 
To his question: "Can you forgive him? " the "housewife" answers 
humbly that she is in no position to judge him since he is the father of 
her children. She adds that his misbehaviour was due to "illness": 
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Housewife: I always believed that Mehmet Bey has fallen prey to 
some illness. We are a big family ... if one of us gets ill, do we 
have to be angry with him? ... In fact, the disease he caught 
is a contagious one ... Didn't you see in Istanbul ? 
Those people who raise some money end up in Europe 
instead of spending their money for their country... 
Immediately to Europe ... As if there cannot be good things in 
our country (p. 84). 
She even suggests to help him financially when told he had lost 
all his money. When she hears that he finished his relationship with 
the "mademoiselle" her comment is: "What else would you expect 
from that woman? " (p. 86). In the end of the play, the housewife finally 
learns from the brother that her husband is there in the house, and it 
was a false rumour that he has lost all his money. TOccar Mehmet, in 
the next room with his son, already busy in dealing with the finances 
of the Union for Embellishment of the Town, has heard his wife's 
tolerant words. He says: "Oh, my woman ... My woman who is full of 
true and high feelings ... I have heard all you said. " (p. 88) 
The play ends by the poet's song: 
Camels wrestle 
Nomads have a home 
Hand in hand they work 
The state and the people 
Embellishes the town 
It is everybody's goal 
To stay here forever 
It is interesting that the play based on a simple dramatic action 
touches upon so many fantasies that become linked to nationalistic 
aspirations. The prominent theme of reconstruction involves almost a 
magical change in the town. Both nature and culture are acted upon 
to be transformed into a dream like "Turkish" town where everybody is 
happy to work together and with the government, to educate 
themselves, to build the most advanced "technological" enterprises 
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(such as a big common "ice factory" where different tradespeople, 
butchers, grocers keep their goods) as well as a green natural 
landscape. The change also involves Westernisation not only with its 
"modern arrangements" but in actual modernisation of the people who 
play the piano, paint pictures, dress like Europeans (the servant, for 
example), know Shakespeare etc. Thus the play renders the fantasies 
of change desirable in comparison to Europe. However, the 
comparison with Europe also brings to view the undesirable elements 
of civilisation such as the war (which makes Europe an ashtray). So 
the dream-like Turkish town represents a better world in its 
Turkishness. The better world is described in terms of "traditional" 
elements which are saved from changing : the cooperation of people 
(the word imece is used here which denotes the long tradition of 
solidarity in villages of Anatolia), the coffee house where people meet 
and discuss things, the local poet which continues the oral tradition of 
culture, and the ascribed desire of people to stay there "forever". 
The juxtaposition of elements of change and stability involves no 
dynamic element of time. The "forever" and timeless national time 
brings together past and future in its empty form. There is no dramatic 
"collision" in Lukacs's words. 48 Neither is there an action that "moves 
forward with each phrase of the dialogue" (Lukacs, 1973: 284). Even 
TCjccar Mehmet's "awakening" to the changes in the town is timeless 
(doesn't move forward) since he has already chosen to come back to 
his town with his money, as we discover at the very end. The 
restrained action of the drama which avoids collisions, and by which I 
mean that there are no dynamics (except from a "romantic passion for 
reconstruction") and no consequences of the change (except from an 
indefinite harmony and happiness), is best represented by the 
"housewife". 
She represents the traditional values that changes have not (and 
perhaps could not) alter. She stills cooks local foods and speaks in a 
rural accent, At the same time, she is praised as the heroine of the 
4b He says, "in drama everything must serve to support the basic possible attitudes and 
concentrate upon one central collision".... He argues that "the historical character of drama 
thus concentrates round the historical character of the collision itself in its pure 
form ... Whatever will not be absorbed directly and completely by the collision will spoil or 
even ruin the flow of the drama. " (Lukacs, 1973: 288,294,295) 
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drama with her capacity to understand the "ills" of the society, almost 
in terms of sociology and psychology, and to forgive and cure them. 
The author's semantic authority, therefore, cannot account for the 
terms of her "tolerant" behaviour. She stands exterior to the dramatic 
action: she has been such a character all her life and she will be like 
that forever. In the same way, in signifying the good in the play by this 
"timeless" passive and forgiving woman, the author cannot account for 
the dynamics of change. Change is linked back to stability in a circular 
manner, conveying a drama of "change without change". 
I argue that neither the elements of modern change nor 
traditional stability are absorbed in the dramatic action. The only 
dynamic element in the play, and that figures and refigures within the 
time of the drama, is the sexuality of TOccar Mehmet. The "green 
eyes" of the "mademoiselle" echoe in the people's talking. The 
"crowd" in the coffee house says: "Come here tomorrow TOccar 
Mehmet ... They say she has green eyes. Come and tell us what she 
thought about you... " (p. 71) Even the housewife acknowledges the 
desire for the green eyes. She remembers that when she was briefly 
together with her husband in Istanbul he had a crisis one day: "He 
was trembling and repeating the same words, 'that green-green 
paradise'. First I thought he was praising the beauties of Prince's 
Islands in Istanbul.. but then I realised what that green green paradise 
meant... " (p. 87) To which the brother Attar replies that "now" it has 
changed, now the "green green paradise" only represents the 
beauties of his town for TOccar Mehmet. The sexual metaphor of the 
"green green paradise" is a traveling one, it first represents the beauty 
of a woman instead of a landscape, but then it comes to represent a 
landscape instead of a woman. However, the persistent and 
multiplying reference to the metaphor conveys the underlying sexual 
character of the national discourse in its relation to the West. The real 
passion is the passion for the French woman whose eyes which look 
back at the subject constitute the object of desire. 
Here we see an Occidentalist construction of the national self 
through the projected eyes of the "foreigner", which in an oscillating 
way represents both the West and the Turkish land. The subject is 
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split between the desire for the West (whose space is Istanbul) and 
the call of the "homeland" which has changed to come close to the 
West but not quite like it. The split is cured by the "good" woman who 
has, in fact, no sexuality (no jealousy for example) and who 
understands all and embraces the naughty boy. The national identity, 
after all crises and changes, is vested in the stable figure of the 
housewife who stands exterior and anterior to the significations of 
national change but who, in her stability, makes change redundant. 
b. "One Has to Struggle" 49 
This radio drama written by a woman author engages more 
deeply with a woman's character and with her problems. Yet the 
dramatic action takes place within a very similar logic, that cannot 
account for changes both in the characters of the play and 
consequently in the national life that they signify. Ironically, the 
concept of "struggle" , which has strong connotations in terms of 
"national struggle", in this context , becomes interchangeable with 
"complacency". 
Let us look at the characters in the play: 
FCjruzan: A young housewife and a mother. She is sensitive, kind 
and good tempered. She attaches great value to her family life. But 
she is also a "modern" woman and keeps up with the standards of 
"new life" in her child care practices. 
Macit: A young man married to FOruzan. His character is 
variable. He takes on different characters in different situations 
throughout the play. While he can be a loving and honest man at 
times, he is also capable of being careless and selfish, or of easily 
being carried away by his lustful feelings. 
Mother-in-law: An elderly woman, mother of Macit, living with the 
family. She is troublesome. She complains all the time and wearies 
out FOruzan by her bitter comments. She is a traditional woman in 
many ways, yet she is intrigued by "modern life". 
49 "MOcadele Etmeli", a radio drama written by a woman, MOkerrem Kamil Su and 
broadcast in 1949.1 have found the soundtrack of the drama in a store room of Ankara 
Radio. 
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Fatma: The servant -in 
the house. Her husband is a factory 
worker. She is not educated but has "common sense". She cannot get 
along with the mother-in-law but likes FUruzan. 
Omit: The little girl of the family. She is a sensitive child, closer to 
her mother than to her father. She takes piano lessons, and becomes 
a great pianist at the end. Her name means "hope". 
Rezzan: A minor character in the play. She is a "modern" and an 
immoral woman, who is into extra-marital relationships. She admits 
enjoying these "immoral games". 
Aunt: Also a minor character. Yet she has a great influence on 
the course of events. She is an educated, urban, "modern" woman. 
She is wise and experienced. 
The play starts by a description of a "crisis" in FOruzan's life. She 
sits in the dark living room waiting for her husband , who has 
developed the habit of going out almost every night. She dreads this 
but cannot do much about it. Her feminine insight tells her that there is 
another woman in Macit's life. The mother-in-law cruelly teases her 
about the situation, almost enjoying the possibility that his son, like 
most other men, has a life elsewhere. 
Mother-in-law: How many times have I told you, don't keep the 
dinner table waiting like this. The angels get disturbed ... It is 
almost midnight, he must have eaten somewhere else. 
Here we witness a typically traditional comment. The traditional 
stance of the mother-in-law, in terms of what to expect from a man, is 
fortified by her superstitious belief about angels. FOruzan keeps quiet 
and imagines their first days with Macit, as lovers. The indexical music 
of flashback takes us back in time to a romantic conversation in a 
wood. We hear the birds singing as the young couple dream about 
their future marriage. They wish for a suburban house, a bicycle, a 
fireplace in the house, a radio ... The shared dream depicts an ideal 
marriage: the things to be owned, the things to do (picnics on 
weekends, fishing, cycling, dancing to the music of the radio), the 
division of labour between the spouses (she will prepare the food, 
embroider the table clothes, wait for his arrival in the evenings, while 
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he will earn money). The -dream also portrays 
how quarrels should 
proceed and end peacefully: 
FCjruzan: Shall we quarrel when we get married? 
Macit: No, I won't do anything that upsets you. 
FiDruzan: But quarrels happen in a marriage. 
Macit: Then, we will quarrel but make peace afterwards. 
FCjruzan: Yes ... I will bring your coffee when you are reading your 
newspaper. 
Strangely this flashback does not foreshadow the present 
situation in which Macit has forgotten all his promises. The flashback 
stands as an appendix that portrays the ideal. The only element in the 
dream that can be linked to the present of the dramatic action is "a 
bird in a cage". (When Macit mentions a pet bird in a cage in their 
future home, FOruzan suddenly gets sad and tells her fiance that she 
doesn't like birds in a cage, she wants them to fly freely. ) The author 
doesn't make any analogy between the figure of a bird in a cage and 
FOruzan sitting at home while his husband is having fun, but the 
analogy forces its way into one's mind as soon as it is mentioned. 50 
Moreover, it remains unaccounted why FOruzan chooses not to fly 
away to her freedom but retains her waiting position in the present 
crisis. When Rezzan calls her late that night to hint that Macit may be 
having an affair with a woman -this is a mean game to hurt FCjruzan 
since Rezzan is the woman having an affair with Macit- FOruzan 
replies serenely: "A woman does not lose anything by being tolerant". 
Macit, on the other hand, does not reflect on the situation. In his 
secret affair with Rezzan which is referred to even when they are 
together in the family setting, he seems passionate. When Rezzan 
and Macit are alone in the living room while FCjruzan is in the kitchen 
cooking the dinner, they lead a highly erotic dialogue. He seems to 
have forgotten all about his family. He does not respond to the 
question raised by Rezzan as to whether he sees his wife as menace. 
To her question about his relationship with his daughter, he replies 
bU Of course, this is my reading and different readings can make different meanings out 
of this. However, there is no apparent reason in the text why FOruzan's emotional reaction 
to a bird in a cage is mentioned in the flashback. This can be treated as a clue for 
"something" given the highly symbolic structure of the text. 
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that he likes her but not more than Rezzan. He seems to be in a state 
of "passionate illness" (a recurring theme that I have touched upon in 
the analysis of the previous radio drama) which hinders any reflection 
on the situation. 
One day the Aunt comes for a visit. First there is the conversation 
of the two elderly women, the mother-in-law and the aunt. Although 
they share the painful symptoms of old age, they do not agree on the 
interpretation of the present "crisis" in the family. The mother-in-law 
believes that it is only natural for a man to have an extra-marital 
relationship, especially if he is handsome and prosperous (which she 
thinks his son is and is proud of that). The aunt does not believe that 
all men (should) cheat their wives, to which she gives her late 
husband as an example. The mother-in-law, in her mean attitude 
replies: "Men walk on snow and never leave a trace" which echoes a 
traditional truth in women's world. 
The aunt then talks to FDruzan. Her advice is simple: 
The Aunt: It is the woman's role to work for the survival of a 
marriage. Most of the times she will have to make sacrifices. 
A wise woman manages to lead the family out of a crisis. To 
forgive is part of the honor of womanhood. After all, Macit is 
your husband. And you also have to think of your child. 
FOruzan: I wish sometimes fathers also thought of their children. 
The Aunt: Men are like children. You have to manage them. 
FCjruzan: What is considered shameful for women loses its 
significance when men do it. 
The Aunt: What can you do about it? It has always been like this. 
So, don't busy yourself with these profound questions. And 
don't forget that being sad and nervous can be detrimental 
to your health and beauty. You need strength for your 
struggle. 
FOruzan: Struggle? 
The Aunt: To struggle is one of the rights or rather duties of a 
woman. But this struggle should aim for happiness and 
salvation. I will be with you in your struggle. 
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The conversation is. significant for the meaning of the word 
9C struggle". I will come back to it. In the dramatic action itself, the 
"struggle" of FOruzan is nothing more than her demand to talk with 
her husband, "to talk about everything openly": 
FCjruzan: Can't you stay at home tonight? 
Macit: No, I have things to do... 
FOruzan: I want to talk. 
Macit: No, I don't have time ... 
FCjruzan: You can't do that ... 
Macit: Why? Don't I have the right to enjoy myself? 
FCjruzan: What about me? Don't I have the right too? Don't 
women and men, both have the right? 
Macit: Either you accept the situation or... 
FCjruzan: Be careful Macit. If it was not for my child I would have 
left but I have a child ... (we hear the sound of the piano 
played by Omit). To be a mother means responsibilities... 
Tell your lover that the struggle has started. We will all play 
the game openly now. 
We as listeners don't know whatever forms the "struggle" takes in 
FOruzan's life. What we know at the end is the happy family reunion. 
The voice-over tells us that FOruzan's "struggle took less time and 
energy than she initially thought". "Now" it is ten years after the crisis. 
FOruzan and Macit are listening to radio together. There is, on radio, a 
live relay of a music festival in Europe, in which their daughter 
performs a "classical" piece. The parents are extremely happy that 
their daughter has proven her talent in Europe. Macit praises his wife: 
Macit: She is a product of yours, your achievement. You are a 
wonderful woman and a wonderful mother. I owe my 
honour, my professional status, and my daughter's success 
to you. You are a hero. If it was not for your maturity, I 
would have led astray. Your aunt was right: "A woman who 
can forgive is a complete woman. " 
FOruzan: There are many women who do this. 
Macit: But you are special and dear to me. 
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We have several definitions of womanhood throughout the play. 
The basic opposition is between a "traditional" and "modern" woman, 
which are represented by the mother-in-law and the aunt. They are 
types rather than characters with a name. The mother-in-law despises 
the modern way of life, which can be heard in her several comments 
about new ways of child raising, taking them to cinema and theatre, 
and to seaside. She cannot understand why a girl should take piano 
lessons. She assumes an authoritarian position over other women in 
the family, over FOruzan and the servant Fatma. She represents an 
old style of authority, typical authority of elder women in family life. On 
the other hand, the Aunt represents a new type of authority. She is 
wise and understanding; she practices her authority through 
"communication". She symbolically assumes a role very similar to 
radio. Her authority wins against the traditional one since her 
comments are more influential in the resolution of the "crisis". 
However, a closer look at the content of the controversy makes it 
apparent that, in fact, they are not saying anything different with 
regard to the "crisis". The mother-in-law claims that women should be 
tolerant; the aunt says that women should struggle. But the struggle 
means for a woman, according to her, to forgive a man. 
This is a very interesting replacement. The traditional 
significance of womanhood is converted into a modern one through a 
replacement of words. However, the limits of the "new" is set by the 
limits of the meaning of "struggle", which evokes a new discourse but 
also an acceptance of established roles for women. The boundary 
management that employs the concept of "struggle", both with its 
associations to national reforms, and its restrained and confined 
meanings, points to the ambivalence in the national discourse on 
women. It provides a perfect example for a "change without change". 
The play also sets up "lessons" in modernity: a model of an ideal 
marriage and child care with reference to the new techniques and 
objects (such as radio) in everyday life. However, the most important 
lesson is about "crisis management" for women. Traditional 
knowledge, represented by the mother-in-law for example, is 
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transformed into a modern discourse, on how to manage a husband, 
as it acquires an almost scientific character. Here we see a 
disembodiment of traditional knowledge which is then processed by 
the techniques of pedagogy and psychology and presented as "new". 
While the role of women is problematised both practically and 
conceptually, the role of men remains constant in the play. The shifts 
in the character of Macit are not accounted for. His oscillation between 
"sexuality" and "family duties" (which are opposed to each other) is 
not reflected on. He shifts from one to the other without any inner 
contradictions or responsibility for his decisions. Hence the dynamics 
of his personality remain unknown. While he is the only person who is 
really active in the play (in so far as he does things that changes the 
course of events), there is no reflexivity that would make us know 
more about him as an acting subject. To the extent that the male 
subject does not know anything about himself he is led by different 
women. He is a weakling, a "child". ("All men are like children" said 
the Aunt). He becomes a blind spot in the text. 
The play defines the contours of the duties and rights of women 
in "modern" life. It exhibits dialogic references to other discourses on 
women, such as feminism (which is evoked by the sentences that 
stress the equality of men and women) but contains and refutes them 
in its dramatic action. There are also references to being accepted in 
the West -the "hope" that contributes to the resolution of the "crisis" 
and which is represented by Omit's "success" in Europe. Yet the 
semantic authority of the author cannot account for the blind spots, 
namely FOruzan's close resemblance to a "bird in a cage" or Macit's 
non-knowledge of himself. As the drama tries to walk on the tight rope 
set by the word "struggle", it gives unintended or surplus clues to 
reflect on gender and nationality. The fact that the play was written by 
a woman manifests itself by going more deeply into the internal world 
of women, which remained untouched in many other radio dramas 
that treated women merely as symbols. Nevertheless the author 
speaks from a hegemonic male perspective on the roles of women. 
Both radio dramas, that I have analysed in this chapter, are 
significant in their "restrained" character. Contrary to several stage 
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dramas of the period5l , they avoid collisions and conflicts. The final 
harmony envisioned in their portrayal of gender relations have to be 
thought in the context of radio broadcasting. The make-believe 
fantasy of radio, that substitutes sound for the reality of the bodies, 
implies the role of technology in the Occidentalist boundary 
management which goes against the existing divisions in the social 
and redefines them in the more flexible soundscape of national 
imagination. 
But these dramas also bring to view the splits and gaps in the 
imagined gendered identities which cannot be accounted in terms of 
the fantasies, The surplus of meanings evoked by these fantasies 
gives clues to understand how change and stability were conceived of 
in Turkish national discourse. While change was associated with 
words and talking -and the technology of talking- it was made 
redundant by the stable figures of women which stood exterior to the 
discourse of change. The male subjectivity in power, could not reflect 
back on itself. Finally it rendered itself as a child which avoided 
contradictions and mature sexuality, and sought forgiveness and 
harmony in the mythical mother figure of the woman which signified 
national virtue. The male power in early Turkish history that denied 
reality which seemed to obstruct its unlimited creativity and power 
could only signify itself in its submission to the all-encompassing 
mother figure. 
I have argued before that in early Turkish nationalism the fantasy 
of the nation could not be accounted and legitimised in a "rational" 
framework. The analysis of radio drama on Turkish Radio shows that 
imagining the nation meant the disavowal of both the past and the 
present. The Occidentalist fantasy articulated itself by imagining an 
origin anterior to time and social change which was symbolised in the 
figure of the woman. Psychoanalytically, this denotes the narcissistic 
illusions of the elite -based on the denial of any differences with the 
bI And (1983) gives an account of almost all plays staged either by National Theatre or 
by other groups, from 1923. These plays showed a great variety They were either 
adaptations of Western plays or specifically written for stage by Turkish authors. Their 
subject-matters also varied. Many dramas on family life portrayed "devilish" figures of 
women who cheated their husbands, became prostitutes etc. And the plays usually had 
tragic endings such as suicide or murder which were not allowed on radio. 
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West and the people, and also on the denial of the paternal 
significance of the past regime. 52 Radio voices, in this context, on one 
hand experimented with the instruments of modern-Western 
technology to stage the fantasy of the nation. However, the ego boost 
that was partially availed by the fantasy work, was undermined by its 
pale images that failed to construct a reality of its own accord. Thus, 
on the other hand, the elite sought shelter in "eternal" origins. They 
attempted to ground their projections of a Westernised truth in the 
"essential" truth of the mother. 
52 Lasch argues that "(T)he absolute reign of the son implies, as its latent content, union 
with the mother -a union, that is, that acknowledges no impediments, in the form of 
paternal prohibitions or even in the form of a paternal presence, to its consummation .... In the modern world, groups seem to find their dominant fantasy not in submission to the 
father but in collective reunion with the mother. " (1985: xiii, xv) 
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CONCLUSION 
The Instruments of Occidentalism 
I have argued in the previous chapters that every attempt to 
define, build and demarcate Turkish national identity on radio was 
shaped in reference to an imagined Western-ness and for the 
Western gaze. This is the fantasy of Occidentalism. Furthermore, 
becoming Western was associated with certain spaces and groups in 
power and endorsed internal divisions based on gender, region and 
ethnicity. Radio technology provided the means to produce and 
sustain an Occidentalist fantasy that both denied and re-defined 
divisions in the national realm. Occidentalism was the product of, and 
figured in, the processes of subject-constitution of the non-West, 
which was labeled by Said as the "silent Other' in Ofientalism (1995). 
1 have attended to various aspects of radio broadcasting in early 
Turkish history and the BBC Turkish Service, mainly during the 
Second World War, to demonstrate the dialogic link of the fantasies of 
the West and the East. I explored some instances of these 
encounters, especially by examining the relation between the audio 
significations of national identity on radio with accounts of the truth of 
national identity that were manifested in statements and practices. 
My research focused on a period when the concern to both join 
"Western civilisation" and, at the same time, to create a distinct 
Turkish identity was most intense. However, the "reality" that could 
not be signified within the Occidentalist fantasy was a disturbing 
factor for the national elite. The gap was made more evident by radio 
broadcasting that operated with sound images and produced 
"immaterial" effects. Today in Turkey, there are several private and 
local radio stations. The announcers and DJ's speak in various styles 
and accents, ranging from "American" to "Anatolian". The anxiety of 
producing a "correct" and "unified" Turkish seems to have vanished. 
Yet the audio significations of what is considered as Western today 
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still are not in perfect harmony with those "Oriental" audial or visual 
images. One can hear the Islamic prayer, in Arabic, coming from the 
mosques five times a day, together with Western pop music songs 
rising from shops, cars, and personal music sets. Or one can hop on 
a bus driven by a "traditional looking" male (women bus drivers are 
very rare) and hear information recorded by a "civilised" woman 
voice. The struggles of identity' are more vivid in the Turkish 
soundscape today. Still the desire to be Western -in all its complexity 
of contempt/ idealisation, self -den ig ration, and gendering the national 
and the Western- persists. It is possible to observe several instances, 
especially in a political climate where the relations of Turkey with the 
European Union are most strained, in which the Occidentalist fantasy 
still manifests itself against the reproduced and redefined 
Orientalness. The much awaited synthesis between the Orient and 
the Occident has not materialised. 
I had to draw on wide range of sources and disciplines to 
formulate the framework of the thesis which brought to view a series 
of problematic areas that are worthy of further research. Yet despite 
the fact that my research had to exclude in depth analysis of some 
areas, especially the historically specific configurations of politics and 
economy, I believe it contributes a new perspective to deal with the 
dynamics of Occidentalism. This is significant in face of persistent 
theories that still argue for independent histories of the West and the 
Orient; or a synthesis of the two in Turkey as if the constituents of 
being Western or Oriental are independent and movable elements in 
history. 2 Or against those, both in Turkey and in Europe, that see 
1 Kadioýlu states that following the military coup in 1980, "a trend was set in Turkey 
towards challenging the early Kernalist principles. Such a trend was set in the aftermath of 
the 1982 Constitution which curbed the number of categories of the state elites, that is, 
the appointed rather than elected bureaucratic and military elites ... The political climate 
that prevailed in the 1980s and the early 1990s has opened the Kernalist Pandora's box 
out which have emerged multiple identities... " (1996: 189). The late 80's and all of the 
90's have witnessed a struggle of various identities, in movements such as "ferninism", 
"political Islam" , "Kurdish liberation" and 
"Alevi opposition", which contest the limits of the 
"national culture" defined by the early Kernalists. The identity politics is manifested in 
listening to music whose "appropriation and control is a reflection of power, that is 
essentially political" (Attali, 1985: 6). 
2 For example, Andrew Davison (1998) concludes his recent article on G6kalp praising the 
culture/civilisation conceptual frame for offering a better alternative for the future of 
humanity. According to him, a "different" culture can be accommodated within the same 
"civil isation", read Western civilisation. 
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"local culture", coloured by Islamic fundamentalism, as an element 
that hinders "full Western isation". 31 hope to have shown by now that 
the signifiers of the Orient and Occident cannot be posed in a binary 
opposition. They shift in a political context determined by power 
relations, and re-produce the political discourses of Orientalism and 
Occidentalism, as well as bearing on being a subject. There is no 
"real thing", be it the West or the East. I have also shown that the 
culture/civilisation frame of the Turkish nationalists was not 
independent from the imposed Westernisation, or the tide of 
capitalism and nationalism. The Western discourse of universalism 
advanced subtle negotiations of "sameness" and "difference", as can 
be seen in the BBC Turkish Service strategies. Thus the need for the 
deconstruction of the divide between culture and civilisation, and 
consequently between values/ideas and technology must be 
apparent. 
Furthermore, my research brought to view an understudied realm 
-that of voice and sound- in thinking about identities. This is 
especially significant due to the often cited and criticised equation of 
the West with "voice" and the East with "silence" (Moore-Gilbert, 
1997: 104). Yet Occidentalism was not silent. As I have shown, the 
speaking "national subject" on Turkish radio, which was regarded as 
the "voice" of the nation, provided rich sources to demonstrate how 
Occidentalism was articulated and exercised, and what instruments, 
conceptual or technical, were made use of. Occidentalism manifested 
itself in the very act of talking of what Said called the "silent Other'. 
The Turkish elite imagined that by talking, on radio in particular, they 
could build a unified nation in the idealised image of "Western 
civilisation". "Civilisation" and "Western culture" were operationalised 
by electrical technical means in contrast to nature -the essence of 
Turkishness- which was mainly associated with children and women. 
3A group of people who call themselves "laicists" in Turkey today argue against "Islamic 
fundamentalism" which they think takes Turkey "backward" in modernity. Bernard Lewis 
puts it as a choice between "democracy and fundamentalism" which has a direct bearing 
on another choice between "inward and outward modernization". "Outward modernization 
means accepting the devices, the amenities, the conveniences provided by Western 
science and industry while rejecting what are seen as pernicious Western 
values ... outward modernization means 
buying and firing a gun. Inward modernization 
means learning to manufacture and ultimately design one. " (1997: 46) 
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This conveyed the gendered link between a certain projection of the 
West in the Turkish national imagination and the actual Western 
instruments that were employed to facilitate and disseminate an 
"authentic" national voice on radio. The voice had attributes of a 
69 maternal voice", as I have shown in Chapters 5 and 6, that fulfilled 
the longing to belong to an "essential origin" for those who have 
denied their fathers (the past) and set foot on bewildering, rapid 
changes. 4 
However, the emphasis on "voice" does not represent a "coming 
to voice" of the subaltern (Spivak, 1993). Nor does voice, as G69ek 
and Balaghi argue, be directly connected to the experience of the 
subject by advantaging "the text of the subject over that of the 
interpreter" (1994: 1). To the extent that Turkish radio assigned itself 
the task of governing the masses, educating and shaping their 
conduct in the newly emerging "national life", radio broadcasting 
actively took part , or at least presumed to, in the consolidation of an 
authoritarian power regime in Turkey which paradoxically silenced a 
large proportion of the population. Therefore, the sound images of 
national identity and the specific procedures of embodiment and 
disembodiment, such as sound effects and music through radio 
broadcasting are important questions to tackle further in future 
research. The production and perception of voice -intonation, 
elocution, tone, inflections and rhythm- need to be addressed. This 
should also involve theoretical questions on the registers of the 
subjeCt5 , which, according to Lacoue-Labarthe, has been theorised 
mostly at the level of the specular ignoring the audible (1989). 
Turkish Radio's complicity with, and its link to a highly 
centralised and non-democratic power regime also complicate its 
representative status as being simply the Other of the West. The 
Orient, that figures in Said's Orientalism as a constructed and 
unified Other appears in this context as a site of struggle which does 
4 It could be interesting to think if "the West" represented an aspired father figure for the 
Turkish national elite. 
5 Roland Barthes writes on the "voyage of body" through language, in its different 
registers. He points to a "difficult voyage" of speech in broadcasting that is "at the same 
time original and transcribable, ephemeral and memorable", and which brings "a striking 
interest" (1985: 7). 
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not only challenge, displace and modify the hegemony of the West by 
its own practices, but generates and names its own Others within its 
specific regime of power. So one problem that my thesis centres on 
but which needs further reflection in terms of the scope of postcolonial 
theory is the power-stricken area of boundary management within 
Turkish nationalism which is engendered by the historical division of 
the West and non-West. This is especially significant since the 
Turkish case which fails to fit into a neat category of either belonging 
to the East or to the West (and is reckoned to be a bridge between 
East and West) has remained invisible both to Western scholarship 
and to postcolonial criticism. 6 Although Said's account of Orientalism 
has been criticised by some later postcolonial critics, such as 
Bhabha (1994), Pathak et al. (199 1) and Young (1990), for its too 
monologic conceptions of both the West and the Orient, not much 
account has been taken of how a combination of internalised 
Orientalism and Occidentalism established the very basis of power in 
the Turkish case. While most postcolonial critics, such as Bhabha and 
Spivak dwelled on the dynamics of "interruption" of Western 
hegemony by the narratives of what is called the Orient; the 
"dedication" to Western modernity in Turkish nationalism was taken 
for granted by many scholars. 
The Turkish case has attracted mostly the attention of 
modernisation theorists and not of the postcolonial critics. This ties in 
with the primary reason of its invisibility which is based on the idea 
that Turkey was Westernised without being colonised. For example, 
Gellner argues the Turkish case is unique in the sense that "Turkey 
... can claim that 
its commitment to modern political ideas owes 
nothing to alien imposition, and everything to an endogeneous 
6 Although Turkey does not really fit into a postcolonial model due to the fact it was never 
overtly colonised, and also because of the complications of its own colonial past; it is still 
possible to argue that it is more or less a proper object for postcolonial criticism if we 
accept Moore-Gilbert's broad definition: "In my view, postcolonial criticism can still be seen 
as a more or less distinct set of reading practices, if it is understood as preoccupied 
principally with analysis of cultural forms which mediate, challenge or reflect upon the 
relations of domination and subordination -economic, cultural and political- between (and 
often within) nations, races or cultures, which characteristically have their roots in the 
history of modern European colonialism and imperialism and which, equally, 
characteristically, continue to be apparent in the present era of neo-colonialism. " (1997: 
12) 
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development. Turkey chose its destiny. It achieved political modernity: 
it was not thrust upon it. " (Gellner, 1994: 82) For Gellner the 
commitment to elective and constitutional government testifies for this. 
The military coups, in his view, although signs of not an "easy ride" in 
liberal democracy, were just necessary lapses in democracy since 
they have always ensured that democracy is eventually restored. In 
this approach, the compromises in democracy, and a whole history of 
suffering that accompanied them, are shadowed as negligible while 
the commitment to Westernisation is privileged. However, as I have 
tried to argue so far, "Western isation" is a discourse that is generated 
by unequal power relations, not only between the West and Turkey, 
but also between the Turkish elite and its Others. Western scholars' 
either easy celebration of Turkey's modernising potential or their 
neglect of the particular conditions of translation of Western 
discourses in Turkey erect an invisible barrier against questioning 
some conditions and consequences of Western modernity itself. The 
Turkish "replica" of Western modernity is either taken too literally or is 
regarded as not worthy of comment. By this thesis I hope to draw 
some future attention to the material, discursive and psych oanalytical 
aspects of the production of the "replica" in Turkey, as well as to the 
intricate link between the "original" and the "replica". 
The status of Turkey is further complicated by the fact that 
Ottoman Empire was itself a colonising force. The power regime in 
the Ottoman Empire was highly centralised but flexible enough to 
hold different ethnic and religious communities over a large territory 
from Balkans to the Arabic peninsula under control by allowing some 
cultural autonomy to each community. The peculiar mechanisms and 
rationale of Ottoman rule in its colonies is a vast subject for Turkish 
and Western scholars. 7 The major challenge to the Ottoman rule 
came from the West starting from the eighteenth century. The invasion 
of Western sciences, know-how and artifacts, which contested Islamic 
7 An Italian theorist, Boccalini, wrote back in the sixteenth century that "Turkey brought to 
life and exemplified what the political thought of the Renaissance had always been 
striving after: an artificial construction which had been consciously and purposely built up, 
a State mechanism which was arranged like a clock, and which made use of the various 
species and strengths and qualities of men as its springs and wheels. " (in Gordon, 
1991: 11) 
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and traditional ways of life. and invoked the existence of a "lack", was 
accompanied by actual Western enterprises that established and 
monopolised certain trades and industries. 8 Thereafter Ottoman rule 
underwent a period of decline which can be described as the 
colonisation of the coloniser. The impact of this period , either the 
Western colonisation of Ottoman life or the problem of the Ottoman 
colonies, were not openly addressed in the Kemalist discourse9 that 
reigned after the foundation of the Turkish Republic. The Kemalist 
rupture that tried to set a zero point in time has contributed to the 
predominant ambivalent attitude towards both the West and the 
Ottoman past in Turkey. Akin to the maneuvre of the Kemalist tradition 
which rendered the dynamics of the colonisation of the coloniser 
Ottoman invisible, Western scholarship has also not fully addressed 
the complexities involved. 
It then becomes worthwhile to ponder on Said's omission of 
Turkey in Orientalism given his critical investigation of Western 
conceptions of the non-West. Said does not only skip the long 
Ottoman history which has been an object of Orientalist visions of 
desire and derision which can be depicted in many areas such as 
bI have discussed in Chapter 1 that the Western capital infiltrated the Ottoman social, 
economic and political life starting from the nineteenth century. The low tariff rates in trade 
during the Tanzimat era led to a flood of imported European goods which dealt a blow on 
local small craft industries (Mardin, 1990: 89). Economic capitulations given to Western 
powers and the treaties that endowed European merchants with economic privileges 
reduced the Turkish government to the status of 'the gendarmes of foreign capital"' 
(F. Ahmad, 1993: 93). In addition to economic colonisation, the social life was also 
colonised due to factors such as the constitution of Western schools and organisations, 
the invasion of Western technologies and ideas (Davison, 1990), and the political power 
enjoyed by Western embassies (F. Ahmad, 1993: 41). Tuncay makes the point that, 
despite the nationalist struggle against foreign privileges, the position of "foreigners" in 
economic, social and political life, in the first ten years after the foundation of the 
Republic, was not dramatically altered (1981: 198). 
9 The only exception to this is a group of Kernalist intellectuals around the journal Kadro, 
which began publication in 1932 and was forced to suspend publication in 1934. 
According to F. Ahmad, their aim was the creation of "an ideology original to the regime" 
(1993: 65). They dwelled on the economic and political aspects of colonialism and 
reckoned their ideology to be useful for all colonies and semi-colonies (a term they used 
to define the Turkish past). They emphasised the "original character' of the Turkish 
revolution (Ibid). One of the prominent members of Kadro, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoolu, 
whose comments I have cited in the thesis, has continued to be an almost haunting 
critical voice of Kernalist reforms through his novels and essays. 
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philosophical essays, travel-writing and art10, but also does not 
address the complications of "the defeat of Turkey and the West's 
appropriation of its former imperial possessions" (Moore-Gilbert, 
1997: 52) after the First World One, the period which Said considers 
to be one when the Orient increasingly "appeared to constitute a 
challenge ... to the West's spirit, knowledge and imperium". (Said, 
1995: 248) Said primarily sites the "Oriental" Other in the Arabic 
world to where he partially belongs, and his omission of the Turkish 
case implies that Turkey stands in a very problematic relationship to 
the Arab world, the Ottoman Empire being the former colonial power 
in Palestine. This may reflect Said's own ambivalence to the history of 
Ottoman colonisation of Palestine: the Ottoman Empire disrupts the 
binary oppositions of East and West, Coloniser and Colonised that 
informed his analysis. Yet Said refers to Turkey in a later text (1983) 
on Auerbach; but only to emphasise the extreme conditions of 
Auerbach's exile in Istanbul in the 40's which made his work, 
Mimesis, possible". In this passage, the non-Occidental traits of 
Turkey gain more prominence than the fact that it was an object of 
OrientaliSM12, leaving one with the afterthought that maybe in this 
work, Said is looking from the point of view of the West. Said's 
approach to the "Orient" seems to have been split between feelings of 
belonging to and a Western look of denigration of the "Orient" which 
becomes more apparent in his account of Turkey. This brings Said 
closer to Occidentalism, rather than what Sadek al- 'Azm called as 
"Orientalism in reverse" (1981). 
IU Alain Grosrichard studies the European fantasies of the East focusing on the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century writings on Ottoman Empire. He analyses the 
Western image of "Oriental despotism" in terms of the Lacanian concept of fantasy. 
Mladen Dolar, in his introduction to the English translation of the book, states that "Said 
consciously limits himself to the Arab world, the Near East, while Grosrichard's sources 
mostly treat the Ottoman Empire (still a very real threat at that time). " (1998) 
11 "The book owed its existence to the very fact of Oriental, non-Occidental exile and 
homelessness. " (Said, 1983: 7-8) 
12 "Throughout the classical period of European culture Turkey was the Orient, Islam its 
most redoubtable and aggressive representative. This was not all, though. The Orient 
and Islam also stood for the ultimate alienation from and opposition to Europe, the 
European tradition of Christian Latinity, as well as to the putative authority of ecclesia, 
humanistic learning, and cultural community. For centuries Turkey and Islam hung over 
Europe like a gigantic composite monster, seeming to threaten Europe with destruction. 
To have been an exile in Istanbul at that time of fascism in Europe was a deeply 
resonating and intense form of exile from Europe. " (Said, 1983: 6, emphasis added) 
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While Turkey appears as the perfect example of non-Occident 
for Said in the above passage, it has other connotations. Turkey 
represents the West for the Arabic world while the Arabic world 
represents the East for Turkey which is itself the East of Europe. Thus, 
Arabic culture has been an inferior Other for Turkish national 
identity. 13 The equation of being Western and Turkish at the same 
time was only possible by the existence of a third variable, that of 
being against the Arabic culture. A Kemalist spokesperson Atay wrote 
in his memoirs that "... to be Westernised meant at the same time to 
escape from being Arabicised; it meant being Turkified. " (1969: 446) 
The hidden and inferior Other for Turkish "nation", Arabicisation14 , 
still plays itself out in contemporary Turkey, for example in the 
denigration of popular arebesk music. 15 The long and complex 
history of the emergence of national identities and othering in the 
Middle East is a huge and separate topic which lies beyond the 
scope of my thesis. However it is still possible to argue that the blind 
point in Said's account, as well as Atay's peculiar definition of 
Westernisation are symptoms of a masked interdependency of 
Orientalism and Occidentalism which unsettles easy identifications of 
power positions. The complication can be partly addressed by an 
account of Occidentalism in Turkey, which was, and still is, a 
IJ According to Sayyid, Kemalists could only westernise by repressing the oriental within 
themselves. The principles of Kemalism show how they "operated vis-cý-vis the opposition 
between the West and its other -and on which side of this 'violent hierarchy' they wanted 
to position themselves" (Sayyid, 1997: 68) 
14 The concept of Arabicisation here represents not only the influence of the actual 
Arabic culture(s) but refers to the culture(s) of the "uneducated masses" whatever their 
origins were. I have pointed to examples of this replacement in the thesis in Chapters 3 
and 5 in debates on "national" music and family life respectively. Ko9ak argues that the 
"internationalisation" of Turkey was an escape from East to West in order to guard against 
"Arabicisation/Calibanisation". (Kogak, 1995: 239). One can also argue, in reverse, that in 
order to deny its cultural colonisation of the people, Turkish nationalism disavows the 
history of subordination by the West. By its too quick identification with the West, it 
nurtures and consolidates its power over the "inferior' or "dangerous" others. 
15 Martin Stokes argues that arabesk music is associated with the southern border of 
Turkey -the border that separates Turkish territory from Syria. However the myth of the 
"South" has little to explain about the history of the genre. It has more to do with centres 
of cultural production in Turkey. Yet the way arabesk is positioned points to the complex 
history of the border area, especially Hatay -annexed to Turkish territory in 1936- where 
Arabs and Turks have close encounters, and to the often gendered significations of the 
border. Stokes demonstrates how arabesk "has a vital role to play in bridging the gap 
between nationalism and its all too visible limits" (11998: 284). Stokes also gives an 
account of the "arabesk debate" in Turkey in a previous book (1992). 
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discourse in which Western power was both contested and 
established within a complex relationship to the West. 16 
Occidentalism functioned as an answering practice against a 
projected West, but also contributed to a form of government of the 
domestic population warding off against those "inferior others" 
defined by ethnic, regional and gender divisions. My thesis focused 
on the idea that Occidentalism that manifested itself in the specific 
conditions of radio broadcasting was itself instrumental in imagining a 
modern form of government, as well as defining the identity of the 
governors and the governed. "Western isation " in Turkey was an effect 
of creating new ways of addressing and managing the population in 
addition to the actual employment of Western artifacts. Yet the 
modern form of government envisaged by the Turkish elite and 
practiced by Turkish radio diverges in many respects from Western 
case as manifested in the comparison of the BBC and Turkish Radio. 
The truth manufactured by the BBC, although itself based on a play of 
force lines, was taken to be the natural truth, while the Turkish 
broadcasters were in a position of negotiating various truths which 
led to an apparent split in the manifestation of what was called the 
truth on Turkish nationality. The divergence is critical and can only be 
meaningfully addressed if it is contextualised within the history of the 
Turkish "nation" in relation to its Others, both the West and the East. 
The particular logic of nationalist discourse that informed radio 
16 One can refer to several examples in Turkish national history up to date that point to 
the tension stricken relationship with Europe: When Turkey joined the NATO alliance 
after the Second World War a Turkish statesmen said that this "filled Turkish hearts with 
pride and exaltation. They were no longer 'outsiders'. They were at least part of the 
West. " After the military coup of 1980, the general who seized the political power, 
ironically, commented that "Turkey is an integral part of democratic and free Europe and 
intends to remain so. " When Greece was accepted to the EEC, a Turkish newspaper 
wrote: "They have become Europeans and we have remained Asians. " The feeling of 
inferiority triggered by Greece's membership was addressed by a Turkish academic and 
politician in a significant remark : "This is the most opportune time to rid ourselves of the 
complex of 'being considered European'.. We are Turks from Turkey . Turkey is a country 
with one bank in Europe and the other in Asia. The same thing can be said of our 
geography and culture. We must realise this and accept this as such and we must turn 
this embarrassment into a sense of superiority. " (all cited in Kushner, 1984: 234-40) 
(emphasis added) Finally the remark of Turgut bzal, the prime minister of the first elected 
government after the 1980 military coup and a president afterwards, who has been 
regarded as the architect of market economy in Turkey reflects on the tension in an 
interesting way: "Turkey is not alien to Europe, as is the popular belief, but is her alter 
ego, her complementary identity. " (cited in Robins, 1996: 80, emphasis added) 
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broadcasting in early Turkish history, which often was assessed in 
terms of an absolute (the West) and was found to be lacking as I have 
discussed through the thesis, can only be derived from the set of 
crises it went through. 17 The Turkish national elite tried to 
compensate the historical "lack" projected unto them by the West, by 
appropriating the means of Western civilisation, which meant 
techniques and artifacts. This was to be combined with "authentic" 
Turkish culture which found its grounding and legitimacy in an 
"essential" Turkish nature. However, there were a set of crises 
involving the use of techniques and technological means. 
Technology, including radio broadcasting, was not neutral. 
Technologies were designed by and attempted to incorporate a 
certain vision of social relations. 18 What is at stake, for example, in 
Turkish broadcasters' interaction with microphones is not a direct and 
unmediated link with a technological apparatus. 19 The microphone 
linked the body to the world, while at the same time translating it into 
a codification of voice and language. Speaking to the microphone 
was reckoned to be a new discipline which had to be taught to the 
broadcasters. In "the age of radio", a new "radio language" had to be 
crafted, and for this usually Western examples were taken as 
models. 20 Speaking on radio was not a natural thing, it was different 
from both writing and speaking in everyday life. The new language 
that was developed, modified and problematised for and on radio 
also altered the meaning of the speaking subject and his or her 
addressee. Radio was meant to speak to a mass of people. This 
I/I use Deleuze's statement as a starting point here: "... the logic of a thought (pens6e) is 
the set of crises it goes through. " (From Pourparlers, cited in Rajchmann, 1991: 5) 
18 Deleuze says that "the machines are social before being technical. Or, rather, there is 
a human technology which exists before a material technology. " (1988: 39) 
19 "Talking to the world through the microphone" is a phrase repeated in many memoirs 
of early Turkish broadcasters. For example, one of the first announcers of Istanbul Radio 
in 1927, Eýref ýefik says: "I was very tense in the first announcement because my voice 
was going to be heard in the world, because everybody was going to hear it. It was just 
going to be like what happens when we listen to the Rome or Paris Radio. " Ankara Radio 
Sound Archives, "TOrkiye Radyolarinda Yarim YOzyil", YOcel Ertugay, TRT Radio 
Programme, 1975. 
20 Nurettin Artam wrote in the radio journal that the British had mastered in this art of 
speaking to the microphone: "In Britain there are approximately 28 different kinds of 
speaking. Now a 29th has been added to this: Speaking on radio. " Radyo, Vol. 2, No. 16, 
15 March 1943, p. l. 
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closely ties in with the idea of "mass communication" through which 
the formation of the audience as a single totality occurs. What we 
might call the "total i sation" of the audience through radio enhanced 
the notion of the nation as a unified and homogeneous entity as has 
been discussed by commentators on the history of mass 
communication. 21 The employment of radio broadcasting for this end 
was problematic in Turkey. Radio technology, one hand fostered the 
imagination of speaking to the nation, but it introduced fears of 
'cvulgarisation" on the other. Technological imagination -the 
imagination already implied by the design of the technological 
apparatus- was to be modern/Western. However, the "social diagram" 
in Deleuze's term (1988)22, in which the technology was deployed 
was not congruent with the imagination. 
Therefore, I wish to further reflect on my working hypothesis: the 
connection between communication and government. Similar to 
Foucault's description of modern government -a government which is 
simultaneously "totalising" and "individualising" (in Gordon, 1991: 3) 
- radio broadcasting addresses all and each at the same time; it both 
totalises and individualises the audience. 23 In this there lies a 
significant crisis of early Turkish radio broadcasting. The 
21 Scannell argues that the definition of broadcasting as a public utility in the form of a 
national service came from the state in Britain. Broadcasting aimed to construct a unified 
national space and time. For example, the live relay of national ceremonies and functions 
aimed to foster national unity. The first time the king was heard on radio in Britain was 
reckoned by the BBC to be a step in "making the nation as one man" (Scannell, 1990: 14) 
The subordination of the local to the centre, of the specialized departments to the central 
authority, can be clearly observed in Scannell's research about the music policy of the 
BBC (1990). Schlesinger also discusses the role of communication in national integration, 
mapping out different perspectives on media and nationality (1991). Hilmes gives an 
account of American radio broadcasting in a framework that relates media to national 
imagination, not only in terms of integration but of discrimination along race and gender 
(1997). 
22 Deleuze defines "social diagram" as "a map, a cartography that is coextensive with the 
whole social field. It is an abstract machine. It is defined by its informal functions and 
matter and in terms of form which makes no distinction between content and expression, 
a discursive formation and a non-discursive formation. It is a machine that is almost blind 
and mute, even though it makes others see and speak. " (1988: 34) 
23 The hints for presenters on radio, in a section called "A to Z of Presentation" in a 
recent book on radio broadcasting make this point clear. For example: "K Do not forget 
to have a positive attitude to communicating on the radio. You have to enjoy talking to 
people and listening to people. You must be interested in what you are talking about, or 
people will switch off ... P: Why 
do people listen to voices on the radio? What are they 
hoping for? What do they appreciate? And how do they listen? You need to understand 
that listening is an individual experience. " (Crook, 1998: 114-5). 
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technological imagination Ahat radio broadcasting made available to 
its speaking subjects, that is of speaking to the world, speaking to all 
and each, was constantly interrupted by the avoidance of 
communication with certain groups in the social make-up. I have 
shown in Chapters 5 and 6 that the talks and dramas on Turkish radio 
were geared to address an imaginary audience modeled on the idea 
of a "Westernised society" and avoided a "realistic" portrayal of the 
complexity of the history and culture of the population, as well as the 
cultural heritage of the Ottoman past. The representation of the 
people as a nation on radio was deliberately based on fiction rather 
than documentation, in contrast, for example, to the contemporary 
broadcasts of the BBC. In connection to this, the audience survey 
never assumed a significant role for Turkish broadcasters, while it 
made it possible for the BBC to build up a representative fantasy -of 
all and each- of the audience which could be taken as reality, 
however imperfect this was in practice. 24 In Turkey, the technological 
imagination inhered in and produced by radio broadcasting could 
clash with "reality" and was self-consciously regarded as a 
contradiction, or at least as a problem, by the broadcasters 
24 1 demonstrated the imperfections of the representative fantasy of the BBC in its 
encounters with Turkish audience, in Chapter 4. Scannell & Cardiff point to how in day to 
day output of the BBC in its formative years "the issues of national identity and culture 
posed problems which, on the one hand, arose from divisions within the supposed unity 
of British life and culture and, on the other, from the impact of foreign cultures and their 
perceived threat to traditional national values. " (1995: 324) In Hilmes's words, "a need to 
contain and moderate sites of social tension establishing a hierarchy that promises to 
hold chaotic forces of difference and instability" (1997: 23) in radio broadcasting is bound 
with conflicts. However, to the extent that these conflicts are not surfaced in the fantasy, 
the fantasy of "true communication" can be functional in defining a truth. 
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themselves. The fantasy. of "true communication"25 that provided a 
basis for understanding Western societies, was already disrupted by 
the specific social diagram in Turkey. 
Therefore, the problem that manifested itself in Turkish radio 
broadcasting should be thought in relation to the problem of 
communication as a form of government. A prominent Turkish 
sociologist, ýerif Mardin, has extensively dwelled on the split 
between fantasy and reality in early Turkish history (1991). The 
significance of his comments, for my argument, lies in the novel 
perspective that he introduced to make sense of the contradiction. 
Whereas other scholars of Turkish nationalism mostly confined their 
object of analysis merely to texts of official nationalist discourse, 
Mardin treated the problem as a problem of "modern communication", 
as a specific link between statements and practices. Inspired by a 
Weberian approach, Mardin takes communication to be the total of 
instruments -political, economic and social- that makes the 
government of a group of people possible. "... a new business ethic, 
organisational reforms and the market network can be regarded as a 
cumulative of the means of communication which establishes and 
promotes the continuity of autonomous mechanisms of rational 
capitalism. " (1991: 202) He argues that this operational network has 
not been established in Turkey. The apparent resistance against 
liberalism in Kernalism, which denied class and ethnic divisions, and 
the autonomy of economic and social life, which I have discussed in 
25 The fantasy of "true communication" is a highly significant subject that requires further 
reflection. I have developed my methodological standpoint in Chapter 2 against the idea 
that communication can be regarded as an objective process of sending and receiving 
messages. However, a genealogy of the concept of communication is yet to be done. 
Many Western essays on nationality and communication assume that "true 
communication" is possible. Karl Deutch, in the 50's, developed his thesis on how 
11 processes of communication" constitute the "basis of the coherence of societies" (1966). 
A more recent example, is of course, Anderson's thesis that communication is the 
objective basis of national imagination (1983). Giddens argues that "(T)he extension of 
communication cannot occur without the 'conceptual' involvement of the whole community 
as a knowledgeable citizenry. " (1985: 219) Yet he does not attend to the fantasy of the 
11 concept" of communication. Habermas seeks the sources of a true rationality in a "non- 
distorted" communication (1984). A. Ahmad makes what is critical in upholding a notion of 
Irue communication" more evident in his criticism of Said: "in relation to the knowledge of 
history, then, this image of human communication as a ruse of illusory subjectivity 
precludes the possibility of truthful statement on the ground that evidence, the criterion of 
truthful statement in history-writing, is always-already prejudiced by the very nature of 
language itself. " (1992: 194) 
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Chapter 1, supports Mardin's ideas. Early Turkish government had its 
sole emphasis on the centre of government, Ankara. The concept of 
communication was taken to be a static notion in this sense, through 
which certain messages were conveyed and disseminated from the 
centre to the population. The effects of radio were thought in a 
"visible grid of communication" (Gordon, 1991: 20) that traveled from 
the centre to the unknown object, the people. Whereas, 
"(L)iberalism ... affirms instead the necessarily opaque, dense 
autonomous character of the processes of population. " (Gordon, 
1991: 20). It is evident that the population was never an autonomous 
force in Turkish government as can be seen in the practice of the 
People's Houses. The people were seen as something to be 
moulded, as passive objects, with no dynamics of their own. Or to put 
it in other terms, the dynamics of the population were contrasted to 
the ideal of Western civilisation and were reckoned to be dangerous 
for the ideal. The People's Houses, though based on the idea of 
autonomy of the people, shunned in practice from entrusting the 
government of individuals to themselves. This led to the failure of the 
People's Houses as efficient instruments of modern government, 
which was partly acknowledged by Kemalists themselves. 
However, one should not describe this situation simply as a 
problem of inefficiency. The crises of communication meant more that. 
The reforms that aimed to put "Western civilisation" in place of the 
Ottoman way of life created a gap between what was lived as reality 
and what was constructed as fantasy but presented as the reality in 
official discourse. For example, the adoption of Latin alphabet 
together with the "Turkification" of language, led to a crisis in schools 
in the 40's where not only the students but also the tutors could not 
understand the schoolbooks (Mardin, 1990: 210). However, says 
Mardin, the education went on "as if" they could use the book as an 
instrument for education. (1990: 210). The "as if" involved in the 
process points to the Occidentalist fantasy. The self-conscious 
disavowal of reality, including the reality in which the elite themselves 
operated, came in contradiction to the technological imagination that 
the Western instruments, such as a book in Latin alphabet, enhanced. 
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The communication in this context paradoxically meant the blocking 
of communication. 
The people, the presumed objects and would-be subjects of the 
new technologies were, in practice, excluded from the visible grid of 
communication if they did not participate in the fantasy of 
Occidentalism, if, for example, they demanded to talk in their own 
languages. The rural population of different ethnic and religious 
backgrounds in Turkey was transformed in the Occidentalist fantasy 
into a single image: the "ideal Turkish peasant". The rationality of 
government in Turkey was confined to the operations of the "avant- 
garde"26 elite which dealt with the heterogeneous domain of the 
people as a projected image in order to contain the purity of the 
image. But the confinement itself inverted the rationality that the 
adopted Western techniques were designed for, such as talking to all 
and each- and constituted the source of the crises in government. The 
Turkish national elite, in the fashion of colonialists, never fulfilled their 
role in the normalisation of power, because the premise of their 
power was the preservation of their alienness from the people, having 
grounded their reason of being in the Occidentalist fantasy. 
There were some critics of early Turkish history -usually of 
Anatolian origins- who criticized the imaginary construct of the people 
by making the necessary distinction between the people as an object 
and would-be subject, and the people as an image. Tongug, in 1938, 
said: "In order to teach something to peasants, first we have to learn 
from them ... In this way the vast and difficult 'village problem' will 
become more vivid in our eyes losing its present misty landscape. " 
(Tongug, 1938: x) He proposed ways and techniques for dealing with 
the problem stressing that this was only "a matter of discipline". He 
emphasised in his books that the "imaginary village", constructed by 
a view from outside and by means of theoretical conceptions, was 
totally different from "reality". Nevertheless his voice is not included in 
the official history of the Turkish Republic. The "village problem" was 
never handled within a liberal paradigm. The political power in 
26 National elite can be likened to "avant-garde" both in the sense that they were 
11 ahead" of the society and they were the warriors defending various borderlines, such as 
between the East and the West, and themselves and the people. 
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Turkey did not depend on knowing society nor on the self- 
knowledge of the elite. It was based on a necessary "non- 
knowledge" that produced inverted or projected images. 27 Non- 
knowledge nurtured the national epic while denying the autonomous 
processes of the population and the possibility of using 
"communication" as a technique of government. But "non- 
knowledge" was also a source of frustration and splits for the elite, 
and paradoxically produced an endless obsession with "reality". 
On the one hand, the Occidentalist fantasy justified and 
maintained the logic of the "passive revolution"28 by putting limits and 
determining the forms of "the sayable" in the nationalist discourse 
(Foucault, 1991 a). On the other, it was not normalised as a discourse 
of power, and stood exterior to "reality" which, in practice, continued 
to contest the limits of the sayable. In other words, what was excluded 
was not totally silenced. The Occidentalist fantasy had a strange 
loop: "it itself fills the lack which it itself opens up and perpetuates. It 
opens it by filling it, and can fill it only by constantly evoking it. " (Dolar, 
1998: xxii) Therefore, I have argued in the thesis that Foucault's 
method of analysis - the study of the "explicit" programmes for the 
analysis of discourses (1991a)- is not wholly applicable to the 
Occidentalist fantasy. One has to attend to the dialogic link between 
the "explicit" and the excluded to make sense of the "explicit" in 
Turkish nationalist discourse. This is why I have introduced 
psychoanalytical concepts such as "non-knowledge" to account for 
the surplus, that is, for what was excluded but was evoked by the 
fantasy. As Adam Phillips puts it, "(I)f the aim of a system is to create 
27 This was a critical element of the Occidentalist fantasy. Mladen Dolar argues that 
fantasy is a "useless tool to explain its object". Yet it "can shed light upon its producers 
and adherents. It projects unto the screen of this distant Other our own impasses and 
practices in dealing with power, and stages them. " (1998: xiv) This can also be connected 
to Chatterjee's comment on the "inherent contradictoriness" of nationalist thinking in a 
postcolonial setting, because "it reasons within a framework of knowledge whose 
representational structure corresponds to the very structure of power nationalist thought 
seeks to repudiate" (1993a: 38). 
28 1 have previously referred to this concept, which originally belongs to Gramsci, and is 
used by Chatterjee to account for Indian anti-colonialist nationalism. He argues the logic 
of "passive revolution" was to promote change without the risk of mass mobilization, the 
object of which was "to contain class conflicts within manageable dimensions to control 
and manipulate the many dispersed power relations in society" without transforming them 
(1993a: 214). 
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an outside where you can put the things you don't want, then we have 
to look at what that system disposes of -its rubbish- to understand it, to 
get a picture of how it sees itself and wants to be seen. " (1995: 19) In 
these terms, the connection of communication and government 
introduces a fruitful perspective to reflect on the specific rationale of 
Turkish government. 
Scannell and Cardiff argue that "(B)roadcasting mediates a 
seemingly unmediated reality, but the world that is organized in 
programme output is not a reflection, a mirror of a reality that exists 
elsewhere. " (1991: A) It creates its own universe. Any broadcasting 
is based on assumptions and projections of "absent" audiences. Yet, 
broadcasting mediates the "commonsense knowledge, the practical 
experience and the everyday pleasures of whole societies" (1991: xi). 
Broadcasting production does have a mediated referent: audiences. 
Therefore, the concept of "audience" has not been problematic for 
Scannell and Cardiff in their account of the "social history of British 
broadcasting" although they point to its constructed nature. Most 
Western media scholars tend to imagine that audiences can be 
known by some kind of "scientific method". 29 The imagination of 
29 It is possible to argue that various trends in media studies, though differing vastly on 
the methods applied to know the response of audiences, assume that audiences can be 
known in some way. Audience research has come a long way from perspectives of 
"media effects" (Lazarsfeld&Stanton, 1944; Lazarsfeld&Berelson&Gaudet, 1948) and 
"uses and gratifications" (Blumler&Katz, 1974) in which processes of influence were 
transformed into graphical and statistical models. More sophisticated methods were 
informed by literary criticism and cultural studies, among which the "encoding/decoding" 
model of Stuart Hall (1980) stands as most important. Both Hall and Morley's (1980; 1983; 
1986) "incorporation/resistance" paradigm emphasised the possible different 
interpretations of messages by audiences. They were only influenced media but they 
were active in their reception. The ethnography of audiences that followed dwelled on 
how different audiences, according to their class, race, ethnicity and gender, made 
different senses of media messages (Ang, 1985; Herzog, 1987; Radway, 1987; 
Silverstone, 1990). The ethnographical registers of audience activity found its most radical 
expression in "active audiences" theory (Fiske, 1987; 1991; 1993) according to which 
audiences enjoyed almost a boundless serniological freedom in their interpretations, 
which was criticised by James Curran (1990) as " new revisionism" . What all these 
radically different perspectives share is the attempt to make sense of audience reaction, 
whether it manifests itself as affirmation, resistance or free interpretation. Therefore I 
agree with Ettema&Whitney who argue that a conception of communication still captures 
most mass communication research, "with its tidy separation of 'elements' and its 
unidirectional progression of 'actions'. The predominant theoretical function of audiences 
is still to receive (i. e., 'selectively attend to', 'process information from', 'make sense of', 'be 
gratified by', 'be socialized by', 'be subjugated by', 'offer resistance to', 'ritualistically 
partake in' or just 'veg-out with') media messages. " (1994: 3) 
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scholars completes the circuit of "true communication". In the case of 
early Turkish broadcasting however, the relation of production and 
reception was not accounted by any "scientific method". People, in 
their middle ages now, talk nostalgically of the "magical" radio - 
especially radio drama and children's programmes- at least in the 
big cities. However, there was never any audience research to 
"measure" or "interpret" either the moulding of or the resistance of 
audiences. This does not mean that radio did not have any effects on 
the unknown "masses". One can "imagine", though only partly, how 
that "magical box" was conceived, and how the "remembered 
soundS"30 contributed to the constitution of various subjectivities. But 
what is of "scientific" concern here in this thesis is the way the 
"impact" of radio broadcasting itself was problematised by the 
broadcasters. 
It is highly interesting that the significance of the public address 
on radio was made a matter of debate in the journal Yeni Adam in 
the 40's. The question was: "Do you approve of the personalised style 
of address, such as greetings, directed to a non-visible, unknown 
public on radio? "31 The replies from readers varied, some were 
against it thinking it was insincere, while others approved it arguing 
that it was part of civilised behaviour. But one reply from Sivas (a 
rural Anatolian town) gave an important hint concerning the 
significance of the form of public address on radio. According to the 
informant: "Hearing a good night greeting from Ankara, the centre of 
the state, in a far away town gives one pleasure and peace. "32 This is 
one evidence that radio broadcasting created an effect of truth 
through its "voice of power" that talked to everybody, that was 
disembodied, and triggered sensual mechanisms, but without altering 
the material conditions of life. 33 Radio gave access, in principle to all, 
3u Lacoue-Labarthe, in support of his argument that to each individual or subject there 
corresponds a rhythm, cites a poem by an American poet, Wallace Stevens. A line from 
the poem reads: "The self is a cloister full of remembered sounds". (1989: 207) 
31 "Radyo Anketi", Yeni Adam, No. 321,20 February 1941, p. 12. 
32 Ibid. 
33 According to Hilmes, radio's "space-transcending qualities" makes an "escape from the 
usual mechanisms of control" possible. She makes the point that it constitutes "a different 
kind of mechanism of control" (1997: 16). Although Hilmes does not elaborate the point it 
is worthy of further reflection. 
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to the world of fantasy. Radio simulated the voice of a maternal 
authority that was reassuring, and which gave enjoyment, fostering 
the fantasy of the nation in Occidentalist terms. However, it also 
provoked a sense of "modern longing". In a letter to his son, the father 
of an announcer wrote: 
"You have become a dream. But a dream that is comprised 
only of sound. When I hear you talk, as your existence -that 
I cannot see in the living room where we used to sit all 
together- comes to life only with words, I feel that my eyes 
hurt. I cannot name this as separation. It is not, either, what 
we know as longing. But this is a modem longing. "34 
Although reckoned to be a failure in its "actual effects" in 
governing the masses (Kocabaýoýlu, 1980), radio triggered the never 
satisfied desire to be modern. I have shown in this thesis that radio 
played a significant role in the production and reproduction of the 
Occidentalist fantasy in early Turkish history. I hope the thesis opens 
a path for future research that advances not only new evidence but 
also new ways of connecting the past records to the present fantasies 
of the future. After all, the struggle over the representation of the past 
in theory and in practice is a struggle for redemption from the burden 
of history. 
34 Nezih Manyas, "Spikerler ve Spikerlik", Radyo, Vol. 2, No. 17,15 April 1943, p. 19. 
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